Leyy v. Ukwk

FCMC 1393 / 2015

[2020] HKFC 118

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1393 OF 2015

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RULING
(Costs in children’s cases)

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Introduction

1.On the 19 March 2020 I handed down my judgment in relation to the arrangements for the child of the family, A. The judgment was in two parts, the first part being a Fact Finding determination and the second part being a judgment inter alia on the practical arrangements for A, a little girl who is now 8 years of age, going forward. In that judgment I initially summarized my orders and directions as follows:

Summary of the judgment

2.  In summary the judgment states as follows:

i) On the balance of probabilities, the allegations made by the father against the mother, T and M are without any proper foundation and I accept that the abuse did not take place;

ii) Paragraph 1 of the court order dated the 20 April 2020 shall be varied and sole custody and care and control of A shall be granted to the Petitioner mother with immediate effect;

iii) There shall also be an immediate change of residence, or as immediate as is possible given the challenging circumstances brought about by COVID-19;

iv) The father, his family and nanny P shall have no contact with A in the short term. Longer term I accept that the father shall, all things being equal, have regular contact with A. Consequently, access shall be suspended temporarily and this issue shall be reviewed at a hearing scheduled for September 2020;

v) For the avoidance of doubt it is further directed that A shall have therapy, preferably with the Family Separation Clinic in the UK, together with a therapist in Hong Kong. A copy of this judgment shall be made available to them. It is anticipated that A will need to have therapy once a week for about 6 months – 25 sessions in total.

vi) A penal notice shall be endorsed on this order;

vii) The issue of costs shall be reserved for argument and shall be dealt with by way of paper disposal.

viii) I shall stand down inter alia so that the mother can formally provide the undertakings that she had promised to give during the course of the trial and as set out in paragraph 50 of this judgment.        

2.This summary gives a flavour of the trial and the litigation itself. However, this Ruling on costs should be read in conjunction with the full judgment dated the 19 March 2020 and to the findings made within that judgment.

The issues

3.In summary and notwithstanding the fact that this is primarily a children’s case, the mother asks for her costs on an indemnity basis. The father for his part argues that there should be no order as to costs or in the alternative that costs should be awarded on a party and party basis.

Legal principles

4.Although costs are always in the discretion of the court, it is accepted that a costs order made against one parent in a child related matter is generally considered unusual unless that parent has, for example, been unreasonable in the conduct of the litigation or has behaved in a way that is somehow reprehensible, or beyond the limit of what might be regarded as reasonable. See Sutton London Borough Council v Davis (Costs) (No 2) [1994] 2 FLR 569, Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2) [1992] 1 AER 271, S v S HCMP 5547/1999 and L v C CACV 169 of 2006). 

5.Thus, in the normal course of events, regardless of the outcome, the court would normally make no order as to costs following a trial on a children’s matter. To that end, Ms Irving for the mother has also referenced the following English cases in her written submission:

5. The principle that reprehensible behaviour, or behaviour beyond the band of what is reasonable, may result in an order for costs against that party was set out in Keller v Keller and Legal Aid Board [1995] 1 FLR 259 at 265 per Wilson J.;

“No one suggests that the court’s discretion in respect of costs under s 51 (1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 has become emasculated in children cases. The position is only that in most such cases, indeed in ordinary cases, the proper weighing of the factors in the exercise of the discretion is likely to lead to the choice of no order …. Where, for example, the conduct of a party has been reprehensible or his stance in the litigation has been beyond the band of what is reasonable, an order for costs might well be made against him.” [emphasis added]

6. When assessing whether a party’s conduct has been unreasonable, what should be considered is unreasonableness in the attitude to the litigation. In R v R (Costs: Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95 at 98B, per Hale J.

7. In Re G (Costs: Child Case) [1999] 2 FLR 250, per Butler-Sloss LJ at 252G:

“If this judge in this case had found that this Father had behaved unreasonably in the litigation and had gone beyond what many Fathers do, seeking orders which are hopeless, the point will come at which pursuing a hopeless application becomes unreasonable. But hopelessness and unreasonableness are not necessarily the same thing. Indeed, particularly where there is a litigant in person, a degree of generosity towards a litigant may be more appropriate than to a litigant which is on legal aid generally advised by counsel and solicitors as to the extent to which they should continue to litigate.” [emphasis added]

Her Ladyship then added at 253D:

“It seems to me that the case of R v R does not change the normal situation that it is unusual to order costs, although it will be appropriate to order costs when a parent, even a litigant in person, goes beyond the limit of what is reasonable to pursue the application before the court.” [emphasis added]

6. This general approach was also reiterated in the later case of Re T (A Child) [2005] EWCA Civ 311, where the Court of Appeal in England and Wales repeated the general principles on costs in child related matters as follows:

36. The principles, which fall to be applied, are not, we think, in dispute.  The judge summarised them succinctly in the following way:-

“2.1 The CPR apply. Under normal circumstances, according to rule 44.3(2)(a), the general rule is that costs should follow the event, although the court can make a different order. ( Rule 44.3(2) (b) )

2.2 However, this general rule does not apply to family proceedings. (Family Proceedings (Miscellaneous Amendments) Rules 1999)

2.3 It is suggested that even in family proceedings, the general rule is probably the starting point but can more easily be displaced. (Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2) [1992] Fam 40)

2.4 In cases involving children in particular, costs awarded against one parent or another are exceptional since the court is anxious to avoid the situation where a parent may feel “punished” by the other parent which will reduce co-operation between them. This will only impinge ultimately on the welfare of the child or the children concerned. (London Borough of Sutton v Davis (Costs) (No 2) [1994] 2 FLR569; Re: M (Local Authority’s Costs) [1995] 1 FLR 533)

2.5 The conduct of the parties is in reality the major consideration when deciding whether or not an exceptional order for costs should be made. It should only be made if the penalised party has been unreasonable in his or her conduct. Moreover the “unreasonableness” must relate to the conduct of the litigation rather than the welfare of the child. ( R v R (Costs: child case) [1997] 2 FLR 95)

2.6 One has to be very careful in this distinction when, as in the case of (the mother), the apparent unreasonableness is as a result of the personality of the relevant party. In such circumstances, there is often an overlap of that party’s conduct of the litigation and the conduct relating to the welfare of the child.

7.Reference may also be made to our own Court of Appeal decision in TPL v WYY, CACV 47 & 61 of 2014, which also reiterates these general principles.

8.However, notwithstanding this, it is very unusual indeed, for a court to take this further and to make a costs order against a parent in a private child related case on an indemnity basis. I know of no such case and it is of note that Ms Irving has not been able to produce one in support of her submissions.

9.However, she did refer to my sister judge’s analysis of the correct approach to indemnity costs generally in an unreported family case (although not a child related case) namely LYE and CWW and HWL, FCMC 14787 of 2002, 6 May 2005. In that case HH Judge Bebe Chu (as she then was) sets out the Legal Principles relating to indemnity costs as follows:

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

3.  According to Rule 3 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, the Rules of the High Court (RHC) shall apply with the necessary modifications to the commencement of matrimonial proceedings in, and to the practice and procedure in matrimonial proceedings pending in the Court of First Instance or in the District Court.

4.  Rule 91A of the Matrimonial Causes Rules provides that where the costs of an incidental to any matrimonial proceedings are directed to be taxed, R.H.C. Order 62 shall have effect in relation to the costs of proceedings in the Court of First Instance, and R.D.C. Order 62 shall have effect in relation to the costs of proceedings in the District Court.

5.  Order 62 Rule 28(3) in both R.D.C. and in R.H.C. provides that the Court in awarding costs payable to one party by another may in any case in which it thinks fit to do so order or direct that the costs shall be taxed on the common fund basis or on the indemnity basis.

6.  Any order for costs is in the discretion of the Court.  (see Headnote of Re Engindata Ltd (No. 2) 1993 1 All ER 232).

7.  Section 53 of District Court Ordinance Cap. 336 (equivalent to Section 52A of High Court Ordinance Cap. 4) provides that the Court shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.  See also Hong Kong Civil Procedure, 62/2/5:-

“The Court of Appeal in Choy Yee Chun (The Representative of the state of Chan Pui Yiu) v. Bond Star Development Ltd [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 1327, CA reviewed the cases and summarised the law as follows. A taxation of the successful party’s costs on an indemnity basis could properly be ordered where the proceedings were scandalous or vexatious, or had been initiated or prosecuted maliciously, or for an ulterior motive, or in an oppressive manner. Any proceedings instituted or prosecuted in such circumstances as to constitute an affront to the court could properly be the subject of a direction for the taxation of the successful party’s cost on the indemnity basis. However, the circumstances in which an indemnity award might properly be made were not restricted to circumstances beyond the requirement that taxation on an indemnity basis must be “appropriate”. The principle for the award of an order of costs on an indemnity basis applied equally to those who not only instituted proceedings but who defended them. If a plaintiff had been forced to institute proceedings by the defendant whose conduct had been not only hostile in the normal litigious sense, but oppressive and with base ulterior motive, and if the pursuit of a defence constituted conduct which was part of an oppressive game plan, then invocation of the power to award costs on an indemnity basis might well be justified”.

10.Ms Irving, also refers to Town Planning Board v Society for Protection of the Harbour Ltd No 2 (2004) 7 HKCFAR 114, which supports the general proposition that indemnity costs orders are based “on a wide range of factors and circumstances” and that an order must be “appropriate”.

Discussion 

11.Thus the issue to be determined here is essentially a question of degree. Given the circumstances in this case, should the father be penalised when it comes to the issue of costs? Generally, as I have said, it is accepted that there should be no order as to costs in a standard dispute over a child, where for example the argument is about the level of access for a non-care taking parent or whether there should be an order for sole or joint custody? These sorts of disputes form the bedrock of the Family Court and are in no way unusual. Thus parents should not be discouraged from raising legitimate concerns about their children, which need to be properly ventilated and determined by the courts when considering what is in their best interests, by the concern caused by a possible adverse costs order being made against them. It is however a fine line. When then can it be said that a parent has crossed that line to the extent that a costs order against him (or her) is deemed permissible? And did the father cross that line in this case? Further, even if that is the case, when does the situation additionally warrant an order for indemnity costs?

12.In this instance I made a number of findings, which go to the father’s behaviours. For example, in paragraph 26 of the judgment I said as follows:

… the father believed then and continues to believe now, that what A had told him and allegedly the Police also, was 100% true. He did so notwithstanding the fact that there was little, if any, corroborating evidence in support of what A says.

I added at paragraph 33 – 35 that:    

Discussion

33.The difficulty is that whereas the father has made these complaints there is very little to support them – there is no evidence of any injury; for example, there are no medical reports or photographs to support the allegation that T “punched” A’s chest repeatedly and on various occasions. There is also no subsidiary evidence to support his case. For example, there was nothing to suggest by A’s behavior at school during the initial period of time i.e. from the 29 April 2017 – 16 December 2017, (or indeed during the later period) that she was being abused or ill treated in any way. Further A did not generally resist contact with her mother during this time. There was one conversation with A’s teacher which led to second allegation about M, but that happened after the first allegation had been made. Infact, it seems that if A had not said anything then there would have been very little at all to suggest that anything was wrong. The father did claim that A had said various things to both him, KA and Grandma C and that she had also painted some dark or “black pictures” – but again there is nothing to verify this. It is also of note that none of the said paintings were produced. I can also place no weight on anything allegedly said by KA in this respect. [This is because although KA was asked to file an affidavit and to attend court, she chose not to do so]. When asked about the pictures in the witness box the father said that he had destroyed them because they were just “weird”.       

34.It is also of some concern that the father simply seems to have believed everything that A allegedly said to him verbatim, stating continually that his daughter does not/did not lie. With respect it seems to me that this shows a remarkable lack of insight. In my experience, children, like adults lie all of the time and for various reasons, both good and bad. 

35.My other concern relates to the fact that it subsequently transpired that the father had bought boxing gloves for A because she was taking Kung Fu lessons, so presumably she was aware of the concept of boxing or fighting. I also had an opportunity to view exhibit LEYY 3-3 produced by the mother which shows A “play fighting” with a mutual friend of both parties. The father can be heard commenting in the background. A also got into trouble immediately before the alleged incidents in December 2017 for hitting another child at school. In such circumstances it seems very likely indeed that A was very alive to the concept of both punching and/or fighting. It is also of note that the father did not tell the police about the Kung Fu lessons or the purchase of the boxing gloves.        

13.Ms Irving for the mother says, and I accept this to be the case, that the father had an obligation not to simply accept what A told him verbatim, but to make a proper assessment of what she had said. In her reply submission dated the 5 May 2020 she adds that:

7.   Para 9(a) and (b); an argument that has been rejected is an unreasonable one when there is not one shred of evidence to support it and a great deal of evidence against it, yet there is no attempt made to evaluate that evidence. F’s determination to insist on his version of events was so far removed from reality that it moved beyond the realms of hopeless, and became unreasonable.  Before acting as he did, F had a responsibility to properly assess the evidence and his own conduct e.g. the boxing gloves, which he did not inform police about, while then relying on A making boxing moves.  This case was not merely a “normal” Family Court issue about how much time either parent might spend with a child; it was an attempt to exclude M from her child’s life and send her innocent boyfriend to prison.

8.   Para 9(d); the conduct of the litigation was appalling; this was not just a matter of running a case that was unreasonable; inter alia, orders were obstructed and breached, an SJE was given instructions contrary to the Judge’s directions, relevant factors were not disclosed, (e.g. boxing gloves) and an Order to produce correspondence was “reinterpreted” by F, saying;

“There are many irrelevant emails from the school with respect to this case. Given the mother has access beginning. What are the purpose and need to read every mail?” [B6/1327]

14.The difficulty however, is that whilst that is the case, it is also true that husband does appear to have genuinely believed what A had said to him. He then acted on that, without making a proper investigation it is true, but with A’s best interests at heart. I do not accept, for example, that he deliberately set out to destroy the child’s relationship with her mother, although this will certainly have been the outcome if his behaviours had been allowed to go unchecked. I also accept that it is inevitably the case that a Police investigation often takes a long time to complete and that the father cannot be blamed for the flaws in the system.

15.The other difficulty is that some of the problems seem to have come about because of the father’s personality. Reference to this is made in Ms L’s report as set out in paragraph 40 of the judgment. Dr JB also added in his psychological report on the father, at paragraph 41 of the judgment as follows:

41. …

Mental Status:

K [the father] was oriented to person, place, and time.  His memory and concentration were within normal limits. His speech and thought were impaired, as evidenced by tangential, disorganized and magical thinking, and marked difficultly and resistance to taking the perspective of others.  His event memory appeared appropriate. His fund of knowledge seemed limited, especially in his understanding of child development. K’s intellect appeared average.  His insight and judgment appeared impaired, as evidenced by his difficulty in considering alternative interpretations / hypotheticals to his present situation insistence that his perspective was the only one that could possibly be accurate, and belief that only he could heal the wounds resultant from the current litigation. His mood was anxious during this evaluation and he displayed a restricted range of spontaneous affect.

42. In his Discussion and Recommendations, he added that:

K found it difficult to consider a situation in which the child’s visitation with her mother was unsupervised. He ultimately acknowledged that such an order is within the realm of possibilities.  Although it appeared that he would be compliant with such a court order, it did not appear that he could be openly cooperative.  Rather, he would tend to interpret an order that is not in complete alignment with his beliefs in his own terms, and act accordingly. Therefore, it seems necessary that any order for cooperative parenting needs to state explicitly the terms for communication, visitation, and exchange of residence between the parents.

K’s psychological condition is stable and resistant to therapeutic intervention. Indeed, K saw no need for personal psychotherapy and is not amenable for such treatment.  He did state that he is willing to attend co-parenting courses.  He stated that he has not attended any such course in the past.  He also stated that he is willing to attend courses in child development.

16.Thus it seems to me that this case is one in which the apparent unreasonableness of the father was due in part to his personality (see paragraph 6, subsection 2.6 above).

17.This goes in some way to explain, but not to excuse, the litigation conduct of the father as set out in paragraph 49 of the judgment. Although this is a very long paragraph, I have nevertheless decided to reproduce it in full, as it goes to the heart of the cost issue currently before me. It is also of note that some of the truly terrible incidences that are set out in this paragraph, and which took place during the course of the litigation, were also perpetuated not by the father, but by his mother and sister, KA. 

The litigation and other incidences that occurred during the litigation process

49.    In addition to the allegations of abuse the following is also of note:

a)  On the 8 January 2018 the father sent A’s school photographs of the mother, T and someone who they thought might be M and made various allegations against them.

b)  A wrote a number of letters to the school in which she discussed with them inter alia how to block the mother from the school communications tools, SS and V. It is of note that the mother was unilaterally removed from these and KA and the father’s girlfriend V were added. 

c)  The father moved to live in Sai Kung with A and his other family members following the alleged incidents, in February 2018.  He did not inform the mother of this or provide her with the address or other contact information.

d)  Notwithstanding the court’s order on the 21 March 2018 for interim access namely that the mother should have unsupervised access on Wednesday afternoons in Sai Kung for 4 ½ hours and supervised access for the whole day on Saturday’s, A only saw her mother on three occasions namely on the 24 March, 28 March and 14 April 2018. It is of note that she had not seen her mother for nearly 4 months at that point. There were difficulties on each occasion emanating from the fact that the father did not agree that any access should be unsupervised and as a result he orchestrated his own attendance at those sessions. In addition, on the 24 March 2019 A attended access and was found to be wearing a yellow paper triangle on a black cord around her neck. She told her mother that it was to “keep away the bad stuff” presumably whilst she was at the mother’s house. In the witness box the father said that this was a “lucky charm”. On the 14 April 2018, during the Saturday access, immediately after the Easter school holiday, when no access had been allowed given that the court order referred to access during term time, an incident ensued between the mother, the father and KA. The mother produced a video clip taken shortly before this unfortunate event, from her phone, which shows a very unhappy A refusing to go to her mother’s apartment. Both mother and father were charged with fighting in a public place and on the 5 June 2018 they were both bound over for 12 months.  It seems that during this fracas, which was witnessed by A, the father and KA both accused the mother and T of being pedophiles and child abusers. Notwithstanding this the father wrote to the school and told them that the mother had been arrested on that day for child abuse and was on bail. This was a deliberate lie on his part. A was also taken to hospital following this incident and she remained there for 9 days.      

e)  The mother did not have access to A from the 14 April 2018 until the court order in March 2019. 

f)  The father unilaterally appointed a play therapist for A, Ms SM. This was not done with the mother’s permission. Difficulties then ensued. It seems that Ms SM was appointed on the premise that the alleged abuse had taken place. It is also of note that Ms SM’s did not liaise with the mother. On the 19 June 2018 I ordered that this therapy cease forthwith. In doing so I accepted Ms L’s assessment that this could be very damaging for the child, if the abuse had not taken place as claimed. There was some confusion during the trial about the number of therapy sessions attended by A, with it initially being suggested that she had had 17 play therapy sessions. Although this was not proven it was clear that she had attended a significant number of sessions with Ms. SM prior to the order of the 19 June.

g)  Further problems then ensued with respect to the appointment of a therapist, to provide A with intensive (and independent) therapy for herself. Eventually this led to the hearing of the 19 October 2018 and the subsequent Ruling dated the 2 November 2018. Reference may be made to that Ruling as appropriate. In conclusion I said as follows:

Decision

12. Consequently and for the avoidance of doubt, order 4 contained in the court order dated the 19 June 2018 shall be discharged. It is further directed that A shall commence therapy with Dr A immediately and for 120 minutes per week. This is not currently in anticipation of intensive family therapy or indeed reunification therapy. A copy of this Ruling is to be provided to Dr A and as indicated during the hearing a penal notice shall be endorsed. Thus an order shall be made as follows:

1. The Respondent [father] shall take or arrange his agent to take the child of the family, namely U, AV, a girl born on XX March 2012 (“A”), to attend the intensive therapy sessions, for 120 minutes per week with the jointly appointed child psychologist, Dr. A OV pursuant to paragraphs 3 of the Order dated 19th June 2018. For the avoidance of doubt the cost of those sessions shall be split between the parties equally.

2. Order 4 of the court order dated the 19 June 2018 shall be discharged.

3. A penal notice be endorsed on this order and personal service of the Order be dispensed with.

h)  In a nut shell although the court had ordered that A should receive intensive therapy and eventually also ordered, in the absence of agreement between the parties, that Dr OV be appointed for that purpose, the father did not co operate with that appointment. He was clearly very unhappy indeed at the approach taken by Dr OV, which he said was more in the nature of an investigation. He also rejected any notion that the underlying reason for the therapy was to mend the relationship between mother and child; he was certainly opposed to the concept of “reunification” therapy. Although he agreed to give permission for Dr OV to communicate with the school counselor, he did not follow through with this. He objected to Dr OV reading into the case, even though I had directed that she be provided with all of the pleadings and reports to date. He also insisted that a third party sit in on the sessions, namely Grandma C, even though Dr OV made it clear that she could not work properly in that environment as she was unable to form an appropriate therapeutic relationship with A. There were also other difficulties, including the father cancelling appointments at short notice and ultimately stopping all sessions at all prior to the hearing in October 2018. He then informed Dr OV of the outcome of that hearing BEFORE I had handed down my Ruling. Ultimately Dr OV resigned not once but twice, stating finally on the 5 February 2019 as follows:

To Whom It May Concern,

It has come to my attention that the following incidences have taken place:

·  A parental party is not in agreement with interventions being conducted by myself (Dr. A OV). This includes any interaction and the forms of therapeutic approaches considered necessary and relevant.

·  A parental party is breaching confidentiality and has requested confidential notes and records (between therapist and other parties).  This is despite both parents’ written consent for liaising with relevant parties (such as school or other parent) when clinically necessary.

·  This also includes the request of information about other (non-relevant) parties attending school and SPOT.

·  Intentional obstruction of information important to support child clinically.

·  Improper boundaries and coaching to child in order to keep child from divulging information and develop therapeutic rapport.

·  Threatened or insinuated litigious actions against therapists.

·  Repeated bounced checks, missed payments and missed sessions - causing a substantial bourdon on our administrative staff.

Considering the above, it is concluded that therapy may be counter productive given that said actions can:

·  potentially create a rift between the child, parents and therapists

·  perpetuate unhelpful polarisation of caregiver roles

·  place child in unstable position to have to choose parties to trust

·  cause pervasive and long term negative consequences with respect to the healthy development of child’s sense of self, and relationships and undermine their need for stability.

While it is still strongly advised that the child and caregivers seek therapeutic support, current circumstances impede therapeutic success and are believed to be further damaging at this time.

…

i)  Dr. OV later confirmed, on the 5 March 2019, that the parental party in question was the father. She said that she could not resume therapy because this placed A in a detrimental position and that:

My hope is that this termination of services will somehow aid in the court’s understanding of the family dynamics, necessity in future treatment, and aid in the decision regarding parental access/custody.

j)  As indicated above, there were also other concerns including the fact that the school removed the mother from two web sites, one called SS, where a parent is able leave messages for their child and to comment on their child’s work etc and the other called V. This was done at the request of the father and KA. It is of note that KA was then nominated to be the contact person in lieu of the mother. It seems that the school concurred because the father was the parent with care and control.

k)  There have also been other issues concerning both KA and Grandma C and their inappropriate involvement in this litigation and the care of A. This includes KA’s correspondence with the school and communications sent to other family friends and acquaintances in which all manner of accusations are made against the mother, T and M, without any proper foundation.    

18.The father asks for some degree of generosity arguing that an adverse costs order would only make things worse and suggesting that it would further undermine the possibility of the parties co-operating in the future (although I tend to agree with Ms Irving that given the very extreme nature of this litigation it seems very unlikely indeed that the parties will be likely to successfully cooperatively co parent going forward). He also confirmed, once again, that he is being penalized for believing his daughter and acting in what he thought was her best interest. Even now he seems to have little insight into the damaging effects of his behaviours. However, I do accept up to a point, as stated in paragraph 14 of his submission that:

14. …  It is not that case that I had acted dishonestly by fabricating the allegations against the Petitioner or that I had acted maliciously for an ulterior motive or in an oppressive manner.

In other words, I accept that the father did not simply make the whole thing up in order to destroy the mother’s relationship with A. As ever the situation is more complicated than that. However, I do not accept that he was merely defending himself. This litigation arose because of his actions and at his instigation.    

19.In such circumstances it seems to me that it would be appropriate for the father to contribute towards the mother’s costs, although not on an indemnity basis. Although he behaved very badly on occasions, I am not convinced that this case falls into that very rare band of cases where an indemnity costs order would be appropriate.      

20.Instead I shall order that the father contribute towards 50% of the mother’s costs of and arising out of her amended summons dated the 10 September 2018. This order shall also include all other related applications within the litigation and all costs reserved. There shall be certificate for counsel. The costs shall be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed.                  

Ms. Frances Irving instructed by Haldanes for the Petitioner

The Respondent acted in person