Re Kb (Asia) Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 307/2013 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 30 June 2014.
1. On 18 December 2012 a petition was presented by Inspur (HK) Electronics Limited (“ Inspur ”) to wind up the Company on the grounds of insolvency. The Petitioner had obtained a judgment for US$1,730,092 on 18 February 2010 and had come to terms for payment of this sum and interest in February 2011. The settlement was not honoured and Inspur relied on the outstanding debt of US$1,781,465.22 to establish insolvency. As matters developed there was no dispute that the Company was massively insol
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HCMP 307/2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 307 OF 2013 ____________
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_________________________ D E C I S I O N _________________________ Introduction 1.On 18 December 2012 a petition was presented by Inspur (HK) Electronics Limited (“Inspur”) to wind up the Company on the grounds of insolvency. The Petitioner had obtained a judgment for US$1,730,092 on 18 February 2010 and had come to terms for payment of this sum and interest in February 2011. The settlement was not honoured and Inspur relied on the outstanding debt of US$1,781,465.22 to establish insolvency. As matters developed there was no dispute that the Company was massively insolvent and unable to pay Inspur. The Company sought time to present a scheme of arrangement for consideration by its creditors. I adjourned the winding-up petition. 2.The company is a private company. It was involved in trading, principally, electronic products. The company is family owned and the family business has a long history. The company’s audited financial statements show that in the financial year ending 31 March 2009, it had a turnover of $252,940,994. The turnover increased by approximately another $50 million in 2010. Then the financial fortunes of the company changed dramatically. 3.The financial statement for the year ending 31 March 2013, which has recently been audited, shows that by the end of 2012 the company had a turnover of $16,269,195. In practice, the company had ceased taking new orders by February of 2012 and for the remainder of that financial year was involved in dealing with outstanding orders. In 2012, the company made an operating loss of $98,489,497. 4.The balance sheet for the year ending 31 March 2012 records that the company has very limited assets. Plant and equipment are valued at $63,139 and trade and other receivables have diminished to $760,270. This is a very significant reduction in the trade receivables shown in the financial statement for earlier years. Change in the balance sheet has come about largely, I understand, as a result of a significant proportion of receivables having been written off. 5.On 14 February 2013 the Company applied by originating summons under section 166 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32, for leave to convene a meeting of creditors to consider a scheme. When the matter first came before me on 26 March 2013 I declined to make such an order because it seemed to me that the explanatory statement was obviously inadequate and needed further work. I, therefore, adjourned the originating summons. It was restored on 5 July 2013. On that date I made an order convening a meeting, but made it clear, as is recorded in my judgment of that date, that I had concerns about the scheme. The relevant concerns were as follows:
6.One scheme meeting took place on 25 September 2013 at which unsecured creditors were called upon to vote on the Scheme. Rak voted at that meeting. According to the Chairman’s report 81.9% in value[1] of unsecured creditors who attended in person or by proxy and voted, voted in favour of the Scheme. A majority in number of those attending in person or proxy also voted in favour of the Scheme. On the face of the matter, therefore, a statutory majority was obtained. The hearing of the Petition was delayed because of the death of Mr. Sunder Khemlani in November 2013 whilst on a business trip in Tanzania. 7.Inspur objects to the court sanctioning the Scheme on four broad grounds:
8.Before turning to consider its reasons for objecting I will summarise the relevant legal principles. Legal Principles 9.For the purpose of determining whether there were properly constituted classes of creditors in the Scheme Creditors' Meeting, the Court of Final Appeal has laid down the following general principles in UDL Argos Engineering & Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Li Oi Lin (2001) 4 HKCFAR 358 (at §27):
10.As Lewison J explains in Re The British Aviation Insurance Co Ltd [2006] BCC 14 at §82, which was decided after UDL Argos, in deciding whether the classes of creditors were correctly identified, the starting point is to identify the appropriate comparator. Where a company is insolvent (as is the present case) or insolvent liquidation is the only alternative to the scheme, then insolvent liquidation is the comparator. 11.The Court’s function under Section 166 has been defined as summary and quasi-inquisitorial. The Court should not be pre-disposed to question statements made under oath by the Company. However, if there are matters that cast serious doubt on the opinion of the majority, the Court must give such matters their due weight. The Company is not entitled to the full protections of an adversarial hearing [2]. When a serious allegation of collateral motive is made, it must be backed by proper evidence [3]. 12.Mr. Gormley argued that where it is suggested that votes of a supporting creditor should be discounted it is not sufficient simply to demonstrate that the creditor is related to the Company. He referred me to the judgment of Kwan J (as she then was) in Re App (Hong Kong) Ltd [4]. This is correct as far as it goes, but in my view the court can properly be invited to draw the inference from the relationships between a company and a creditor that a creditor has sufficient personal or special interest in supporting a proposal that its views cannot fairly be regarded as representative of the class in question; so much in my view is clear from the judgment of Lord Millett in UDL. Whether or not it is proper for the court to do so is fact sensitive, but it does not seem to me that it is essential to adduce direct evidence of a creditor having regard to collateral considerations. Grounds of Opposition 13.The first ground of opposition is that Rak should not have voted as an unsecured creditor because it has security in the form of a floating charge over the Company’s receivables. This was disputed by Mr. Gormley who appeared for the Company, who argued that the evidence filed by the Company indicated that Rak had waived its security. It does not seem to me that this is a fair reading of the evidence. 14.Mrs. Khemlani, who is a director of both the Company and Rak, says this in the final two sentences of paragraph 10 of her affirmation in support of the Scheme:
15.In his report to the court the Chairman of the meeting, Glen Ho of Deloitte Touche Tomastsu, records the following exchanges between him and various creditors:
16.As I read these passages Mr. Ho is stating that he did not know whether the floating charge had been waived or otherwise discharged. If he did know he should have answered the question accurately. I do not accept, as Mr. Gormley suggested, that because at the end of paragraph 10 of his Report, Mr. Ho says the appraised value of the debt due to Rak is zero and Rak “should be regarded as an unsecured liabilities”, it follows that the floating charge must have been released. On the contrary the language used tends to suggest that Mr. Ho approached the treatment of Rak’s debt in accordance with clause 3.7 of the Scheme which provided that a secured creditor could be admitted as Scheme Creditor by either foregoing his security or by agreeing an appraised value for it and voting any shortfall. The language Mr. Ho used suggests that he dealt with Rak’s debt in accordance with the latter mechanism, which in turn indicates that the security had not been released, or possibly, that it had been, but he had not been told. However, as Mrs. Khemlani in her evidence makes no reference to the security being released, as I would have expected if it had been, it seems to me that the only inference that can sensibly be drawn is that it had not been. I am fortified in this conclusion by the fact that at no time during the hearing did Mr. Gormley receive instructions, and his clients were in court, that the security had been released. 17.Mr. Ho seems to have thought that clause 3.7(a) of the Scheme allowed him to value the security at zero and to admit Rak as an unsecured creditor for the whole of its debt. On its face clause 3.7(a) does allow him to do so if the Scheme is sanctioned. However, this is not the relevant test for the purposes of determining whether or not the class voting has been properly constituted. The test is whether or not the court considers that Rak’s legal rights and those of the unsecured creditors were so dissimilar that they could not sensibly be allowed to consult together over the merits of the Scheme. In my view they could not. 18.The critical difference between Rak and the unsecured creditors is that if, as I shall assume on the basis of the evidence before, Rak did have a floating charge over the accounts receivables it did not have to concern itself with whether or not the accounts receivables proved to be recoverable in the future because if they did it would benefit. I do not consider Inspur’s concern that accounts receivables may prove recoverable in the future fanciful. In my view the classes were not properly constituted and for this reason the Scheme fails. 19.The second objection is that there was no fair and bona fide representation at the Scheme Creditor’s meeting. There is no dispute that the Company formed part of a family business which included other companies. Rak, for example, is owned by Mr. Khemlani’s sons. Mr. Khemlani’s interests in other creditors are explained on page 27 of the Explanatory Statement, which was drafted at a time when he was still alive. It tells us:
20.Page 20 of the Explanatory Statement sets out reasons why Mr. Khemlani wished to keep the Company alive and was prepared to inject US$1,000,000 into it:
21.I accept for present purposes that Mr. Khemlani would have preferred creditors to recover something, however, it is clear, as indeed I would expect, from a fair reading of the relevant paragraphs that the main incentive for making a payment to creditors was the commercial value that he believed existed in the Company’s name and to continue what he describes as “the family business”. This invites the suggestion made by Inspur that in these circumstances the “family” creditors, in particular Mr. Khemlani himself, have a purpose in supporting the Scheme other than maximising their recovery as creditors. In this regard they do have a special interest “which differs for the interest of the ordinary independent and objective creditor”: Re British Aviation [5]. In my view the Explanatory Statement does demonstrate that, what I shall call, the family creditors do have a special interest to promote in determining how to vote and that accordingly their vote should be discounted. If their votes are ignored a statutory majority has not been achieved. 22.The third ground of opposition is that no honest and intelligent person would support the Scheme. This is an established ground for the court refusing to sanction a scheme. It amounts to saying that it is irrational for a creditor to support it. I disagree. Recovering the accounts receivables, many of which seem to have been outstanding for years, or recovery from HSBC, would be an expensive and time consuming and there is no certainty that it would be successful. There is no guarantee that if anything is recovered it will exceed the amount offered by Mr. Khemlani. Although I can understand Inspur’s objections to the Scheme and its decision to oppose it, it does not seem to me that it can fairly be said that a decision to support it is irrational. Given the generally low level of recoveries in liquidations of companies which have no substantial assets other than prospective claims against third parties it seems to me that there are likely to be few cases in which it can fairly be said that a creditor’s decision to accept an immediate modest payment rather than wait in the hope of a larger recovery as a result of the liquidation process is irrational. 23.The fourth ground of opposition is that the Scheme did not provide enough information. I disagree. It seems to me that the Scheme Document provided sufficient information for an honest and intelligent creditor having regard to relevant considerations to make a decision whether or not to support the Scheme. The gravamen of Inspur’s objections is that the Scheme is not put forward honestly and it advances principally two reasons for this: first, that accounts receivables have too readily been written off and, secondly, that a claim against HSBC has not been pursued. It seems to me that the Scheme tells creditors enough about these matters to determine whether or not it is better for the Company to be put into liquidation with a view to a liquidator investigating these matters or to take the sum currently offered. Conclusion 24.I am not satisfied that the class of voters was properly constituted, which is enough to justify dismissing the Petition. It also seems to me that the creditors related to Mr. Khemlani have an interest in supporting the Scheme that differs from the ordinary unsecured creditor and that the court should, if I were wrong about the first matter, take this into account in determining whether the 75% threshold has been achieved. In my opinion their votes should be discounted and it follows a statutory majority has not been achieved. 25.So far as costs are concerned I order that the costs of the Inspur are paid by the Company and be treated as part of the costs which Mr. Khemlani has undertaken to pay.
Mr Anthony Michael Gormley, instructed by Lo, Wong & Tsui, for the applicant Mr Anson Wong SC and Mr Martin Ho, instructed by Hastings & Co, for the opposing creditors, Inspur (HK) Electronics Limited [1] HK$86,824,448.83 total debt was voted without any abstentions. [2] Lam J in Re PCCW Ltd CACV 85/2009 at §114-§116 [3] Lewison J in Re Linton Park Plc [2008] BCC 17at §12 [4] [2005] 1 HKLRD 272 at §31; see also Lord Millett in UDL supra at 372J to 373B and Chadwick LJ in Re BTR Plc [2000] 1 BCLC 740 at 747G to 748B. [5] Supra §69 quoting Re BTR Plc [2000] 1 BCLC 740 |
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