HKSAR v. Sajid Mahmood
Read the full judgment text of CACC 333/2013 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 12 February 2015.
1. The applicant, who was the 5 th defendant at trial, originally sought leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence. He had been tried by Deputy Judge Longley in the District Court on a joint charge of Robbery, contrary to section 10 of the Theft Ordinance, Cap 210 together with four other defendants. The 1 st defendant (D1) pleaded guilty to the charge; the 2 nd defendant (D2) was, together with the applicant, found guilty after trial; and the 3 rd and 4 th defendants (D3 and D4) wer
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CACC 333/2013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 333 OF 2013 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO. 280 OF 2013) ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Hon Macrae JA (giving the Reasons for Judgment of the court): Introduction 1.The applicant, who was the 5th defendant at trial, originally sought leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence. He had been tried by Deputy Judge Longley in the District Court on a joint charge of Robbery, contrary to section 10 of the Theft Ordinance, Cap 210 together with four other defendants. The 1st defendant (D1) pleaded guilty to the charge; the 2nd defendant (D2) was, together with the applicant, found guilty after trial; and the 3rd and 4th defendants (D3 and D4) were found not guilty after trial. The applicant was sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment. 2.He was represented at the appeal by Mr Sutherland, with him Mr Tibbo, on the instructions of the Bar Free Legal Service, Mr Sutherland having also represented the applicant at the trial. In the course of the hearing in relation to the appeal against conviction, the applicant abandoned his appeal against sentence. The Background to the Offence 3.Subject to one matter, which we have italicised in the passage below and which we shall deal with in due course, the deputy judge accurately summarised the factual background and the respective roles of each of the defendants at the trial. In view of that apparent inaccuracy, which was initially relied upon by Mr Sutherland as demonstrating a misunderstanding by the deputy judge of what he characterised as “confused, contradictory and inconsistent evidence” by the victim, Jonathan Lau, we shall set out the relevant parts of the deputy judge’s summary. The judge said as follows:
4.To elaborate on that summary, when the police intercepted the five defendants, PC 3774 had asked the applicant, before conducting a body search on him, if he understood Punti. The applicant confirmed that he did. Having found the mobile phone in the applicant’s jacket, he then asked the applicant about the source of the phone. The applicant replied in Punti that he had bought it in Tsuen Wan. When, a few minutes later, he was informed by a colleague that the mobile phone had now been identified by the victim, PC 3774 proceeded to arrest and caution the applicant, again in Punti, after which the applicant pointed at D1 and said in English, “He give me the mobile phone”. After a voir dire, the deputy judge exercised his discretion to exclude the applicant’s answer under caution on the basis that he may not have fully understood the formality of a caution administered in Punti. The answer given by the applicant during PC 3774’s preliminary enquiries before caution was, however, admitted into evidence. The defence Case 5.The applicant gave evidence both in the voir dire and on the general issue. His defence essentially was that he was present in the Park with the other defendants when D1 and D3 had suddenly left the group and become involved in an altercation with Jonathan Lau. He was not, however, involved in that incident. He challenged by way of voir dire the admissibility of:
6.On the general issue, the applicant was the only defendant to give evidence. The deputy judge summarised his account as follows:
The issues at trial 7.The major issue at trial was the correctness of the identification of the applicant as someone who had been involved in the incident with Jonathan Lau in Kwok Shui Road Park. Although the applicant admitted his presence in the Park and later at Kwong Fai Circuit at the material times, his case was that he was not involved in any robbery of the victim. Accordingly, Jonathan Lau’s identification of him as a participant in the robbery was severely challenged. There was a further issue of whether the victim’s mobile phone had been found in the applicant’s jacket as PC 3774 claimed, or whether the applicant was innocently holding it in the circumstances for which he contended. The verbal uttered before arrest and caution was, therefore, disputed. Reasons for Verdict 8.Notwithstanding the applicant’s previous good character, the deputy judge found that he could attach no weight to his evidence. He did not believe that it was simply a coincidence that the applicant should have come across D1 and D2 at Kwong Fai Circuit after walking for 15 to 20 minutes after the incident at Kwok Shui Road Park. He found it artificial that the applicant would have asked D1 what he had picked up in the Park and then, for no particular reason, examined the mobile phone, at which time he happened to be intercepted by the police. 9.The judge explained in detail his reasons for admitting the applicant’s statement that he had bought the mobile phone in Tsuen Wan, while excluding the applicant’s answer to the caution that he had been given the phone by D1. 10.In relation to the evidence of the identification parade, the deputy judge considered the authorities of R v Walsh[1] and Secretary for Justice v Lam Tak Ming[2]. He was satisfied that there was no truth in the applicant’s allegations of assault in the police vehicle on the day of arrest, or that his resulting fear of further assault caused him to raise no objection when he attended the identification parade a few days later. 11.In respect of the suggestion that the identification parade had not been conducted fairly, in as much as the applicant did not understand his rights, the interpreter having used Punjabi which was not a language or dialect with which he was sufficiently familiar, the deputy judge noted that the applicant had appeared before a magistrate on four occasions when proceedings had been translated into Punjabi and that he would normally communicate with his Indonesian wife in English. Furthermore, the applicant had admitted that he understood the purpose of the parade and that he had been asked whether he was willing to take part in it. He had also asked for one of the actors to be removed from the line-up. The deputy judge was satisfied from this and other evidence that the applicant’s knowledge of both Punjabi and English, and his understanding of what was going on at the parade, was greater than he admitted and sufficient to negate any suggestion of unfairness. 12.Insofar as the issue of the applicant’s appearance and clothing were concerned, the judge found that there was no impropriety in the conduct of the identification parade and there was no deviation from the procedure laid down in the Police Force Manual. He distinguished the circumstances of the case from HKSAR v Wong Chi Kwan[3]and R v Gall[4]. 13.The deputy judge reminded himself of the observations in R v Turnbull[5]. However, on the basis of all of the evidence, he was satisfied that the applicant was the one who had held Jonathan Lau’s wrist or arm at the initial stage of the robbery, after which D1 had picked up and run off with his mobile phone. Accordingly, he convicted him as charged. Application for leave to appeal against conviction 14.On behalf of the applicant, Mr Sutherland argues a number of matters, which may be reduced to essentially three grounds of appeal. 15.First, Mr Sutherland complained of the quality of the identification evidence. He submitted that:
16.Secondly, Mr Sutherland argued that the judge erred in admitting into evidence what the applicant had allegedly said before caution, yet had excluded what he had said after caution; when he should have excluded them both. The effect of allowing the pre-caution utterance into evidence was to compel the applicant to give evidence and thereby compromise his right to remain silent. 17.A third ground averred that the deputy judge’s reasons were inadequate in dealing with the issues raised by the evidence. Consideration of the appeal 18.Before considering Jonathan Lau’s evidence and what the deputy judge made of it, we should return to and deal with the apparent error relied upon by Mr Sutherland in the italicised part of the passage recited at para 3 supra, which he contends demonstrates a misunderstanding of the witness’s evidence. In fact, earlier on in the same passage, the judge had stated as part of the factual background that:
Later in his reasons for verdict, the deputy judge drew a distinction between “the person who (Jonathan Lau) says was the 5th defendant rather than the person who snatched up his phone”, while in his concluding remarks, he made the following finding in relation to the applicant:
19.It becomes patently clear when these passages are examined within the deputy judge’s reasons for verdict as a whole that the italicised reference in the passage concerned to “the fifth defendant pick(ing) up the phone” was a slip of the tongue on the part of the deputy judge and that, consistent with the other passages to which we have referred and his eventual findings, he had meant to say that it was D1, and not the applicant, who had picked up the phone. 20.In our view, it is not right to say that the deputy judge was in any doubt as to what Jonathan Lau was saying about the applicant’s role. It is true that the witness’s version of the attack on him on the first day of his evidence differed from his later evidence, which had changed when he was shown his written statement of 10 January 2013 during cross-examination. The witness explained that any inconsistencies between his oral testimony and his written statement to the police were caused by a blurring of his memory with the passage of time. He insisted that the account he had given to the police in the statement presented a true and accurate version of events. That version, as the deputy judge found, was that it was the applicant who had first grabbed him by the wrist or arm, after which D1 pushed him to the ground and then made off with his phone which had fallen from his hand. We do not agree that the witness’s evidence, as it ultimately emerged once he had been shown his witness statement, was so confused, contradictory or inconsistent that no reasonable tribunal could accept it. Indeed, Mr Sutherland accepts that he did not see fit at the conclusion of the prosecution case to make a submission of no case to answer on the basis that no reasonable tribunal could safely act upon it. His brief submission was solely confined to the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the offence of robbery as distinct from an offence of assault. 21.In respect of the criticisms of the identification parade, the judge was plainly alive to all of the issues advanced on the applicant’s behalf and the issue of fairness upon which they impacted. He asked himself:
22.The deputy judge was satisfied that there was no truth in the applicant’s allegations concerning the previous assaults by police officers. That was a finding peculiarly within the province of the fact-finding tribunal. 23.In respect of the complaint that the applicant did not understand what was said to him at the identification parade or the implications of his attending the parade, the deputy judge analysed the issues in considerable detail. He found as a fact that the applicant's knowledge of Punjabi and English was greater than he was prepared to concede and that at no stage during the parade had he indicated that he did not understand what was being said. 24.It is clear from the cross-examination of the applicant that, whatever language may have been used during the identification parade, he understood that he was being asked by the chief inspector in charge of the parade whether he needed to have a lawyer present and he had said “No”. He accepted that the chief inspector had further asked him in English whether he had any objection to any of the actors selected for the parade and that he had chosen to stand in place of the actor at position number 5. Thereafter he had confirmed that he had no objection to the remaining selected actors on the parade. To a question from the deputy judge, the applicant agreed that had he been asked in Urdu whether he was willing to take part in the identification parade, he would have said “Yes”. 25.In the light of these answers, which the deputy judge referred to in his reasons for verdict, we cannot see any unfairness in the conduct of the identification parade, even if the language of interpretation was Punjabi when the applicant’s preferred and primary language (or dialect) was Pahari or Urdu. It is clear that he understood the proceedings sufficiently for there to have been no misunderstanding or unfairness in the conduct of the parade. 26.In respect of the complaint that the judge had failed to exclude the words spoken by the applicant before caution, the judge distinguished between the time when the police were making enquiries of the applicant, by which time, as PC 3774 explained, “there was not yet sufficient information to confirm that the mobile phone was a stolen property”, and the time when the victim had subsequently identified his property, as a result of which the applicant was arrested and cautioned. The judge excluded the ensuing answer to caution, not on the basis that it was involuntary, but because it was “possible that something as technical as a caution with its accompanying preamble might not be understood or fully understood by someone who had only been in Hong Kong since March the previous year” and the officer had not ascertained whether he understood it. In our view, the same considerations did not apply to any answers made to the officer’s enquiry before the caution. The questioning of the applicant as to where he had obtained the mobile phone, and his reply that he bought it in Tsuen Wan, would both have been in simple Cantonese, which the applicant had told the officer he understood. The applicant had also told the officer in Cantonese that he had lost his Identity Card. 27.Mr Sutherland had seemed to suggest in his cross-examination of PC 3774 that before asking questions of, or seeking information from, someone when investigating a crime, a police officer must wait for an interpreter who could speak the language or dialect of the person from whom enquiries are being made to be procured before proceeding further. To this proposition, PC 3774 gave an obvious and entirely understandable answer:
The police were investigating a serious offence which had taken place a short time earlier. They were making enquiries of a group of persons who may or may not have been connected with that offence. A mobile phone had been found which, likewise, may or may not have been connected with the offence. A conversation ensued in simple Cantonese, which the applicant said he understood. No misunderstanding or ambiguity of language was alleged. There is nothing in this point. 28.Finally, it is submitted that the deputy judge’s reasons for verdict were inadequate. Presumably, this ground is founded principally upon the deputy judge’s alleged failure to give proper reasons for accepting Jonathan Lau’s evidence in the face of the various criticisms which were made of it, while rejecting the applicant’s account for no good reason. 29.With respect to this argument, the deputy judge’s reasons for verdict were in many ways a model of how a District Court judge is expected to deal with issues in a contested trial. Having set out the respective cases of the prosecution and the defence, he dealt with all the significant issues and disputes in the evidence as well as the legal arguments which they engaged. He considered the relevant authorities which were placed before him and explained clearly in a concise and reasoned manner what his findings were and why. While Mr Sutherland may not agree with the way the deputy judge resolved various issues of fact, he has had considerable difficulty in pointing to any flaw in the reasoning which might vitiate those findings. The deputy judge did not simply accept the main witness’s evidence and thereby conclude that he must have been correct in his identification of the applicant. He gave careful, considered reasons for his decision and came to the conclusion that:
30.Amongst the other evidence which the deputy judge accepted was the rather significant discovery of the mobile phone in the jacket of the applicant less than 20 minutes after the robbery, by which time the SIM card had been removed and the phone reset to its factory setting. Further, when asked in the course of police enquiries how he had come by the mobile phone, the applicant gave an answer which, upon the phone’s subsequent identification by the victim as his stolen property, was plainly untrue. The deputy judge accepted the evidence of the police office that the stolen mobile phone was in the applicant’s jacket when intercepted and rejected the applicant’s account that it was in his hand. 31.In our view, there can be no criticism whatsoever of the adequacy of the reasons for verdict in this case. Conclusion 32.There is in the result no merit in any of the grounds advanced by Mr Sutherland. The verdict is in no sense unsafe or unsatisfactory and the application for leave to appeal against conviction must be refused. 33.Wisely, the applicant has not pursued his application for leave to appeal against sentence, although notice that he wished to abandon his application was only given during the course of the appeal against conviction. Given that this was a robbery of a 16 year-old student by more than one defendant after midnight in a public park, the sentence passed on the applicant, who was a 33 year-old torture claimant permitted to remain in Hong Kong by virtue of a Form 8 recognizance, was lenient in the extreme. Quite apart from the complete lack of any merit in the appeal against conviction, we are very surprised that the Bar Free Legal Service should have countenanced advancing an appeal against sentence which, in the event that it had been pursued and failed, would almost certainly have had ramifications on the applicant’s original sentence. Post-script 34.Finally, we would point out that the Court was presented with no less than 1055 pages of transcript in this matter, which it was obliged to read in preparation of this appeal. No proper explanation has been given as to why the Registrar was prevailed upon to order so much transcript when so little of it was germane to the issues raised on appeal or referred to in argument. Further, as is emphasised by paragraph 6(d) of Practice Direction - 4.2 ‘Criminal Appeals to the Court of Appeal’, the preparation of such transcripts is expensive, which is a matter to be clearly borne in mind by those requesting their provision.
Mr Mark R C Sutherland & Mr Robert J H Tibbo, assigned by the Hong Kong Bar Association Free Legal Service Scheme, for the Applicant Ms Irene Fan SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent [1] R v Walsh [1987] 85 Cr App Rep 255 [2] Secretary for Justice v Lam Tak Ming (2000) 3 HKCFAR 168 [3] HKSAR v Wong Chi Kwan [2006] 2 HKC 318 [4] R v Gall [1990] 90 Cr App Rep 64 [5] R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 |
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