HKSAR v. Law Lam Man
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 136/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 4 June 2018.
1. The Appellant appeals against his conviction after trial in the Magistrates’ Court on a summons laid under section 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance (Cap 228). Section 4(28) is directed against the conduct of “[a]ny person who without lawful authority or excuse … does any act whereby injury or obstruction, whether directly or consequentially, may accrue to a public place or to the shore of the sea, or to navigation, mooring or anchorage, transit or traffic”. The particulars of offence a
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HCMA 136/2018 [2018] HKCFI 1337 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO 136 OF 2018 (ON APPEAL FROM KTS 30 OF 2018) ________________
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________________ JUDGMENT ________________ 1.The Appellant appeals against his conviction after trial in the Magistrates’ Court on a summons laid under section 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance (Cap 228). Section 4(28) is directed against the conduct of “[a]ny person who without lawful authority or excuse … does any act whereby injury or obstruction, whether directly or consequentially, may accrue to a public place or to the shore of the sea, or to navigation, mooring or anchorage, transit or traffic”. The particulars of offence are that at 4:57 pm on 11 July 2017 at the junction of Cheung Yip Street and Hoi Bun Road, Kowloon Bay, he without lawful authority or excuse did an act whereby obstruction whether directly or consequently might accrue to traffic at that junction. 2.Two perfected grounds of appeal against conviction have been filed on the Appellant’s behalf. Ground 1 is that “[t]he Magistrate erred in finding that the Appellant bore the evidential burden in proving that there was a lawful excuse for the obstruction.” Ground 2 is that “[i]n considering whether the offence was proven against the Appellant, the Magistrate erred in failing to consider whether the Appellant’s obstruction was without lawful excuse.” 3.At the trial, the following facts were admitted under section 65C of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 221):
4.There were two prosecution witnesses. The Appellant was the sole defence witness. 5.The Magistrate’s Statement of Findings contains the following summary of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses:
6.As to the Appellant’s evidence, it is summarised as follows in the Statement of Findings:
7.The Magistrate referred to the criminal burden and standard of proof, evaluated the whole of the evidence in the case, accepted the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, rejected the Appellant’s evidence, found that the incident occurred in the way described by the prosecution witnesses, found that the Appellant had no lawful authority to stand in front of PW1’s taxi, and found that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 8.After delivering a verdict convicting the Appellant, the Magistrate was informed that the Appellant had a clear record. Upon being so informed, the Magistrate adjourned to reconsider his verdict. When reconsidering his verdict, the Magistrate took the Appellant’s clear record into account in the Appellant’s favour both in respect of credibility and in respect of propensity. The verdict remained one of guilty. 9.Ground 1 is based on the Magistrate having said this in paragraph 18 of his Statement of Findings:
10.At the trial, prosecuting counsel (who does not appear in this appeal) relied on section 94A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 221), which deals with negative averments. She submitted that on a charge laid under section 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance, the defence bore an evidential burden of proving lawful authority or excuse. That reliance was misplaced and that submission was wrong. Section 94A deals with exceptions or exemptions from or qualifications to the law creating the offence charged, and it does not apply to any ingredient of theoffence: Tong Yiu Wah v HKSAR (2007) 10 HKCFAR 324. The absence of lawful authority or excuse is an ingredient of the offence created by section 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance, and the burden of proving the absence of lawful authority or excuse lies on the prosecution: Yeung May Wan v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 137. 11.So the Magistrate was mistaken in thinking that the Appellant bore an evidential burden to prove lawful authority or excuse. 12.Did that mistake affect the result? 13.In the present case, there was evidence on which the Magistrate was entitled to find, as he did, that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that traffic at the junction concerned was blockedand therefore obstructed by the Appellant’s conduct. An evidential burden such as the Magistrate mistakenly thought existed would mean no more than that there has to be sufficient evidence to raise an issue on lawful authority or excuse. Once that issue is thus raised, the prosecution wouldbear the burden of proving the absence of lawful authority or excuse beyond reasonable doubt. The Magistrate’s Statement of Findings shows that he found the absence of lawful authority or excuse proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Subject to Ground 2, he was entitled to so find. 14.Although the Magistrate did make the mistake referred to in Ground 1, that mistake did not affect the result. The Magistrate would have reached the same result even if he had not made that mistake. So Ground 1 does not provide a basis on which to disturb this conviction. 15.Ground 2 is based on what the Magistrate said in para 27 of his Statement of Findings which reads:
16.On the facts pertaining to Ground 2, counsel for the Appellant points to material on which the following might be said. PW1 began driving his taxi at the Appellant thereby pushing him backwards. PW1 had driven at the Appellant for 8 seconds before the Appellant said that he was calling the police. The Appellant did not have his phone with him and was afraid PW1 would leave the scene. PW1 was prosecuted for careless driving as a result of this incident, and that prosecution could only have been based on his driving at the Appellant. 17.The Magistrate spoke in terms of “if [the Appellant] had been bumped”. The use of the word “if” causes me concern as to whether the evidence on this part of the case has been sufficiently sifted by the Magistrate. On that basis, I do not feel able to say with confidence that this conviction is safe. Ground 2 succeeds. 18.The appeal is allowed to quash the conviction. As to whether to order an acquittal or to order a retrial, I will hear the prosecution on whether they seek a retrial, and if they do, I will hear both sides on whether I should order an acquittal or a retrial.
19.In all the circumstances, I do not consider that a retrial should be ordered. I therefore decline to order a retrial.
Mr Prakash L Daryanani, SPP of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Randy Shek, instructed by Director of Legal Aid, for the Appellant | |||||||||||||||||||
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