HKSAR v. Chan Hiu Yeung
Read the full judgment text of CACC 196/2014 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 26 April 2016.
1. This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of the High Court. The applicant has been convicted after trial of one count of “trafficking in a dangerous drug” involving a net narcotic content of 1.59 kg of ketamine (commonly called as K Chai), for which he was sentenced by the trial judge (Deputy Judge Joseph Yau [1] ) to a term of 16 years’ imprisonment. The applicant, feeling aggrieved, applies for leave to appeal against conviction in person.
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[English Translation - 英譯本] IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 196 OF 2014 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC 316/2013) ________________
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JUDGMENT Hon D Pang JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of the High Court. The applicant has been convicted after trial of one count of “trafficking in a dangerous drug” involving a net narcotic content of 1.59 kg of ketamine (commonly called as K Chai), for which he was sentenced by the trial judge (Deputy Judge Joseph Yau[1]) to a term of 16 years’ imprisonment. The applicant, feeling aggrieved, applies for leave to appeal against conviction in person. Summary of prosecution case 2.In the afternoon of 31 January 2013, a team of detectives attached to the special duty squad of Kowloon Region carried out an anti-narcotic operation around the area of Kam Tsin Village on Kam Tsin Raod and Kwu Tung in Sheung Shui. They patrolled in the above area in two groups which were on foot and mobile patrol respectively. 3.At 5:15 pm on the same day, PW(1)(DPC 7844) who was on foot patrol noticed the applicant near Tsung Pak Long Substation on Kam Tsin Road. At that time, the 22-year-old applicant was carrying a dark-coloured LV bag on one side with the shoulder strap across his body and holding a yellow reusable bag on the other side, kept looking around and paying attention to the roads in the Kam Tsin Raod area and vehicles passing by. That location was remote and the applicant appeared to be trying to get a taxi but did not stop those few which had passed by, which arose PW(1)’s suspicion. Eventually, he and his teammate PW(2)(DPC 4896) went up together to stop the applicant for investigation. 4.Just at the moment when the above two witnesses crossed the road and showed the applicant their warrant cards, the applicant turned and ran towards a small river (also called “the nullah” in the case) behind the substation. He also raised his right hand in the attempt to throw the yellow reusable bag in his hand into the river. Nevertheless, PW(1) promptly grabbed the applicant’s right hand from behind, while PW(2), together with PW(6) and PW(7)(DPC2797 and DPC 6292) who were originally on mobile patrol, also hurried to the scene one after the other and joined in subduing the struggling applicant. In the course of it, the applicant fell onto the ground and scraped his wrist(s) and elbow(s). 5.After the applicant had been subdued, PW(1) checked the above yellow reusable bag. He found inside a white plastic bag containing two transparent plastic bags, and each transparent bag further contained four gold-coloured sealed tinfoil packages having printed characters “精選茗茶” [meaning specially selected tea] (referred to as “teabags” below). PW(1) pressed these teabags with his hand and got the feeling that the content was like dangerous drug rather than tea, he thus arrested the applicant for the offence of “trafficking in a dangerous drug”. The applicant indicated under caution, “It’s only because I owe financial company money that I carry K Chai for others so as to repay.” The teabags were then taken over for custody by PW(2). 6.Having gone back to Sheung Shiu Police Station and sent the applicant to see a doctor, PW(1) made a post-record of the above confession in his notebook which the applicant refused to sign because of not agreeing with the content. The police could not get further evidence from the video recorded interview with the applicant or the subsequent house search. Summary of defence case 7.The applicant elected not to give evidence or call any witness. 8.In view of defence counsel’s cross-examination on the prosecution witnesses, the defence was in general understood as follows[2]:
Evidence relevant to the main dispute 9.The above allegation (namely the police had arrested the wrong person and fabricated with a plant) was the main dispute at the trial. 10.In respect of specific evidence, PW(1) admitted that on the day in question, PW(5)(DSgt 34361) had briefed and told him and the team members that an informant had provided some information and the police were to take notice of a “male aged about 20, 5 feet 6 to 7 inches tall, fat, wearing short black hair and carrying a dark-coloured LV bag with the shoulder strap across the body” around the area of Kam Tsin Village, Kam Tsin Road and Kwu Tung[3]. However, PW(1) did not think that it meant the police had already got a “target person” because they yet had any definite idea of how the face of this person looked like[4]. In any event, PW(1) insisted that he went up to intercept the applicant only because he found him suspicious[5]. 11.On the same point, PW(2)’s evidence was slightly different. He accepted that basing on PW5’s briefing, the police might be regarded as having a “target person”[6]. However, he added that PW(5)’s precise briefing was: in case of seeing this person and finding him suspicious, you may intercept him for investigation[7]. The above version (ie suspicion was a prerequisite for interception) was supported by the evidence of PW(6) and PW(7)[8]. 12.As to PW(5), his evidence in examination-in-chief[9] and relatively long cross-examination[10] on the “target person” may be summarised as follows:
13.The evidence of the above prosecution witnesses has been recounted by the trial judge in detail in both his summary and directions (referred to as “summing-up” below) given to the jury[11]. Defence counsel also in her closing submissions criticised PW5 specifically that it was unreasonable for him to claim the briefing to be only “sharing experience”[12]. Counsel also asserted that PW(1) had no reason whatsoever to allege that the applicant was behaving suspiciously[13]. Finally, the trial judge in his summing-up also told the jury that it was for them to decide whether they would accept the criticism put forward by the defence[14]. In other words, the dispute and the relevant evidence have been clearly put before the jury for their determination. The jury’s verdict 14.Finally, after a deliberation of 3 hours and 40 minutes (including lunch time[15]), the jury returned a verdict of guilty by a majority of six to one. Grounds of appeal 15.On 11 June 2014, the applicant filed his Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal (Form XI) to the Registrar, High Court. He complained that the trial judge’s summing-up had been biased towards the prosecution and his mention of the defence had not been sufficiently comprehensive. 16.On 8 December 2015, the applicant filed in this court a thirteen-page affidavit, raising challenges of various nature regarding the trial of the present case. 17.On 17 February 2016, the applicant mailed to this court: (1) a copy of the letter sent by his solicitors to the police shortly after the occurrence of the case, requesting for the video recording of the CCTV outside Tsung Pak Long Substation; and (2) newspaper clippings regarding a number of cases in which dangerous drugs were trafficked by making use of cake carton, pen, toy, plate, teabag, video game box, sculpture, canned food, girdle, biscuit packing, water pump and fruit [gift] box and so on, consisting of fourteen pages in total. 18.On the day of hearing (13 April 2016), the applicant further submitted to this court written submissions in eight pages. Discussion 19.The applicant’s complaints, having been tidied up, may be summarized as the following grounds of appeal, and this court will discuss them one by one. Ground (1) 20.In the applicant’s view, the trial judge erred in admitting the dangerous drug in question as evidence:
Discussion 21.The applicant cited the regulations in Chapter 53 of the Police General Orders on how police officers should use their notebooks in criticising PW(2)’s record for being incomplete or even incorrect. The applicant even suggested that the trial judge should have told the jury the contents of Chapter 53 so as to highlight the significance of PW(2)’s mistakes. In his view, the jury could then be in a better position to see how suspicious PW(2)’s evidence was. 22.The point is that the General Orders are not the law. They are only orders that the Commissioner of Police may make from time to time “for the administration of the police force, rendering the police force efficient in the discharge of its duties and for carrying out the objects and provisions of the Police Ordinance”[16]. The police officer who breaches the General Orders “may” (ie not must) be subject to disciplinary action[17]. As regards Chapter 53 of the General Orders, in particular sections 5[18] and 6(a)[19] which the applicant placed sole reliance on, in the context of Chapter 53 as a whole, it aims at effectively supervise the strict compliance of police officers with the time of reporting on and off duty and rest time assigned to avoid the occurrence of unpunctuality and false report of overtime work and so on. As to the submission that police officers (in particular detective police officers who are in the investigation of a case) are required to make note of everything that happens while on duty, no matter how important or trivial, this court has serious reservation. 23.It is of course common sense that police officers should make record of relatively important matters relevant to the case. It is also for this very reason that PW(2) admitted the record of handing over the teabags was incomplete (see the complaint on [para] 20(2) above ) and the details may be found in the trial judge’s summing-up[20]:
24.As the applicant has pointed out, the trial judge had left the significance of the above omission entirely to the jury for consideration. It is indeed correct for the trial judge to do so, albeit different from the applicant’s understanding. The reason is that whether the prosecution could successfully prove the dangerous drug had in fact found from the accused’s person was a question of fact which ultimately could only be left to the jury for determination. Before arriving at any conclusion, the jury were entitled to consider all evidence in the case including the incomplete police evidence, and lack of completeness in records does not necessarily mean a break of the chain of evidence. Provided that the jury believed the explanation given by the prosecution witness (which is PW(2)’s testimony in the present case), they could still find the dangerous drug to have come from the accused. 25.The principle which has just been explained above is important. It shows that under the existing law, there is no “procedures governing the handing over of exhibits” as alleged, which required the trial judge to make enquiries. By the same token, this principle has provided answers to the applicant’s complaints in the above paras 20(3) and 20(4). The reasons are set out below. 26.According to PW(2)’s testimony, the chronology of the important events in the present case is set out as follows (all events happened on the afternoon or evening):
27.It can be seen that the accusation against PW(2) for failing to make any record applied to the period between two important events only, and the failure was obviously due to PW(2)’s engagement in some trivial matters irrelevant to the case, such as taking a rest or eating. On the other hand, what did PW(2) maintain in what he said? It was that during whatever time mentioned above, including the time of using the washroom, he had never put down or left the drug exhibits in the present case. Under such circumstances, as the jury were entitled to give an affirmative finding on the continuity of the chain of evidence and to believe PW(2), that is to say, they also believed that the drug exhibits had not been unlawfully tempered with before being sealed up, the applicant’s complaint was groundless. 28.The complaint in [para] 20(6) above remains the applicant’s misconception of the law. After PW(1) had identified the two dangerous drug exhibits, the trial judge marked them as provisional prosecution exhibits (PP3 and PP4) because PW(1) was not the exhibit officer, he was not in the position to tell how the drug exhibits had been dealt with in the remaining procedures, nor could he give complete evidence on the chain of evidence. On the other hand, PW(2) as the exhibit officer, after explaining the above chronology[21], in fact completed establishing the entire chain of evidence, and hence PP3 and PP4 became formal exhibits (P3 and P4) with no objection from the defence. As to the final result, and who were to be believed and who were not, as said above, were still something for the jury to decide. 29.According to PW(1), it was because the contents of the teabags were not like tea, coupled with the information received from the Narcotics Bureau and the knowledge of teabags being commonly used by drug traffickers to conceal drugs[22] that he arrested the applicant. In cross-examination, when he was asked if the teabags would be punctured for checking what was inside when measuring the weight of the drug exhibits, he replied by saying “definitely not”[23]. In that case, this court does not see any doubt arising as a result of the police officers’ not opening the teabags to check. On the contrary, the “guilty” verdict arrived at by the jury has shown complete rejection of the allegation of police fabrication. Although the applicant has provided to this court the newspaper clippings (see para 17 above) and the numbers of the two High Court cases (on the date of the hearing) to try to show that the police did open secret drug packages in some cases, the above conclusion cannot be overridden. 30.As this court has indicated at the hearing, documents which are not produced at the trial in general cannot be considered during appeal. This is the law. This is the reason why this court would not and could not pay any regard to PW(2)’s written witness statement and the police investigation report in the present case (see paras 20(4), 20(5) and 20(7) above). Furthermore, the doubts raised by the applicant on these documents are only questions on some collateral matters that had not been tested in cross-examination and/or were irrelevant to the core issue of the present case. For example, by judicial experience, all dangerous drugs regardless of their types are generally white in colour, and therefore the doubt concerned could not have influenced the jury’s verdict. Finally, the applicant was represented by counsel who has quite a number of years’ experience, and she chose not to cross-examine PW(2) on those issues, the applicant at this stage does not have any ground to complain. Ground (2) 31.The applicant complained that it was wrong for the trial judge not to allow provisional defence exhibits PD4 and PD5 to be formally produced. Discussion 32.Provisional defence exhibits PD4 and PD5 were a black coat and a pair of black sports pants respectively. According to the defence counsel, the applicant was wearing these two items of clothing when he was arrested and they were taken away and kept in his “prisoner’s property” during his detention and were taken out at the time of the trial. The point is that this was only the defence counsel’s own version. She did not adduce any evidence in this regard or obtain consent from the prosecution to produce these two items of clothing by way of admitted facts. On the contrary, at the conclusion of the testimony of the last prosecution witness (PW7), the defence even expressly said that she would not seek to turn PD4 and PD5 into formal defence exhibits[24]. Under such circumstances, it was correct for the trial judge not to turn PD4 and PD5 into formal exhibits, and he had no alternative indeed. 33.Furthermore, as to what has been described above, the defence was in fact trying to make use of the mechanism concerning provisional exhibits to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses with the two pieces of clothing which had not been formally produced in order to make their testimonies sound incredible[25]. An example is the fact that the defence played back the applicant’s video-recorded interview in court with the sound track switched off and then requested the prosecution witnesses to compare the applicant’s clothing as seen on the TV screen with PD4 and PD5. This was incorrect to do although the trial judge did not criticise or stop. In any event, such cross-examination has all been conducted in front of the jury, and hence it can be said that the defence had achieved their purpose in full; PD4 and PD5 were not turned into formal exhibits at the end, and therefore no prejudice whatsoever has been done to the applicant. Ground (3) 34.The applicant submitted that PW(1)’s testimony was self-contradictory and not trustworthy:
Discussions 35.PW(1), apart from changing to say that the substance was in “granular” form, also repeatedly said that the feeling of pressing the teabags was the same as pressing the substance returned after chemical analysis. In other words, PW(1)’s concession under cross-examination was only that the wording was inappropriate. It was for the jury to decide if they had any other view. 36.PW(1) said he could decide by himself what had to be recorded. This court does not find him wrong to say so. In case of any challenge, the jury could decide on the facts in view of the witness’ explanation. This court does not think that he must make a record of the act of pressing the teabags in his notebook. 37.This court has not viewed the video-recorded interview in question. We have no idea whether it did clearly show the applicant’s clothing. If it did, the jury might have negative views on PW(1)’s integrity. If it did not, it goes without saying that the applicant’s complaint could not be established. 38.In any event, defence counsel has extensively addressed the above complaint in her closing submissions[26], and the trial judge in his summing-up again mentioned the above three aspects in PW(1)’s evidence. In other words, the jury were clear about the issue concerned and their verdict reflected that they believed the prosecution witness. 39.As to the complaint in para 34(4) above, the prosecution witness explained: in accordance with the procedures, after making the post-record, the statement would first be given to the prisoner for him to read it over, and then amendments and addition would be made, after that the declaration would be copied onto it, and only after all these would the prisoner sign to confirm. However, the applicant, just upon reading it, indicated that he disagreed with the contents, and hence the witness simply knew the applicant would not sign without making the request. That was the reason why he simply wrote down on the record to indicate the applicant’s refusal to sign. This court does not see that any suspicion could possibly arise from this explanation. In any event, the trial judge has given proper and clear directions on matters relating to the confession to the jury in the summing-up[27]. Ground (4) 40.The applicant complained that the evidence given by PW(5) to PW(7) was contradictory. Discussions 41.The applicant meant that there were disparities in the details of the evidence given by the above prosecution witnesses, such as that at the moment when it was decided to take action, whether the sergeant had given any order, whether he/they afterwards run together with the other two detectives to assist PW(1) and so on. The problem is that such disparities have been sufficiently addressed by the defence counsel in her closing submissions[28]. The trial judge has also in the summing-up rightly reminded the jury of how to deal with and consider the contradictions among witnesses. Therefore the applicant’s complaint is groundless. Ground (5) 42.The applicant complained that the evidence given by PW(4) (a duty officer of Sheung Shui Police Station) was inconsistent with those given by PW(1) and PW(2). Discussions 43.The applicant meant that there was contradiction in the evidence given by the duty officer and the other two detectives on whether PW(1) was present in the course of the two events, in which the drug exhibits were weighed and sealed up in temper-proof exhibit envelopes. Nevertheless, it can be seen from the duty officer’s testimony that when he said that only he and PW(2) were present at that time, he only based on his notebook record[29]. He had never been asked if he had any independent memory about the incident or if he would have made note of any police officer other than the exhibit officer. In any event, the defence alleged that the police had planted the drug, but such planting of drug could be done by any police officer at any time, and therefore whether PW(1) was present in a certain step after the arrest cannot be said to be significant. Moreover, the defence at the trial only disputed the chain of evidence before the drug exhibits had been sealed up (see note 21), and therefore whether PW(1) had taken part in sealing the exhibits was simply not in issue. The defence did not dispute that what had been sealed up were in fact dangerous drug. Ground (6) 44.The applicant complained that for the exhibits that had already been in the case, there were doubts; for the evidence yet available, the police in fact deliberately avoided seizing them:
Discussions 45.The yellow reusable bag was not bound to be damaged because of the applicant’s struggle, and the defence after all has addressed this point in her closing submissions[31] to try to raise the jury’s suspicion, albeit in vain. 46.It is within judicial knowledge that a person who touches something may not leave any fingerprint. An identifiable fingerprint does not necessarily lead to the discovery of the fingerprint owner because the result depends on a lot of factors, which is also within judicial knowledge. In para 6ii of the “Admitted Facts”, it was said that the identifiable fingerprint “lead to nothing and was still under verification” [32], and it means that the police had not yet found out whose fingerprint it was. In any event, the trial judge in his summing-up indicated there was no evidence in the present case that proved the applicant had had contact with the dangerous drug in question, and it was left for the jury to decide how this point affected their verdict[33], and such directions were already very favourable to the defence. The trial judge might (but did not) add by saying this: somebody who delivers dangerous drugs may not have touched the drugs inside the bag. 47.Same as fingerprints, the presence of DNA evidence is not necessarily helpful to the prosecution or the defence. Moreover, it is completely up to the prosecution and the defence to decide how to take evidence and what evidence to take, and the court just could not and would not intervene. For example, it is for the prosecution to consider the impact of not seizing the recordings of the CCTV outside the substation on the prosecution case. Conversely, even if the police had made no seizure, the defence could ask for the recordings in question from the authority concerned through his solicitors. Therefore, the applicant’s letter sent to the police through his solicitors was not helpful to his defence. As a matter of fact, the letter was sent two days after the case, which was a long time before the date of the trial, and the defence have had sufficient time to collect the evidence by themselves. In the above discussion, it is presumed that the exhibit in question did exist; whereas another possibility is there was simply no CCTV outside the substation. There was no evidence in this regard in the case. Ground (7) 48.The applicant suggested that the prosecution should not have made closing submissions in the present case according to the law. Discussion 49.Since the applicant had not given evidence or called any witness, he suggested that the prosecution should not have made any closing submissions before the jury. The authority which the applicant relies on is Overview on Hong Kong Laws (《香港法概論》)[34] (p 53):
50.Since the above authority is one of the books for promoting legal education to the general public, the excerpted part is not comprehensive. On the contrary, according to the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in R v Bryant & Oxley [1978] 2 All ER 689, where an accused was represented by counsel and did not give or call evidence, the prosecution had a right to make a closing speech. The only point to add is that in the view of the English Court of Appeal, it should not be necessary to exercise that right in every case, and would be more appropriate to do so in long and complex cases, and the speech should be brief (p 694G-J):
51.It is worth noting that it is only the opinion of the English Court of Appeal that the exercise of the right should go slow. This opinion of course carries a lot of weight but it is not the law. For example, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, in affirming the prosecution’s right to make a closing speech under the above circumstances, has not added the same reservation[35]. From the report of Man Ching Ip in the Hong Kong Law Reports (see note 35), Bryant & Oxley is even one of the precedents that has been considered by the Court of Appeal in Hong Kong, but the Court of Appeal has not in its judgment reminded prosecutors in Hong Kong of going slow in exercising the right. 52.To conclude, the opinion of the English Court of Appeal aims at ensuring that the accused has a fair trial, and the trial judge and the counsel of both sides in the present case knew the relevant principles well. It was only after the trial judge had been aware of the content that the prosecution intended to submit and the prosecution had assured that the speech would be brief and under control, and thereafter having no objection from the defence that the trial judge allowed the prosecution to make closing submissions[36]. Eventually, the prosecution simply briefly urged the jury not to reject the prosecution’s case for the reason of the discrepancies among the witnesses on some trivial matters such as the applicant’s clothing. Since the defence had extensively cross-examined the prosecution witnesses in great detail regarding various parts of the case, the prosecution’s submissions are understandable and well within the boundary. Ground (8) 53.The applicant complained in general that the trial judge’s summing-up was not sufficiently comprehensive or fair. Discussion 54.After carefully going through the whole summing-up, this court has the view that the jury has been given fair and comprehensive directions on both facts and law. Conclusion 55.None of the applicant’s grounds of appeal has been established, and the application is dismissed.
Mr David Joseph Chan, Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent. The Applicant appeared in person. Translated by the Judgment Translation Unit of the Judiciary and vetted by Mr Patrick W.S. Cheung, Barrister-at-law. [1] As he then was. [2] See Appeal bundle, pp 30N-31R: the cross-examination of PW(1) as summarized by the trial judge. [3] Appeal bundle, p 82F-Q. [4] Appeal bundle, p 82L-M. [5] Appeal bundle, pp 96C-97C. [6] Appeal bundle, p 178D. [7] Appeal bundle, p 178J-P. [8] Appeal bundle, pp 225E and 231Q. [9] Appeal bundle, p 203R. [10] Appeal bundle, pp 208K-214U. [11] Recount of PW5’s evidence, which can be seen at p 36H-P of the appeal bundle. [12] Appeal bundle, the whole p 55. [13] Appeal bundle, the whole p 56: PW(1) admitted that he had not noticed if the taxies passing by the scene of crime had “covered the flag”. [14] Appeal bundle, the whole p 40. [15] The jury retired at 12:06 pm and returned the verdict at 3:47 pm. [16] Section 46, Police [Ordinance]. [17] Section 4, Police General Orders. [18] This section provides that officers shall make a fresh entry in their notebooks at the commencement of each dutyshift, detailing the date, time and particulars of the duty allocated to them. [19] This section provides that officers shall make notes of their times of reporting on and off duty, to and from meals or refreshment and the time and duration of any overtime worked. [20] Appeal bundle, p 34H-M. [21] According to the (Amended) Admitted Facts in the present case, the defence only disputed about the chain of the evidence before the drugs were sealed in the temper-proof envelopes (ie 10:42 on that night) and required it to be proved by the prosecution. [22] Appeal bundle, p 66U. [23] Appeal bundle, p 107O. [24] Appeal bundle p 243K-R. [25] See the allegation in para 34(3) below. [26] Appeal bundle, pp 57S-58J and p 59B-F. [27] Appeal bundle p 42D-V. [28] Appeal bundle p 58 M-T. [29] Appeal bundle, p199O. [30] The police found two fingerprints in total, one of them did not have sufficient feature for identification. Para 44(2) refers to the other one. [31] Appeal bundle p 57L-O. [32] Appeal bundle, p8. [33] Appeal bundle, p42B. [34] Chan Hung Yee and others (ed), Overview on Hong Kong Laws (《香港法概論》) (1st ed, Joint Publishing (HK), March 1999)July 2006 edition. [35] See Man Ching Ip v The Queen [1980] HKLR 890 and HKSAR v Chan Sau Man [2001] 3 HKLRD 593. [36] Appeal bundle, pp 260U-262M. |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACC 196/2014