Lau Ming Lee v. Secretary for Justice for and on behalf of Director of Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation
Read the full judgment text of DCPI 1217/2016 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 26 September 2017.
1. By a summons filed on 30 June 2017 (“the summons”), the plaintiff applies for leave to appeal from my decision handed down on 2 June 2017 (“the Decision”), in which I ordered that the plaintiff’s statement of claim filed on 30 November 2016 be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action and the plaintiff’s action be dismissed. The facts have been set out in the Decision and I do not repeat the same herein. For ease of reference, the abbreviations used in the Decis
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DCPI 1217/2016 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 1217 OF 2016 -------------------------------------
------------------------------------- Before: His Honour Judge MK Liu in Chambers (Open to Public) Date of Hearing: 26 September 2017 Date of Decision: 26 September 2017 ------------------------ DECISION ------------------------ 1.By a summons filed on 30 June 2017 (“the summons”), the plaintiff applies for leave to appeal from my decision handed down on 2 June 2017 (“the Decision”), in which I ordered that the plaintiff’s statement of claim filed on 30 November 2016 be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action and the plaintiff’s action be dismissed. The facts have been set out in the Decision and I do not repeat the same herein. For ease of reference, the abbreviations used in the Decision are adopted in the paragraphs below. The principles 2.Leave to appeal from the District Court to the Court of Appeal is governed by the District Court Ordinance (“DCO”), s 63A(2), which provides:-
3.The principles concerning DCO s 63A(2) are trite. A succinct summary of those principles can be found in a recent Court of Appeal’s decision Yuen Oi Yee Lisa v Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi and Others (HCMP 3305/2015, 18 February 2016), in which Poon JA said:-
4.As to the “some other reason” limb, the court may grant leave under this limb if there is an issue which the court considers that in the interest of the public should be clarified by the Court of Appeal. See Smith v Cosworth Casting Processes Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1538. However, even if there is an issue which may need clarification, if the “clarification” would not change the outcome of the appeal, the court may still refuse to grant leave. Grounds of appeal 5.Mr Wong, counsel for the plaintiff, put forward several grounds of appeal. Those grounds in fact can be summarized in 2 points:-
No reasonable prospect of success 6.As to whether P’s Proposition is an arguable point of law, with respect to Mr Wong, he is repeating the arguments made in the previous hearing. For the reasons set out in the Decision, [11]-[19], I have rejected those arguments and ruled that P’s Proposition is unarguable. My view remains unchanged. In my judgment, the plaintiff does not have a reasonable prospect of success in overturning my ruling on this point. 7.Since the plaintiff does not have a reasonable prospectus of success in establishing that P’s Proposition is an arguable legal proposition, her case must come to an end. The point made by Mr Wong as summarized in §5(b) above does not assist the plaintiff at all. 8.For the sake of completeness, I have also considered the submissions made by Mr Wong concerning the point as summarized in §5(b) above. Mr Wong submits that whether the plaintiff should be considered as the “keeper” of the said Dog should be determined by reference to the time of the said Incident. In my view, one should not overlook that the plaintiff started §1 of the statement of claim with these words, ie “At all material times ......”, which must include the time of the said Incident. Notwithstanding Mr Wong’s submissions, for the reasons set out in the Decision, [21]-[31], I am of the same view that a reasonable law enforcement officer may well regard the plaintiff as the keeper of the said Dog for the purposes of the RO. With respect to Mr Wong, I do not regard the plaintiff has any reasonable prospect of success in appealing against my ruling. Some other reason? 9.Mr Wong further submits that there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard, and that some other reason is that the Court of Appeal may take the opportunity to clarify whether the duty of care as suggested in P’s Proposition exists in Hong Kong notwithstanding the Liu Mei Huei case. In my judgment, this is saying the same thing in another way. Mr Wong in fact is still suggesting that P’s Proposition is an arguable point of law notwithstanding the Liu Mei Huei case. I have already rejected the submissions and ruled that P’s Proposition is unarguable. With respect to Mr Wong, I do not think there is anything unclear which has to be clarified by the Court of Appeal. 10.Further, for the reasons set out in the Decision, [21]-[31], even if P’s Proposition is arguable, I am of the view that the plaintiff’s case is bound to fail. This is another reason for declining leave under the “some other reason” limb. Disposition 11.The plaintiff has failed in demonstrating any reason justifying for leave to appeal being granted. I therefore dismiss the summons. 12.Having heard submissions on costs, I am of the view that costs of the summons should be to the defendant. I order that costs of the summons be to the defendant, with a certificate for counsel. I summarily assess those costs at HK$10,000. 13.I thank Mr Wong and Mr Chik for the assistance rendered to the court.
Mr Anson Wong Yu Yat, instructed by Y H Yeung & Associates, for the plaintiff Mr Edward Chik, Government Counsel, of Department of Justice, for the defendant | ||||||||||||||||
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