Wong Yui Lun v. Lee Wai Ming
Read the full judgment text of HCPI 398/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 December 2020.
1. This is the trial of a personal injuries action commenced by the Plaintiff (“P”) against the 1 st and 2 nd Defendants (together “Ds”, respectively “D1” and “D2”) for damages arising from injuries suffered as a result of a road traffic accident at Victoria Road on 25 October 2015 (“Accident”). P alleged that the Accident was caused by the negligence of D1, for which D2 was vicariously liable as D employer.
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HCPI 398/2018 [2020] HKCFI 3120 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 398 OF 2018 ________________________ BETWEEN
________________________ Before: Deputy High Court Judge Dawes SC in Court Date of Hearing: 11, 12 and 14 November 2019 Date of Judgment: 28 December 2020 ________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.This is the trial of a personal injuries action commenced by the Plaintiff (“P”) against the 1st and 2nd Defendants (together “Ds”, respectively “D1” and “D2”) for damages arising from injuries suffered as a result of a road traffic accident at Victoria Road on 25 October 2015 (“Accident”). P alleged that the Accident was caused by the negligence of D1, for which D2 was vicariously liable as D employer. 2.P was the only factual witness at the trial and his evidence was tested extensively in cross-examination. Ds elected not to adduce any factual evidence. 3.Whilst liability and quantum were both disputed on paper, the parties managed to reach considerable agreement over the course of the trial. As discussed below, the main issue that was hotly disputed concerned P’s claim for loss of earnings which amounted to some HK$13 million. B. BACKGROUND 4.The undisputed factual background is summarized in this section. 5.P was born in Hong Kong on 27 June 1965, and was 50 years old at the time of the Accident (54 at the time of trial). He studied at the Kwai Chung Technical Institute and went on to study in a course on textiles in the United Kingdom. He could read and write in both Chinese and English. Prior to the Accident, he was in good health. 6.In 1989, P joined Bureau Veritas Hong Kong Limited (“BVHK”), part of what is now the Consumer Products Services division of Bureau Veritas Group (“BVG”), which provides testing, inspection, and certification services to well-known brands, retailers and their supply chains in over 25 countries. By the time of the Accident, P had assumed the position of ‘technical director’ in the group’s operations for “softline & accessories” (including apparel and home textile) in the south China region, earning an average monthly income of $92,000 in the 2015/2016 year of assessment. 7.At all material times, D1 was employed by D2 as the driver of green public minibus bearing vehicle registration number EM9642 (“PLB”), having had about 24 years of driving experience, including 13 years as a minibus driver. 8.On 25 October 2015 at around 9:45 am, P set out cycling alongside the pavement of Victoria Road in the north-bound direction towards Kennedy Town. The road was a dual traffic lane, meaning that there was traffic moving in both directions on the road separated by double white lines. The location of the Accident was that part of Victoria Road abutting on a minor road (“Minor Road”) leading towards Lower Baguio Villa situated at the nearside of the lane on which P was cycling, ie to his left. 9.At around the time that P was approaching the entrance of the Minor Road, D1 was driving the PLB on the opposite lane in the south-bound direction. Upon reaching the junction with the Minor Road, D1 negotiated a right turn and manoeuvred the PLB to diagonally cut across the opposite lane. The PLB then collided into P’s bicycle at the opening of the Minor Road, causing P and his bicycle to be trapped and dragged under the PLB. 10.D1 was convicted of careless driving on 3 May 2016 upon his guilty plea. 11.As a result of the Accident, P sustained multiple serious injuries, diagnosed as (i) right hip dislocation with sciatic nerve contusion injury; (ii) open fracture of right tibia shaft; (iii) right index finger injury with extensor tendon cut; (iv) L2-L4 lumbar spine transverse process fracture; and (v) right rib fracture with pneumothorax. It is not disputed that the Accident was the sole cause of P’s injuries. 12.In view of his injuries, P was granted a total of 410 days of sick leave by his treating doctors at Queen Mary Hospital (“QMH”) and MacLehose Medical Rehabilitation Centre (“MMRC”) from 25 October 2015 to 6 December 2016 and on 6 June 2017. However, before the expiry of his sick leave, P resumed his employment with BVHK as technical director on 1 June 2016. During his resumed employment, P was further granted two consecutive 84-day sick leave periods from QMH on 21 June 2016 and 13 September 2016 respectively. 13.Around 8 months after resuming his job, P was given notice by letter of his dismissal on 19 January 2017 (“Dismissal Letter”), to take effect from 19 March 2017. By the same letter, P was asked to vacate the office premises by close of business of the same day, and he has not returned to the office since. 14.Following further discussions, P and BVHK entered into an agreement on 30 March 2017 whereby BVHK would pay P a monthly sum of HK$80,465 from April to July 2017 in consideration of P agreeing to certain undertakings in connection with the termination of his employment with BVHK (“Release Agreement”). The aforesaid monthly payments were duly made to P. 15.Subsequent to his dismissal from BVHK in March 2017, P was engaged in various forms of alternative employment:-
16.Since 11 February 2019, P has been employed as an administrative assistant in a fencing centre, earning a monthly salary of HK$10,000. As of 14 November 2019, P has earned HK$90,000. C. INJURIES, TREATMENT AND JOINT ASSESSMENT BY EXPERTS 17.It is not in dispute that P has received the following medical treatments since the Accident, as evinced by contemporaneous medical records. 18.After the Accident on 25 October 2015, P was sent to the Accident and Emergency Department of QMH on the same day, where he underwent emergency surgery. After being treated by the Intensive Care Unit and the orthopaedic ward for 11 days at QMH, his condition stabilised and he was transferred to MMRC for in-patient rehabilitation. After 23 days of treatment, P was discharged on 27 November 2015. 19.Since his discharge, P has regularly attended follow up appointments at the orthopaedic clinic of QMH. In the course of these follow-ups, P underwent another surgery on 4 January 2016 for revision fixation of his right tibia fracture, and again on 23 March 2016 for removal of cement and bone graft from the iliac crest to the tibia bone defect. 20.Between April and October 2016, P attended a total of 30 physiotherapy sessions at Kowloon Hospital (“KH”). To highlight a few of these sessions in order to track the progress of P’s physical recovery during this period:-
21.Meanwhile, from 22 April to 14 June 2016, P received occupational therapy treatment at QEH for his right index finger splint. 22.Since 14 November 2016, P has been receiving psychiatric treatment from various departments of Kwai Chung Hospital (“KCH”), primarily under the supervision of Dr Benjamin Lau (“Dr Lau”). Again, to highlight some of these consultations in order to track the progress of P’s psychiatric recovery:-
23.On 27 November 2018 (around 3 years and 2 months after the Accident), P was jointly examined by two orthopaedics experts, Dr Lie Wai Hung Chester (“Dr Lie”) (for P) and Dr Yip Kwok Hing Daniel (“Dr Yip”) (for Ds), who subsequently prepared a joint medical report dated 14 February 2019 (“Joint Report”) for the purpose of this trial. By an Order of Master Roy Yu dated 23 July 2019, the Joint Report was adduced at trial without either expert giving oral evidence. 24.The Joint Report recorded that P complained of continuous right leg pain, occasional right hip pain, right index finger stiffness/weakness, and insomnia or poor quality of sleep. It noted that P did not complain of any chest or back pain. 25.The joint examination by the experts revealed the following:-
26.The experts were in agreement on certain aspects of P’s condition. They agree that P’s injuries were properly diagnosed, that such diagnoses are consistent with the Accident as alleged, and that the Accident was the sole cause of P’s injuries. They also agree that the necessary sick leave period was from 25 October 2015 to 6 December 2016 and on 6 June 2017, and that P had been promptly and adequately treated so not to require any further treatment. 27.There are however differences in material aspects between the experts in the Joint Report. Relevantly, for our purposes:-
D. THE ISSUES AT TRIAL 28.At the start of the trial, the parties notified the Court that Ds agreed to accept liability on the basis that P was 10% contributorily negligent (which will be reflected in quantum). Thus, liability was no longer in issue at trial. 29.As regards quantum, P has claimed for multiple heads of damages amounting to some HK$13,798,768.48 plus interest as at the date of his Revised Statement of Damages (“RSOD”), ie 5 March 2019. In their Answer dated 17 May 2019 (“ASOD”), Ds averred that P should not be entitled to more than HK$549,555 plus interest. The stark differences between the parties’ position are summarised in the following table:-
30.Fortunately, much of these differences were narrowed down during the course of the trial. Specifically, the parties have reached agreement on PSLA in the sum of HK$450,000, pre-trial cost of care for services rendered by P’s wife during his hospitalisation in the sum of HK$15,000, and special damages (including medical expenses, travelling expenses, tonic foods, and damaged properties) in the total sum of HK$57,750. 31.In this light, what divides the parties is P’s loss of earnings, especially P’s post-trial loss of earnings which forms the single largest sum claimed by P (over HK$10 million), and his loss of earning capacity. In particular, the main issue at trial is whether P is able to prove that the injuries he has sustained as a result of the Accident were causative of such losses. 32.P’s pre-trial loss of earnings are ascertained by reference to the period during which he was prevented by his injuries suffered as a result of D1’s negligence from returning to work: Tam Fu Yip Fip v Sincere Engineering & Trading Co Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 210 at §18 per Le Pichon JA. 33.P’s case under this head as pleaded is premised on the contention that but for the Accident, P would have continued his employment with BVHK throughout the pre-trial period. In the RSOD, P takes the figure of HK$96,000 (ie his average monthly income for the 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 years of assessment) as his base monthly income, and further assumes that his income would have increased by 5% per annum since his effective date of dismissal from BVHK on 19 March 2017 (based on the historical rate of increase in P’s income prior to the Accident from 2012 to 2015 according to P’s tax returns). 34.However, P invited the Court in closing to calculate the rate of increase in P’s income based on inflation rates since 19 March 2017 as reflected in the Composite Consumer Price Index instead, viz 2.6% (year-on-year from March 2017 to March 2018), 2.1% (year-on-year from March 2018 to March 2019) and 1.93% (from March 2019 to September 2019). On this basis, P would now be earning around HK$102,505 [ie HK$96,000 x 1.026 x 1.021 x 1.0193], yielding a rounded-off median of HK$99.250 per month throughout the pre-trial period [(HK$96,000 + HK$102,505) / 2]. 35.Against this, Ds submit that P’s loss of earnings should be limited to the time he returned to his pre-Accident job on 1 June 2016 because he should have had no problems performing his pre-Accident work having regard to his progress of recovery by that time. Furthermore, Ds pointed to P’s failure to give any discovery of and its decision not to call any witnesses from BVHK regarding the circumstances of his dismissal, and submitted that the Court was entitled to draw adverse inferences in respect thereof. 36.Having considered the views of P’s treating doctors and the experts, I accept that the sick leave period of 410 days is reasonable. Out of this period, it is common ground that P is entitled to loss of earnings from the date of the Accident up until the time he resumed work with BVHK on 1 June 2016. It is also not in dispute that P’s average monthly income during the 2015/2016 year of assessment (ie when the Accident occurred) was around HK$92,000, as evinced by the Inland Revenue Department’s records. Taking into account the total actual earnings received by P from November 2015 to May 2016 (ie HK$482,260), P’s pre-trial loss of income for the period between 25 October 2015 to 31 May 2016 (before deduction for tax) should be HK$190,940, ie HK[$92,000 + HK$1,500 (MPF)] x 7.2 months – HK482,260. 37.As for the period between 1 June 2016 and 19 March 2017 when P resumed work with BVHK from, P’s salary advices indicate that he earned HK$817,505 (inclusive of salaries, MPF and other benefits), and so he is not entitled to claim any pre-trial loss of earnings during this period. 38.The real question is whether P was prevented by his injuries sustained as a result of the Accident from returning to his pre-Accident work since 19 March 2017. This requires consideration of the following sub-issues: (i) the nature of P’s pre-Accident work; (ii) whether P was able to resume his pre-Accident work on 1 June 2016 until his dismissal; and (iii) whether P was dismissed from BVHK by reason of his injuries suffered as a result of the Accident. D1. P’s Duties as Technical Director before the Accident 39.At the time of the Accident, P was employed by BVHK as a ‘technical director’ belonging in the ‘Top Management II’ grade. According to P’s evidence, he was in charge of the Apparel Department and was mainly responsible for ‘technical’ matters such as inspecting the component, safety, washability, and coloring of apparel. Depending on the location of his clients’ factories and their production requirements, such inspections may be carried out by P personally in Hong Kong, the Mainland, or other southeast Asian countries if he was the person-in-charge of the brand in question, notwithstanding the fact that BVG may have on-the-ground personnel and facilities. 40.P has also described himself as a “customer manager”, whose responsibilities include contacting clients and providing quotations on technical matters. During cross-examination, P explained that such tasks could be dealt with in the office, but it was not uncommon that he had to travel to meet with clients to discuss their production problems. If he had to travel within Hong Kong, he would take public transport, whereas if he had to travel outside Hong Kong, he would do so by air or train to the destination before switching to local transportation. To that end, P described his pre-injury work as “70% outdoor, to meet clients”, and “30% in office” when he was interviewed by the experts who prepared the Joint Report. 41.Taking his role as customer manager first, P’s assertion that he spends 70% of his time at work outdoors is an assertion unsupported by any other witness testimony or documentary evidence. In any event, it appears from his evidence that most of the time he spends “outdoors” is actually for transportation purposes. To the extent that he had to travel overseas to meet clients, P’s immigration records prior to the Accident suggest that he did not do so frequently. For example, between 4 January to 14 October 2015 (with the exception of a 5-day trip in June 2015), P made 20 day-trips of which 5 were personal trips during weekends. In other words, in a span of over 9 months, P made 14 day-trips for business reasons and they were all short trips. 42.As for garment testing, it is important to point out that in the evidence adduced by him, P did not explain what exactly he was required to do when he carried out onsite inspections. At the beginning of the trial, Counsel for P only requested to supplement P’s witness statement by clarifying two matters through oral evidence: (i) the current condition of P’s injuries; and (ii) the difference in P’s monthly income as pleaded in his RSOD and that stated in his witness statement. Nor was this explored during cross-examination. 43.It was only during re-examination that P, upon his Counsel’s prompting, explained that such inspections may involve P adopting certain physically-demanding postures and standing for long periods of time (1-2 hours) for the purposes of carrying out inspections such as pulling and drawcord tests that are designed to ensure that children’s garments are safe to wear. In this regard, P testified that he conducted 80% of the onsite testing himself. It is not surprising that Mr Sakhrani for Ds objected to such re-examination. 44.Although I allowed such matters into evidence during re-examination because they strictly arise from cross-examination, I attach little weight to it. As Mr Sakhrani submitted, P’s evidence is clearly self-serving, and the fact remains that such evidence has not been properly tested in cross-examination. Thus, P’s evidence is of limited probative value. It is clear that such matters did not emerge from cross-examination was due to no fault on Ds’ part: P’s pleaded case all along was that his residual disabilities had seriously affected his job performance “as he was unable to travel to places to meet clients” and this was also the sole basis that his case was put during the opening submissions by Mr Kenny Lin for P (see §42 of his Written Opening). P was thoroughly cross-examined by Mr Sakhrani on this matter. D2. Was P Able to Resume his Work at BVHK? 45.As stated above, P’s pleaded case (repeated in his written opening submissions) is that since he resumed his pre-Accident work at BVHK in June 2016, his residual disabilities had seriously affected his job performance and he was unable to travel to places to see and advise clients as before. No other reason that his job performance was detrimentally affected has been pleaded. 46.Even then, the evidence is not entirely clear as to what precisely his duties were between June 2016 and January 2017, when he was given notice of his dismissal. According to P’s evidence, his scope of work remained unchanged when he resumed employment, but his supervisor was considerate and assigned him to work mainly at the office. Yet, the patient history particulars taken from P as appears in the Joint Report records that while P mainly worked in the office and did not need to go out to meet clients in the first 2-3 months whilst he was still relying on crutches, he later resumed normal duty including outdoor work and meeting with clients. 47.I consider that the Joint Report contains the most reliable and plausible account of what occurred after P resumed employment with BVHK. 48.First, it is in line with the unchallenged physiotherapy records tracking P’s physical recovery, which consistently show (by P’s own admission) that his condition did substantially improve in the period between May and October 2016. In functional terms, P was able to walk unaided by crutches with normal gait for 30 minutes at least by September 2016, when he rated his overall subjective improvement at 80%. P’s complaint that he was “struggling to cope” at work during his consultation for psychiatric treatment on 14 November 2016 is ambiguous as it is unparticularised, and should not be taken to detract from the general tenor of the progress of his physical recovery. 49.Second, and insofar as P was required to travel abroad for work purposes, such account of the facts is consistent with P’s travel records, which show that he did not leave Hong Kong from the time of the Accident until September 2016, during which he resumed traveling abroad. The records indicate that P took a number of multi-day trips all the way up to March 2017 when his dismissal took effect, albeit that P was unable to recall the purpose of most of these trips. 50.That said, it does not follow that I accept P’s case that his residual disabilities have detrimentally affected his job performance by reason of him being unable to travel and meet with clients. This is because P’s case necessarily excludes the period when he was confined to the office in the first 2 months, and so did not have to go out to meet with clients. Thereafter, when he resumed outdoor work and meeting with clients (whether in Hong Kong or abroad) at least by September 2016, P’s progress of recovery suggests that his physical condition would have permitted him to take public transportation without any problem. Indeed, no evidence has been adduced to show that P had experienced any difficulty doing so, and there is no reason to expect that his superiors would require him to travel despite any such difficulty. D3. Was P Dismissed because of his Injuries? 51.From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that P faces significant difficulties in proving that he was dismissed from BVHK because of his injuries. Not only is the present state of the evidence insufficient to show that P’s injuries have detrimentally affected his ability to perform his work, more importantly, P has not adduced any evidence apart from his own assertions as to the actual reasons why he was dismissed. Certainly, such reasons are not apparent from the Dismissal Letter nor the Release Agreement. 52.Faced with these difficulties, Mr Lin invited the Court to draw the inference that P must have been dismissed from BVHK due to his injuries, in view of the fact that he was a career employee in a senior position who was suddenly dismissed within 7 months of his return to work, where the only thing that stood out before his dismissal was his injuries. He relies on P’s complaint recorded in Dr Lau’s consultation notes dated 14 November 2016 (around 2 months before P was given notice of dismissal) that he was “struggling to cope” with a job he had done for 26 years. 53.On the basis of the evidence available, I am unable to accept Mr Lin’s submissions. It is established that the facts proved must provide a reasonable basis for a definite conclusion before one enters the realm of drawing inferences in a civil case: Natuzzi Spa v De Coro Ltd HCA 4166/2003 (unrep, 16 June 2006) at §12 per Lam J (as he then was); SFC v Wang Jian Hua HCMP 745/2013 (unrep, 29 October 2015) at §78 per G Lam J. Absent objective proof that P was in fact prevented from resuming work due to his injuries, I am far from satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to conclude simply from the circumstances of his dismissal and his own subjective complaint that it is more likely than not that P must have been dismissed due to his injuries. In fact, there may be a myriad of other reasons as to why he was dismissed. 54.As P has simply failed to discharge his onus to show that he was dismissed from BVHK by reason of his injuries, there is no need for me to consider Mr Sakhrani’s further submission that the Court is entitled to draw adverse inferences against P as to the true reason for his dismissal by reason of his election not to seek documentary evidence from BVHK and/or call a former colleague to give evidence. 55.Accordingly, I reject P’s claim for pre-trial loss of earnings from 19 March 2017 onwards on the basis that P would have continued his pre-Accident employment with BVHK throughout the pre-trial period but for the Accident. D4 Post-Trial Loss of Earnings and MPF 56.As with the case for pre-trial loss of earnings, the underlying premise of P’s claim for future loss of earnings is the contention that but for the Accident, he would have continued his pre-Accident employment with BVHK until retirement at 65 years of age, earning a monthly salary of HK$102,505. Again, Ds have challenged this premise, arguing that P is not entitled to claim under this head because the Accident did not render him unable to return to his pre-Accident work (or comparable employment). 57.Having regard to the totality of the medical evidence, I have no doubt that P’s physical impairments suffered as a result of the Accident had substantially improved (80% according to P’s own subjective assessment) by the time he completed his physiotherapy sessions in October 2016 with KH. As Dr Yip observed in the Joint Report, the medical records clearly indicate that he could ambulate independently on ground and stairs by April 2016, and “although his endurance would have been less at that stage, he would be expected to continue to improve given that all targets had been achieved”. Certainly, by October 2016, P was able to walk unaided by himself for 30 minutes (albeit needing to rest to alleviate his right hip soreness), and had fully functional muscle strength for his right hip, knee and ankle. 58.In addition, I am satisfied from the medical evidence that whilst P suffered from depression (with the concomitant symptoms of low mood, insomnia, crying episodes and negative cognition) when he first attended KCH in November 2016, his psychiatric condition had steadily improved with treatment such that by April 2018, his depression was in the progress of good remission. That was certainly the view of Dr Lau, P’s principal psychiatrist at KCH since November 2016. Dr Lau’s view is also not inconsistent with the progress notes of the clinical psychologist of KCH, which record that P has indicated subjective improvement since October 2017. 59.For completeness, I should mention that I have also reviewed the surveillance videos conducted by Incredible Investigation Consultants Ltd on P in May/June 2018 and September/October 2019 adduced by Ds. By and large, the videos show that P was capable of walking unaided at a reasonable pace for extended periods of time, even though (as pointed out by Mr Lin) a number of frames might suggest that P had to take rests and twist his ankle for relief. Not much turns on these videos at the end of the day: an individual may have good and bad days, and it would be dangerous to extrapolate general observations of fact from a select few recordings. 60.On the pertinent question of whether P would be able to return to his pre-Accident work (or other comparable employment) after trial, I have derived further assistance from the Joint Report. In this regard, I prefer the assessment of Dr Yip to that of Dr Lie for the following reasons:-
61.Taking all these matters into account, I am not satisfied that P was unable to resume work comparable to his pre-Accident job with BVHK after trial. Thus, P is not entitled to any loss of future earnings. D5. Loss of Earning Capacity 62.The purpose of damages for loss of earning capacity is to compensate for the disadvantage in the labour market which P has suffered as a result of his injuries arising from the Accident. In this regard, P asks for HK$250,000 in the RSOD, reduced to HK$200,000 in his closing submissions. On the other hand, whilst Ds averred in the ASOD that P should only be entitled to HK$30,000 under this head, they were prepared to compensate P up to HK$120,000 under this head by the time of their closing submissions. 63.As I have held that P should have been able to resume work comparable to his pre-Accident employment, he must prove that, had he returned to such a job, there is a real or substantial risk that he might lose the job in the future and suffer financial loss because of his disadvantage in the labour market: Tamang Tikaram v Tong Kee Company Ltd HCPI 19/2013 (unrep, 1 April 2015) at §§82-83 per DHCJ Paul Lam SC. 64.In the present case, there is a lack of evidence as to the reason of P’s dismissal from BVHK, and whether that was related to his injuries. Moreover, whilst P averred in his RSOD that he had submitted numerous job applications but was rejected due to his injuries, there is no other evidence before the Court on the practical difficulties faced by P in finding other jobs (especially those comparable to his pre-Accident employment) besides the fact that he obtained alternative employment described in paragraphs 15-16 above. 65.That said, both experts agreed that P will suffer a small degree of WPI and LOEC (3-8%). Indeed, P was found to have experienced some right hip pain on deep terminal flexion and some loss of flexion over his right knee at end range upon examination by the experts. Hence, one cannot exclude the possibility that P might suffer from such problems in the future, be prevented from working from time to time because of these problems and suffer financial loss as a result. 66.Furthermore, I accept that the reality is that employers would prefer to employ fully able-bodied persons if they can, so P’s residual physical and psychological impairments (though slight) may have some impact on his ability to secure a new job if he is thrown into the labour market: see Khan Amar v Cheung Ying Construction Engineering Limited & Or HCPI 231/2005 (unrep, 14 March 2006) at §103; upheld on appeal in CACV 153/2006 (unrep, 5 June 2007) at §54. 67.For these reasons, I am satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to support an award for loss of earning capacity. Although it is impossible to accurately quantify the extent of the risk, doing the best I can in light of the totality of the evidence, I am prepared to grant the full sum of HK$200,000 as claimed by P taking into account the extent of P’s residual ailments and Dr Yip’s assessment of P’s WPI and LOEC. 68.The reasonableness of the sum could be cross-checked this way. Assuming that P is entitled to claim future loss of earnings on a multiplier/multiplicand approach, the multiplier should be 9.39 (calculated with allowance for projected mortality and a net rate of return of 2.5%, for a person aged 54 at the date of trial who would work to age 65). Applying such a multiplier, a sum of HK$200,000 will yield HK$21,299.25 a year. Taking the daily rate derived from P’s average monthly pre-Accident income as the comparator, ie HK$3066.67 [HK$92,000 / 30 days], the sum of HK$21,299.25 postulates that P will lose around 7 days’ wage a year if he resumes work comparable to his previous job with BVHK in the future up to his retirement. Such an estimate of P’s risk of financial loss due to his reduced earning capacity seems reasonable in view of Dr Yip’s assessment of P’s WPI and LOEC. D6. Summary of Quantum 69.In summary, I assess damages for P’s personal injury claim as follows:-
70.There will be an award of interest on special damages at half judgment rate from the date of the Accident, and interest on PSLA at 2% from the date of the writ of summons. Interest from judgment until full payment runs at judgment rate. E. CONCLUSION 71.For the foregoing reasons, I order that Ds do pay P the sum of HK$822,321 by way of damages. 72.Given the quantum of damages awarded, I also make a costs order nisi that Ds do pay P’s costs of the trial to be taxed if not agreed on District Court scale. The costs order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of any application within 14 days unless an application is made to vary the same.
Mr Kenny Lin & Ms Kathy Sum, instructed by B Mak & Co, for the Plaintiff Ms Ashok K Sakhrani, instructed by Winnie Leung & Co, for the 1st and 2nd Defendants |
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