Ngan Cheung Wah v. Kwong Shook Ling
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 578/2011 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 10 January 2014.
1. The plaintiff (“P”) claims possessory title by adverse possession to a portion of a piece of land (“the Property”) of about 1,000 sq ft in Cha Kwo Ling (“CKL”) in Kowloon now known as the “Remaining Portion of Sub-Section 4 of Section A of Lot No. 622 in Survey District No. 3” (“the Lot”).
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DCCJ 578/2011 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 578 OF 2011 ________________________
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Background 1.The plaintiff (“P”) claims possessory title by adverse possession to a portion of a piece of land (“the Property”) of about 1,000 sq ft in Cha Kwo Ling (“CKL”) in Kowloon now known as the “Remaining Portion of Sub-Section 4 of Section A of Lot No. 622 in Survey District No. 3” (“the Lot”). 2.Since 1972, the late Mr Yu King Kwok has become the registered owner of the Lot. When Mr Yu passed away in 2002, the Lot fell into his estate, which is represented by Madam Kwong, the Defendant (“D”) who counterclaims for vacant possession of the Property and mesne profit. 3.According to P, he moved to live about 300 feet away from the Property in about 1977 and noticed an abandoned house and pigsty thereon. 4.In about 1982, P replaced the door lock of the house and refurbishing it for entertainment purposes and stored building materials in the pigsty for his said business. In the same year, a fire broke out at the Property. Later in 1984, a more extensive fire broke out and destroyed the said structures. 5.After the 1984 fire, P returned to the Property to clear off debris and continued to store materials on it. He claimed to erect a wire mesh fence on two sides of the Property. 6.In around 1986, P allegedly began to build a house on the Property but was stopped by the government before completion, thereby leaving a short wall. 7.In around end of 2008 or early 2009, P erected a wire mesh fence around the Property to prevent others from entering the Property as he was frequently in Mainland China. 8.Since the late Mr Yu acquired the Lot in 1972, he has made no use of the land. The defence case is that the Lot has been left vacant and unoccupied all along until P trespassed the Property by erecting a wire mesh fence around the Property in around 2008/2009. 9.D used to accompany her husband to collect rent of some other properties in CKL once or twice every one or two years and the last visit was in around 2000. Whenever D went to CKL with her husband, they would walk past the Lot. She saw the Lot was vacant with no signs of occupation and no items were put on the Property. 10.After the late Mr Yu passed away in 2002, D through her solicitors instructed surveyors to carry out valuation for estate duty purpose of 300 odd pieces of land of the late Mr Yu’s estate. 11.The D’s surveyor visited the Lot on 3 September 2002. According to his surveyor’s report, no fence or freestanding wall was observed on that land. He considered the land as vacant, only with some rubbish on it. 12.Each party has called two factual witnesses to give viva voce evidence: P himself and Mr Yau So (an elderly indigenous resident of the CKL village) for P; D and Mr Sung Shu Hung (the surveyor) for D. P has eventually decided not to call Leung Kwok Man and his witness statement be removed from the trial bundles. 13.Besides, each party has nominated one land surveyor expert to give expert opinion on some aerial photos. On the first day of the trial, I directed that the 4 expert reports filed by P and D be adduced without calling the makers to give viva voce evidence. The Legal Principles of Adverse Possession 14.To succeed in the adverse possession claim, P has to prove: (i) factual possession; and (2) the intention to possess (animus possidendi). Both elements depend on the circumstances. 15.Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. P needs to show that he has been dealing with the land as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no one else has done so. 16.An intention to possess is an intention to exercise such custody and control in one’s own name and behalf to exclude the world at large, including the registered owner. Such intention can be inferred from P’s acts of factual possession (Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P&CR 452 at 470-472 and 477; Wong Tak Yue v Kung Kwok Wai (No 2) (1997-98) 1 HKCFAR 55 at 68E-69A; J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 at §76). 17.It is the P’s case that his adverse possession of the Property began in 1984 and continues up to present for about 30 years. The requisite period of adverse possession in this case should be 20 years. Assessment of Evidence 18.The activities relied on by P to show adverse possession are summarised as follows:
19.The challenge of the above evidence by D is limited to:
20.Mr Ho, senior counsel for the P, submitted that D’s evidence should be rejected or given very little weight in light of her response during cross-examination. I agree that the quality of the D’s observation of the Property is not satisfactory. D only “passed by” the Property when she accompanied her late husband to collect rent occasionally. There is no evidence D has indeed entered the Property to inspect its status. Furthermore, she only learnt about the Property from her husband. 21.Save as the unchallenged evidence of the D such as the Nuisance Notice dated 11 March 1999 addressed to the late husband of D, I do not attach weight on the D’s evidence in relation to her observation of the Property. 22.Mr Ho SC criticised Mr. Sung’s evidence as inherently unreliable:
23.In light of the above, Mr Ho SC submitted that Mr. Sung’s below statements should be rejected or given very little weight:
24.Although the above challenge of Mr Sung’s evidence is not groundless, there are certain aspects of his evidence not contradicted by the P’s evidence:
25.I accept that Mr Sung and his colleague brought along the lot index plan for the site visit not only to locate the Property but also to check the physical location against the lot index plan. It is reasonable for Mr Sung to ascertain the current status of the Property in order to assess the valuation of the Property and to report to D’s solicitors as to whether the land was occupied or used by anyone. I accept that Mr Sung did look for the fence cutting across the Lot as indicated by the lot index plan at the time of inspection. 26.If the 1984 fence was still there when Mr Sung visited the Property and Mr Sung has looked for it, it is rather unlikely that Mr Sung would fail to notice it, or would fail to take any photos of it and to report it, if he did see it. 27.In light of the above and in the absence of any positive evidence from P that the 1984 fence was still there in 2002, on balance of probabilities I accept Mr Sung’s evidence that he found no fence erected on the Property, notwithstanding that his site visit notebook no longer exists. The reasonable inference to be drawn is that 1984 wire mesh fence has dilapidated sometime before 2002 leaving some wooden poles of the fence as seen in the recent photographs. Expert Evidence 28.Experts have conflicting views as to the interpretation of the so-called “C-shape feature” as appears on the aerial photos dated 22 September 1986 and 28 January 1987. P’s expert opined that it “looks like a wall or the foundation of a house” because of its geometric shape. D’s expert opined otherwise and considered such feature as vegetation. 29.I prefer P’s expert that the C-shape feature is more likely a construction such as a wall or foundation of a house, as natural plants or vegetation could not be so geometric in shape. 30.However, I do not accept that the entire C-shape feature represents the short wall built by P in 1986, as I find similar geometric shape of one side of the C-shape feature in earlier aerial photos dated 15 January 1982 and 30 December 1980. Finding of Facts 31.In view of the above analysis, I make the following factual findings on balance of probabilities:
Factual Possession 32.Mr Mok, counsel for D, submitted that P did not achieve sufficient factual possession to the exclusion of others until 2008/2009 when P enclosed the Property with wire mesh. The following cases are cited to illustrate activities of insufficient degree of exclusive physical control:
33.In contrast, the following successful adverse possession cases are cited by P:
34.In the above case Simpson v Fergus, erecting notices to claim parking spaces was held to be insufficient act of securing factual possession to the exclusion of others and the English court further stated that
35.In light of Simpson v Fergus, even if P has declared his intention of possession of the Property and made known to the CKL villagers, such as his witness Mr Yau, P’s mere declaration could not amount to exclusive possession. The question is whether all the other P’s activities on the Property constitute sufficient degree of exclusive possession. 36.It is worthy to note that the embedded half bricks, the “short wall” and the 1984 wire mesh fence were temporary structures which did not last for the entire limitation period. The embedded bricks were all removed in 1989 when the drain was built. The bricks of the short wall were removed within 6 months after the construction of the wall in 1986. The 1984 wire mesh fence was no longer present in 2002. Therefore, the above structures ceased to have any effect after they disappeared. 37.Letting out part of the Property facing CKL Road during the Tin Hau Festival for the sale of joss sticks and allowing Leung Kwok Man to use the Property for waste metal recycling for about three months in 2004/2005 are similar to the drying of clothes on the roof which was considered as temporary activities not done with the intention of dispossessing the paper title owner as per the case IO of San Po Kong Mansion. 38.Cutting the grass or other plants on the Property by P is also insufficient to constitute continuous and exclusive possession or control of the land in light of the above cases: Cobham v Frett, Boosey v Davis, Wai Wah Traders Ltd v Wong Yim & others. 39.The P’s more regular activity on the Property should be using it to store his building materials. However, I do not think such user amounts to clear and unequivocal act of exclusive possession of the Property. In fact P’s belongings placed thereon have been at least twice considered as rubbish by objective bystanders: (i) in 1999 the Provisional Urban Council & Urban Services Department found “accumulation of household refuse” on the Lot leading to the issue of the Nuisance Notice dated 11 March 1999; and (ii) in 2002 Mr Sung considered P’s things on the Property as rubbish dumped there when he visited the Lot to prepare the valuation report. 40.In those successful adverse possession cases cited by P, apart from different activities carried on the land, there are acts of encroachment, or complete enclosure secured by the trespassers. 41.As P has been able to enclose the Property by fence in 2008/2009, there are no reasons why P could not enclose it by fence earlier. Obviously erecting wire mesh fence on two sides as alleged by P is insufficient to secure exclusive possession of the Property, having taken into account of the location and nature of the land. One side of the Property facing the pavement of Cha Kwo Ling Road has never been fenced. Before the erection of the present wire mesh fence, members of the public can easily enter the Property from Cha Kwo Ling Road pavement without any barriers. Therefore, there is lack of evidence of sufficient control of access by the public to the Property before 2008/2009. 42.Having considered all the circumstances, in particular the nature and situation of the Property, I find that all the P’s acts and their overall effects before the complete enclosure of the Property in 2008/2009 do not constitute sufficient degree of exclusive physical control of the Property to establish factual possession. Animus possidendi 43.As I have held that the P’s acts do not constitute factual possession of the Property before the enclosure by the wire mesh in 2008/2009, the reasonable inference to be drawn is that P does not have the requisite intention to possess the Property before 2008/2009. Counterclaim 44.Apart from seeking vacant possession, D also counterclaims for mesne profit or damages to be assessed for the trespass of P. However, D has failed to adduce any evidence on the rental value of the Property. Mr Mok in his final submission suggests such damages to be assessed at either the daily rate of $300 for the Tin Hau Festival or $2,000 for 3 month for the metal recycling use according to P. 45.P has eventually elected not to call his potential licensee Mr Leung to give oral evidence at the trial. Even according to P’s own evidence, he and Mr Leung did not reach agreement to rent the Property. Regarding the daily rate of $300 to let part of the property during Tin Hau Festival, it is only chargeable on such festive occasion. In any event there is no evidence to show that the monetary gains made by P out of the Property are indicative of the reasonable market rent of Property. In the circumstances, I do not agree with Mr Mok that D is entitled to rely on P’s evidence to claim for mesne profit or damages. 46.In the absence of any evidence on quantum of damages from D, I award nominal damages in the sum of $1 to D. 47.Since D is only entitled to nominal damages, it is not appropriate to award any interest on the nominal damages. Conclusion and order 48.Since P has failed to establish both factual possession and intention to possess of the Property before 2008/2009 for the aforesaid reasons, I dismiss his claim of adverse possession. 49.I therefore order P to deliver up vacant possession of the Property to D within 28 days from the date hereof and to pay D nominal damages of HK$1. 50.I also make an order nisi that the costs of the action be to D, to be taxed if not agreed with certificate of two counsel. 51.Last but not the least, I am grateful to the counsel for both parties for their valuable assistance offered to this court.
Mr Ambrose Ho SC & Mr Jonathan Lee instructed by Messrs Chong Fu & Co, for the plaintiff Mr Mok Yeuk Chi & Mr Gary CC Lam, instructed by Messrs Chui & Lau, for the defendant Please refer to CACV92/2014 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal. |
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