阮 對 張

Read the full judgment text of FCMC 9862/2014 on BabelCite. This Family Court judgment was delivered on 28 September 2017 before 彭家光.

Matrimonial proceedings – Leave to appeal – Costs – Conduct – District Court Ordinance s.63A – Respondent applied for leave to appeal dismissal of costs application – Petitioner admitted false documents in Magistrates' Court – Parties separated since February 2013 – No children involved – Court held no reasonable chance of success on appeal grounds – Conduct only material if obvious and gross – No ancillary relief claimed – Leave to appeal refused – No costs order

Legal issues: Fact-finding on separation · Costs entitlement based on conduct

Outcome: Leave to appeal refused; No costs order

Cited by 1 case · Cites 2 cases

Case No.FCMC 9862/2014
Court
Family Court
Date28 Sep 2017
Judge彭家光
Case Document
100%Judiciary

FCMC 9862 / 2014

香 港 特 別 行 政 區

區 域 法 院

婚姻訴訟案件編號2014年第9862宗

____________________

  呈請人
  答辯人

____________________

主審法官: 區域法院暫委法官彭家光內庭聆訊 (非公開)
聆訊日期: 2017年9月7日
判決日期: 2017年9月28日

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判 案 書
(上訴許可申請)

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申請

1.在以下本席簡稱呈請人為“男方”;答辯人為“女方”。

2.這是一宗女方的上訴許可申請的聆訊。

3.應女方2017年1月23日的傳票申請,在2017年8月11日,本席頒下判案書撤消女方要求本案的訟費的申請。

4.女方不滿本席的判決,於2017年8月22日提出上訴許可申請。女方的上訴理由可概括的分為以下兩方面:

(i) 女方不同意本席接受男方的證供為本案的事實認定,也不接受從2013年2月以後,訴訟雙方並不是在同一住戶共同生活,因此應被視為分居。

(ii) 男方在裁判法院承認使用虛假文書控罪,被判接受判社會服務令。女方認為因此她應得呈請和交相呈請的訟費。

5.就上述的第(i)點,女方在她的支持誓章中列出了許多與上訴有關的論點。雖然如此,但大體來說她是不滿意本席在證據方面的評估、衡量,和酌情權的運用。女方不少的論點,本席已在作出原來的判決時加以考量,本席不打算在此再重複的逐點作回應。經小心考慮以後,本席認為女方就一點上訴理由並無合理機會得直。

6.就上述第(4)段之第(ii)點,本席有以下的看法:

(a)   案例確立,如果明顯地雙方的婚姻已破裂至無可挽救的地步,雙方就應該採取一個務實和明智的態度,以期儘快地和儘量的無痛地了結婚姻。如果根據呈請內容,已足夠讓離婚命令頒發,法庭就不會再對其他的指控作深入的調查。

(b)   如在SJH v RJH (CACV 280/2011, HCMP 749/2012,判決理由書日期為2012年6月18日),上訴庭便說:

7)   …… As both parties are now of the same view that the marriage has been irretrievably broken down, the Court in exercising its divorce jurisdiction in a modern setting, will be loathed to allow the parties to use valuable court time to litigate on a matter which has no impact whatsoever on the divorce itself and which should be dissolved as quickly and painlessly as possible.  As Ormrod LJ observed in Grenfell v Grenfell [1978] 1 All ER 561 at 566 that,

‘There is no point, as I see it, in a case like this in conducting an enquiry into behaviour merely to satisfy feelings, however genuinely and sincerely held by one or other of the parties. To do so would be a waste of time of the court and, in any event, would be running, as I think, counter to the general policy or philosophy of the divorce legislation as it stands today. The purpose of Parliament was to ensure that where a marriage has irretrievably broken down, it shall be dissolved as quickly and as painlessly as possible under the Act, and attempts to recriminate in the manner in which the wife in this case appears to wish to do should be, in my judgment, firmly discouraged.’

8) (a) In that case the wife petitioned for divorce based on the husband’s behaviour.  The husband filed an answer denying the wife’s allegation and cross petitioned for divorce based on five years’ separation.  The wife admitted the parties had been separated for five years but opposed the cross petition on the ground that she would suffer grave hardship as provided for by section 5 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in that, because of her religious belief, ‘her conscience would be affronted if the marriage were to be dissolved other than for grounds of substance whereby the true cause of the breakdown of the marriage would be determined by the Court...’.  The Court struck out the wife’s petition.

(b) The English Court of Appeal dismissed the wife’s appeal against the striking out.  Ormrod LJ emphasized that there is only one ground in which the court has power to dissolve a marriage, namely, the marriage has broken down irretrievably and there are five separate facts, one of which has to be established in order to prove that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.  On the facts of the case there was nothing further to inquire other than the fact that the parties had been living apart for five years.

(c) While it is true that in Grenfell there was common ground that the parties had been separated for five years, which is not the situation here if the proposal by the husband is to be ignored, the discussion by Ormrod LJ on the underlining principle of a modern divorce is instructive and apposite, if not more so, 35 years after that decision to modern Hong Kong.

9) The issue of behaviour i.e. the wife’s adultery also has no impact on the more substantial dispute of the parties namely, the question of custody of the children and ancillary relief.  Specifically in respect of ancillary relief, the Court of Final Appeal has in LKW v. DD (2010) 13 HKCFAR 537 at 540 stated that,

‘Conduct, or more accurately, negative conduct, is therefore only to be regarded as a material factor if it is “obvious and gross” in the sense explained in Wachtel v Wachtel or, which comes to the same thing, if it is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it.’

10) I am of the view that the same reasoning would apply to the issue of custody as well.  The adultery by the wife, which is denied by her, cannot amount to anything like gross misconduct which may affect the husband’s position on these two issues now that the divorce, custody and ancillary relief applications will be addressed in Hong Kong and not elsewhere.

(c)   在本案來說,訴訟雙方的一段婚姻並無子女。不論在本案和新案(FCMC 14326/2015),男方對女方並無任何附屬濟助要求。訟費方面,男方要求無訟費命令。雖然在本案的交相呈請下,女方向男方提出各種附屬濟助的要求,但她並沒有就此採取跟進之法律程序。在新案下,她更並沒有提出任何附屬濟助要求。

(d)   在2017年8月11日的判案書,本席說:

19.  按以上裁決,就女方的訟費申請,本席有以下各點考慮:

(1) 在2013年2月以後,訴訟雙方並不是在同一住戶共同生活,因此應被視為分開居住。

(2) 在2013年12月,女方將一份經她簽署的表格2C寄給男方。雖然女方指出她並未在該表格2C填上分居日期,她的立場始終是至2013年10月雙方才開始分居,但本席認為無論如何,由此可見女方是同意離婚的。

(3) 因此,本席認為在2014年7月,男方以一年分居及雙方同意為理由提出離婚呈請,並非屬不合理。

(e)   在以上各點的考慮下,雙方本來就應以男方提出的一年分居及同意來了結訴訟雙方的婚姻。因此,女方提出的交相呈請,是並不需要的。換言之,女方並不應得包括呈請和交相呈請的訟費。

7.在考慮女方的上訴許可申請時,本席須首先考慮香港法例第336章《區域法院條例》第63A條的條文。本席將有關法例的條例節錄如下:

(1)  根據第63條批予的上訴許可,可 ─

(a)  就在有關的判決、命令或決定中出現的某個爭論點而批予;及

(b)  在聆訊該許可申請的法官、聆案官或上訴法庭認為為使有關上訴得到公正、迅速及合乎經濟原則的處置而需要的條的規限下批予。

(2)  聆訊有關上訴許可申請的法官、聆案官或上訴法庭除非信納 ─

(a)  有關上訴有合理機會得直;或

(b)  有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊,

否則不得批予上訴許可。

8.經小心考慮以後,本席認為女方的各點上訴理由並無合理機會得直,本席也看不到任何有利於秉行公正的理由應進行上訴聆訊。本席拒絕女方的上訴許可申請。

9.男方缺席聆訊,本席作無訟費命令。

  ( 彭家光 )
  區域法院暫委法官

呈請人:無律師代表,缺席聆訊

答辯人:無律師代表,親自出席聆訊

Cited by 1 case

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