The Pool Co Ltd v. Sino Rise Realty Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1755/2012 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 26 September 2014.
1. The plaintiff’s action against the defendants (collectively “ Ds ”) was based on trespass and nuisance, which arose out of alleged wrongful acts of Ds, and the plaintiff (“ P ”) claimed a final injunction, and damages for trespass, nuisance, physical damage to its building and for loss of use and enjoyment of its building or part thereof.
Cites 7 cases
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HCA 1755/2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 1755 OF 2012 ________________________ BETWEEN
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__________________ J U D G M E N T __________________ Introduction 1.The plaintiff’s action against the defendants (collectively “Ds”) was based on trespass and nuisance, which arose out of alleged wrongful acts of Ds, and the plaintiff (“P”) claimed a final injunction, and damages for trespass, nuisance, physical damage to its building and for loss of use and enjoyment of its building or part thereof. 2.P had taken out a summons for summary judgment (“Order 14 Summons”), seeking :
Background 3.P, D1, and D2 are all limited companies incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong. 4.P is the owner of a building known as Fast Plus Center, No 16, On Lok Mun Street, Fanling, New Territories (“FP Centre”). 5.D1 is the owner of a building adjacent to the FP Centre, which is known as Kawada Commercial Plaza (“KC Plaza”), situate at Sheung Shui Town Lot No 239 commonly known as 15, On Kui Street, On Lok Tsuen, Fanling, New Territories (“Site”). 6.At all material times, D2 is a construction company engaged by D1 as the main contractor to conduct construction works for the redevelopment of KC Plaza on the Site (“Construction Works”). 7.FP Centre has an open area working platform on the 1st floor (“FP Platform”). 8.On about 31 August 2012, P found various problems in FP Centre which were allegedly caused by wrongful acts of D1 and/or D2. Thereafter, workers carrying out the Construction Works were also allegedly found on the FP Platform. 9.All this led P to issue a writ endorsed with a statement of claim on 21 September 2012. On 25 September 2012, P issued a summons for an interim injunction to restrain the defendants (collectively “Ds”) from any trespass and/or nuisance to P’s property, which was granted on 28 September 2012 (“Interim Injunction”). The directors of D2 and representatives of D1 were present at this hearing. By consent of all parties, the Interim Injunction was ordered on 6 November 2012 to continue until the trial of the action. 10.It was P’s case that notwithstanding the Interim Injunction and the continuation thereof, the alleged wrongful acts of Ds continued up till the final construction phase of KC Plaza in July 2013. The statement of claim had since been amended to include such wrongful acts (“ASOC”). 11.Further, the continued wrongful acts after the Interim Injunction had led to P to commence committal proceedings against D2 in March 2013, which were eventually settled in about May 2013 since all the Construction Works had been completed on 16 May 2013 and scaffoldings were dismantled. The Site was subsequently handed over to D1 in October 2013. 12.Ds denied any wrongdoing, and had also pleaded contributory negligence on part of P. Although initially, Ds filed a joint defence on 19 November 2012, later after they became separately represented, and each had filed an amended defence of its own, respectively on 11 November 2013 (“D1’s Defence”), and on 25 November 2013 (“D2’s Defence”). 13.P issued the Order 14 Summons about two months after Ds filed their respective amended defences. General legal principles on Order 14 applications 14.It is trite that in an Order 14 application, the defendant has the burden to satisfy the court with respect of the claim, or part of the claim, that there is a triable issue or some other reason to be tried. 15.As has been said by Cheung JA in Paul Y Management Ltd v Eternal Unity Development and Others, unrep, CACV 16/2008, 12.08.2008:
16.P’s Counsel, Mr Roy Lau, had referred to paragraph 14/4/8 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2014 Volume 1 where it is stated that when the judge is satisfied not only that there is no defence but no fairly arguable point to be argued on behalf of the defendant it is his duty to give judgment. Further where in an action for unliquidated damages, the liability of the defendant is clearly established, whether by the evidence or by admission or by submission, the court should give judgment for the plaintiff with costs for damages and interest thereon to be assessed. 17.D1’s Counsel, Ms Elizabeth Cheung, had referred this court to what was said by Bohkary JA, as he then was in Re Safe Rich Industries Ltd CACV 81/1994, unreported 3.11.1994 :
18.Ms Cheung had also referred to the “warning” given by Godfrey JA in Man Earn Ltd v Wing Ting Fong [1996] 1 HKC 225 :
19.As pointed out by Ms Cheung, an Order 14 application is not intended to be a mini trial on affidavits and where there are complicated factual issues, the Order 14 procedure is clearly not the correct procedure[4]. 20.I now turn to the present application. P’s Case 21.As mentioned earlier, P’s claims against D1 and/or D2 were based on alleged trespass and nuisance and P claimed damages against both Ds. 22.P’s Order 14 Summons was supported by the 3rd affirmation of its director, Chung Tsi Kuen (“Chung”). Chung and also P’s security guard Yeung Chi Keung (“Yeung”) had earlier filed affirmations to support P’s application for the Interim Injunction. In his 3rd affirmation, Chung had deposed to various problems/incidents including the following:
D1’s Defence 23.D1’s case was that it had acted reasonably in entrusting the Construction Works to D2 and denied any knowledge of those problems/incidents alleged by P or that it had authorized or allowed any of the wrongful acts pleaded by P in the ASOC. D1 admitted to having received a letter dated 5 September 2012 from P’s solicitors[7] and said upon receiving notice of the matters complained of by P, it, as owner of KC Plaza, it had taken reasonable measures and/or steps to prevent any wasted construction materials falling onto the FP Platform. 24.It was further or further alternative of D1’s case that if P was unable to use, occupy or enjoy the FP Platform in normal manner, the same was wholly due to the faulty execution of the Construction Works by D2[8]. 25.D1 had also averred that if it was held liable to P, then any damages awarded to P should be reduced by the extent of P’s contributory negligence[9]. Trespass 26.Trespass to land consists in any unjustifiable intrusion by one person upon land in the possession of another, and the slightest crossing of the boundary is sufficient[10]. Further, trespass differs from nuisance in that it is a direct as opposed to a consequential injury, and is actionable without proof of damage, whereas damage must be proved in nuisance[11]. 27.D1’s position in the present case was quite different from D2’s in that D1 was the owner/employer and D2 was the independent contractor. However, P’s case in the ASOC was pleaded against them without distinguishing their different positions. 28.It was not disputed by all parties that other than having engaged D2 as the main contractor, D1 was not engaged at all in the actual carrying out of the Construction Works on the Site. As mentioned earlier, D1 had denied any knowledge of the problems/incidents. P admitted to receiving the letter dated 5 September 2012 from P’s solicitors and D1’s solicitors had replied on 10 September 2012 that P had no knowledge of the alleged wrongdoings and that it was making enquiries from its main contractor D2, and in the mean time, requesting P to withhold all legal proceedings. 29.The video taken on 3 September 2012 only showed a workman on the FP Centre claiming he was employed by D2. At this stage, there cannot be a determination simply based on the affidavit evidence before this court as to whether D1 had in fact trespassed or “procured, caused, authorized, permitted or allowed” the wrongful act of trespass by its agents. I am of the view that so far as the alleged trespass by P is concerned, there is a triable issue. Nuisance 30.Ms Cheung had referred this court to paragraphs 6-56 and 6-57 under “Vicarious Liability” in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 20th Ed on the law on liability for owners/employers where independent contractors have been engaged, and also to those paragraphs from Clerk & Lindsell quoted by Recorder Kwok SC in Tsang Hing Cheung and Chan Po Ling Stella & Others in HCPI 869/2001, unreported, 20.11.02[12]. 31.I will not set out in detail those quoted or relevant paragraphs from Clerk & Lindsell, save that the principles extracted therefrom would appear to be as follows:
32.Some examples of cases where Non-Delegable Duties have been recognized by the courts have also set out in paragraphs 6-60 to 6-71 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 20th Ed. Liability for nuisances caused by independent contractors is said by the learned authors to be “not terribly straightforward”[19]. On one hand there was the case of Spicer v Smee [1946] 1 All ER 489 which supported the view that the occupier would not be liable in nuisance for the act of his independent contractor. On the other hand, Matania v National Provincial Bank Ltd [1936] 2 All ER 633, an earlier case supported the contrary thesis, namely that liability for the act of the independent contractor would depend on whether the work had entailed an inherent risk of creating a nuisance. Slesser LJ in Matania had said that “If the act done is one which in its very nature involves a special danger of nuisance being complained of, then the employer of the contractor will be responsible if there is a failure to take the necessary precaution that the nuisance shall not arise”[20]. The learned authors of Clerk & Lindsell submitted that this should be the correct approach[21]. 33.Another example where it had been held a Non-Delegable Duty existed was where the works involved “extra-hazardous acts”. 34.Relying on the above principles, Ms Cheung submitted that D1 had acted reasonably in selecting D2 as independent contractor and had taken all reasonable steps to satisfy itself and prior to the incidents complained of by P, had been satisfied that D2 was competent to commence, carry out and complete the Construction Works. Further, the Construction Works were not “extra-hazardous acts” and did not fall within any of the “exceptions” to the general rule. 35.D1’s director, a Mr Lee Man Kin (“Lee”) had made an affirmation to oppose the Order 14 Summons. In his affirmation, Lee explained the background leading to KC Plaza being erected, and that initially in around 2010, D1 had engaged another main contractor which ran into financial difficulties, after finishing the foundation works for KC Plaza, and was unable to continue. In its replacement, D2 was eventually engaged as the main contractor in 2012. 36.According to Lee, D2 was picked because it was a very experienced registered general building contractor in Hong Kong having held the relevant construction licence for over 20 years and another main reason was that D2 had been engaged to construct 5 blocks of buildings in the vicinity of KC Plaza, including P’s FP Centre. 37.There was no real challenge from P that D1 had acted reasonably in entrusting the Construction Works to D2. There was no affirmation filed on behalf of P in reply to Lee’s affirmation. 38.Mr Lau referred to various passages in Clerk & Lindsell, where it is stated that an actual wrongdoer will be liable for a nuisance whether or not he is in occupation of the land[22]. The wrongdoer may create the nuisance either personally or by his servants or agents, and that he is liable on this ground if he authorizes a licensee to burn bricks upon his land, thereby creating a nuisance or if he allows gypsies to camp on his land so as to be a nuisance from their noise and the insanity conditions of the camp[23]. 39.Further, whether a person can be said to be a wrongdoer if the nuisance is created by his independent contract depends on whether he could reasonably have foreseen that the work he has instructed the independent contractor to do would likely to result in a nuisance[24]. Mr Lau had referred to the passage quoted by the authors of Clerk & Lindsell from the case of Bower v Peate where Cockburn CJ had said:
40.To summarise, a person will be liable for nuisance, as the wrongdoer, in the following circumstances :
41.Sub-paragraph (iii) above applied to the creation of dangers in the highway, and to the interference with the right of support, and it had has not been confined to public nuisances but also applied to cases of private nuisance where it appeared that the nature of the work involved inherent dangers, being itself “a dangerous operation”[29]. 42.In light of the above principles, Mr Lau had submitted that it was futile for D1 to argue that D2 was carefully selected as an independent contractor, and that it was clear that the wrongdoings of D2 were totally foreseeable in a construction site and would result in nuisance to its neighbour. 43.According to its director Lee, D1 is a company of which the sole shareholder is Ms Suen Wai Kwan, Samantha (“Suen”). Lee deposed that he and Suen only came to know of any issues relating to the debris at the Site of the Construction Works after they received the letter from P’s solicitors dated 5 September 2012. According to Lee, he and Suen made only sporadic visits to the Site, and not on a regular basis and when they arrived at the Site, all the Construction Works would be halted as the workers would greet them and would stop work, and this had a disruptive effect on the construction. Hence Suen and Lee would visit the site only once every 5 or 6 weeks. 44.Further, according to Lee, D1 had taken the following steps after the Interim Injunction :
45.Having considered the evidence before this court, I am of the view that so far as D1 is concerned, whether D1 could reasonably have foreseen that the Construction Works he had instructed D2 to do would likely to result in a nuisance, and whether D1 had taken reasonable steps after the Interim Injunction are disputed factual matters, which this court cannot determine in a summary manner, and should be allowed to go to trial. D2’s Defence 46.D2 had denied or made no admission to P’s allegations of trespass and nuisance, and had also averred that certain of the alleged problems/incidents were caused solely and/or partly by P’s own negligence. Final Injunction 47.D2’s director Lui, confirmed that completion of the Construction Works was on 16 May 2013[32], and after dismantling of the scaffolding, D2 had vacated and handed over the Site to D1 in about October 2013[33]. 48.Although according to Chung, up till July 2013 (final construction phase of the KC Plaza), Ds continued to cause and allow wasted materials to be fallen, dumped or left on the FP Platform, it seemed that after July 2013, there had been no further complaints from P. 49.Ms Leung submitted that there was no evidence that the acts complained of would be repeated, and in the absence of “grounds apprehending the repetition of wrongful acts”, P’s application for a permanent injunction should be refused. Ms Leung had relied on Proctor v Bailey (1899) 42 Ch D 390. 50.Proctor v Bailey was a case in relation to an infringement of the patent. It was held on appeal in that case that though the defendant had infringed the patent, it was not to be inferred from the circumstances that he had any intention to infringe it again, and that the plaintiff, if he had made such inquiry as he ought, would have discovered this and there was, therefore, no case for an injunction. It was said by Cotton LJ that the defendant had infringed the patent, but that the court must look at all the circumstances to see whether there was any ground for inferring they the defendant intended to continue to infringe it[34]. 51.Ms Leung had also referred to Chiu Hung Shun, Paul and Anor and So Ka Tai and Anor CACV 136 of 2005, unreported, 05.12.05. The plaintiffs and the defendants were neighbours in a building, with the defendants owning and occupying the flat immediate above the plaintiffs’ flat. There had been seepage of water from the defendants’ flat to the plaintiffs’ flat, which led to the writ being issued by the plaintiffs claiming breach of the deed of mutual covenant and/or negligence and/or nuisance. Subsequently, the defendants admitted liability. The plaintiffs then sought, among other things, a permanent injunction in addition to judgment being entered in their favour. Their summons was dismissed, save that the judge did order that the defendants to rectify the water leakage of their premises. 52.On appeal, in relation to whether a permanent injunction should have been granted by the judge in the lower court, Ma CJHC, as he then was, said the judge was right to have refused to grant the plaintiffs such an injunction, and said among other things, the following:
53.Mr Lau submitted that the matters complained of was not a single incident of trespass/nuisance but were repeated acts for a long period of time. He had also referred this court to Romag Fasterners Inc and Anor and Inter Core Limited HCA 1096 of 2008, unreported, 21.04.09. There was some argument between the parties in that case as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction against the defendant as the incident complained of was only a one-off incident and whether the defendant was really an innocent infringer. A Cheung J, as he then was, had mentioned that there was some dispute as to whether the defendant was really as innocent as it claimed, but in his view, given the clear infringement of the registered mark, prima facie, the plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction save for any special or exceptional circumstances. 54.In my view, the circumstances in the present case are more akin to the Chiu Hung Shun case. Here, the injunction sought by P was to restrain D2 whether by itself directors officers or by their servants contractors agents or otherwise from doing, repeating, continuing, procuring causing, authorizing, permitting or allowing any trespass and/or nuisance of a like kind, in particular (a) continuing the erection of the bamboo scaffolding on the FP Platform; (b) continuing to allow any wasted construction materials of the KC Plaza to remain on the FP Platform; (c) entering onto or remaining at the FP Platform; (d) causing any further damage to the FP Platform or the external walls of FP Center; and (e) interfering with the P’s use, occupation and enjoyment of the FP Platform[35]. These are the terms in the Interim Injunction. 55.Mr Lau submitted that for an Order 14 application, the test is whether D2 had any real defence to an injunction claim, and that P would be fully entitled to the grant of a final injunction. Further, Mr Lau submitted that P would be entitled to a final injunction at trial as the wrongful acts did repeat after 21 September 2012, after the issue of the writ, and that the relevant time that one should consider whether P was entitled to the injunction was at the time of the issue of the writ. 56.P’s complaints arose out of the Construction Works on the Site. The fact remains that there was no dispute that by the time P took out the Order 14 Summons on 21 January 2014, the Construction Works had been completed and D2 had already handed over the Site to D1. This meant that D2 had vacated the Site. The last complaints from P were in July 2013. As pointed out by the then Ma CJHC in Chiu Hung Shun, a permanent injunction would only be justified where the risk of a breach remained even despite the repairs or the party in breach had somehow shown by his conduct that unless restrained, he would continue with the breach. 57.There was no sufficient evidence before this court that the alleged wrongful acts would be repeated or continued by D2 to justify a final or permanent injunction in the terms sought by P against D2. Further, in my view, this is a case where damages would provide an adequate remedy. Trespass and Nuisance 58.Mr Lau complained that D2’s Defence consisted of bare denials. Ms Leung pointed out that there is a difference between a “denial” and “non-admission” and that D2 should not be criticized for D2’s Defence when the ASOC itself had lacked particulars, and the burden would be on P to prove its case against Ds. Anyway, as I have mentioned earlier, for the Order 14 Summons, the burden would be on D2 to satisfy this court that with respect of P’s claims, or part of the claims, that there is a triable issue or some other reason to go to trial. 59.The videos, in particular, those taken on about 1, 3, 7 September 2012, or shortly thereafter showed workers actually on the FP Platform. One of the videos showed one of the workers had said he was employed by D2. 60.As stated in Clerk & Lindsell, it is also a trespass to place anything on or in land in the possession of another, eg dumping rubbish on another’s land[36]. Further, allowing waste material, wet concrete and unknown chemical to spill onto another’s land, if not trespass, would be nuisance. 61.Lui, however, did not admit that D2 had done any of the acts complained of by P in the ASOC. Specifically, he had pointed out that according to D2’s daily progress report, in or about August 2012, D2 was only erecting main scaffolding from 1/F level to 2/F level at KC Plaza, whereas the waste materials were alleged by P to be dumped and left on the FP Platform on the 1/F. 62.Having looked at the photographs and the videos, as conceded by Ms Leung, one could see acts or trespassing/nuisance prior to the Interim Injunction. Ms Leung, however, submitted that there would be triable issues as to whether D2 would be liable for alleged wrongful acts after the Interim Injunction, since the evidence from Lui showed that D2 had taken various measures and steps to comply with the terms of the Interim Injunction[37]. It was not really disputed by P that those measures/steps alleged by D2 were taken and the issue was whether they were adequate or reasonable. 63.Further, Lui had said even if there was dripping of water from the 6/F ceiling on 31 August 2012, and blockage of drainage system of FP Platform on 31 August 2012 and/or 26 September 2012 as alleged by P, the causes of those incidents would need to be properly investigated by the court. 64.D2’s solicitors had on 6 December 2012 served a request on P for further and better particulars. P’s answers were eventually filed on 18 February 2014 (“Answers”). 65.In the Answers, P had said :
66.Ms Leung thus submitted that at this stage it would be difficult to see how the accumulation of water on the roof was related to the waste materials dumped on the FP Platform which was on the 1st floor, and that the cause of accumulation of water on the roof needed to be investigated and the blockage of drainage system of the FP Platform would also need to be addressed by expert evidence. The issue of causation had to be investigated by the court upon receiving expert evidence in this respect, and summary judgment thus should not be granted. In this connection, Ms Leung had referred this court to European Partners In Capital (EPIC) Holdings BV v Goddard & Smith [1992] 41 EG 118. 67.In relation to the accumulation of rainwater on the roof of FP Center on about 31 August 2012, the photographs produced by P seemed to be all undated. Anyway, one could see a lot of wasted construction materials/debris being dumped and there was a drain pipe in the photographs. However, it was not quite clear from the photographs whether the drain pipe led from the roof to the FP Platform, or whether the wasted construction materials/debris had in fact blocked the drain pipe, or indeed whether such blockage then caused the rainwater to accumulate on the roof. Further, it was not clear whether there were other drain pipes which led from the roof to the FP Platform. 68.As mentioned earlier, P’s security guard Yeung had filed an affirmation in support of P’s application for the Interim Injunction. What Yeung said was that FP Center had come across “many previous rainstorms situations and there was no single incident that flooding occurred on the roof or the FP Platform” and that the incident on 24 September 2012 was completely different and that various parts of FP Center were seriously affected[38]. Yeung had also mentioned that “as said by Cheng (Chung), the flooding, water accumulation and dripping problems in FP Center will worsen on rainy days”[39]. 69.It was not clear what Chung had said to Yeung or what Yeung meant, namely what period of time were the previous rainstorm situations, or whether there had been other flooding problems/incidents in FP Center in the past. I can see the rather bad situation in the video produced by P of the flooding on 24 September 2012, but again whether such was caused by blocking of drain pipes from waste construction material dumped by D2 on FP Platform was disputed. 70.D2 had also pleaded contributory negligence. Mr Lau submitted that this was only a bare assertion. There were no particulars, although D2 had reserved the right to plead further in paragraph 9 of D2’s Defence after P had filed the Answers. P only filed the Answers after it had already issued the Order 14 Summons. However, up to this stage, there had been no application to re-amend D2’s Defence. Thus, I accept as this stage, the allegation of contributory negligence is only a bare assertion. 71.In D2’s Defence, it had pleaded further or in the alternative, in or about August 2013, D2, had, without admission on liability, offered to remove, cause to remove and/or make good of wasted construction materials and/or damage, if any, which were alleged to have been dumped and/or left and/or damaged by D2 at the cost of D2, but such offer had been rejected by D2, and that D2 had alleged that P had refused to take any reasonable steps to mitigate the alleged loss or damages suffered by P. This would be a matter in relation to assessment of damages. 72.More importantly for the present application, as mentioned earlier, it was D2’s case that it had taken steps to comply with the Interim Injunction and that even if there were debris or materials falling or left at the FP Platform after the Interim Injunction, these acts were involuntary and that no liability should attach. As stated in Clerk and Lindsell, noise and dust caused by demolition and rebuilding will not be actionable if the operations are reasonably carried out, and all reasonable and proper steps are taken to ensure that no undue nuisance is caused to neighbours[40]. The burden is of course on D2 to prove that the measures and steps it had taken were reasonable. 73.There were 4 major complaints after the Interim Injunction, 2 of which reports had been made to police, but no further action by the police was taken, and there were undated photographs of the other complaints. Apart from these 4 complaints, P’s case was that there was continued dumping, falling or leave of waste materials on the FP Platform up to July 2013, but, there seemed to be no contemporaneous documents adduced by P to support such allegations. 74.Having considered the above, D2 has raised an issue as to causation of the water accumulation on the roof and water dripping from the ceiling of the 6/F of the FP Centre on about 31 August 2012, and also the serious flooding on about 24 September 2012, and further there are disputes over the alleged wrongful acts after the Interim Injunction up to July 2013, and/or whether the measures/steps taken by D2 after the Interim Injunction were reasonable. All these are not really issues which this court can decide in a summary way. I am therefore of the view that D2 has satisfied this court that there are triable issues, and that the matter should go to trial. Conclusion 75.In light of what I have said, the Order 14 Summons is dismissed with costs to Ds. This is an order nisi which will be made final after 21 days.
Mr Roy Lau, instructed by Alan Ho & Co, for the plaintiff Ms Elizabeth Cheung, instructed by Tony Kan & Co, for the 1st defendant Ms Pauline Leung, instructed by Chung & Kwan, for the 2nd defendant [1] At para 19 [2] At pg 5 [3] At pg 228 H-I [4] See Paul Y Management Ltd at para 19, and also para 14/4/9, Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2014 Volume 1 [5] Para 31, A:135 [6] At para 20, A:170 [7] A:204 [8] Para 9A, A:66 [9] Para 18, A:70 [10] Para 19-01, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 20th Ed [11] Ar para 19-08, supra [12] At para 7, Tsang Hing Cheung [13] At para 6-57, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 20th Ed [14] See paras 6-56 and 6-57, supra [15] At para 6-56, surpa [16] At para 6-57, supra [17] At para 6-59, supra [18] At para 6-60, supra; see also Farraj v King’s Heathcare NHS Trust [2009] EWCA CIV 1203; [2010] P.I.Q.R. P 7 at [93], per Dyson LJ (Sedley LJ agreed at [99]); applied in Woodland v Swimming Teachers’ Association [2012] EWCA CIV 239; [2012] P.I.Q.R. P 12 [19] At para 6-61, supra [20] At 646, Mantania [21] Last sentence para 6-61, pg 389, supra [22] At para 20-70, pg 1313 [23] At para 20-71, pg 1313 [24] At para 20-72, Clerk & Lindsell [25] At para 20-72, supra [26] At para 20-70, supra [27] At para 20-71, supra [28] At para 20-72, supra [29] Para 20-73, supra [30] B:654 [31] B:656-658 [32] Para 21, A:170 [33] Para 23, A:171 [34] At page 398, per Cotton LJ [35] A:61-62 [36] Para 19-02, pg 1224, supra [37] At paras 11-20, A:166-170 [38] At para 8, A:126 [39] At para 6, A:125 [40] At para 20-15, pg 1282 |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCA 1755/2012