So Kai Hau v. Ysk2 Engineering Co Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCPI 1077/2006 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 May 2013.
1. The present application was brought by the Fourth Party,Wellgo Archdecor Consultancy Limited (“the Fourth Party”) under Order 38 Rule 36 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) and paragraph 71 of Practice Direction 18.1. In the Summons, the Fourth Party applies for leave to adduce expert evidence “on the subject of authorized person services” under the Buildings Ordinance on the liability in respect of Fourth Party proceedings. The 2 nd Third Party, JMK Consulting Engineers Limited (“2 nd T
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HCPI 1077/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 1077 OF 2006 _________________________
(Joined by the 2nd Third Party) _________________________
_______________________ D E C I S I O N _______________________ Introduction 1.The present application was brought by the Fourth Party,Wellgo Archdecor Consultancy Limited (“the Fourth Party”) under Order 38 Rule 36 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) and paragraph 71 of Practice Direction 18.1. In the Summons, the Fourth Party applies for leave to adduce expert evidence “on the subject of authorized person services” under the Buildings Ordinance on the liability in respect of Fourth Party proceedings. The 2ndThird Party, JMK Consulting Engineers Limited (“2nd Third Party”) opposes the application. Background The Accident 2.On 20 November 1996, there was a No. 5 Alarm fire happened in Garley Building in Jordon, Kowloon (“the Building”). Many lives were lost in that tragic fire. Subsequent to the fire, the Buildings Department (“the BD”) ordered the then owners of the Building to carry out remedial and monitoring work on the condition of the Building (“the R&M Work”) until such a time when the Building would be demolished for redevelopment. 3.Mr David Chan (“Chan”), who was employed by the Fourth Party at the time, was appointed as the Authorized Person (“AP”) for the R&M Work of the Building in May 1997. As part of his duties as AP, Chan had to carry out regular monthly inspection to the Building and to prepare monitoring inspection reports on the condition of the Building. During the relevant period, Chan had, under the Fourth Party’s name, issued a total of 40 monitoring inspection reports (“the Inspection Reports”). The first of these Inspection Reports was dated 29 May 1998 and the last one was dated 29 August 2003. 4.In the first Inspection Report, Chan stated in paragraph 7.1 thereof that, after his inspection of the Building on 13 May 1998, “in respect of the 3rd floor, all tenancy fixtures & furnitures (sic) together with fire damages (sic) debris were removed and carted away from the premises.” 5.The same finding had been made throughout the rest of the Inspection Reports during the aforementioned period. In fact, in almost all the Inspection Reports, when it comes to the condition of the 3rd floor, it almost inevitably stated that “premises free from debris” and the condition was “similar to previous inspection” or words to those effects. 6.In the final Inspection Report, which was dated 29 August 2003 (with inspection took place on 23 August 2003), Chan reported that for the 3rd floor down to the ground floor, “(P)remises free from debris” and “(D)ebris all cleared away”. 7.Subsequently, the Building was sold to a company called Worldfaith Properties Ltd (“the New Owner”) on 11 September 2003 under an order for compulsory sale. 8.On 29 December 2003, the New Owner then entered the site to start the demolition work. The New Owner appointed the 4th Third Party, Mr Daniel Kwan, as the AP for the demolition work on or about 30 September 2003. The Defendant in this case, YSK2 Engineering Company Limited, was the main contractor for the demolition work. The Plaintiff was one of the workers employed by the Defendant to carry out demolition work at the site. 9.On 28 June 2004, while the demolition work was under way on the 3rd floor of the Building, a cylinder shot up from under a heap of building debris following the sudden release of pressurized gas. It hit the external wall of the 16th floor of an adjacent building and ricocheted downwards back to 3rd floor of the Building. Unfortunately, the Plaintiff’s left arm was amputated at the elbow region in the process (“the Accident”). 10.Perhaps it is worth noting at this juncture that at all material time it must be within Chan’s knowledge that it was necessary for the Building to be free from debris. This can be demonstrated by reference to the Notes of Meeting on 4 November 1997 held at the conference room of the Tsim Sha Tsui Fire Station where representatives from the Fire Services Department, Labour Department, Buildings Department, the registered structure engineers, the security company, the Incorporated Owners of the Building and the Fourth Party. Chan was the only person representing the Fourth Party at the meeting. 11.The following has been recorded in the Notes of Meeting:
12.In addition, by a letter from the Fourth Party to the Incorporated Owners of the Building (“the Incorporated Owners”) dated 20 October 1999, the Fourth Party explained to the Incorporated Owners that removal of all fire debris including fixtures and fittings by respective occupiers of the premises of the Building would be eventually required prior to the intended demolition of the Building. 13.The facts of this case must also be seen in the light of the guidelines provided in the Draft Code of Practice for Demolition of Buildings issued by the BD in February 1988 (“the Draft Code”). The Draft Code aims to provide guidance on safe and good practices for demolition works and for compliance with the requirements of the relevant provisions of the Building (Administration) Regulations and Building (Demolition Works) Regulations relating to demolition works. The following are some of the provisions of the Draft Code which are relevant to this case:
…… 3.9.4 Hazardous Materials
The Pleadings 14.The Fourth Party was originally joined by the Defendant as the 1st Third Party in this case. However, the action against it was discontinued by the Defendant on 25 July 2011. 15.Instead, the 2nd Third Party issued a Fourth Party Notice against the Fourth Party pursuant to an Order made by Master Ng on 6 February 2012. The Fourth Party Notice was dated 17 February 2012. 16.In the Fourth Party Notice, the following facts have been pleaded:
17.The 2nd Third Party’s cause of action against the Fourth Party is one solely based on the tort of negligence only. It has been capsulated in the Fourth Party’s Notice as follows:-
18.Hence, the 2nd Third Party is seeking indemnity from the Fourth Party should it be adjudged as liable to pay the Defendant in this case. 19.In the Re-Amended Defence filed by the Fourth Party, it is not disputed that Chan was aware of the presence of the bromotrifluoro-methane (“BTM”) installation, including the BTM cylinder which subsequently exploded, inside an enclosed BTM bottle room as early as on 3 September 1997. On that day, he carried out an inspection with a building surveyor from the BD by the name of Michael Pang: see para 19(d) of the Re-Amended Defence of the Fourth Party. 20.There is also no dispute that the Fourth Party did not advise the Incorporated Owners or state in any of the Inspection Reports regarding the presence of the BTM installation (including the BTM cylinder) on the 3rd floor of the Building at any material time: see para 19 (e) & (f) and 25(b) of the Re-Amended Defence of the Fourth Party. 21.Further, there is no dispute that the Fourth Party did not cause the BTM cylinder to be removed from the 3rd floor of the Building nor did the Fourth Party give notification to or make any enquiries with the Fire Services Department, Buildings Department, Labour Department or other government departments regarding the disposal or removal of the BTM cylinder: see para 25(c) and (d) of the Re-Amended Defence of the Fourth Party. 22.It has been asserted by the Fourth Party in its Defence that the BTM cylinder was a fixed fire services installation as part of the 3rd floor premises of the Building, instead of a separate detachable and portable cylinder. Further, it has been asserted that the BTM installation (including the BTM cylinder) was not debris: see para 19(d) of the Re-Amended Defence of the Fourth Party. 23.However, it has been admitted that the Fourth Party knew that the Building was going to be demolished for redevelopment because it has been stated in the Defence of the Fourth Party that the Incorporated Owners’ “were willing to carry out only such essential work to ensure the structure stability of the Building which was sealed off with no access save with permission.”: see para 16(a) of the Re-Amended Defence of the Fourth Party. 24.In short, the Fourth Party asserts that it owed no such duty to make any advice on the presence of or to cause the removal of the BTM cylinder. Further, it does not consider the BTM cylinder to be debris, tenancy fixtures or furniture. The Fourth Party’s Summons 25.In the Fourth Party’s summons dated 28 September 2012, the following are the principal directions sought:
The Relevant Legal Principles 26.The legal principles on whether a party is allowed to adduce expert evidence at trial in a particular case are well established and not in dispute between the parties. The basic principles can be found in Wong Hoi Fung v American International Assurance Co. (Bermuda) Limited and another [2002] 3 HKLRD 507 at paras 11 & 12; Kam Hing Trading (HK) Ltd v The People’s Insurance Company of China (HK) Ltd [2009] 4 HKC 531 at paras 2 & 3. 27.Mr CY Li, SC, who represents the Fourth Party, has succinctly summarized the basic legal principles in his Skeleton Submissions. I respectfully agree with them and would produce his summary here:
Discussion The Fourth Party’s case: why expert evidence should be allowed 28.In essence, the Fourth Party submits that the main issue in the Fourth Party proceedings is the “exact scope” of duty of Chan acting as AP in the R&M Work. As the “exact scope” was not defined anywhere, whether under the Fourth Party or Chan’s terms of engagement or under the Building (Demolition Works) Regulations or the Draft Code, the Fourth Party submits that expert evidence will be necessary in this case. 29.The Fourth Party further submits that in the context of professional liability such as an AP, evidence of “common practice” is highly relevant in determining whether there has been a breach of duty: see Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 20th Ed., paras 8-165 & 8-166. 30.It says that the common or normal professional practice of an AP in Hong Kong is a subject which the Court would require the assistance of an expert. The Fourth Party says that the questions stated in the Summons are to address the issue of whether the work fell within the common scope of duty of an AP in the position of the Fourth Party or Chan, or whether they were duties of the AP for the demolition. The 2nd Third Party’s case: why expert evidence should not be allowed 31.The 2nd Third Party’s primary submission is that the “expert evidence” the Fourth Party is seeking to adduce is not relevant to the issues in the present case as “common professional practice” of an AP in Hong Kong has no bearing on the issues in the face of “such clear and succinct instructions” prescribed in the Draft Code. The 2nd Third Party further submits that the Draft Code itself is patently clear and more than sufficient to assist the Court in coming to the conclusion on how dangerous materials such as a BTM cylinder found in a demolition site should be handled. It says that it does not require evidence from an expert to tell the Court what the common professional practice of an authorized person under the Buildings Ordinance is. 32.Further, the 2nd Third Party submits that the provisions of the Building (Demolition Works) Regulations and the Buildings Ordinance have already adequately defined what the duties of an AP would include, in particular in a demolition work situation, and hence no expert evidence is required to advise the Court what the scope of duties would include. 33.In addition, the 2nd Third Party submits that as any ordinary and reasonable man, it would have been patently clear to Chan that a cylinder of compressed air would be extremely dangerous in a demolition site if not properly handled and left unattended for more than 6 years, and that serious harm and damage would be inflicted on people occupying (including workers engaged in the demolition work) and properties on the site should there been an explosion. It says that the facts of the case clearly indicate that Chan had failed to exercise reasonable skills and care in handling and reporting the debris that was left on the 3rd floor of the Building. 34.Finally, the 2nd Third Party submits that the issue to which the Fourth Party intends to adduce expert evidence is not one that requires special knowledge. It says that this is not a case where expert opinion is required to explain special terms or terminology where ordinary person would be incapable to understand without the assistance of experts. It submits that it is just common sense that a cylinder of compressed air having been left unattended for more than 6 years in a demolition site is extremely dangerous. Analysis 35.I am of the view that this is not a case where expert evidence is required or necessary for the Court to rule on the issue of whether Chan as AP was negligent or not in the Accident. 36.There are a number of reasons that assist me to reach such conclusion. 37.First and foremost, I am of the opinion that the questions raised by the Fourth Party in the Summons which it says the Court ought to be assisted by the experts to answer are no more than questions of common sense. They are factual issues that will have to be resolved by the Court should the fourth party proceedings proceed to trial. In my view, there is no reason why the Court cannot answer those questions or resolve the factual issues by itself without the assistance of experts. 38.For example, the Fourth Party submits that the first 2 questions, i.e. questions (a) & (b) could only be answered by the Court with the assistance of experts in this case. 39.I do not agree. To my mind, these are matters of fact or law that ought to be answered by a judge after hearing evidence from witnesses and submissions from the parties. They are not matters that an expert or experts can purportedly answer on behalf of the Court or able to provide assistance to the Court in answering those questions. 40.For questions (c) to (i), I am not even certain whether they are questions which need to be answered by the Court in the first place before able to decide on the central issue between the 2nd Third Party and the Fourth Party, namely, whether Chan was negligent when discharging his duties as AP for the R&M Works prior to the demolition of the Building. Even assuming that they are questions that need to be resolved by the Court, of which I have great reservation, there is no reason why in my view the Court cannot resolve those matters by itself without the assistant of an expert. 41.Second, it is a well recognized fact that the term “authorized person” defined under the Buildings Ordinance has a wide meaning and does not confine to a single trade or profession within the building or demolition industry. Under section 2 of the Buildings Ordinance, the term “authorized person” has been defined to mean “a person whose name is on the authorized persons’ register kept under section 3(1) -- (a) as an architect; (b) as an engineer; or (c) as a surveyor”. Under section 3(1) of the Ordinance, it states that the Building Authority shall keep a register of “all persons who are qualified to perform the duties and functions of an unauthorized person” in accordance with the Ordinance. Besides the above register for those 3 different professions, a register for structural engineers, a register for geotechnical engineers and a register for inspectors were subsequently added to the original register kept under section 3(1). Hence, it is not difficult to see that when one is talking about an “authorized person”, one could be talking about different kind of professions who may be involved at different stages in the building or demolition work of a particular project. 42.The lack of clear demarcation of different trades or professions in the definition of an AP is amply illustrated in this case. In the Fourth Party’s summons, it specifically mentioned the names of 2 proposed experts and states that one of the areas of expertise of the Fourth Party’s expert(s) is on the “common professional practice of an authorized person under the Buildings Ordinance in Hong Kong”. When asked by this Court of what kind of expertise does the proposed experts possess that may assist the Court in arriving its decision on one or more of the issues to be resolved, the Fourth Party could only say the one of the experts with the title of a “professor” whom it intends to instruct as an expert in fact is a retired senior civil servant who used to work for the Buildings Department and is now a part-time visiting professor at a local university. With respect, his views on the issues set out in the summons are as good as any AP who is familiar with R&M Works in Hong Kong. Further, it has not been shown by the Fourth Party why the Court cannot answer those questions itself without the assistance from such so-called “experts”. I therefore am not satisfied that any views to be expressed by the experts would even qualify as “expert evidence” in this case to meet the first stage of the two-stage test as set out in Wong Hoi Fung v, American International Assurance Co (Bermuda) Ltd & Another, supra, at p.512 B-C. 43.Third, the Fourth Party places much emphasis on what is the “common professional practice” of an AP under the Buildings Ordinance in Hong Kong and it says that it is this “common professional practice” which would require expert evidence to assist the Court to understand. 44.I would respectfully agree with Mr Yeung, who represents the 2nd Third Party, that whatever is the ‘common professional practice” of an AP (if there is one as such at all), it has no bearing on the dispute between the 2nd Third Party and the Fourth Party in this case. This is particularly so when the duties of the AP have already been clearly defined in the Draft Code and the Regulations. 45.In this regard, I find the judgment of Ward L.J in Michael Hyde & Associates Ltd v J D Williams & Co Ltd [2001] PNLR 233, at 247 particularly helpful when the English Court of Appeal held that there were three situations where the Bolam test did not apply:
46.Fourth, I also agree with Mr Yeung that the issue to which the Fourth Party intends to adduce evidence is not one that requires special knowledge. I agree with him when he says that this is not a case where expert evidence is required to explain special terms or terminology where an ordinary person would be incapable to understand without the assistance of experts. Judges are asked to resolve complicated factual issues on a daily basis. I do not see any special features or technicality in this case which a judge who is experienced in personal injury cases cannot answer himself without the assistance of an expert. 47.Last but not the least, I think it is worth noting that there has been no application by any party in this action, including the Third Party Actions, for adducing expert evidence to comment on what is the “common professional practice” of an AP and the specific questions raised by the Fourth party in this case. Of course, the fact that it was not raised by any other party does not mean that the Fourth Party is wrong and the other parties are right in doing so. However, it is most telling when the Fourth Party was first joined by the Defendant as the 1st Third Party in this case (eventhough the action was discontinued against it by the Defendant subsequently), no similar application had ever been made by the Fourth Party even up to the stage when the exchange of witness statements had already taken place. Order 48.In the aforestated premises, I am not convinced that the Fourth Party has satisfied that expert evidence as proposed in the Summons is either relevant or necessary in this case. Thus, I shall dismiss the Fourth Party’s summons herein with costs. 49.I shall make an order nisi that the Fourth Party to pay the 2nd Third Party’s costs of this application to be taxed if not agreed, with Certificate for Counsel. Such order on costs will become absolute unless the party takes out an application to vary the order within 14 days. 50.Lastly, I would like to thank Counsel for their very able submissions and assistance rendered to the Court.
Mr M T Yeung, instructed by Messrs. Liu, Chan & Lam, for the 2nd Third Party Mr C Y Li, SC instructed by Messrs. Fred Kan & Co, for the Fourth Party |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCPI 1077/2006