Magic Key Ltd and Others v. Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1931/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 29 July 2020.
1. On 14 June 2018, the Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) (“ the Tribunal ”) determined that no good cause had been shown for holding a full hearing of the Applicants’ appeals (“ the Appeals ”) against various buildings orders issued by the Building Authority (“ the BA ”) more particularly described below, and dismissed the Appeals (“ the Determination ”). This is the Applicants’ application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Determination.
Cited by 7 cases · Cites 10 cases
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HCAL 1931/2018 [2020] HKCFI 1716 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1931 OF 2018 ________________________ BETWEEN
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___________________ D E C I S I O N ___________________ INTRODUCTION 1.On 14 June 2018, the Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) (“the Tribunal”) determined that no good cause had been shown for holding a full hearing of the Applicants’ appeals (“the Appeals”) against various buildings orders issued by the Building Authority (“the BA”) more particularly described below, and dismissed the Appeals (“the Determination”). This is the Applicants’ application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Determination. BASIC FACTS 2.Green Valley Mansion, 51 Wong Nai Chung Road, Hong Kong (“the Building”) is a 15-storey composite building of which the G/F is used for retail purpose, while the 1/F to 14/F are used for domestic purpose. There are 4 flats on each floor from 1/F to 14/F. The occupation permit of the Building (“the OP”) was issued on 30 November 1964. 3.The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Applicants are respectively the Flat B owners of the 1/F, 3/F and 4/F of the Building. 4.The Building was one of the targeted buildings designated by the Buildings Department (“the BD”) in its Blitz UBW Clearance Operation 2006. On 9 June 2006, a letter was issued by the BD to inform the owners and occupiers of the Building that it had been selected as one of the targeted buildings in the said operation, and Maunsell Consultants Asia Limited (“the Consultant”) had been appointed to investigate unauthorized building works on external walls, in common areas and on approved cantilevered slab balconies of the Building. On the same date, the Consultant also sent a letter to the owners and occupiers of the Building advising them to remove unauthorized building works in or at their premises voluntarily. Subsequently, due to difficulty of access and problems about resources, the intended enforcement action was suspended until 2009, when the Building was again selected as one of the targeted buildings designated by the BD in the Blitz UBW Clearance Operation 2009. On 20 October 2009, the BD issued a letter to request the owners and occupiers of the Building to remove unauthorized building works in or at their premises and reinstate the same in accordance with the approved building plans. 5.On 20 May 2010, the BA issued to each of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Applicants a building order (collectively “the Building Orders”) under s 24(1) of the Building Ordinance, Cap 123 (“the Ordinance”) requiring them to demolish various unauthorized building works in or at their premises and reinstating the parts of the Building so affected in accordance with the approved plans of the Building (“the Approved Plans”) within 60 days of the date of the orders. The unauthorized building works complained of by the BA and with which this application for leave to apply for judicial review is concerned (“the UBWs”) were described in the Building Orders as -
6.According to the Applicants, the UBWs in or at each of their units consist of 2 adjoining structures, namely
7.The South Re-Entrant Structure is an enclosed structure on the exterior of the Building over what, according to the Approved Plans, was originally a void space between a bedroom and a kitchen. The enclosure was formed by the construction of an additional floor slab, ceiling slab and wall (with window openings), turning the original void space into a room. 8.The Verandah Extension Structure is also an enclosed structure on the exterior of the Building over what, according to the Approved Plans, was originally an open, quarter-oval, verandah. The enclosure was formed by the construction of (i) an extension to the original cantilever floor slab of the verandah to become a rectangular floor slab, (ii) an extension to the original cantilever ceiling slab of the verandah to become a rectangular ceiling slab, and (iii) enclosing walls (with window openings), turning the original open verandah into a room. 9.It is not in dispute that the UBWs do not appear on the Approved Plans. 10.Similar building orders were issued to other owners of the Building, including some owners of Flat A and Flat B on other floors of the Building. 11.On 10 June 2010, NY Architects & Associates, on behalf of the Applicants and other affected owners of the Building (collectively “the Appellants”), lodged a total of 29 notices of appeal to the Tribunal against (inter alia) the Building Orders. THE DETERMINATION 12.The Tribunal conducted a preliminary hearing of the Appeals on 16 and 17 November 2017. The Appellants were represented by counsel and solicitors at the preliminary hearing. 13.6 grounds of appeal were raised by the Appellants before the Tribunal[1]. The grounds relevant for the purpose of the present application for leave to apply for judicial review[2] are:
14.In relation to “Ground 1”, the Appellants argued that there was evidence that the projecting structures in question were erected by the developer of the Building in the 1960s, and they should not be held responsible for them[4]. In support of this argument, the Appellants relied upon:
15.In relation to “Ground 5”, the Appellants contended that the UBWs were constructed with the approval of the BA and they should not be regarded as unauthorized building works. It was argued, in particular, that:
16.On 14 June 2018, the Tribunal determined that no good cause had been shown for holding a full hearing of the Appeals, and dismissed the Appeals. 17.The Tribunal’s reasons for rejecting Ground 1 can be found in §§25-31 of the Determination:
18.The Tribunal’s reasons for rejecting Ground 5 can be found in §§45-51 of the Determination:
APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 19.On 13 September 2018, one Lo Kai Yuen Felex made the present application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Determination. He was, apparently, authorized by, inter alia, the Applicants to make the application. 20.The intended grounds of judicial review are set out in “Attachment B” to the Form 86, which I shall refer to later in this decision. In summary, the principal point raised by the Applicants in support of the present application for leave to apply for judicial review is that both the BA and the Tribunal failed to distinguish or differentiate between the South Re-Entrant Structures and the Verandah Extension Structures when considering whether they were constructed at around the same time by the developer of the Building in the 1960s prior to the first sale of the individual units to the purchasers. Accordingly, the Determination, in so far as it concerns the South Re-Entrant Structures, cannot stand. 21.Pausing here, it may be noted that before the Tribunal, the Applicants objected to being required to demolish both the South Re-Entrant Structures and the Verandah Extension Structures and reinstate the parts of the Building so affected in accordance with the Approved Plans. However, in the present application for judicial review, the Applicants seek to challenge the Determination in relation to the South Re-Entrant Structures only. They do not challenge the Determination in relation to the Verandah Extension Structures[6]. 22.Pursuant to a Consent Summons dated 4 May 2020, leave was granted by this Court to Mr Lo to amend the Form 86 such that the Applicants became substituted as the applicants of the application for leave to apply for judicial review in place of Mr Lo. PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO HOLD A FULL HEARING 23.Under s 49 of the Ordinance:
24.The purpose of s 49 is to weed out hopeless appeals. It has been said that a decision not to hold a full hearing ought to be made only in “plain and obvious” cases (Ronald Wilson v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) [2013] 5 HKLRD 158, at §31 per Anthony Chan J). Although it may sometimes be useful to describe statutory thresholds in various contexts by reference to standards which the court is familiar with, such as “plain and obvious”, “reasonable arguability”, “real or realistic prospect of success”, etc, ultimately the applicable threshold is that as stated in the statute. For the purpose of s 49(2), the threshold is whether a “good cause” has been shown for holding a full hearing of the appeal. 25.Whether a good cause has been shown for holding a full hearing depends on all relevant circumstances of the case. The merits of the appeal are obviously an important consideration, but it is by no means conclusive. 26.Even where an appellant cannot show that his appeal has a reasonable, or good, prospect of success at a preliminary hearing, the Tribunal may determine that, on the facts of the particular case before it, good cause has been shown for holding a full hearing because, for example, the appeal raises some points of general importance, or may have precedential value in other cases lining up before the Tribunal, or the interests of justice would be served by holding a full hearing. It is not possible to state exhaustively all the situations which would constitute a good cause for holding a full hearing of an appeal. The matter is left to the discretion of the Tribunal, subject to the court’s supervisory jurisdiction in judicial review. 27.Generally speaking, if an appellant is able to raise a substantial dispute of fact the resolution of which is required for the purpose of disposing of his appeal, it is likely that a good cause has been shown for holding a full hearing for the purpose of s 49 of the Ordinance. However, if the disputed fact raised by the appellant is not material to the outcome of the appeal, the Tribunal is under no duty to resolve such dispute and does not have to hold a full hearing to determine the factual issue, but may dismiss the appeal forthwith (Lo Ying Ming v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) [2011] 3 HKLRD 586, at §6 per Lam J (as he then was)). Further, as stated by Au-Yeung J in Chinluck Properties Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), HCAL 124/2012, 12 October 2012, at §25, the Tribunal may refuse to hold a full hearing where it is apparent that an ostensible dispute of fact is without substance, or where the appeal is wholly lacking in merits or is frivolous. 28.When approaching the question of whether there is a substantial dispute of fact which requires determination at a full hearing, the Tribunal is entitled to approach the threshold question with a degree of robust common sense. The Tribunal does not have to examine the minutiae of the evidence, and is not bound to take the appellant’s evidence at face value, or read the evidence in a way which is most favourable to the appellant’s case. The Tribunal, whose members are chosen on account of their specialist knowledge and skills in areas relevant to building appeals, is entitled to consider the evidence broadly, pragmatically and with common sense. 29.Lastly, it should be borne in mind that (i) the burden of establishing a “good cause” for the purpose of s 49 lies on the appellant, and (ii) whether an appeal has merits must be determined by reference to the materials placed before the Tribunal by the parties (Longest Profit (Hong Kong) Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), CACV 60/2013, 29 January 2014, at §§11 and 25 per Lam VP). DISCUSSION 30.As stated in Attachment B to the Form 86, the Applicants’ grounds of judicial review are as follows:
31.In my view, it was not necessary for the BA or the Tribunal to distinguish or differentiate between the South Re-Entrant Structures and the Verandah Extension Structures for the purposes of issuing the Building Orders or determining the Appeals. In so far as the BA was concerned, both structures were unauthorized buildings works the construction of which had not received the prior consent and approval of the BA as required by s 14 of the Ordinance. The “projecting structure” referred to in each of the Building Orders covered both the South Re-Entrant Structure and the Verandah Extension Structure (as can be seen from the plans attached to the Building Orders). The fact that the South Re-Entrant Structures might all have been constructed by the developer of the Building, or some other person, at around the same time in the 1960s prior to the first sale of the individual units to the purchasers is no evidence that their construction had received the approval and consent of the BA. Under s 14 of the Ordinance, no person shall commence or carry out any building works without having first obtained the BA’s approval in writing of documents submitted to him in accordance with the building regulations and his consent in writing for the commencement of the relevant works. It is trite that the BA has no power to grant retrospective approval under s 14. There is also no evidence that the BA has ever given the requisite approval or consent under s 14 in relation to the South Re-Entrant Structures and the Verandah Extension Structures. 32.In this regard, it is important to appreciate that Lo Ying Ming v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) [2011] 3 HKLRD 586, which apparently supports the Applicant’s argument, is a decision on the old statutory regime under s 9 of the Buildings Ordinance 1955. In his judgment, Johnson Lam J (as he then was) was at pains to draw a distinction between the legislative regime under s 9 of the 1955 Ordinance and that under s 9 of the Buildings (Amendment) Ordinance 1959 (which is similar to the current legislative regime in Cap 123):
33.In other words, under the 1955 Ordinance, it was possible for the BA to give his relevant consent or approval to the commencement of building works by conduct which, depending on the evidence, might be evidenced by the issue of an occupation permit. However, this was no longer possible under the 1959 Ordinance, which prescribed that the relevant consent or approval could only be given through the approval of plans. The same position applies under the current Buildings Ordinance. 34.Since it is not in dispute that the South Re-Entrant Structures (as well as the Verandah Extension Structures) do not appear on the Approved Plans, it is clear that the relevant works were carried out in contravention of the Ordinance, and were therefore subject to the BA’s enforcement action under s 24 of the Ordinance. Also, being the owners of the relevant units in or at which the unauthorized buildings works were found, it was correct for the BA to issue the Buildings Orders to the Applicants (HKSAR v Yu Ching [2006] HKCLRT 311, at §33 per Deputy Judge Barnes (as she then was); Lee Hoi Ching v Lok Fuk Ding [2008] 5 HKLRD 809, at §§48-50 per Recorder Ambrose Ho SC). The contention that the Applicants were not the correct parties to be served with the Building Orders is incorrect as a matter of law. 35.For the same reasons, I do not consider that the Tribunal was in error in not distinguishing or differentiating between the South Re-Entrant Structures and the Verandah Extension Structures in the Determination. In any event, the Tribunal, having considered the reports of Mr Howes and Mr Hui and studied the relevant photographs of the UBWs, took the view that the evidence before it was not such as would justify a conclusion that they were built by one person at around the same time[7]. Normally, it may not be appropriate for the Tribunal to resolve conflicts of expert evidence at a preliminary hearing. However, the experts’ conflicting evidence in this case concerned the question of whether the external appearance of the UBWs appeared to be uniform, and the experts reached their views based on external visual inspection[8]. In such circumstances, I consider that the Tribunal was entitled to reach its own conclusion with the assistance of the evidence of the experts and upon an examination of the relevant photographs of the structures in question if the Tribunal considered that the materials before it could justify a conclusion being reached on the issue at a preliminary hearing [9]. 36.It is relevant that the evidence of Mr Hui that the external appearance of the UBWs did not appear to be uniform covered both the South Re-Entrant Structures and the Verandah Extension Structures. In particular, in respect of the former, Mr Hui stated at:
In my view, the Tribunal was entitled to accept the evidence of Mr Hui[12] (as supported by what could be seen from the relevant photographs), and come to the view that that there was not sufficient uniformity of construction of the UBWs such as to give rise to an inference that they were built by one person at around the same time. 37.Even if the Tribunal’s conclusion that there was not sufficient uniformity of construction of the South Re-Entrant Structures is wrong such that an inference ought to be drawn that they were constructed by the developer of the Building, or some other person, in the 1960s prior to the first sale of the individual units of the Building to the purchasers, there was still no evidence that such structures already existed at the time when the BA inspected the Building prior to the issue of the OP on 30 November 1964. There was thus no factual foundation for the argument that those structures had been approved by the BA by conduct, which, in any event, could not turn them into lawful structures under the Buildings (Amendment) Ordinance 1959 or the current Buildings Ordinance. 38.In relation to the Applicants’ argument based on legitimate expectation, it is well established that an expectation, to be legitimate, must be both lawful, in the sense that the benefit must be something that can be legally accorded, and reasonable (Ng Siu Tung v Director of Immigration (2002) 5 HKCFAR 1, at §§101 and 112). The Applicants’ expectation (if any) that they would be permitted to retain and use the UBWs is neither lawful nor reasonable.
In short, no owner of premises in or at which unauthorized building works are found has any right or legitimate expectation to retain them (see Sky Wide Development Ltd, ante, at §18). In the present case, there is also no relevant representation or promise made by the BA which the Applicants can point to in support of the alleged legitimate expectation. 39.In all, I reject the Applicants’ intended grounds of judicial review as raised in Attachment B to the Form 86. 40.In passing, there is one other point that I should deal with. Mr Chiu has sought to make something out of §25 of the Determination, in which the Tribunal stated the following:
Mr Chiu argues that this passage shows that the Tribunal was in a state of “confusion” as to whether there was or was not uniformity of appearance of the projecting structures from the photographic evidence, and thus “one should treat the finding of the Appeal Tribunal with caution”[13]. In my view, reading §25 of the Determination as a whole and having regard to other express findings made in the Determination (in particular, the finding at §28 where the Tribunal stated that having studied the photographs with care “we do not think that the evidence is such that one can conclude that the projecting structures … were built by one person … nor can one say with any degree of certainty that they were built at or at around the same time as alleged”), it is clear that the word “not” was a typing or clerical error which should be omitted. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 41.Mr Lo issued a summons on 4 May 2020 seeking to amend Attachment B to the Form 86 to raise 2 additional grounds of judicial review, as follows -
42.In respect of the proposed “Ground (2A)”, the inference that the Tribunal drew from the symmetry of the Flat A and Flat B units of the Building as appeared on the Approved Plans, in so far as it relates to the South Re-Entrant Structures (but not the quarter-oval verandahs which, as mentioned above, is no longer in issue in this application), seems to me to be a reasonable one which the Tribunal was entitled to draw. 43.In respect of the proposed “Ground (2B)”, Mr Andy Yan’s evidence, even if it were to be accepted, cannot prove that the UBWs were constructed by the developer of the Building (or some other person) prior to the issue of the OP. However, the Tribunal’s comment at §30 of the Determination that the UBWs at Flat 4B “could have been done either by his father or someone else on his father’s behalf” during the period from “30/11/1964 - end of 1965”, may not be justified. 44.These having been said, the proposed additional grounds do not advance the Applicants’ application for leave to apply for judicial review for the same reasons given in §§31-34 and 38 above. 45.In all, none of the intended grounds of judicial review is reasonably arguable or has a realistic prospect of success. DISPOSITION 46.The application for leave to apply for judicial review, as well as the summons dated 4 May 2020, are dismissed with costs to the Building Authority, to be taxed if not agreed.
Mr Simon Chiu, instructed by Ong & Chung, for the 1st to 3rd Applicants The Putative Respondent was absent Ms Sanyi Shum, GC of Department of Justice, for the Putative Interested Party [1] See §10 of the Determination. [2] See §17 of Mr Chiu’s Skeleton Submissions dated 29 April 2020. [3] See §12(2) of the Determination. [4] See §22 of the Determination. [5] See §44 of the Determination, and §38 of the Appellants’ Skeleton Submissions dated 9 November 2017 before the Tribunal. [6] See §24 of Mr Chiu’s Skeleton Submissions. [7] See §28 of the Determination. [8] Although Mr Howes also carried out an internal inspection of the Building, his opinion regarding uniformity of construction of the South Re-Entrant Structures and the external walls (but not other parts) of the Verandah Extension Structures was based on “external visual inspection” (see the bottom paragraph on page 3 of Mr Howes’ report). [9] See §27 of the Determination. [10] See §11.5 of Mr Hui’s Affirmation filed dated 13 March 2020. [11] See §11.4 of Mr Hui’s Affirmation filed dated 13 March 2020. [12] See §8 of Mr Hui’s report dated 27 January 2017. [13] See §32 of Mr Chiu’s Skeleton Submissions. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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