Chow Tin Sang v. Citihero International Ltd
Read the full judgment text of CACV 121/2012 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 20 June 2013 before Cheung JA, Chu JA, Poon J.
Civil law – land law – adverse possession – factual possession – intention to possess – continuous use – abandonment – encroachment – enclosure – limitation period – boundary – form of declaration – extinguishment of title. The plaintiff, as manager of Chau Fuk Tso, claimed to have acquired title to Lot No. 397 in DD 215, Sai Kung by adverse possession since 1963, seeking a 20-year limitation period. The Land, originally acquired by the plaintiff's father Chau Fuk Li in 1914 and sold the next day, had remained in the family's continuous possession with the District Lands Office keeping a separate register recording succession to Chau Fuk Tso. The defendant acquired the Land through a chain of title from the 1914 purchaser in 2009 and fenced it off, destroying the plaintiff's planted trees. The trial judge (Deputy High Court Judge Lok) found in favour of the plaintiff. On the issue of continuous use, the Court of Appeal (Cheung JA, Chu JA and Poon J) held that continuous use is not the test for adverse possession; the taking of possession is critical. Once the plaintiff took possession by enclosing the Land through walls, bamboo barriers, and natural features, the possession continued unless abandoned, regardless of whether visible cultivation continued in later years. The expert evidence that no cultivation was visible on aerial photos after 1978 did not defeat the claim, because the plaintiff continued to grow longan, pomelo, and banana trees (which take 20-30 years to grow to the present height), used the south-eastern portion as an access path for the 1983-85 construction of houses in Lot 975, and asserted his interest by seeking an injunction when the defendant fenced the Land in 2009. The defendant never pleaded abandonment. On encroachment, the Court of Appeal held that the southern and western walls built by the plaintiff's predecessor (staked interest), the bamboo plantation on the north (to keep out people and cattle), and the natural slope on the east (and later, the requirement to pass through private properties in Lot 975) all combined to demonstrate the plaintiff dealing with the Land as an occupying owner to the exclusion of others, following the test in Powell v McFarlane. On the form of declarations, the Court of Appeal followed Fairweather v St Marylebone Property Co Ltd and reformulated the declarations: (i) a declaration that the defendant has lost the right to bring any action to recover the Land by virtue of s.7(2) of the Limitation Ordinance, and (ii) a declaration that the defendant's title, rights, benefits and interests have been extinguished in favour of the plaintiff by virtue of s.17 of the Limitation Ordinance. Appeal dismissed with provisional costs to the plaintiff.
Legal issues: Continuous use and occupation of the Land for adverse possession · Whether encroachment supports finding of adverse possession · Form of declarations granted in light of Fairweather principles
Outcome: Appeal dismissed with provisional costs order in favour of the plaintiff; declarations granted by the trial Judge were reformulated.
Cited by 20 cases · Cites 2 cases
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CACV 121/2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 121 OF 2012 (ON APPEAL FROM HCA No. 2315 OF 2009) ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Cheung JA : 1.Chau Fuk Li (also known as Chau Fuk) was the former registered owner of a piece of land known as Lot No. 397 in DD 215 which is located in Sai Kung, New Territories (‘the Land’). He acquired the Land by public auction on 24 July 1914. On the next day, i.e. 25 July 1914, he sold the Land to Tsu Un Tai Tso. Tsu Un Tai Tso then transferred the land to Tsu Yau Shi on 19 October 1915. The defendant eventually became the registered owner of the Land on 5 October 2009. 2.Despite the transfer to Tsu Un Tai Tso on 25 July 1914, the District Lands Office keeps another register of the Land, recording the succession of the Land on 6 April 1932 by Chau Fuk Tso with Chau Wa as Trustee from Chau Fuk Li upon his death. The plaintiff is the son of Chau Fuk Li and the current manager of Chau Fuk Tso whose appointment as one of its two managers was made on 25 July 1961. The other manager was removed on 23 December 1961. 3.The plaintiff claimed that he acquired adverse possession of the Land since 1963 and commenced the present action in September 2009 seeking, amongst other things, a declaration that Chau Fuk Tso has acquired a good title to the Land by adverse possession. The relevant period of adverse possession is 20 years starting from 1963. Deputy High Court Judge Lok found for the plaintiff. The defendant now appeals. The plaintiff’s case 4.The original lease granted to Chau Fuk Li has been lost. However, the acquisition by Chau Fuk Li and the sale by him to Tsu Un Tai Tso are recorded in the two Land Registers of the Land. There is also a Memorial of the sale to Tsu Un Tai Tso registered in the District Lands Office of Tai Po. In this action the plaintiff had originally claimed that he is the paper title owner of the land. This point was not pursued by him in the Court below. 5.Chau Fuk Li died in 1930. The Land is located to the west of Lot 276 RP in DD 215 where Chau Fuk Li had built a house for his family. Lot 276 RP is also owned by Chau Fuk Tso with the plaintiff as its manager. Immediately adjacent and to the north of Lot 276 RP is Lot 975 which also belongs to Chau Fuk Tso. Between 1983 and 1985, there was construction of four small houses in Lot 975 by the plaintiff. 6.The Judge summarised the plaintiff’s case as follows :
The defendant’s case 7.The Judge summarised the defendant’s case as follows :
The site visit 8.The Judge also had a site visit. This is his observation :
Expert evidence on the aerial photos 9.The parties obtained the aerial photos of the Land and its surroundings from 1963 to 1985. Expert evidence was obtained about the interpretation of these photos. The agreed interpretation is as follows :
The finding 10.The Judge accepted the evidence of the plaintiff and rejected the evidence of the defendant. He said that he had great reservation about the creditability and reliability of Mr. Tam’s evidence. 11.The Judge found that the plaintiff had established both factual possession and the intention to posses of the Land. Grounds of appeal 12.The focus of the appeal is whether there has been continuous use and occupation of the Land, the issue of encroachment and the form of the declarations granted by the Judge. 1) Continuous use and occupation of the Land (1) The Judge’s finding 13.The Judge found that that was factual possession, at the very least from 1963 to 1985. He further held that :
(2) The defendant’s argument 14.The defendant challenged the Judge’s finding of factual possession by the plaintiff. Ms Winnie Chan submitted that while the plaintiff might be in adverse possession in the early years, this was not the case after 1978. 15.Ms Chan first submitted that the Judge had failed to address an important matter disclosed by the plaintiff in respect of events in 1978. The plaintiff had in his affirmation filed in support of his application for an interlocutory injunction and in his witness statement stated that he was told by a senior officer of the District Office in 1978 of double entries in the register of the Land. The plaintiff, however, denied this conversation when he gave evidence. 16.Ms Chan submitted that the expert agreed that after 1978, no cultivation could be observed on the Land. She argued that it could not be a mere coincidence that it was in 1978 that the plaintiff was told of the double entries. She submitted that this raised the crucial issue whether or not the plaintiff had during the 20 years’ limitation period abandoned his possession of the Land. 17.Ms Chan then submitted that after 1978 no cultivation could be observed on the Land and that the plaintiff’s evidence on cultivation was consistent with this observation :
18.Ms Chan submitted that the Judge should not have accepted the evidence of Mr. Chow WD and Mr. Kwok who observed cultivation on the Land. Their observation was only peripheral in nature and was contrary to the views of the experts. 19.Further the Judge was wrong to explain away the evidence of the joint expert that there was no more cultivation after 1978 when it was not the plaintiff’s evidence that a small scale of crops were grown there. 20.Ms Chan submitted that cultivation on land in the nature of planting trees, clearing dead trees, weeding or fertilizing the trees together with appropriation of the branches and fruits had been held to be insufficient to amount to physical possession required of adverse possession : Wai Wah Traders Limited v Wong Yim trading as Creative Advertising Design Company & others, HCMP 965/2000 at paras. 51 and 53. 21.Ms Chan further submitted that the Land did not have a well-defined boundary. The boundary was traced by the plaintiff’s surveying expert for the purpose of this litigation. It was also the agreed evidence of both experts that the Land was not fenced for the entire limitation period. In Neilson v Poole (1969) 20 P & CR 909, it is held that ‘..... where there is neither defined boundary nor physical division, ..... nothing short of exceptionally cogent and precise evidence can establish a sufficient possession or adverse possession, up to some alleged dividing line.’ Trivial or equivocal acts like growing daffodils to adorn and beautify the entrance or using a ditch for its natural purpose had been held not to support adverse possession : Lorna Ellett-Brown v Tallishire Limited, 29 March 1990, unreported (CA) as approved by Hawkes v Howe (2002) EWCA Civ 1136. (3) My view on continuous occupation and use 22.As this is a challenge to the factual finding by the Judge, the defendant must show that the Judge is plainly wrong. 23.In my view context is important in a case like this. This is not the usual type of adverse possession cases in the New Territories where a trespasser entered the land of someone else and started cultivation there. On the contrary, the plaintiff’s father and predecessor in title, Chau Fuk Li had acquired title to the Land in 1914 and although he had immediately sold it to Tsu Un Tai Tso, he had remained in possession on the Land despite its disposal and treated it as if it was still his own land. This applies also to the plaintiff. 24.It is not clear from the available evidence as to when Chau Fuk Tso assumed control of the Land from Chau Fuk Li himself. But according to a copy of the Rent Roll of the District Lands Office of Tai Po, by the 1920s, Chau Fuk Tso by its manager Chau Wah was already the owner of Lot 397. 25.According to the plaintiff, there was encroachment of the Land on all four sides. There is the retaining wall in the south which the Judge found has been there since the 1910’s. There are bamboo trees planted by the plaintiff as a barrier to cows and people in the north. There is a low barrier wall to the west which is a continuation of the retaining wall in the south. As to the east side of the Land, the Judge found :
26.The north and west sides of the Land are further partially surrounded by Lot No. 638 which were acquired by the plaintiff in 1963. The plaintiff had said (which is accepted by the Judge) that in order to gain access to the Land, unless one tried to climb over the walled barriers, one normally had to go through the front gate of his house in Lot 276 RP. 27.As the Judge pointed out, the act of encroachment is the most cogent evidence of the plaintiff taking possession of the Land. After taking possession in these circumstances, short of abandonment, there must be continuous use and possession of the Land irrespective of whether the plaintiff continued to cultivate or not in the later years. In Chambers v Havering London Borough Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1576, Lewison LJ said :
This was applied by Mr. Recorder Ambrose Ho S.C. in Law Bing Kee v Persons in Occupation of RP and Anor HCMP 2270/2009, Judgment dated 8 March 2013 at para. 42. 28.It is of note that the defendant had never pleaded abandonment of possession by the plaintiff. All that the defendant had pleaded was a general denial that the plaintiff has been in uninterrupted control and occupation of the Land since 1963 or for any other period of 20 years or more. Further, this point was not even argued before the Judge. Had this point been raised and its connection with the alleged 1978 conversation was explored, I have no doubt the Judge would have addressed this issue. As it is, I do not see how this would assist the defendant. 29.In any event, the evidence of the plaintiff clearly pointed towards continuous use of the Land. Any reference to the plaintiff ceasing cultivation must be properly considered in its context. The plaintiff had at one time grew sweet potatoes so that their leaves could be used to feed the pigs. This stopped when he no longer raised pigs. The plaintiff also referred to cultivating the field (耕田) which he later ceased and the Land had become vacant (荒地). In this context he was actually referring to cultivating rice which he had later ceased. Both the plaintiff and his son’s witness statement confirmed that :
30.The reference to the son’s evidence on ceasing cultivation in 1972 or 1974 was in the context of the defendant’s counsel referring to the son’s evidence in his closing submission. The transcript of the son’s evidence has not been sought by the parties. In any event the Judge’s finding in response to counsel’s submission clearly showed that he had not accepted the son’s evidence that cultivation stopped in 1972 or 1974.
31.The experts merely gave their opinions on the aerial photographs. In their Joint Statement on the use of the Land, they had not defined what cultivation was. In any event they further agreed that the aerial photograph taken on 20 May 1979 showed that bushes and trees were covering the entire Land. This is contrary to any suggestion that the Land has become vacant and barren. The evidence points to continuous cultivation although on a small scale. 32.The observation by Mr Chow WD and Mr Kwok of the vegetation on the Land was accepted by the Judge. Considered in the light of the other evidence adduced in this case, I cannot say that the finding is plainly wrong. 33.In an unfenced field, the planting of trees, the gathering of branches and the harvesting of fruits alone may not be a sufficient act of possession. The matter has to be considered in its context. In this case the plaintiff has been carrying out these activities within the enclosed boundary of the Land. In the words of Slade J in Powell v. McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452 at 471, ‘what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it, and that no one else has done so’ (emphasis added). The plaintiff has been doing precisely that. He has been dealing with the Land as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it, and that no one else has done so. 34.Between 1983 and 1985, when the plaintiff was constructing the small houses in Lot 975, the south eastern portion of the Land was used as an access path or roadway for the construction work. This is another example of the plaintiff’s use and possession of the Land. 35.On 22 September 2009, workers claiming to be employed by the defendant forcibly entered the Land and fenced it off, and in the process destroyed the planted trees. The plaintiff immediately applied for an injunction to stop the trespass. This is another act of the plaintiff asserting his interest in the Land. 36.All this means that there has been continuous occupation and possession of the Land by the plaintiff. The defendant has simply failed to show that there was abandonment of the Land after 1978. 37.Ms Chan submitted that the plaintiff only relied on adverse possession from 1963 onwards which was after he had acquired the two plots of land in Lot 638. I really do not see how this would assist the defendant. The plaintiff only became registered as the manager of the Chau Fuk Tso in 1961 and if he can establish adverse possession by himself from 1963 onwards, I really do not see why he needs to rely on acts of adverse possession by his predecessor before that time. 38.Ms Chan submitted that the boundary of the Land is not well defined. What the plaintiff’s expert had said in his report is this :
39.By the time the trial was heard, the parties had the benefit of a Survey Record Plan where the boundary was properly defined. The defendant’s expert also relied on this plan. However, what is more important is that one can see from the A-Sheet and the Lot Index Plan referred to by the plaintiff’s expert, the Land is almost in a square shape. It is 6,400 square feet in area and is located next to the house where the plaintiff has been living since his birth 90 odd years ago. There cannot be any possible confusion as to where the plaintiff has taken possession or the extent of the possession. 2) Encroachment (1) The defendant’s argument 40.Ms Chan argued that the Judge had overstated the importance of encroachment when the southern and western walls were already been there when the plaintiff began his claim for adverse possession in 1963. Further, within the southern wall, there is a strip of government land immediately below the Land and another strip of government land between the Land and the plaintiff’s house. The northern and eastern sides of the Land are only natural barriers which do not preclude people from going into the Land. In Wilson and Another v. Martin’s Executors [1993] 1 EGLR 178 it was said that the repairing of an existing fence was insufficient to make it perfectly plain to the world at large that the trespasser intended to exclude the owner of the land. (2) My view on encroachment 41.Again the matter has to be considered in its context. Chau Fuk Li built the southern and western walls after he had acquired the Land and despite disposing of the Land. This can be interpreted as Chau Fuk Li staking his interest in the Land. The continuous use by the plaintiff of these walls can only mean that he continues to stake his interest in the Land to the exclusion of the others. The mere fact that some strips of government land are within the enclosed walls does not change this assertion. One of the purposes of the plaintiff planting the bamboo trees in the north of the Land is to stop people from coming in. While some may nonetheless creep through the bamboo trees into the Land, again it does not lessen the effect of the plaintiff staking an interest in the Land. On the eastern side, the Judge had already found that after 1985, if people used the steps to the east of Lot 975 to enter the Land, they would have to pass through the private properties in Lot 975 and that would give the impression that they were ‘entering some sort of enclosed private property’. In other words, the effect of enclosure is still there. 42.In my view the Judge’s reliance on the encroachment cannot be faulted. 3) Form of the declarations 43.In my view the above is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. I will now address the form of the declarations. (1) The defendant’s argument 44.Ms Chan argued that since the Judge accepted that Chau Fuk Li had sold the Land to Tsu Un Tai Tso, then he should not have granted a further declaration that the defendant is not the owner of and has no interest in the Land. Instead, the Judge should have granted the declaration sought by the defendant in its counterclaim, namely, ‘(it) is the only registered and lawful owner of the Land’. The defendant relied on Fairweather v St Marylebone Property Co. Ltd. [1963] AC 510 where it was held that the limitation statutes providing for extinguished legal title did not make a ‘parliamentary conveyance’ of the dispossessed lessee’s title or estate to the dispossessing squatter (p.535)…...when a squatter dispossesses a lessee for the statutory period, it is the lessee’s right and title as against the squatter that is finally destroyed but not his right or title as against persons who are not or do not take through the adverse possessor. (p.538).…..the effect of the ‘extinguishment’ …..is not to destroy the lessee’s estate as between himself and the lessor….. (p.540). 45.Counsel for the defendant at the trial (not Ms Chan who only appears in this appeal) had not taken this point despite being invited by the Judge to make submissions on the wording of the order (see paragraph 91 of the judgment). (2) My view on the orders 46.In my view the argument on the form of the orders made by the Judge does not affect the outcome of this appeal. The fact that the plaintiff abandoned his challenge on the paper title of the Land does not mean that the Judge must grant a declaration in favour of the defendant in terms of the relief sought in the counterclaim, bearing in mind his finding on the plaintiff’s adverse possession of the Land. However, in order to reflect the true intention of the two declarations made by the Judge, I will direct paragraphs 1 and 2 of the judgment below be amended as follows, to which Mr. Ko for the plaintiff has indicated no objection :
Conclusion 47.The appeal is dismissed with a provisional costs order in favour of the plaintiff. Hon Chu JA : 48.I agree and have nothing further to add. Hon Poon J : 49.I agree.
Mr Tony Ko, instructed by K.Y. Lo & Co., for the Plaintiff Ms Winnie Chan, instructed by Wat & Co., for the Defendant |
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