Astro Nusantara and Others v. Pt Ayunda Prima Mitra
Read the full judgment text of HCCT 45/2010 on BabelCite. This 高等法院原訟法庭 judgment was delivered on 17 February 2015 before Hon Chow J.
Arbitration — Enforcement of SIAC awards — Hong Kong enforcement orders granted under Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 341) — Awards against Lippo and First Media — Singapore Court of Appeal (SCA) held Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in joining Additional Parties and declined enforcement — Whether Hong Kong court bound by SCA decision — Whether First Media barred from resisting enforcement due to late challenge and conduct — Whether entry of judgment precludes setting aside enforcement orders — Whether extension of time to set aside should be granted — Held: Entry of judgment does not bar setting aside application, but extension of time refused for 14-month delay and calculated risk — Good faith principle under s44 precludes First Media relying on jurisdictional challenge after defending merits arbitrarily — SCA ruling conclusive and binding as issue estoppel — Memorandum of Issues did not constitute binding submission to arbitration — Stage 1 enforcement requires only apparently valid arbitration agreement and award — Refusal to grant extension of time consistent with arbitration finality principle — First Media’s challenge dismissed; enforcement orders and judgment upheld; costs awarded to Astro.
Legal issues: Whether the entry of judgment precludes an application to set aside enforcement orders · Whether First Media is precluded by good faith principle from resisting enforcement of Awards under s44(2) of the Ordinance · Binding effect of the Singapore Court of Appeal Judgment on tribunal jurisdiction issues · Validity of binding submission to arbitration by signing the Memorandum of Issues · Compliance with multi-tier dispute resolution mechanism · Stage 1 and Stage 2 statutory pre-conditions for enforcement under the Ordinance · Extension of time to apply to set aside the Hong Kong Orders
Outcome: First Media’s summons dated 18 January 2012 to set aside the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment dismissed; extension of time refused; enforcement of Awards upheld.
Cites 12 cases
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HCCT 45/2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS NO 45 OF 2010 ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Introduction 1.I have before me a summons issued by the 2nd defendant, PT First Media TBK (formerly known as PT Broadband Multimedia TBK) (“First Media”), on 18 January 2012 seeking, inter alia:
2.The five arbitration awards (“the Awards”) were made by an arbitral tribunal (“the Tribunal”) constituted by Sir Gordon Langley, Sir Simon Tuckey and Stewart C Boyd CBE QC under the auspices of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) on various dates between 7 May 2009 and 3 August 2010. 3.Although relief was granted to all eight applicants under the Awards, the principal monetary relief awarded by the Tribunal was in favour of the 6th to 8th applicants (“the Additional Parties”), and the focus of the parties’ arguments before this court relates to the enforcement of the Awards by the Additional Parties against First Media. 4.While the validity of the Awards can no longer be challenged by First Media before the Singapore court, being the supervisory court of the arbitration, enforcement of the Awards by the Additional Parties against First Media has been refused by the Singapore Court of Appeal by a judgment of that court rendered on 31 October 2013 (“the SCA Judgment”), on the ground that there was no valid arbitration agreement between the Additional Parties and First Media and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the Awards in favour of the Additional Parties against First Media. 5.Notwithstanding the SCA Judgment, Astro has, through its counsel Mr David Joseph QC leading Mr Bernard Man and Mr Justin Ho, advanced formidable arguments in support of the contention that First Media’s present application to set aside the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment ought to be refused. In summary, Mr Joseph argues that:
6.At first sight, it may be thought that, given the SCA Judgment that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the Awards as between the Additional Parties and First Media, enforcement of the Awards should be refused in Hong Kong virtually as a matter of course. Indeed, the Court of Appeal here, when dismissing an application by Astro for leave to appeal against an order made by Madam Justice Mimmie Chan granting a stay of the garnishee order absolute pending the determination of the present summons (as to which see further below), said at paragraph 13 of its decision in HCMP 835/2014 that “it will indeed be remarkable if, despite the Singapore Court of Appeal judgment on the invalidity of arbitration awards, Astro will still be able to enforce a judgment here based on the same arbitration awards that were made without jurisdiction.” 7.I fully recognize the force of the above statement of the Court of Appeal. Nevertheless, for reasons which I shall explain in this judgment, I am ultimately persuaded by the arguments advanced on behalf of Astro that (i) I should not exercise my discretion to extend the time for First Media to apply to set aside the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment, with the consequence that they shall remain undisturbed, and (ii) in any event, even if an extension of time is granted, First Media would be precluded from relying on s 44(2) of the Ordinance to resist enforcement of the Awards. 8.Before I consider the validity of each of the five grounds advanced by Mr Joseph, and a number of additional issues raised by Mr Toby Landau QC (appearing together with Mr Mark Strachan SC and Mr Jeffrey Chau) for First Media in support of its application, I shall first set out the background facts relevant for the present purposes. Background facts 9.The facts set out in this section are taken largely from the SCA Judgment. 10.The dispute between the parties arose out of a joint venture agreement called the Subscription and Shareholders’ Agreement (“the SSA”) dated 11 March 2005 entered into between companies belonging to an Indonesian conglomerate (“the Lippo Group”) on the one hand and companies within a Malaysian media group (“the Astro Group”) on the other for the provision of multimedia and television services in Indonesia. The joint venture vehicle was the 3rd defendant in these proceedings (“Direct Vision”). 11.The Lippo Group’s interest in the joint venture was held by the 1st defendant in these proceedings (“Ayunda”), whose obligations to the Astro Group under the joint venture were guaranteed by First Media, an Indonesian company with its shares listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. On the other hand, the Astro Group’s interest in the joint venture was held by the 3rd and 4th applicants, with the 5th applicant guaranteeing their obligations. 12.The original parties to the SSA were the 3rd to 5th applicants on the side of the Astro Group, and Ayunda, First Media and Direct Vision (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Lippo”) on the side of the Lippo Group. Subsequently, pursuant to a novation agreement, the 1st and 2nd applicants took the place of the 3rd and 4th applicants in the joint venture. 13.The Additional Parties were, however, never made parties to the SSA. 14.The SSA contained an arbitration agreement, under the heading of “Dispute Resolution”, as follows:
15.Clause 18.5 of the SSA provides that the agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. 16.The SSA contained a number of conditions precedents upon which the parties’ respective obligations thereunder were predicated. It was agreed that the parties would have until July 2006 to fulfil those conditions precedent. In the meantime, funds and services were provided by the Additional Parties to Direct Vision to build up the latter’s business from about December 2005. 17.As a matter of fact, the conditions precedent were not fulfilled. By about mid‑August 2007, it became clear to the parties that the joint venture would not close. Nevertheless, the Additional Parties continued to provide funds and services to Direct Vision while the parties were exploring exit options. A dispute then arose between Lippo and Astro. Lippo contended that the Additional Parties had, orally or by conduct, agreed to continue to provide funds and services to Direct Vision, but Astro was not willing to do so. 18.In October 2008, the Additional Parties stopped further provision of funds and services to Direct Vision. In the meantime, in September 2009, Ayunda commenced proceedings in the Indonesian court against, inter alia, the Additional Parties (“the Indonesian Proceedings”). 19.On the basis that the commencement of the Indonesian Proceedings amounted to a breach of the arbitration agreement contained in the SSA, Astro commenced Arbitration No 62 of 2008 (“the Arbitration”) at the SIAC by a notice of arbitration dated 6 October 2008 against Lippo. 20.In the notice of arbitration, Astro sought, inter alia, the following relief against Lippo: (i) an anti‑suit injunction against Ayunda in respect of the Indonesian Proceedings; (ii) declarations that the SSA was the parties’ only joint venture agreement which had lapsed and there was no continuing obligation on the part of Astro to continue to provide funds and services to Direct Vision, and (iii) payment of various sums by way of restitution and/or quantum meruit. 21.In view of the fact that the Additional Parties were not parties to the SSA, Astro stated in the notice of arbitration that the Additional Parties had consented to being added as parties to the Arbitration, and made an application pursuant to rule 24(b) of the 2007 SIAC Rules (“Rule 24(b)”) to join the Additional Parties as parties to the Arbitration (“the Joinder Application”). 22.The Joinder Application was contested by Lippo. 23.Rule 24(b), under the heading of “Additional Powers of the Tribunal”, states as follows:
24.On 7 May 2009, the Tribunal rendered an award (“the Award on Preliminary Issues”), holding that (i) on the true construction of Rule 24(b), it had power to join the Additional Parties as parties to the Arbitration as long as they consented to being joined, and (ii) the power to join the Additional Parties as parties to the Arbitration should be exercised. 25.Thereafter, between 3 October 2009 and 3 August 2010, the Tribunal rendered four other awards, including an interim final award on the merits of the parties’ disputes dated 16 February 2010 (“the Interim Final Award”). 26.The total monetary award made by the Tribunal in favour of Astro against Lippo under the Awards was in excess of US$130 million. 27.Lippo did not take any steps to challenge or apply to set aside the Awards before the supervisory court of the Arbitration (ie the Singapore court). 28.Astro sought enforcement of the Awards in various jurisdictions, including Singapore, Hong Kong, England, Malaysia and Indonesia. I am told that Lippo did not resist proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of the Awards in England or Malaysia, because Lippo had no assets in those jurisdictions on which execution of the judgments giving effect to the Awards could be levied. For the same reason, Lippo did not originally take steps to resist proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of the Awards in Hong Kong, but subsequently adopted a different stance when it transpired that there were assets of Lippo to be found here (disputed by Lippo). Lippo did take active steps to resist proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of the Awards in Indonesia on various grounds which it is not necessary to set out in this judgment. The Singapore proceedings 29.In so far as Singapore is concerned, leave to enforce the Awards was originally granted by the Singapore High Court on 5 August and 3 September 2010 (“the Singapore Enforcement Orders”), but the judgments entered pursuant to those orders on 24 March 2011 were later set aside on 22 August 2011 at the instance of First Media on the ground of irregular service of the enforcement orders. On 12 September 2011, First Media applied (“the Singapore Setting Aside Application”) to set aside the Singapore Enforcement Orders, but its application failed at first instance by a judgment of the Singapore High Court rendered on 22 October 2012. First Media then appealed against the first instance judgment to the Singapore Court of Appeal, which led to the SCA Judgment. 30.In view of the fact that the seat of the Arbitration was in Singapore, the Awards were regarded as “domestic international awards” in so far as proceedings for their recognition and enforcement in Singapore were concerned. The statutory regime governing the enforcement of a domestic international award in Singapore is s 19 of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (“IAA”), which states as follows:
31.The following provisions of the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“the Model Law”) adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) are relevant for the purpose of understanding the SCA Judgment:
32.The Singapore Court of Appeal found in favour of First Media, for the following reasons (see in particular paragraphs 22, 30, 143, 158, 178, 198, 224 and 230 of the SCA Judgment):
33.In a further judgment rendered by the Singapore Court of Appeal on 11 September 2014 to settle the terms of the order to be made, the Singapore Court of Appeal referred to First Media’s observation or complaint that the SCA Judgment did not address the merits of First Media’s argument that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the 1st to 5th applicants on the ground of non‑compliance with the “multi‑tier” dispute resolution mechanism contained in clause 17 of the SSA. The Singapore Court of Appeal noted that the Tribunal had found that the conditions precedent for commencing arbitration had been complied with and there was no basis to reverse the Tribunal’s finding on that specific issue. The Hong Kong proceedings 34.By an order dated 3 August 2010 (ie the first of the two Hong Kong Orders), Mr Justice Saunders:
35.By a further order dated 9 September 2010 (ie the second of the two Hong Kong Orders), Mr Justice Saunders:
36.No application was made by Lippo to set aside the Hong Kong Orders within the time limit as stipulated in those orders. Accordingly, on 9 December 2010, Mr Justice Saunders entered judgment (ie the Hong Kong Judgment) against Lippo in terms of the Awards, pursuant to s 2GG of the Ordinance. 37.The reason why First Media initially did not take any step to seek to set aside the Hong Kong Orders within the time limit as stipulated in those orders or challenge the Hong Kong Judgment is set out in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the affidavit of Charles William Allen of Sidley Austin (First Media’s former solicitors) filed on 18 January 2012 in support of the present application, as follows:
38.In passing, I should mention that Mr Allen also stated in the said affidavit that, according to preliminary advice which First Media received from MR & Partners, the service of the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment was contrary to Indonesian law. It was said that First Media was entitled to argue that it was not properly served with the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment in accordance with their terms and Order 73, rule 10 and Order 11, rules 5, 6 and 8 of the Rules of the High Court, but nonetheless it did not in fact seek to set aside the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment on that ground. In his oral submissions to the court, Mr Landau made it clear that First Media was not taking the point that it had not been properly served with the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment, but relied on the advice given by the Indonesian lawyers as being relevant to the issue of whether First Media’s conduct (namely, the delay in making the present application) was reasonable. 39.First Media’s stance regarding the Hong Kong proceedings changed, however, when Astro successfully obtained the Garnishee Order Nisi on 22 July 2011 to attach a debt of US$44 million (“the Debt”) due from AcrossAsia Limited (“AAL”) to First Media to answer the Hong Kong Judgment. AAL is a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands, with its shares listed on the Growth Enterprise Market of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, and holds 55.1% of all the issued shares in First Media. 40.The Debt arose out of a facility agreement (“the Facility Agreement”) entered into between First Media and AAL on 30 June 2011, whereby First Media granted a loan facility of US$44 million to AAL. 41.On 5 August 2011, the Garnishee Order Nisi was served on First Media. On 16 August 2011, AAL filed an affirmation of Yuk Hung Chan to oppose the grant of a garnishee order absolute, on the principal ground that a Hong Kong garnishee order would not extinguish the underlying debt owed by AAL to First Media which was governed by Indonesian law, because such order would not be recognised by the Indonesian courts. In other words, it was argued that AAL would be at risk of “double jeopardy” in having to pay the Debt twice. In that affirmation, it was also stated that “steps will also be taken by First Media to challenge the applications in Hong Kong to enforce [the Awards]”. 42.On 18 January 2012, First Media took out the present summons seeking an extension of time to apply to set aside the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment, and an order to set aside those orders and judgment and to discharge the Garnishee Order Nisi. 43.On 20 February 2012, Astro issued a summons (“Astro’s Stay Summons”) seeking (i) an order that all further proceedings in this action, including the present summons, be stayed pending the determination by the Singapore court of the Singapore Setting Aside Application, and (ii) an order that pending the final determination of the Singapore Setting Aside Application, AAL was to pay all sums due and payable, or as they became due and payable, to First Media into court. Astro’s Stay Summons came before Deputy High Court Judge Lok on 15 March 2012, who granted the order sought by Astro. 44.In the skeleton argument of Mr Clifford Smith SC, former counsel for Astro, filed in support of Astro’s Stay Summons, it was stated that the basis of the application was that First Media’s present application would require the Hong Kong court to consider and decide issues which:
45.In the same skeleton argument, Mr Smith identified three issues which is was said would arise for decision in the Singapore court:
Mr Smith further stated that it was common ground that the above questions raised important issues which would be determined by the Singapore court, and the determination of First Media’s present summons would required the Hong Kong court to consider and determine issues of Singapore law which “are identical to those raised by First Media in the pending Singapore proceedings”. 46.There was no appeal against Deputy High Court Judge Lok’s order staying all further proceedings in this action pending the determination of the Singapore Setting Aside Application, but AAL appealed against the order requiring AAL to pay into court all sums due and payable, or as they became due and payable, by it to First Media (“the Payment‑In Order”). On 10 August 2012, the Court of Appeal gave judgment dismissing AAL’s appeal. 47.On 24 September 2012, AAL took out two summonses for (i) an order to set aside the Payment‑In Order, and (ii) an order to lift the stay in respect of the garnishee proceedings and discharge the Garnishee Order Nisi. 48.On 27 September 2012, Deputy High Court Judge Lok made an order lifting the stay in respect of the garnishee proceedings, and directing AAL’s two summonses and the Garnishee Order Nisi be heard at an early date. 49.AAL’s two summonses and the Garnishee Order Nisi were heard by Deputy High Court Judge Mayo in September and October 2013. After a contested hearing involving viva voce evidence given by the parties’ witnesses, Deputy High Court Judge Mayo gave a written decision on 31 October 2013 ordering that the Garnishee Order Nisi be made absolute (“the Garnishee Order Absolute”) and dismissing AAL’s applications to set aside the Payment‑In Order and to discharge the Garnishee Order Nisi. 50.It is apparent from Deputy High Court Judge Mayo’s written decision that the learned judge was highly critical of the conduct of AAL and First Media. In particular, the learned judge expressed the view that:
51.It will be recalled that it was also on 31 October 2013 that the Singapore Court of Appeal rendered the SCA Judgment. 52.By a notice of appeal dated 27 November 2013, AAL appealed against the aforesaid decision of Deputy High Court Judge Mayo. First Media did likewise by a notice of appeal dated 28 November 2013. These appeals, I understand, have not yet been heard. 53.On 24 January 2014, Madam Justice Mimmie Chan granted a stay of execution of the Garnishee Order Absolute pending the determination of the present application. Astro’s subsequent application seeking leave to appeal against Madam Justice Mimmie Chan’s order was refused by the Court of Appeal on 25 June 2014. 54.It now falls upon me to determine First Media’s summons to set aside the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment. Present application not precluded by entry of judgment 55.Put simply, Astro’s argument under Ground 1 is that once the Hong Kong Judgment was entered, First Media would be barred from applying to set aside the Hong Kong Orders (and any subsequent judgments or orders obtained by Astro pursuant thereto) under Order 73, rule 10(6) of the Rules of High Court (2009 edition, being the relevant edition at the time of the making of the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment). In what follows, references to Order 73, rule 10 shall be references to the 2009 edition of the Rules of the High Court. First Media’s only remedy, it is said, is to seek leave to appeal against the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgement to the Court of Appeal out of time. 56.I am told by Mr Strachan (who presented First Media’s submissions to the court on this issue) that he has not found any authority in Hong Kong, England or elsewhere which supports the proposition that, once a judgment is entered, the court no longer has power to refuse enforcement pursuant to s 44 of the Ordinance. Mr Joseph has not referred me to any such authority either. 57.I shall therefore approach this issue on principle. The statutory scheme permitting an arbitration award to be given effect as a judgment of the court is as follows:
58.It is clear from the above provisions that the first order to be made by the court in an application to enforce an arbitration award as a judgment of the court should be an order granting “leave” to enforce. Within 14 days of the service of the order granting leave (or such other period as may be fixed by the court in the case of service out of the jurisdiction), the debtor may apply to set aside the order. It seems to me to follow that “judgment” should be entered only after the expiry of the time limit for an application to set aside the order, or after the final disposal of the setting aside application if such application is made by the debtor. 59.I note that in the present case, the Hong Kong Orders granting leave to enforce the Awards also provided for entry of judgment to give effect to the Awards, and the Hong Kong Judgment appeared to duplicate the judgments already entered under the Hong Kong Orders. Notwithstanding this apparent oddity, I do not think they were intended to depart from the statutory scheme mentioned above. 60.As a matter of principle, I see no reason why an order granting leave to enforce an arbitration award made in accordance with the machinery laid down under Order 73, rule 10 should become immune from challenge once judgment is entered. If time for the application is extended, the order granting leave to enforce may be set aside based on well established principles. And once the order granting leave is set aside, the judgment entered pursuant to the order (and further orders made in consequence of the judgment such as a garnishee order nisi or absolute) would logically fall away. 61.Although this issue does not appear to have been expressly considered in previous cases, Mr Strachan has referred me to two decisions, namely, Soinco Saci and Another v Novokuznetsk Aluminium Plant and Others [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep 337 (English Court of Appeal), and To Ho Sum v Sheenluxe Development Ltd, HCCT 34/2008 (Reyes J, 3 December 2008), where the courts seemed to have assumed or proceeded on the basis that a judgment entered pursuant to an order granting leave to enforce an arbitration award could still be set aside notwithstanding the entry of the judgment. 62.The situation is, it seems to me, analogous with the ordinary situation where the setting aside of a default judgment (whether regular or irregular) would generally result in the setting aside of any garnishee order nisi or absolute obtained by the judgment creditor pursuant to the default judgment. 63.In the absence of any binding authority on this issue, I am not prepared to accept a rigid rule which would preclude an enforcement order made under Order 73, rule 10 from challenge as soon as judgment is entered to give effect to the arbitration award. 64.In all, I do not consider that the entry of the Hong Kong Judgment means that First Media can no longer apply to set aside the Hong Kong Orders. 65.Whether time ought to be extended to permit First Media to apply to set aside the Hong Kong Orders is a separate issue, which I shall consider after I have considered other issues raised by the parties, in particular the merits of the setting aside application. I am conscious of the general undesirability of turning an application for an extension of time (in the present case to apply to set aside an enforcement order) into an occasion for a detailed examination of the merits of the substantive application. Nevertheless, in the present case, the extension of time application and the substantive setting aside application have been fully argued before me, and it is highly likely that whatever my decision, the matter will go further to the higher court(s). In the circumstances, I consider that I ought to express my views on all the major issues raised by the parties, and it would be convenient for me to examine the issue of extension of time after I have dealt with the other issues going to the merits of the substantive application. This must not, however, be treated as a precedent for postponing an application for extension of time to the full hearing of the substantive application: see Terna Bahrain Holding Company WLL v Al Shamsi and Others [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Law Rep 85, at paragraph 34 per Popplewell J. Permitting First Media to resist enforcement of the Awards in Hong Kong would be contrary to the principle of “good faith” 66.In respect of Ground 3, Astro’s argument that First Media should not be permitted to resist enforcement of the Awards is based, essentially, upon a broad principle of good faith which it is said is applicable under the New York Convention. Astro places strong emphasis on the fact that First Media did not challenge the Tribunal’s preliminary ruling on jurisdiction rendered on 7 May 2009 within 30 days after having received notice of that ruling in accordance with article 16(3) of the Model Law. The detailed matters that Astro relies upon in support of this argument include the following:
67.In paragraph 128.14 of his written skeleton argument for Astro, Mr Joseph acknowledges that from time to time in the course of taking the above steps and defending Astro’s claim on the merits, First Media did on occasions, although not at each step, reserve its position regarding the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. However, Mr Joseph argues that First Media’s defence of the claims on the merits, combined with the matters mentioned above, means that First Media can now no longer resist enforcement of the Awards on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make those Awards. 68.In passing, I should also mention that, in paragraph 128.15 of his written skeleton argument for Astro, Mr Joseph refers to the conduct of First Media subsequent to the making of the Awards in support of Ground 3. However, it is clear from Mr Joseph’s oral submissions that Astro relies principally on the facts and matters set out in paragraph 66 above. 69.I now turn to the legal principles relevant to Ground 3. 70.S 44(1) of the Ordinance provides that enforcement of a Convention award shall not be refused except in the cases mentioned in that section. 71.S 44(2) of the Ordinance goes to state (inter alia) as follows:
72.S 44(3) of the Ordinance, while it does not have direct application to the present case, should also be noted:
73.In considering Ground 3, the following basic principles should be borne in mind:
74.Mr Joseph submits that there are two principal questions of Hong Kong law relevant for the purpose of the present discussion:
75.The answers to these two questions, according to Mr Joseph, can be found in two particular Hong Kong decisions, namely, that of Mr Justice Kaplan in China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd, supra, and that of the Court of Final Appeal in Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polyteck Engineering Co Ltd, supra. 76.China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch concerned an arbitration award rendered by the Shenzhen Sub‑Commission of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”). The defendant opposed enforcement of the award on the ground set out in s 44(2)(e) of the Ordinance, namely, that the composition of the arbitral authority was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties since the arbitration clause provided for disputes to be submitted to CIETAC in Peking, but the plaintiff submitted the dispute to CIETAC in Shenzhen which rendered the award. The defendant had informally raised that issue with one of the appointed arbitrators, who opined that CIETAC in Shenzhen had jurisdiction. Thereafter, the defendant fully participated in the arbitral proceedings, and did not formally raise its objection with the tribunal or communicate its objection to CIETAC in Beijing. 77.Mr Justice Kaplan accepted that technically the arbitrators of CIETAC in Shenzhen did not have jurisdiction, but held that the defendant was not entitled to resist enforcement of the award under s 44(2) of the Ordinance, on two grounds. First, the learned judge considered that upon the true construction of the Convention, there was a general duty of good faith which was distinct from principles of estoppel (and presumably waiver) under domestic or municipal laws. The following passage in the judgment of Mr Justice Kaplan at page 225 of the report encapsulates the reasoning of the learned judge in relation to the application of this principle of good faith:
78.Second, Mr Justice Kaplan considered that, on the particular facts of that case, he ought to exercise his residual discretion under s 44(2) to permit enforcement of the award. 79.Hebei Import & Export Corp concerned a Convention award made in the PRC. The underlying dispute related to the quality of certain equipment sold by the respondent to the appellant which was installed at the end user’s factory. Under the governing Chinese arbitration rules, the tribunal could collect evidence otherwise than in the presence of the parties. The tribunal appointed experts who conducted an examination of the equipment at the end user’s factory. The chief arbitrator was present during the inspection, which was carried out in the absence of the parties, and received communications from the end user’s technicians at the factory. The respondent subsequently became aware of the communications but did not raise the issue of whether it was improper for the chief arbitrator to receive the communications in the respondent’s absence. After the tribunal had made an award in favour of the appellant, the respondent applied, unsuccessfully, to a Beijing court (being the court of supervisory jurisdiction) to set aside the award. The grounds relied upon by the respondent at that stage did not include the complaint that the chief arbitrator received communications from the end user’s technicians at the factory in the absence of the parties. This complaint was also not raised before Mr Justice Findlay at first instance in the enforcement proceedings in Hong Kong, but was raised for the first time in the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal considered that there was departure from natural justice and apparent bias as a result of the communications, and held that enforcement should be refused on the ground that it would be contrary to public policy in Hong Kong to enforce the award under s 44(3) of the Ordinance. 80.On further appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, the decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed. The leading judgment of the Court of Final Appeal was given by Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, who held that, in light of the respondent’s conduct in the arbitration, it was not open to the respondent to resist enforcement of the award on any ground arising out of the communications to the chief arbitrator. At 137F‑138H, Sir Anthony Mason NPJ stated the following:
81.These two decisions support the proposition that the court has a discretion under s 44(2) of the Ordinance to decline to refuse enforcement, even if a ground for refusal might otherwise be made out, in circumstances where there has been a breach of the good faith, or bona fide, principle on the part of the award debtor. The breadth of this principle has not yet been fully set. It is probably not possible, and in any event not desirable, to do so, but it would be wide enough to cover situations recognised under our domestic law as giving rise to an estoppel or waiver. 82.On the other hand, it would appear that there is no general obligation on the part of an award debtor to exhaust his remedies in the supervisory court before he could rely on a Convention ground to resist enforcement in the enforcement court. In Paklito Investment Ltd v Klockner (East Asia) Ltd [1993] 2 HKLR 39 at 48 to 49, the following was stated by Mr Justice Kaplan:
83.This seems to be consistent with the principle of “choice of remedies” applied by the Singapore Court of Appeal. 84.I may add that, as pointed out in paragraphs 38 to 40 of the SCA Judgment, the principle of “choice of remedies”, which draws upon a distinction between “passive remedies” and “active remedies”, was already a recognized feature of English arbitration law under the 1950 Arbitration Act. In Mustill and Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England (1989), 2nd Ed, the learned authors describe the operation of “passive remedies” and “active remedies” as follows (at page 546):
85.The learned authors also explain the options available to parties with jurisdictional objections as follows (at page 545):
86.The current English position appears to remain the same. In Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, supra, [2011] 1 AC 763, at paragraph 98, Lord Collins of Mapesbury JSC stated as follows:
87.Mr Joseph has referred me to a number of other Hong Kong decisions, including Jiangxi Provincial Metal & Mineral Import & Export Corp v Sulanser Co Ltd [1995] 2 HKC 373, Sam Ming City Forestry Economic Co v Lam Pun Hung [2001] 3 HKC 573, Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd v Eton Properties Ltd [2008] 4 HKLRD 972, and Incorporated Owners of Tak Tai Building v Leung Yau Building Ltd [2005] 1 HKC 530, in support of Ground 3, but they do not seem to me to take the matter any further. 88.An important feature present in China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch and Hebei Import & Export Corp, but absent from the present case, is that the award debtor, while being fully aware of the relevant objection, failed to raise it with the arbitral tribunal. 89.In the present case, First Media did raise its jurisdictional objection before the Tribunal, which led to the Award on Preliminary Issues. Although First Media did not challenge the Award on Preliminary Issues pursuant to article 16(3) of the Model Law, the Singapore Court of Appeal considered that First Media never clearly or unequivocally abandoned the objection. First Media’s position was stated in its statement of defence and counterclaim in the Arbitration dated 18 June 2009 served subsequent to the rendering of the Award on Preliminary Issues. There were also other instances where First Media expressly reserved its position as regards the jurisdiction of the Tribunal both before and after the rendering of the Award on Preliminary Issues, details of which are set out in a coloured chart handed up by Mr Landau to the court in the course of his submissions on 8 December 2014, which it is not necessary to recite in this judgment. The question is whether these features are sufficient to distinguish the present situation from that in China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch or Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polyteck Engineering Co Ltd. 90.The Singapore Court of Appeal held that First Media did not waive its right to object to the jurisdiction, or conduct itself in such a way that it was estopped from raising this objection: see paragraphs 199 to 222 and 224(d) of the SCA Judgement. I accept that, in principle, when one is considering whether First Media’s conduct amounts to a breach of the good faith, or bona fide, principle, one cannot, or should not, look at such conduct in a legal vacuum, or divorced from the legal regime governing the conduct in question. As Sir Anthony Mason NPJ remarked in Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polyteck Engineering Co Ltd, supra, at 139‑140, in approaching the question of whether a ground based on s 44(2)(c) and (3) of the Ordinance had been made out for resisting enforcement:
91.These having been said, the Singapore Court of Appeal’s focus, apparently, was on the issues of waiver and estoppel as a matter of Singapore domestic law, while I am here exercising a discretion under s 44(2) of the Ordinance as a matter of Hong Kong law. In my view, what was considered to be so objectionable in China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch and Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polyteck Engineering Co Ltd was the idea that a party to an arbitration, while being fully aware of an objection (whether in relation to the jurisdiction of the tribunal or the procedure or conduct in the course of the arbitration), should be permitted to keep the objection in reserve, participate fully in the arbitration and raise the objection in the enforcing court only after an award had been made against him by the tribunal. This is effectively what happened in the present case. First Media was fully aware of its right to challenge the Tribunal’s ruling on jurisdiction before the Singapore High Court under article 16(3) of the Model Law, but chose not to do so. It seems clear that what First Media decided to do was to defend the claim on the merits in the hope that it would succeed before the Tribunal, and keep the jurisdictional point in reserve to be deployed in the enforcement court only when it suited its interests to do so. The fact that First Media did raise the objection with the Tribunal should not, in my view, make any difference having regard to its subsequent conduct as summarised in paragraph 66 above. In all the circumstances of the present case, I consider that First Media should not be permitted to rely on s 44(2) of the Ordinance to resist enforcement of the Awards because it has acted in breach of the good faith, or bona fide, principle. 92.If I am wrong in this conclusion, I would have to consider the second question posed by Mr Joseph referred to in paragraph 74(2) above. Generally speaking, it seems clear that the discretion under s 44(2) of the Ordinance to permit enforcement of an arbitral award where the award debtor is able to establish one or more grounds for refusal of enforcement is a narrow one. In particular, it would take a very strong case to permit enforcement of an arbitral award in circumstances where it was made by an arbitral tribunal without jurisdiction: see Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, supra, at paragraphs 58 and 61 per Moore‑Bick LJ and paragraphs 74, 87 and 89 per Rix LJ (in the Court of Appeal), and paragraphs 67 to 69 per Lord Mance JSC and paragraphs 127 and 131 per Lord Collins of Mapesbury JSC (in the Supreme Court); see also Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Company Petroalliance Services Co Ltd [2002] 2 Lloyds Law Rep 326, at paragraphs 8 and 18 per Mance LJ; Kanoria v Guinness [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 413, at paragraph 25 per Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers CJ and paragraph 30 per May LJ. 93.On the facts of the present case, subject to the application of the good faith principle mentioned above, I would not feel able to exercise my residual discretion to permit enforcement of the Awards in circumstances where they were made by the Tribunal without jurisdiction. The SCA Judgment on joinder/jurisdiction conclusively settles the law on that issue and is binding on Astro 94.Under Ground 4, Mr Joseph argues that the Tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction is correct, and this court is not bound by the decision of another enforcing court, namely, the Singapore Court of Appeal. 95.This ground can be disposed of quickly. The question of whether the Tribunal had power to join the Additional Parties under Rule 24(b), and had jurisdiction to render the Awards as between the Additional Parties and First Media, is governed by Singapore law, which must now be regarded as having been conclusively settled by the SCA Judgment. See Guangzhou Green‑Enhan Bio‑Engineering Co Ltd v Green Power Health Products International Co Ltd [2004] 4 HKC 163, at paragraphs 2(b) and (c) and 3 per Lam J (as he then was). 96.In any event, the parties before the Singapore Court of Appeal and in the present application are the same, the issue under discussion in this section is identical in the two sets of proceedings, the Singapore Court of Appeal is undoubtedly a court of competent jurisdiction in relation to this issue between the parties, and the SCA Judgment is a final and conclusive judgment on the merits. Accordingly, Astro is bound by the decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal on this issue by virtue of an issue estoppel per rem judicatam. See First Laser Ltd v Fujian Enterprises (Holdings) Co Ltd (2012) 15 HKCFAR 569, at paragraphs 43 to 49 per Lord Collins of Mapesbury NPJ; The Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490, at 493F‑494A per Lord Diplock and at 499A‑C per Lord Brandon. 97.In the course of his oral submissions to the court, Mr Joseph referred to paragraph 96 of the Award on Preliminary Issues and contended that, before the Tribunal, First Media had made a concession that the Tribunal had jurisdiction, under Rule 24(b), to join the Additional Parties as parties to the Arbitration, but argued that the Tribunal should not exercise the power to join as a matter of discretion. In paragraph 96 of the Award on Preliminary Issues, it is recorded that First Media, in the course of its closing submissions to the Tribunal, withdrew the argument that the reference to “parties” in Rule 24(b) connoted persons who were themselves parties to the agreement containing the agreement to arbitrate. Mr Landau contended, however, that First Media had never made any “concession” on this issue, and pointed out that the same or similar argument had been raised by Astro before the Singapore Court of Appeal, albeit that it was not expressly dealt with in the SCA Judgment. 98.In any event, the significance of the concession, according to Mr Joseph, is that First Media is now precluded from relying on this ground (ie lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal to join the Additional Parties) to resist enforcement of the Awards under s 44(2) of the Ordinance. This is effectively the same argument under Ground 3, save that a different facet of First Media’s conduct is relied upon to contend that it should be precluded from relying on the s 44(2) to resist enforcement of the Awards. If First Media did make any concession, it would be a concession on a point of law. Under Hong Kong law, there is no general rule that a party is absolutely bound by an erroneous concession on a point of law (see Paquito Lima Buton v Rainbow Joy Shipping Ltd Inc (2008) 11 HKCFAR 464, at paragraph 11 per Ribeiro PJ), although circumstances may be such as would make it unjust or unfair to permit the concession to be withdrawn. It seems clear to me, from a perusal of the Award on Preliminary Issues, that the Tribunal would have come to the same conclusion regarding the true construction of Rule 24(b) with or without the alleged concession. In this connection, it is also right to have regard to the fact that the question of an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is a matter of fundamental importance to the process of the arbitration as well as the validity of the awards rendered by the tribunal. Further, it is apparent from the Award on Preliminary Issues that First Media continued to maintain that the Additional Parties could not, and should not, be joined as parties to the Arbitration for a number of reasons. In my view, even if First Media did make a concession as regards the true construction or effect of Rule 24(b) at one stage of the proceedings before the Tribunal, such concession should not lead to First Media being be precluded from relying on s 44(2) of the Ordinance to resist enforcement of the Awards. 99.In all, I do not consider that it is open to Astro in the present application to re‑open the issue of whether the Tribunal had power to join the Additional Parties under Rule 24(b), or had jurisdiction to render the Awards as between the Additional Parties and First Media. Astro is not entitled to raise the contention that the Memorandum of Issues amounted to a binding submission to arbitration 100.Under Ground 5, Astro argues that First Media, by signing the Memorandum of Issues, signed a further agreement for the arbitration of the issues identified in that memorandum which amounted to a binding submission to arbitration. It is also said that the Tribunal has made a further finding to that effect in the Interim Final Award, which has never been challenged or set aside and remains valid and binding. 101.Mr Joseph accepts that whether First Media’s conduct in signing the Memorandum of Issues amounted to a binding submission to arbitration is a question of Singapore law, and further accepts that this issue was raised and argued before the Singapore Court of Appeal. However, it was not expressly dealt with as a separate issue by the Singapore Court of Appeal in the SCA Judgment, but was considered in the context of the argument relating to “waiver” (see paragraphs 218 and 219 of the SCA Judgment). At paragraph 219, the Singapore Court of Appeal stated the following:
102.Mr Joseph’s argument is that, upon the true construction of the document itself, it amounted to a submission agreement. The true construction of the Memorandum of Issues is, however, a question of Singapore law. It is apparent from the above quotation of the SCA Judgment that the Singapore Court of Appeal took the view that the Memorandum of Issues amounted only to a statement of the remaining issues to be determined by the Tribunal in the Arbitration. The Singapore Court of Appeal also emphasised that Ayunda and First Media continued to reserve its objection to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction after signing the Memorandum of Issues. In light of those observations, it seems to me clear that the Singapore Court of Appeal did not regard First Media’s conduct in signing the Memorandum of Issues as amounting to a binding submission to arbitration of the issues identified in the memorandum. 103.In Guangzhou Green‑Enhan Bio‑Engineering Co Ltd v Green Power Health Products International Co Ltd, supra, at paragraphs 2(d) and 3, Lam J (as he then was) accepted the proposition that:
104.If the Singapore Court of Appeal was of the view that upon the true construction of the Memorandum of Issues, it amounted to a submission agreement, that would be a complete answer to First Media’s jurisdictional objection and it would be difficult to see how it would have been right to refuse to enforce the Awards. In my view, the Singapore Court of Appeal must, by necessary implication, have rejected Astro’s contention on this matter (see Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 15th Ed, at paragraph 14‑036). 105.It follows that, as in the case of joinder/jurisdiction point, it is not open to Astro to argue in this application that the Memorandum of Issues amounted to a binding submission to arbitration. First Media is not entitled to re‑open the argument that Astro failed to comply with the “multi‑tier” dispute resolution mechanism 106.There are two other issues raised by First Media which I should deal with before I turn to consider the issue of extension of time. 107.First, it is argued that the 1st to 5th applicants failed to comply with the multi‑tier dispute resolution mechanism in clause 7 of the SSA. This is an issue governed by Singapore law. For the same reason that Astro cannot re‑open the issue of whether the Tribunal had power to join the Additional Parties under Rule 24(b), or had jurisdiction to render the Awards as between the Additional Parties and First Media, it is likewise not open to First Media to argue in the present application that the 1st to 5th applicants failed to comply with the multi‑tier dispute resolution mechanism. 108.In passing, I should mention that Mr Landau did not, understandably, press this issue, because a central theme of his arguments is that all issues of Singapore law which have been decided by the Singapore Court of Appeal are binding on the parties and cannot be re‑litigated in the Hong Kong court. Stage 1 versus stage 2 enforcement 109.Second, First Media argues that Astro failed to satisfy the statutory pre‑conditions for enforcement of the Awards. 110.The statutory scheme under Part IV of the Ordinance adopts a two stage approach for the enforcement of a Convention award, which is defined in s 2(1) of the Ordinance to mean “an award to which Part IV applies, namely, an award made in pursuance of an arbitration agreement in a State or territory, other than China or any part thereof, which is a party to the New York Convention”. 111.S 43 of the Ordinance, commonly referred to as “stage 1”, provides that the party seeking to enforce a Convention award must produce:
112.S 44 of the Ordinance, commonly referred to as “stage 2”, then provides that enforcement of a Convention award shall not be refused except in the cases mentioned in sub‑section (2) and (3) of that section. 113.According to Mr Landau:
114.The relationship between stage 1 and stage 2 was the subject of careful consideration by Mance LJ (as he then was) in Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Company Petroalliance Services Co Ltd, supra, at paragraph 10, as follows:
115.At paragraph 12 of his judgment, Mance LJ continued as follows:
116.Both Part IV of the Ordinance and ss 100‑104 of the Arbitration Act 1996 seek to give effect to the New York Convention. The relevant statutory wording in relation to the two stages for enforcement of a Convention award in the Ordinance and the Arbitration Act 1996 is the same or materially the same. I consider that the above judgment of Mance LJ in Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Company Petroalliance Services Co Ltd also correctly states the legal position in Hong Kong as regards the relationship between stage 1 and stage 2 for enforcement of a Convention award. 117.It follow that, in order to satisfy the statutory pre‑conditions contained in s 43 of the Ordinance (ie stage 1) for enforcement of a Convention award, the award creditor is only required to produce, inter alia, (i) the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof, and (ii) the duly authenticated award or a duly certified copy of thereof which must have been made by the arbitral tribunal purporting to act under such arbitration agreement. All further arguments relating to the validity of the award, and other grounds for refusal of enforcement of the award, are to be dealt with in stage 2. 118.In the present case, Astro did produce the documents referred to in paragraph 117 above when it applied for the Hong Kong Orders (see the First and Second Affidavits of Chan Kanice Hoi Lam filed herein on behalf of Astro on 2 August 2010 and 23 August 2010 respectively). I conclude therefore that Astro did satisfy the statutory pre‑conditions contained in s 43 of the Ordinance for enforcement of the Awards. Time for First Media to apply to set aside the Hong Kong Orders should not be extended 119.As earlier mentioned, First Media had, under the Hong Kong Orders, 14 days after service of the orders on it to apply to set aside those orders. It is now no longer in dispute that the Hong Kong Orders were validly served on First Media on 18 October 2010, and the 14 day period for applying to set aside the Hong Kong Orders expired on 1 November 2010 (see Skeleton Argument on behalf of First Media dated 1 December 2014, paragraphs 160 and 161). 120.As a matter of fact, First Media’s present summons to set aside the Hong Kong Orders was issued on 18 January 2012, some 14 months out of time. 121.The issue is whether the court should exercise its discretion to extend the time to permit First Media to apply to set aside the Hong Kong Orders in the circumstances of the present case. 122.I have been referred by the parties to a good many authorities regarding the principles for extension of time. On behalf of First Media, Mr Landau strongly relies upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in The Decurion [2012] 1 HKLRD 1063, which concerned an application by a defendant for an extension of time to file a defence. The application was refused at first instance and judgment was entered against the defendant. In allowing the defendant’s appeal, Cheung JA (with whom the other members of the Court of Appeal agreed) gave the following guidance:
123.Mr Landau also argues that:
124.Mr Landau places special emphasis on (i) the issue of prejudice and submits that Astro would suffer no substantial prejudice if First Media is permitted to make the present application out of time, and (ii) the merits of the application to set aside the Hong Kong Orders in reliance upon s 44(2) of the Ordinance. 125.In so far as reasons for the delay are concerned, as earlier mentioned, First Media initially took the view that it had no assets in Hong Kong and thus it was not necessary to take any action in Hong Kong. I may add that First Media also referred to the advice that it received from its Indonesian lawyer that the Hong Kong Orders had not been properly served on it as being relevant for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness of First Media’s conduct. The position changed, however, when Astro obtained the Garnishee Order Nisi in circumstances which have already been set out above which meant that First Media had no alternative but to take action to set aside the Hong Kong Orders. I do not understand Mr Landau to be arguing that First Media had “good reasons” for the delay in seeking to set aside the Hong Kong Orders. In any event, in my view, the matters mentioned above provide, at best, an explanation for First Media’s delay in taking action but cannot be regarded as any “good reasons” to excuse the delay. 126.On behalf of Astro, Mr Joseph stresses that the short time limit (14 days) provided for any challenge of an enforcement order is designed to underline and support the important principle of speedy finality which underpins the whole of the Ordinance. He refers to s 2AA of the Ordinance which expressly provides that “the object of the Ordinance is to facilitate the fair and speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration without unnecessary expenses”. In this regard, Mr Joseph prays in aid the following statement of Waller LJ in Soinco v Novokuznetsk, supra, at 338:
127.I have also been referred to the recent decision of Popplewell J in Terna Bahrain Holding Company WLL v Al Shamsi and Others, supra, which concerned an application for an extension of the 28 day period to challenge a London arbitration award under ss 67 and 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and serious irregularity). The following statements of principle by the learned judge are worth quoting in full:
128.At paragraph 82 of his judgment, Popplewell J further stated the following:
129.In the present case, I consider the following factors to be particularly relevant in the exercise of my discretion whether to extend to time:
130.I have not lost sight of the size of the Awards. I also accept that Astro has not suffered any substantial prejudice (other than costs which can be compensated) as a result of First Media’s delay of 14 months to make the present application. I do not, however, consider that these matters are sufficient to override the three factors mentioned above or tilt the balance in favour of granting an extension. 131.As mentioned above, I have also come to the conclusion that First Media is precluded from seeking to rely on s 44(2) of the Ordinance to resist enforcement of the Awards. If that conclusion is correct, obviously I should decline to exercise my discretion to extend the time for First Media to make the setting aside application. Even if I had come to the conclusion that First Media’s setting aside application had merits and should otherwise succeed based on s 44(2) of the Ordinance, I would still not be prepared to exercise my discretion to extend time by reason of the three factors mentioned above. Conclusion 132.For the reasons stated above, I decline to exercise my discretion to extend the time for First Media to apply to set aside the Hong Kong Orders, with the consequence that First Media’s summons dated 18 January 2012 shall be dismissed in its entirety. In any event, even if I were to grant an extension of time, I would still have refused First Media’s setting aside application on the basis that it is precluded from relying on s 44(2) of the Ordinance to resist enforcement of the Awards. I also make an order nisi that Astro shall have the costs of this application, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for three counsel. 133.Lastly, it remains for me to thank counsel for their clear and cogent submissions which have assisted me tremendously in coming to my decision on this interesting but difficult case.
Mr David Joseph QC, Mr Bernard Man & Mr Justin Ho, instructed by Clifford Chance, for the judgment creditors (applicants) Mr Toby Landau QC, Mr Mark Strachan SC & Mr Jeffrey Chau, instructed by Stephenson Harwood, for the 2nd judgment debtor (respondent) |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCCT 45/2010