Li Tit-chuen v. The Queen

CACC001280/1976

Coram: Trainor, J.

Date of Judgment: 4th January, 1977.

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JUDGMENT

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1. This is a case in which I do not intend to spend much time in giving reasons for my decision. It is an appeal by an ex-police officer against his conviction of soliciting a pecuniary advantage. The appeal is based primarily on the ground that the complainant was in fact an accomplice and the learned magistrate failed to give any or sufficient attention to the danger of convicting on his uncorroborated evidence. An accomplice, as I understand the word, means someone who at a material time was in someway co-operating with the other person in the commission of an offence; participis criminis. I am satisfied that the evidence that was before the learned magistrate was ample to establish that there was no co-operation whatsoever between the complainant and the appellant. The section of the Bribery and Corruption Ordinance, section 22 which provides that a person giving or receiving a bribe is not necessarily an accomplice, was introduced, in my opinion, to avoid an unwilling donor or donee when called as a witness being deemed to be an accomplice, and establishes that the complainant was not an accomplice. An accomplice in the context of the section and this case, in my opinion, is he who freely offers, gives or pays something to a willing recipient to do or refrain from doing something he ought or ought not do in any case; or does something to the unjustified advantage of another which he willingly accepts. In the present case it is I think quite clear from ample evidence that the complainant unwillingly bargained on the payment of money with the intention of removing what might become a burden on his shoulders: that he would be impeded in carrying on his business. The evidence establishes that at the earliest opportunity he took the action which one could expect, he reported to the I.C.A.C. Whether or not the learned magistrate proceeded to deal with this case conscious of the possibility of the complainant being an accomplice is not quite clear; but I think had he directed his mind to the question of accomplice and corroboration he must have held that the complainant was not an accomplice and corroboration unnecessary. However, it is unlikely that that matter was absent from his mind having regard to the address of Counsel for the prosecution and Counsel for the defence. He did in fact find corroboration of the complainant's evidence.

2. There was ample corroboration in the evidence that was produced and in my opinion the telephone conversation, and the language that was used in it was corroborative, and corroborative to a considerable extent. Had it merely been an ordinary telephone call I can see no reason why the recipient should so indicate his impatience and resort to the filthy and abusive language to which he resorted unless it was because he was annoyed and upset by a failure or delay of the person making the call, the complainant, in performing something that the recipient expected him to perform. I do not find anything in the other grounds of appeal and I have no hesitation in dismissing it.

Representation:

Mr. Eddis (John Ip & Co.) for appellant.

Mr. Gall, C.C. for respondent.