Re Chin Wai Kay Geodie
Read the full judgment text of HCB 7469/2010 on BabelCite. This HCB judgment was delivered on 27 January 2016.
1. This is an application by the sole Trustees (“Trustee”) under Section 30A(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (“BO”) and Rule 88 of the Bankruptcy Rules (Cap 6) for an order against the automatic discharge of Chin Wai Kay Geordie (“Bankrupt”).
Cites 2 cases
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HCB 7469/2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 7469 OF 2010 _________________________
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______________ D E C I S I O N ______________ APPLICATION 1.This is an application by the sole Trustees (“Trustee”) under Section 30A(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (“BO”) and Rule 88 of the Bankruptcy Rules (Cap 6) for an order against the automatic discharge of Chin Wai Kay Geordie (“Bankrupt”). BACKGROUND 2.On 9 June 2011, a bankruptcy order was made by DHCJ Coleman SC against the Bankrupt. The background of these bankruptcy proceedings was set out in paras 3 to 14 of the Decision by Harris J in HCBI 1396/2008 dated 11 June 2010 and quoted by DHCJ Coleman SC in para 8 of his Judgment herein dated 9 June 2011. I will not repeat here. Unless otherwise stated, I will also use the same nomenclatures in the said decision and judgment eg Cheery, Miss Wong, Wealthy Eagle, Net Pacific etc. 3.The Trustee makes the application on the grounds that:
4.The Trustee mainly relied on the followings matters in support of the above grounds:
LEGAL PRINCIPLES 5.It is not disputed by the parties’ Counsel that the court shall adopt a 2-stage approach[1]. First, the court has to determine whether the conduct complained of is unsatisfactory within the meaning of section 30A(4)(d) of the BO and if yes, then, the court has to consider whether to exercise the discretion under section 30A(3) to suspend the running of the relevant period in the light of all the circumstances. 6.As to what conduct is regarded as unsatisfactory, the appropriate test is whether the conduct is such as society would be prepared to condone without any expression of disapproval[2]. In my view, it is indeed a hypothetical reasonable man test having regard to all relevant circumstances. 7.It is noteworthy that the Trustee did not apply for an order to cross-examine the Bankrupt. In my view, the court shall not conduct a mini-trial on affidavit evidence where there are material factual disputes and I have to accept the face value of these affirmations unless they are inconsistent with incontrovertible facts[3]. DISCUSSION Findings against the Bankrupt made by Harris J and DHCJ Coleman SC 8.To start with, I have to identify the findings against the Bankrupt made by Harris J in his Decision in HCBI 1396/2008 dated 11 June 2010. The learned judge in that case was dealing with an application by 2 of the creditors challenging a decision of a meeting of the creditors of the Bankrupt held on 17 March 2009 under section 20E of the BO, at which a voluntary arrangement was approved. 9.It is not in dispute that the main findings by the learned judge are set out in paras 23, 24 and 28 in his Decision as follows:
10.In making the bankruptcy order against the Bankrupt, DHCJ Coleman SC said in paras 27 and 59 of his Judgment herein dated 9 June 2011:
11.The Bankrupt’s appeal against the Judgment of DHCJ Coleman SC was dismissed by the Court of Appeal[4]. In my view, the findings against the Bankrupt made by Harris J and DHCJ Coleman SC in their respective judgment must be binding on the Bankrupt. 12.I have no doubt to accept that, the conduct of the Bankrupt already found by Harris J (before the commencement of bankruptcy) to add friendly creditors to vote for the voluntary arrangement was unsatisfactory since it was not the conduct the society to be prepared to condone without any expression of disapproval. Similarly, the conduct of the Bankrupt already found by DHCJ Coleman SC (before the commencement of bankruptcy) to supply false or misleading information in a material particular and/or have material omissions in the statements of affairs or other documents supplied by him as debtor to his creditors at or in connection with a relevant meeting shall also be regarded as unsatisfactory. 13.However, Mr Suen for the Trustee invited this court to draw inference or implications from the aforesaid findings of the 2 learned judges that Wealthy Eagle, to whom a property at Monte Carlton was assigned by Cheery on 6 June 2009 (ie about 2 years before the date of the bankruptcy order) and for which the Bankrupt acted as company secretary, is an associate of the Bankrupt. With respect, I cannot agree and refuse o draw to draw such inference simply based on the said findings or based on any other evidence before me. In my view, if the Trustee has got sufficient evidence to prove such allegation, the 2 learned judges would have already made such findings in their respective decision and judgment. 14.Mr Suen for the Trustee submitted that the Trustee may commence proceedings against Miss Wong, Cheery and/or Wealth Eagle for recovery of the property at Monte Carlton as being held on trust for the Bankrupt. Nonetheless, the Trustee has not yet commenced any proceedings up to now, probably due to shortage of fund[5]. Omissions in the statement of affairs 15.As to the omission to include Cheery as his assets in his statement of affairs by the Bankruptcy, I accept that such conduct after the commencement of the bankruptcy is unsatisfactory although the Bankrupt all along maintained that he had no beneficial interest in Cheery. Despite the fact that Harris J did not expressly find that Cheery belongs to the Bankruptcy, I consider that the Bankrupt has no choice but to accept the findings by Harris J regarding his relationship with Cheery. In my view, the Bankrupt at least has to state in his statement of affairs that he has some interest in Cheery, though may not be 100%. 16.Based on para 24 of Harris J’s Decision, I think that the Bankrupt should also include his liability to Net Pacific in the statement of affairs after the bankruptcy. Nonetheless, he failed to do so. I consider that such conduct is also unsatisfactory. Default and/or delay in filing annual statements 17.There is no dispute by the Bankrupt that in spite of repeated warnings, he has delayed in submitting annual statements for 2011-2013 and eventually done so in May 2014 almost 3 years after the date of bankruptcy order. For the annual statement for 2014, he only submitted at the meeting on 3 July 2014. I consider that the Bankrupt is highly uncooperative in this regard and such conduct must be unsatisfactory. Default and/or delay in making contributions 18.The Trustee alleged an oral agreement with the Bankrupt that he would make monthly contribution of $10,000. The Bankrupt denied but agreed that he would lump sum contribution for 2011 to 2013. In my view, it is a very serious factual dispute. Since the Trustee did not apply for an order to cross-examine the Bankrupt, I find that there is insufficient evidence before me to conclude that the Bankrupt did reach such alleged agreement of monthly contribution with the Trustee. I cannot agree that he was in default of making the monthly contribution of $10,000 as alleged. 19.In any event, the Trustee agreed that the Bankrupt did deposit the respective lump sums of $132,000, $118,000 and $73,000 on 16 May 2014, 17 July 2014 and 8 September 2015 as contributions. The total amount of contributions made is $323,000, which is the exact total sum of the surplus as stated in the 4 annual statements submitted by the Bankrupt. As there is no order for income payment or written agreement of contribution signed by the Bankrupt, I do not think that he has delayed in making contribution to the estate. In the circumstances, I refuse to regard such conduct unsatisfactory. 20.By the way, I consider that in case the Trustee found that the Bankrupt breached the oral agreement of contribution, the better course for the Trustee is to make application for an income payment order immediately, instead of just waiting until the application for objection to discharge. Default and/or delay in making disclosure, furnishing information and responding to inquires 21.The Trustee further submitted that the Bankrupt was evasive in providing information concerning his relationship with, inter alia, Cheery, Miss Wong and Wealth Eagle. As Cheery is an associate of the Bankrupt, I agree with the Trustee's submission that he has duty to inform the Trustee of the event that Cheery was struck off in the BVI and has to explain to the Trustee as to why it was suddenly struck off. In my view, such conduct must be unsatisfactory. 22.However, there is no finding by the 2 learned judges that Wealth Eagle is an associate of the Bankrupt albeit the Bankrupt being the secretary of Wealth Eagle until 8 March 2014. I do not agree that he has duty to inform the Trustee of the event that Wealth eagle cancelled the transaction with Net Pacific on 11 May 2012. 23.As to Miss Wong, it is not disputed that she was the Bankrupt's former secretary and the only finding by Harris J is that Miss Wong has been acting at the Bankrupt's behest. The Bankrupt said in his 4th affirmation that he could not do anything to compel Miss Wong to respond to the Trustee nor he had authority from her to provide her contact details to the Trustee. First of all, the Trustee is able to obtain the contact address of Miss Wong from other sources, eg company search record, the affirmations filed by Miss Wong etc. It seems unnecessary for the Trustee to insist the Bankrupt to provide her contact address. Secondly, as the Trustee has been advised by his lawyers that a private examination of the relevant parties including Miss Wong pursuant to s29A of the BO is necessary, I cannot see why the Trustee still has to insist the Bankrupt to compel Miss Wong to respond. In any event, I accept the Bankrupt's explanation that he had relayed the Trustee's questions to Miss Wong but no response from her since I shall not conduct a mini-trial on affidavit evidence where there are material factual disputes and I have to accept the face value of the affirmations unless they are inconsistent with incontrovertible facts. 24.Mr Suen for the Trustee also made a very general submission on commercial morality, which I do not think that I need to go into detail. In short, I agree that I shall consider whether the discharge of the Bankrupt will hinder severely the administration of his estate and adversely affect the interests of commercial morality and public interest. 25.On balance of probability, I am satisfied that the Trustee has proved those grounds of objection to discharge the bankruptcy to the extent as discussed above. Exercise of discretion 26.The next issue is exercise of the discretion to suspend the automatic discharge. The 2 main objectives have to be considered by the court are[6]:
27.I also need to bear in mind that he did make a total contribution for the sum of $323,000 out of his annual earnings of $260,000 for the respective periods from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 and 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013, annual earnings of $312,000 for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 and annual earnings of $260,000 for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015. 28.Nevertheless, I am of the view that based on my above findings, the Bankrupt had failed to co-operate in the administration of the estate and discharge of him would be prejudicial to the administration of the estate. The failings of the Bankrupt justify the delay of his rehabilitation. His unsatisfactory conducts warrant a suspension and a period of 18 months is appropriate to mark the court’s disapproval of his pre and post bankruptcy conducts. Accordingly, I exercise my discretion to order that the automatic discharge of the Bankrupt be suspended for 18 months and that the relevant period under section 30A(3) of BO shall cease to run for a period of 18 months from 8 June 2015. 29.I see no reason why the costs shall not follow event. I make an order nisi that the Bankrupt do pay costs of this application to be taxed if not agreed with certificate for counsel, which shall become absolute unless any of the parties apply to vary it within 14 days.
Mr Jenkin Suen, instructed by V Hau & Chow, for the Trustee Mr Jose’-Antonio Maurellet, instructed by Tanner de Witt, for the Bankrupt [1] Decision of DHCJ To (as he then was) in Tong Yuk Kin HCB 22870/2002 [2] Para 17 of Decision of Tong Yuk Kin [3] Para 23 of Decision of Tong Yuk Kin [4] CACV118/2011, date of judgment:14 March 2012 [5] Para 16 of 1st affirmation of Kong Chi How Johnson filed 22 May 2015 [6] See para 10 at pg 561-562 of Re Lau Chi Kam [2008] 3 HKC 558 |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under HCB 7469/2010