Re Jkf
Read the full judgment text of CACV 103/2014 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 14 November 2014 before Lam VP, Kwan JA, Au J.
Civil appeal – judicial review – leave to apply for judicial review under Order 53, rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) – Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – claim by Sri Lankan national alleging ill-treatment and abuse by her husband in her home country – claim arguably amounting to torture – refusal of claim by Director of Immigration and Adjudicator – whether Applicant had reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review of those decisions – extended concept of State acquiescence as ground for review – proper approach to judicial review of immigration decisions – primary decision makers (Director and Adjudicator) should primarily undertake assessment of extended concept of State acquiescence and subsidiary factual questions – court should not readily place itself in their position to undertake such exercise on its own – anxious scrutiny and enhanced Wednesbury approach applied to decisions of this nature – leave should only be refused in very clear cases where final outcome is inevitable – on the present materials, reasonably arguable that Adjudicator had not properly applied concept of extended acquiescence – lack of report to police not conclusive as illustrated by TK v Michael Jenkins – Adjudicator's dismissal of Applicant's concerns about ineffectiveness of reporting as 'speculations' – further probing required along lines suggested by counsel in light of ST v Betty Kwan – reasonably arguable that selective use of country of origin information had tainted assessment per Re MI – judge's reasoning that shortcomings in Sri Lankan government's protection against domestic violence did not amount to de facto permission of domestic violence as changes cannot be expected to happen overnight – court did not express concluded view on merits but saw room for reasonable arguments to be canvassed fully in judicial review application – appeal allowed and leave to apply for judicial review granted.
Legal issues: Whether to grant leave to apply for judicial review of the Adjudicator's refusal of the torture claim
Outcome: Appeal allowed; leave to apply for judicial review granted
Cited by 20 cases · Cites 4 cases
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CACV 103/2014 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 103 OF 2014 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 42 OF 2013) ________________________ BETWEEN
________________________ Before : Hon Lam VP, Kwan JA and Au J in Court Date of Hearing : 14 November 2014 Date of Judgment : 14 November 2014 Date of Reasons for Judgment : 25 November 2014 ________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ________________________ Hon Lam VP (giving the Reasons for Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal against the refusal of McWalters J (as he then was) on 25 April 2014 to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review. At the hearing of the appeal, we allowed the appeal and granted leave to her. Here are our reasons. 2.The Applicant’s case is that she was subject to ill-treatments and abuses by her husband in her home country Sri Lanka which the learned judge regarded as arguably amounting to torture (see para 3 of his judgment). She made a claim under the Convention Against Torture and the claim was refused by the Director of Immigration and the Adjudicator. She sought leave to apply for judicial review against those decisions. 3.She relied on the extended concept of State acquiescence to support her application for leave. The judge accepted the Director and the Adjudicator did not consider that concept in coming to their decisions. However, the judge concluded that the contention that such concept should apply in the present case is unarguable. That was the reason why he refused to grant leave. 4.As has been said in TK v Michael Jenkins HCAL 126 of 2010, 21 October 2011, paras 61 and 64, though the court in a judicial review would subject to a decision of this nature to anxious scrutiny and apply an enhanced Wednesbury approach in examining the same, the primary decision makers are still the Director and the Adjudicator. Thus, assessment of the extended concept of State acquiescence and the subsidiary questions which may arise on the facts of each case under that concept should primarily be undertaken by the primary decision makers. When the primary decision makers did not conduct the necessary assessment or did not make all the necessary inquiry relevant to such assessment, or conduct an oral hearing which the case required, the court should not readily place itself in their positions to undertake such exercise on its own. It is only in very clear cases that the court should reject an application for judicial review on the basis that the final outcome is inevitable, see Chu Ping Tak v Commissioner of Police [2002] 3 HKLRD 679 at [64]; Liu Pik Han v Hong Kong Federation of Insurers Appeals Tribunal [2005] 3 HKC 242 at [47]. 5.In the present case, on the materials before us, we are of the view that it is reasonably arguable that the Adjudicator had not properly applied the concept of extended acquiescence. Though he referred to the lack of report by the Applicant to the police (which is no doubt a relevant matter in the overall assessment of State acquiescence), as illustrated by the facts of TK v Michael Jenkins, supra, the lack of such report is not conclusive. The adjudicator then rejected the Applicant’s concern about the ineffectiveness of making such a report as “speculations”. Though there is an answer in the record of interview of the Applicant (Q45 and A45) which could be so construed, in light of ST v Betty Kwan [2014] 4 HKLRD 277, it is reasonably arguable that there should be further probing along the lines suggested by Mr Remedios at the hearing before us. 6.Further, it is also reasonably arguable that what Mr Remedios criticised as selective use of country of origin information had tainted the assessment by the Adjudicator, see Re MI CACV 69 of 2014, 26 Sept 2014, paras 39 and 40. 7.The judge basically held against the Applicant on the ground that notwithstanding the shortcomings in the Sri Lankan government’s protection against domestic violence, that do not amount to the de facto permission of domestic violence as changes cannot be expected to happen overnight. That led him to the conclusion that the Applicant’s claim must fail that even if the ineffectiveness of the machinery of government in preventing domestic violence provides substantial grounds for believing that the Applicant would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 8.We do not express any concluded view on this issue. However, we do see room for reasonable arguments and they should be allowed to be canvassed fully in an application for judicial review. 9.We therefore made an order allowing the appeal.
Mr Jose D’ Almada Remedios, instructed by John M. Pickavant & Co, assigned by DLA, for the applicant | |||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment