Chen Mei Huan v. Silver Faith Holdings Ltd and Others

HCCW 111/2014

[2018] HKCFI 41

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) PROCEEDINGS No.111 OF 2014

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DECISION ON VARIATION OF COSTS ORDER NISI
AND SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF COSTS

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Introduction

1.On 18 October 2017, I handed down my Decision (“Decision”) granting the following order (“Order”):

(a)   the petitioner (“Chen”) do within 35 days from the date of the Decision pay into court the amount of HK$1,600,000 as security for the 2^nd and 3^rd respondents’ (“Ng’s” and “Daughter’s”) costs up to the conclusion of the present proceedings with liberty to apply;

(b)   subject to any order that may be made by the Companies Judge, all further proceedings in the present proceedings against Ng/Daughter be stayed until such security has been paid;

(c)   there be a costs order nisi that Chen shall forthwith pay Ng/Daughter costs of and occasioned by the summons filed on 9 November 2016 (“Summons”) (with all costs reserved, if any) to be summarily assessed with certificate for two counsel (“Costs Order Nisi”);

(d)   Ng/Daughter do within 14 days from the date of the Decision lodge and serve a statement of costs of not more than 1 page pursuant to Practice Direction 14.3;

(e)   Chen do within 7 days thereafter lodge and serve succinct summary of objections of not more than 1 page in respect of Ng’s/Daughter’s statement of costs;

(f)   if no application is made to vary the Costs Order Nisi within 14 days from the date of the Decision, the summary assessment of costs will be by paper disposal (unless otherwise directed);

(g)   if application is made to vary the Costs Order Nisi within 14 days from the date of the Decision, the party seeking variation of the Costs Order Nisi do within 14 days fix a date with the Listing Clerk for the hearing of the application for variation of the Costs Order Nisi and summary assessment of costs before me in chambers (open to the public) on a date to be fixed not before 28 days from the date of the Decision with half hour reserved.

2.For convenience, unless otherwise stated, I shall adopt herein the abbreviations in the Decision.

3.Pursuant to the Order, Ng/Daughter lodged their statement of costs on 25 October 2017 (“Statement of Costs”), and Chen lodged her summary of objections (“List of Objections”) on 30 October 2017.

4.By a summons filed on 30 October 2017, Chen applied to vary the Costs Order Nisi to the effect that “[Chen] shall forthwith pay 80% of the costs of and occasioned by [the Summons] (with all costs reserved, if any) to be summarily assessed with certificate for one counsel”, and Chen also sought costs of the application (“Variation Summons”). It was said that (a) only certificate for junior counsel should be allowed as there could be no justification for instructing leading counsel for the Hearing, and (b) only 80% of Ng’s/Daughter’s costs should be awarded to reflect partial success on quantum.

5.Pursuant to a consent summons filed on 15 November 2017 (“Consent Summons”), on 17 November 2017, I ordered, by consent and by way of written directions, inter alia that (a) the Variation Summons be dealt with by paper disposal upon Chen and Ng/Daughter lodging/serving written submissions for and against the Summons, (b) summary assessment of Ng’s/Daughter’s costs to be made by paper disposal (based on the Statement of Costs and List of Objections), and (c) costs of and occasioned by the Variation Summons and Consent Summons be reserved for consideration and determination upon paper disposal of the Variation Summons (“17/11/17 Order”).

6.Pursuant to the 17/11/17 Order, Chen lodged the written submissions of her counsel Mr D Tang on 7 December 2017, and Ng/Daughter lodged the written submissions of their counsel Mr A Tang on 27 December 2017.

7.As is usual, paper disposal for summary assessment of costs is often made on the basis of the statement of costs and the list of objections without further submissions since the hearing judge is well familiar with the case/application. For the summary assessment of costs herein, the 17/11/17 Order in paragraph 5(a)-(b) above was expressly clear that the written submissions to be lodged thereunder were to be in support or opposition of the Variation Summons, and that the summary assessment of costs would be based on the Statement of Costs and List of Objections only. The court did not grant leave for lodging submissions in relation to the summary assessment of costs in paragraphs 12-14 and Annexure 1 of Mr D Tang’s written submissions and/or in paragraph 14 of Mr A Tang’s written submissions. But it would be fair to note Mr A Tang’s written submissions did point out the aforesaid parts of Mr D Tang’s written submissions were “technically not part of the Variation Summons”, and Mr A Tang only gave a simple and restrained response.

8.I am quite unable to see why Chen should be allowed to slip in submissions without leave and against the express terms of the 17/11/17 Order, and I am not persuaded I should allow submissions by Mr A Tang beyond the List of Objections.

Certificate for two counsel

9.In Xinyuan Trading Co Ltd v NPH Petrochemical Limited,[1] Master Poon stated as follows:

“24. After the abrogation of the two counsel rule, the client and his solicitor, when instructing counsel, have to decide whether to instruct a leader and if so, whether to instruct a junior also? Depending on the choice made, the client will be represented either by a junior counsel alone, or by leading counsel alone, or by both. On taxation, the taxing master has to determine whether or not the costs were necessary or proper and he must necessarily do so after the event, when leading counsel was in fact instructed. Because leading counsel can now accept instructions without a junior, the first step is to ask whether it was necessary or proper to instruct a leader, even if one counsel was required or actually briefed. In this connection, the following factors are relevant:

(1) the nature of the case;

(2) difficult questions of fact or law;

(3) the complexity, difficulty or novelty of the issues involved;

(4) the skill, specialized knowledge or expertise required for the case;

(5) where money or property is involved, its amount or value;

(6) the importance of the matter to client;

(7) the general importance of the case, for example as affecting other cases;

(8) if a junior counsel has already been instructed, the experience, competency and seniority of that junior;

(9) whether the other side has instructed a leader: see British Metals Corporation Ltd. v. Ludlow Brothers (1913) Ltd. [1938] Ch 774.

These above list is not exhaustive. Depending on the circumstances, other reasons why a leader is required may exist.

25. The next question is if a leader is instructed, should a junior be instructed also. Again, the taxing master will have to decide if the employment of the junior was necessary or proper in the circumstances. Particular reasons why a junior may be necessary or proper include:

(1) assisting with the proper preparation of the case, for example, when the case was complex or heavy documentation is involved;

(2) assisting with the court proceedings by, for example, examining or cross-examining some witnesses, or dealing with a certain part of the case, for example, expert evidence or damages, etc;

(3) carrying out legal research on difficult or novel questions of law.

Again, these reasons are not exhaustive. Other may exist. But I do not think that senior counsel’s own wish to have a junior to assist him is relevant. Instructing a junior is justified only if the interests of lay client require so: cf. para.3, Annex 6 of the Hong Kong Bar Code.

26. Where a junior counsel has been instructed first and a leader is subsequently instructed, the same questions arise, namely, was it necessary or proper to instruct the leader and if so, was it necessary or proper to instruct or to retain the junior. The relevant factors are the same.”

10.Insofar as to whether costs of two counsel should be allowed, the test is whether leading counsel was required, not whether junior counsel was capable of conducting the case on his own.[2]  Such test must be applied to the particular circumstances of the case. The reasonableness of the decision to instruct leading counsel must be judged by whether it is in the client’s interests to do so, and a balance has to be struck between the advantages of more efficient preparation of the client’s case and the extra expenses involved in instructing leading counsel. Ultimately, whether costs incurred for instructing leading counsel are proper or necessary depend on all the circumstances.

11.Mr D Tang submitted it was unnecessary for Ng/Daughter to instruct leading counsel for the Hearing in respect of the Summons “let alone a silk of 14 years” for the following reasons: (a) the application for security for costs did not involve difficult questions of fact or law, (b) the case was fact-sensitive and unlikely to affect other cases in the future, (c) Chen did not instruct leading counsel even in light of the severe consequences of the Hearing, ie she would have to raise a substantial sum or risk stay/dismissal of the Petition, which was of immense value, and (d) Mr A Tang (called to the bar in 2011) was sufficiently senior and experienced to handle the application alone.

12.Mr A Tang disagreed and submitted it was necessary and/or proper for Ng/Daughter to instruct two counsel: (a) the case/application was far from simple as Chen now seemed to suggest, (b) Chen’s suggestion that the Petition was of “immense value” was of itself a relevant factor in favour of permitting engagement of two counsel, and (c) Chen did not instruct leading counsel but very senior and respected junior counsel of 15 years’ standing was engaged so it could not have been inferred from Chen’s choice of representation that the case/application was straightforward and/or it was not necessary or proper for Ng/Daughter to instruct leading counsel.

13.Having considered all the circumstances of the case pertinent to the Summons and Hearing, notwithstanding Mr D Tang’s submissions, I consider it appropriate to grant certificate for two counsel, and set out my reasons as follows:

(a)   Mr D Tang referred to paragraph 70 of the Decision to suggest this court considered the relevant principles to be “trite”.  But paragraph 70 of the Decision only dealt with general principles on seeking security for costs against a foreign plaintiff. There were more intense legal arguments/ considerations on the finer issues of (i) difficulty of enforcement of costs order abroad (paragraphs 72-73 of the Decision), (ii) impecuniosity of foreign plaintiff (paragraph 74 of the Decision), (iii) timing of application for security for costs (paragraphs 75-83 of the Decision), and (iv) impact of court-ordered time limits for taking out application for security of costs (paragraphs 84-87 of the Decision). The parties differed substantially on the legal approach to the question of timing for making an application for security for costs. In my view, the above matters would involve detailed legal research and nuanced analysis of the numerous authorities cited. This was borne out by discussions on the legal authorities in parts of the Decision referred to above. This pointed to the propriety of engaging leading counsel.

(b)   Mr D Tang suggested the Summons was fact-sensitive. Of course, any application for security for costs must be viewed in the context of its own individual case, but Chen in her 7^th affirmation and also by the Li Aff filed to oppose the Summons raised multifarious points to challenge the application for security for costs: (i) delay in seeking security (paragraphs 44-45 of the Decision), (ii) safeguarding creditors’ interest (paragraph 46 of the Decision), (iii) stifling of claim (paragraphs 47-49 of the Decision), (iv) unreliability of Ng as witness in the BVI Action (paragraph 50 of the Decision), (v) need to reserve resources to save the Hotel (paragraphs 51-52 of the Decision), and (vi) likely return of the BVI Interim Payment deposited with BVICA (paragraph 53 of the Decision).

I note (iv) above concerned the BVI Action, which (1) was complicated and vigorously contested, (2) resulted in the Bannister, CA and PC Judgments, (3) required retrial in the BVI courts (paragraphs 17-21 of the Decision), and (4) went to the merits of the case. But it was not until the Hearing that it was conceded Chen/Ng had an arguable case/defence, and that there was no need to look into the merits of the parties’ respective case for the purpose of the Summons.

I further note (iii) above was not abandoned even at the Hearing even though such contention did not even feature in Mr Pao’s written submissions.

Thus, the various strands of evidence and legal contentions Chen relied on in opposition were wide-ranging, which invited wide-ranging response by Ng/Daughter. Such response required careful presentation of the interplay between law and evidence (paragraphs 55-64 of the Decision), and I find leading counsel’s involvement in distilling the evidence in relation to the issues helpful and useful. I am not persuaded the case/application was as simple as made out by Mr D Tang.

(c)   There was no dispute the Petition was of immense value to Chen and Ng/Daughter both financially and commercially. Proceeding to trial on the Petition of such immense value would be no small matter. The quantum of the security ordered for the PTR and trial in the sum of HK$1,600,000 spoke of the importance of securing sufficient protection on potential costs when Ng/Daughter were on the brink of intensive preparation for trial. The commitment on costs in the run up towards trial was a serious matter for Ng/ Daughter in light of concern over future enforcement of any favourable cost order. I have no doubt the Summons was an important matter for them, and this factor contributed to justification for Ng/Daughter to engage senior counsel with the assistance of a junior.

(d)   It was said Mr A Tang was sufficiently senior and experienced to handle the Hearing in respect of the Summons. Whilst junior counsel’s experience would be a factor to be taken into overall account, the question as to whether in a particular case it is appropriate to harness the benefits of employing senior counsel (often regarded as giving a party forensic advantage in more effective deployment of his case through senior counsel’s skill and experience) is to be answered by considering whether it is necessary and/or proper for the relevant party to retain senior counsel and not whether junior counsel is capable of conducting the case/application on his own. In light of the matters discussed above, leading counsel’s involvement was called for herein to ensure Ng’s/Daughter’s case in respect of the application for security was fully and properly presented to the court.

In light of the above matters, I am not convinced (i) Chen’s decision to engage experienced junior counsel without leading counsel to conduct the application, and (ii) the application might not be of general importance to other future cases were sufficiently weighty factors to disallow certificate for two counsel.

(e)   The next consideration is whether a junior should be instructed in addition to the employment of leading counsel. I accept with the abrogation of the two counsel rule senior counsel can appear without a junior. But the discussions above also lent justification to the employment of junior counsel. Although I accept Mr A Tang is a competent junior in his own right, in view of the interplay of legal and factual issues raised in opposition, I am of the view it was necessary and/or proper to instruct junior counsel to assist senior counsel in legal research, effective preparation and at the Hearing.

20% global discount

14.Mr D Tang submitted (a) the principle of “costs to follow event” is no longer the prescribed usual order in the post-CJR era but is just an option as regards costs in interlocutory proceedings,[3] and (b) if the successful party fails on some issues and those issues have caused a significant increase in the length or costs of the proceedings, he may be deprived of the whole or part of his costs.[4] It was said that in light of these principles, Ng’s/Daughter’s costs of and occasioned by the Summons should be subject to a global discount of 20% because (i) only ⅔ of the quantum sought was eventually awarded (and the Bill was held to be unreasonable in 6 respects in the Decision), and (ii) the quantum issue required not insignificant attention from the court and parties, ie 25 minutes of a 3-hour hearing, more than 1 page of Mr Pao’s 9-page skeleton submissions and 5 pages of the Decision where the majority of the items in the Bill were scrutinised.

15.Mr D Tang drew my attention to Libertarian Investments Limited v Thomas Alexej Hall.[5] I am unable to draw much assistance from the observations by Fung J which related to the particular circumstances of that case. Upon continuing ex parte interlocutory proprietary and mareva injunctions after contested inter parties hearing, the learned judge varied a costs order nisi to the effect that “costs should be plaintiff’s costs in the cause, save that the plaintiff should be only entitled to 4/5 of the costs of the contested inter partes hearing on 31 May, 1 and 6 June 2007, to reflect the reduction of the amount of the proprietary injunction. In ordering plaintiff’s costs in the cause, I have taken into account the respective grounds for the claim and the defence (including admissions) on the proprietary claim” (paragraph 20). The interplay between the merits of the claim/defence and the reduction in the amount of the proprietary injunction was unclear from the decision. Also, it was not a case that concerned a finalised costs order since plaintiff’s costs in the cause depended on eventual success or failure by the plaintiff’s claim.

16.But here Chen failed entirely on the merits of her grounds for resisting the Summons. Whilst it was true this court assessed down the overall quantum of security sought in the Bill, this court (a) disagreed with Mr Pao’s suggestion that leading counsel would not be required for trial, (b) accepted the involvement of 2 fee-earners was reasonable, and (c) concluded “there would be core items of costs because PTR/trial would be the final and intensive stage of the litigation with substantial costs to be incurred over a short period”. In my view, the assessment of the overall quantum of security constituted one event, and I do not see the items of costs proposed in the Bill as separate and distinct issues. But I accept the issue-based approach in In re Eligindata (No 2)[6] should not be narrowly construed especially after the introduction of the CJR, and the exercise of discretion is to achieve a just result having regard to the overall circumstances of each case. That said, Ng/Daughter were bound to raise the various items of costs in the Bill in order to obtain the security sought, and they succeeded in establishing core quantum for those various items. The objections won or lost by Chen could not adequately reflect the overall merits of Ng’s/Daughter’s case on quantum, especially the significant point that two counsel was considered appropriate for trial. Further, the question of quantum took little time at the Hearing, and indeed Mr Pao was content to rely on his written submissions on the topic.

17.In the end, it is inappropriate to approach the matter of costs mechanically. Even though Ng/Daughter did not secure the full quantum sought, the overall picture was they secured a substantial sum as security for costs. I am not persuaded I should depart from the general rule that costs follow event in the particular circumstances of this case. Each case is different, and I do not consider it is necessary for me to refer to Laerdal Medical Limited v Hong Kong Haocheng International Trade Limited[7] and Wing Hong Construction Limited v Hui Chi Yeung & ors[8] cited by Mr A Tang.

18.In the circumstances, the Costs Order Nisi is made absolute. There is no reason why costs should not follow event, and I grant a costs order nisi that Chen shall pay Ng/Daughter costs of and occasioned by the Variation and Consent Summonses (including all costs reserved, if any) to be summarily assessed. I further direct that (a) Ng/Daughter shall within 14 days from the date hereof lodge and serve statement of costs of not more than 1 page pursuant to Practice Direction 14.3, and (b) Chen do within 7 days thereafter lodge and serve summary of objections of not more than 1 page in response thereto. Summary assessment of such costs will be by paper disposal unless otherwise directed.

Summary assessment of costs

19.The proper approach to summary assessment of costs had been laid down by the Court of Appeal in Poon Shu Fan v Wong Tin Yan.[9] For the present purpose, it is sufficient to refer to the useful summary in the headnote of the reported judgment at pp 512-514 as follows:

“(2) As in an ordinary taxation, under O.62 r.28(2) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap.4A) (the RHC), in a summary assessment, party‑and‑party costs were allowed only if they were ‘necessary or proper’ for the attainment of justice or for enforcing or defending the rights of the receiving party. Pursuant to Practice Direction 14.3, the court adopted a broad‑brush approach to ensure the final figure assessed was not disproportionate and/or unreasonable having regard to the nature and circumstances of the application or matter and the underlying objectives stated in O.1A of the RHC, even if there was no challenge to individual items. ......

(3) A summary assessment required a two-stage approach. If total costs claimed appeared proportionate, then all that was normally required was that each item should have been reasonably incurred and the cost reasonable. If the overall costs appeared disproportionate, then the court would have to be satisfied that each item was necessary and its costs was reasonable. A sensible standard of necessity should be adopted allowing fully for the different judgments which those responsible for the litigation could sensibly come to as to what was required. While the threshold was higher than that of reasonableness, it should be achievable by a competent practitioner without undue difficulty. The conduct of the other party was relevant, since a cooperative party could reduce costs, but an uncooperative party could render necessary costs which would otherwise be unnecessary. ......

(6) Since Civil Justice Reform in 2009, taxation of counsel’s fees under a party-and-party taxation was no different from taxation of costs and expenses. The test of ‘necessary or proper’ applied and must take into account the matters set out in para.1(2) of Part II of the First Schedule to O.62 of the RHC, as well as the requirement of reasonable proportionality. Accordingly, paras.62/App/28(5) (p.1172) and 62/App/28A of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2012 (p.1172), which referred to the previous pre-CJR ‘excessive and unreasonable’ test under the former para.2(5) of Part II of the First Schedule to O.62 of the RHC, should no longer be followed, ......”

20.Here, Ng/Daughter sought a total sum of HK$507,690 comprising solicitors’ profit costs and disbursements of HK$249,500 and counsel’s fees of HK$258,190.

21.For the purpose of the summary assessment herein, I shall adopt a broad-brush approach pursuant to paragraph 13 of Practice Direction 14.3 as it is inappropriate to conduct any mini-taxation. Bearing in mind the two-stage approach required for summary assessment, and having considered the nature and scope of the Summons, relevant affirmations, skeleton submissions and list of authorities, what transpired at the Hearing, the involvement of leading and junior counsel in this matter, and the matters noted below, and taking into account all the circumstances, the overall costs claimed by Ng/Daughter under their Statement of Costs appeared to be on the high side on party-and-party basis. I make the following general observations.

22.First, the costs in question are assessed on party-and-party basis such that only costs that are necessary/proper and reasonable will be allowed.

23.Secondly, Chen did not dispute the hourly rates of the fee-earners GR and DC. In my view, their hourly rates sought (HK$4,000 for GR and HK$2,000 for DC) were not disproportionate or unreasonable on party-and-party basis.

24.Thirdly, Chen did not take any issue in relation to Item B (manual work).

25.Fourthly, in relation to Item C (communications including conferences, telephone calls and letters), Ng/Daughter claimed HK$30,000 for attendance on client (6.5 hours for GR and 2 hours for DC), HK$8,800 for attendance on other side (1.2 hours for GR and 2 hours for DC) and $20,000 for attendance on counsel (3.5 hours for GR and 3 hours for DC). Chen complained there was no reason why both fee‑earners were involved to the same extent, and suggested all heads of costs under Item C were excessive since (a) the application was straightforward, (b) there was little need for strategy discussion or reporting of developments with counsel, and (c) there were few correspondence with the other side.

26.In my view, the claim for Item C was excessive. Whilst I accept it would be necessary to meet/liaise with the client to take instructions for Ng’s 2^nd and 3^rd affirmations (but not for GR’s affirmation), the preparation of the initial supporting affirmation would not be complicated, and Ng’s 3^rd affirmation (substantive contents of 4 pages) was responsive to issues raised in Chen’s 7^th affirmation. Further, it would not have been difficult to explain the nature of the application or to report the outcome to the clients. In all the circumstances, the time spent for attendance on client was excessive on party and party basis. I also agree with Chen that attendance on other side should be minimal. As for attendance on counsel, I refer to paragraph 30 below in which I have come to the view that a conference with counsel was unnecessary, thus time spent for attendance on counsel should be significantly reduced.

27.Fifthly, Ng/Daughter claimed HK$80,200 for preparation of documents (10.8 hours for GR and 18.5 for DC), HK$38,000 for perusal of documents (6.5 hours for GR and 6 hours for DC), HK$44,000 for preparation for hearing (5 hours for GR and 12 hours for DC), and HK$16,000 for the Hearing (2.5 hours for GR and 3 hours for DC) totalling HK$178,200 for Item D. Chen disputed such claims.

28.In my view, the claim under Item D was significantly excessive on party and party basis. Whilst I agree 2 fee-earners would be appropriate, GR should have a more supervisory role and the bulk of solicitors’ work should be done by DC, especially when leading and junior counsel were involved. Further, preparing initial drafts of Ng’s 2^nd and 3^rd affirmations and GR’s affirmation should not have taken substantial time. The matters raised in Ng 2^nd Aff and GR’s affirmation were limited, and the matters addressed in Ng’s 3^rd affirmation were responsive to Chen’s 7^th affirmation. In my view, the focus in legal work for Ng/Daughter was on the interplay between factual matters and legal issues, and how to argue the legal approach to present their case in the best light, and that fell into counsel’s arena rather than solicitors’ professional work.

29.Having studied counsel’s written submissions and Chen’s 7^th affirmation, I am wholly unable to see how perusal of documents would incur a total of 12.5 hours for 2 fee-earners. Chen’s 7^th affirmation is not difficult to peruse/consider, and it was for counsel to deal with the niceties of legal arguments that arose from such affirmation. I find GR’s and DC’s time for preparation for the Hearing grossly excessive. In my view, given the involvement of leading and junior counsel, only 1 fee-earner (DC) should be allowed on party and party basis for attending the Hearing, and 12 hours of preparation by DC alone were quite excessive. Since only DC should attend the Hearing, there was no reason to allow GR’s time for preparation for hearing. Given the involvement of leading and junior counsel, and DC’s own familiarity with the Summons and matters in relation thereto given his involvement in the run up to the Hearing, I expect DC to spend minimal time for preparation for hearing. As for the Hearing itself, I will only allow time for DC’s attendance for 3 hours.

30.Sixthly, Ng/Daughter claimed brief fees (HK$150,000 for Mr Chua SC and HK$45,000 for Mr A Tang), conference fees (HK$8,460 for Mr Chua SC and HK$6,250 for Mr A Tang) and fees for settling summons and affirmation/affidavit (HK$14,000 for Mr Chua SC and HK$34,300 for Mr A Tang). I am not persuaded a conference with counsel would be necessary at all. All that was required prior to the Hearing as being necessary or proper was for junior counsel to settle Ng’s affirmations, and with proper instructions it would not have required any conference whether with solicitors alone or with clients as well. It was the nuanced presentation of factual information in solicitors’ drafts that required counsel’s skilled input, and it was not the function of counsel to gather primary instructions during conference when costs were claimed for 2 fee-earners for attendance on client and preparation of documents. In particular, I do not see any need for counsel to settle the summons and GR’s affirmation which was brief and well within the scope of work and ability of DC/GR. In any event, I do not see any need, on party and party basis, to involve leading counsel for settling affirmation/affidavit.

31.Taking into account all of the above matters, and upon considering the items of costs claimed to see whether or not they were “necessary and its costs reasonable” on the sensible standard of necessity as explained by the Court of Appeal, Ng’s/Daughter’s total costs on their Statement of Costs are assessed at HK$270,000.  Although I have explained in paragraph 7 above why written submissions on summary assessment of costs should not be considered, having cast a quick eye over the contents of such submissions, I find that even if I were to take them into account, they would not have swayed me from the above analysis and outcome.

32.I therefore order that Chen shall pay Ng/Daughter costs in the sum of HK$270,000.

Mr Danny Tang, instructed by Robertsons, for the petitioner

Mr Alexander Tang, instructed by Ribeiro Hui, for the 2^nd and 3^rd respondents