Muhammad Naeem v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 937/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) refusing to re-open the applicant’s claim of non-refoulement protection.
Cites 3 cases
|
HCAL 937/2018 [2020] HKCFI 2475 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 937 OF 2018 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge C P Pang:
Observations for the Applicant: Introduction 1.This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) refusing to re-open the applicant’s claim of non-refoulement protection. 2.The applicant is a national of Pakistan. Facts and procedural history 3.The detailed facts of the case and the procedural history were stated by the Adjudicator of the Board as follows:
The Board’s decision 4.The Board determined the appeal/ petition by the applicant without a hearing. Having considered all the material and evidence before him, the Adjudicator of the Board found:
Application for leave to apply for judicial review 5.The applicant filed a Form 86 on 25 May 2018 for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Board. The Form did not set out any ground for the relief sought and the affirmation in support only stated “I want to Judicial Review refusal decision of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office/The Torture Claims Appeal Board. The decision was unfair and unreasonable.” 6.By a letter dated 24 June 2020 posted to his last updated address with the Immigration Department, the court invited the applicant to confirm whether he would like to make any submission and to have an oral hearing. Since then, the applicant has not made any response or submission to the court. The applicant did not request an oral hearing. The application is therefore considered on the papers. Discussion 7.The relevant principles regarding appeals on non-refoulement cases have been set out comprehensively in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at paragraph 14. The court in a judicial review exercises a supervisory role and its focus is on the legality and rationality of the decisions challenged and the propriety and fairness of the process by which the decisions were made. Though in non-refoulement cases the court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of issue at hand, the court should not usurp the role of the Board and will not interfere with its finding unless it is reversible on public law grounds. The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. Application out of time 8.It must be pointed out first that the applicant’s intended application for judicial review was made out of time. Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. In considering whether to extend time, the court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393. 9.The relevant principles have been further explained in the recent case of H v Director of Immigration and AH v Director of Immigration FACV 1 and 2 of 2020 (heard together) given on 14 July 2020. 10.In this case, the 3-month time limit expired on 2 February 2018 and the application was late by more than 3 months. The delay was not a short one, for which the applicant did not provide any explanation. I do not see any satisfactory or valid reason for the delay. Merits of the intended application 11.As for the merits of the intended application, I am of the view that the applicant has no prospect of success at all, let alone a case with realistic prospect of success. 12.The Immigration Ordinance imposes duties on the applicant to substantiate a torture claim. The applicant must comply with the requirements provided under the Ordinance. Section 37Y provides:
13.Any failure on the part of the claimant in respect of the above duties may result in the claim being treated as withdrawn, as stipulated by Section 37ZG as follows:
14.Although such statutory provisions are applicable only to torture claim, by virtue of the administrative provisions governing under the unified screening mechanism (USM), the same constraints are applicable for other non-refoulement claims: Ram Chander v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 585. 15.Paragraph 24 of the “The Practice and Procedural Guide of the Administrative Non-refoulement Claims Petition Scheme” also effectively mirrors 37ZG of the Ordinance. 16.A torture claim form (TCF) includes a supplementary torture claim form (SCF) as specified by the Director. A completed torture claim form must be returned within 28 days or any further period that an immigration officer allows: section 37Y(2). Section 37ZG(1) further provides that a torture claim must be treated as withdrawn if the person who made the claim fails to return a completed torture claim form as required under section 37Y(2). 17.After the claim was treated as withdrawn, the claimant may re-open his application if he provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that due to circumstances beyond the person’s control, the person had not been able to return a completed torture claim form as required…: Section 37ZG(3). 18.Having received the applicant’s request to re-open his claim, the Director requested the applicant to provide detailed reasons and evidence that he had not been able to return the completed SCF beyond his control. The applicant did not provide anything further by way of evidence or otherwise. 19.The Director had followed the proper procedure and given every opportunity to the applicant to explain why he was unable to submit the SCF. The applicant was also reminded that publicly-funded legal assistance was available to him and warned of the consequence of his failure to do so. The applicant still did not provide further explanation. The Director was therefore entitled to base on available information to exercise his power to decide whether to re-open the claim. He decided not to re-open as he found there was no sufficient evidence that due to circumstances beyond the applicant’s control, he had not been able to return the SCF as required. 20.The Board examined the case carefully and reviewed all the information and materials before it. It noted that the applicant had had several opportunities to explain the reasons for his failure to complete the relevant application in time. His request for re-opening contained no such reasons and he failed to respond to a reasonable request from the Director to provide reasons. In his notice of appeal to the Board, he also provided no reasons for his failure to do so. He had failed to provide evidence that he had been unable to return the appropriate application form due to circumstances beyond his control. The appeal was therefore dismissed. 21.I agree with the analysis and findings of the Board. A claimant of non-refoulement protection would have been given free legal assistance from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) and advised of the importance of the time limit for submitting a torture claim form. He would also be assisted by the DLS to fill in the claim form. If he had any difficulties in submitting the form, he could have informed the DLS, the Immigration Department or non-government organization for assistance. 22.I agree with both the Director and the Board that the applicant had failed his duty as a claimant to submit his torture claim form and failed to provide sufficient evidence to be satisfied that due to circumstances beyond his control that he had not been able to return the claim form. 23.The Board did not conduct an oral hearing. I have considered the principles explained by the Court of Appeal in ST v Betty Kwan [2014] 4 HKLRD 277. I do not find the course adopted by the Board to be irregular or unfair. 24.The Form 86 and affirmation do not show any valid explanation for his delay in submitting the claim form to the Director nor any reasonably arguable ground for judicial review. There is also no cogent evidence or information to establish a substantial risk of harm that he might face. Nor can I see that in the interests of justice his claim should be re-opened. 25.Having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their refusal to re-open the applicant’s claim. Their decisions are not Wednesbury unreasonable. I am not satisfied that the applicant has shown that there is any merit in his intended application. Disposition 26.For these reasons, there is no good reason for extending time to apply for judicial review, I refuse to grant the applicant extension of time and accordingly dismiss his leave application. Dated 8 October 2020
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 |
Cases cited in this judgment