HKSAR v. Chow Ching Yin
Read the full judgment text of CACC 351/2019 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 22 January 2021.
1. On 29 May 2017, at 8:20 am, a 20-year-old man (known as “Bosco”) was found dead on a slope at Black Hill, Tseung Kwan O. His head was covered by a gunny sack and it appeared that he had been left to die after injuries were inflicted on him. Ultimately, three persons, namely Yim Yu Hang (D1, known as “Martin”), the applicant (D2, known as “Benard”) and Wong Long Ki (known as “Mao Chai”), were charged with the murder of Bosco, contrary to common law and punishable under section 2 of the Offen
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CACC 351/2019 [2021] HKCA 157 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 351 OF 2019 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 149 OF 2018) ------------------------
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__________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT __________________________ Hon McWalters JA (giving the judgment of the court): A. Introduction 1.On 29 May 2017, at 8:20 am, a 20-year-old man (known as “Bosco”) was found dead on a slope at Black Hill, Tseung Kwan O. His head was covered by a gunny sack and it appeared that he had been left to die after injuries were inflicted on him. Ultimately, three persons, namely Yim Yu Hang (D1, known as “Martin”), the applicant (D2, known as “Benard”) and Wong Long Ki (known as “Mao Chai”), were charged with the murder of Bosco, contrary to common law and punishable under section 2 of the Offences against the Person Ordinance, Cap 212. Martin and a fourth person Wong Wai Ho (known as “Jack”) were also accused of removing and deleting the data stored in the mobile telephone belonging to Bosco, and in respect of these acts they were jointly charged with doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course of public justice, contrary to common law and punishable under section 101I(1) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221. 2.Originally, all four accused appeared before Madam Justice Barnes (“the judge”) in the High Court but the judge subsequently ordered that the trial be severed into two with Martin, the applicant and Jack being tried together, whilst Mao Chai would be separately tried on his own. However, the judge subsequently further ordered that the trial of Jack be severed from the trial of Martin and the applicant. 3.This left Martin and the applicant to stand trial on an indictment containing a joint count of murder (Count 1) and a second count against Martin alone of doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course of public justice (Count 2). 4.In respect of the count of murder, both Martin and the applicant offered to plead guilty to manslaughter but these offers were rejected by the prosecution. At the end of the prosecution case, the judge ruled that there was no case for Martin to answer in respect of Count 2. 5.At the conclusion of the trial, Martin was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter by gross negligence whilst the applicant was convicted of murder. 6.By his Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal (Form XI), the applicant sought leave to appeal against his conviction. 7.At the conclusion of the hearing of the application, we refused it and dismissed the appeal. These are our reasons for doing so. B. The prosecution case 8.Bosco was a war-game enthusiast who from time to time traded in military equipment with other war-game enthusiasts including Martin and the applicant. However, Bosco was believed by Martin and the applicant to have been dishonest in some of his transactions with them and they were not happy with him. There had been arguments in the past with him over his dishonest behaviour with one such argument taking place in Mongkok in March 2017 when the applicant ran into Bosco in the street and chided him for cheating people. 9.In a WhatsApp chat group (known as the “Midnight Outing Group”) consisting of 13 members that included Martin and the applicant, but excluded Bosco, a plan was hatched to invite Bosco to join a night hike at Black Hill. The night hike was initially scheduled for 13 May 2017 but was subsequently deferred to 27 May 2017 because of bad weather. The key issue at trial was the purpose of this night hike. The prosecution case was that the purpose was to lure Bosco to the night hike, isolate him on the hill and kill him. The WhatsApp messages were relied upon by the prosecution to prove that this was a joint enterprise crime with a common intent to kill Bosco. Some of the WhatsApp messages were as follows:
10.The prosecution also relied on the following evidence:
11.On the night in question, 27 May 2017, Martin, the applicant, and Mao Chai met up in Yau Tong and then proceeded to Black Hill. There, the applicant continued walking up the hill alone, whilst Martin and Mao Chai waited for Bosco and his friend “05” to arrive. When they did so,[1] Martin and Bosco then went up the hill to a location where, unbeknown to Bosco, the applicant was waiting in hiding for them. 05 and Mao Chai were left behind which meant that Bosco was isolated from his friend and left on his own with Martin who took him to the location where the applicant was lying in ambush. 12.Martin subsequently returned and told 05 that Bosco had left urgently. The respective Octopus card records of Martin and the applicant revealed that, on 28 May 2017, at 4:50 am, they boarded the same bus together which travelled from Tseung Kwan O to MongKok. 13.On the morning of 29 May 2017, Bosco was discovered lying on the ground of a terraced field on a slope which was some 10 metres away from a pavilion at Black Hill. His head was covered by a white gunny sack and his mouth was tied with a brown hemp rope bearing a slipknot fixed around his neck. His clothing was stained with blood. He had been dead for one to two days and the causes of his death were identified by the pathologist as, firstly, multiple stab wounds to his neck caused by repeated stabbing with a single-edged, flat blade stabbing instrument, like a knife; and, secondly, head injuries. C. The defence case 14.The only defence witness who testified at trial was the applicant himself. He said that he had been in an ongoing dispute with Bosco over his trading in military equipment, including the sale of two military radios half a year previously, as a result of which he wanted to resolve his dispute with Bosco and make him admit that he had cheated people. The applicant’s defence was that the reason to get Bosco to go night hiking was not to harm or kill him but to play a trick on him in order to resolve their dispute. The applicant said there were originally three ways to execute the trick but ultimately none could be carried out because Bosco lost his temper as soon as Martin alluded to his dishonesty. 15.The applicant explained what happened on the night in question. He said that whilst hiding in the bushes he heard Martin talking to Bosco about the sale of the two military radios. What happened thereafter, was summarised by the judge in her summing-up as follows:
16.The applicant said that it was only afterwards that he saw a folding black knife on the ground, and he threw it down the hill before he left. 17.The applicant relied on three defences, namely:
18.In respect of the allegation that there was a plan to kill Bosco, the defence submitted that the WhatsApp messages had to be read in the context of the language used by war-gamers; for instance, “take somebody down” might not really mean killing someone. It would also defy common sense to suggest that a person who genuinely planned to harm or kill someone would publicise the plan in the Midnight Outing Group. D. The applicant’s Perfected Grounds of Appeal 19.By his Perfected Grounds of Appeal against Conviction, Mr David Boyton, counsel for the applicant, advanced two grounds of appeal against conviction. D.1 Ground 1 20.In his first ground of appeal, the applicant complained that in her summing-up the judge “erred in law and/or on the facts by placing a burden on the Applicant to prove that he did not intend to kill or cause grievous bodily harm; and the said direction was exacerbated by highlighting prejudicial and/or inadmissible evidence relating to uncharged acts, that arose, or may have arisen from the testimony of the Applicant.” In support of this ground, Mr Boyton referred to a direction of the judge which was given in the context of whether a plan to kill was contained in the WhatsApp messages exchanged by the Midnight Outing Group. He said:
By this direction Mr Boyton submitted that, in effect, the judge was telling the jury that they had to be sure of the doubt raised by the defence. It was said to be an example of the judge reversing the burden of proof. 21.The judge suggested to the jury that to assist them in interpreting what was meant by the text messages they could have regard to the evidence of the Applicant that the plan was originally to take Bosco up the hill on 13 May to resolve the matter of the radio but that was cancelled because of bad weather. Mr Boyton argued that this and other directions of the judge referred to a possible pre-existing and separate conspiracy to kill Bosco. He further argued that such a conspiratorial agreement was an uncharged act and did not form the basis of the murder count. Consequently, in the absence of any appropriate directions on the impermissible use of the evidence of an uncharged act, it might be misused by the jury as evidence against the applicant. He said that the matter was further complicated because the judge had earlier told the jury that:
22.Mr Boyton also criticised a comment made by the judge, on the credibility of the applicant’s claim that during their fight Bosco straddled him and attacked him with a stabbing instrument yet he, the applicant, did not suffer any wounds. The judge commented:
23.Mr Boyton complained that the judge had effectively placed the burden on the applicant to give an innocent explanation as to why, if his defence was credible, no stab wound was found on his body at all. D.2 Ground 2 24.By the second ground of appeal, the applicant complained that the judge’s failure to leave the defence of provocation to the jury constituted a grave miscarriage of justice and rendered the conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory. Mr Boyton argued that notwithstanding that the defence did not run a concurrent partial defence of provocation, the judge, nevertheless, should have, on her own initiative, left the partial defence of provocation to the jury as there was sufficient evidential basis to establish that the applicant was provoked and had lost his self-control at the time of the killing. 25.Mr Boyton submitted that the evidence had to be placed in the context of there being a long-standing dispute between the applicant and Bosco and that the concept of cumulative provocation would come into play. Mr Boyton argued that Bosco’s own words and acts gave rise to the subjective aspect of the provocation defence and that the applicant’s loss of self-control occurred when Bosco attacked the applicant the second time. The applicant’s loss of control was evidenced by his inability to recall how many times he had used a hard object to hit Bosco, his confusion and inability to think clearly after the incident and the number of stab wounds, 38 in total, which suggested frenzied conduct by the applicant. D.3 Appellate counsel’s Apelete enquiries of trial counsel 26.Because the defence of provocation was not relied on by the applicant at his trial Mr Boyton, made enquiries of defence counsel as to why this was so. This is an obligation imposed on appellate counsel by the Court of Appeal in its judgments in HKSAR v Apelete (No 1)[7] and HKSAR v Apelete (No 2)[8]when counsel on appeal complain of the way the defence was conducted at trial. In reply to Mr Boyton’s enquiry, the defence counsel at trial, Mr John McNamara, said that prior to trial he considered all defences to murder. He continued:
Consequently, Mr McNamara said, he did not deem it necessary to raise the matter with the trial judge. 27.Notwithstanding that he had received this reply from a very experienced criminal practitioner, Mr Boyton persisted with his contention that provocation was established by the evidence and was implicit in the testimony of the applicant. He submitted that no one at trial had appreciated that if the defence of self-defence failed and if the jury found proven, as the prosecution asserted, that the applicant possessed the mens rea for murder, thereby removing unlawful act manslaughter as a possible verdict, there was nothing that stood between the applicant and a conviction for murder. In these circumstances, Mr Boyton argued, fairness to the accused required that the defence of provocation be left to the jury. E. The respondent’s submissions 28.Mr Derek Lai, with Mr Mark Wei, for the respondent, submitted that there was no dispute at trial regarding the existence of a “plan” to go for a night hike and that the judge had pointed out that what really mattered was the reason to get the deceased to go night hiking. Mr Lai submitted that the reference to a “plan”, “joint plan” or even “conspiracy” in the judge’s summing-up did not cause any prejudice to the applicant. 29.Regarding the burden of proof, Mr Lai submitted that the judge had at various stages of her summing-up directed the jury that the burden of proving its case was on the prosecution, not the defence. He submitted that the impugned directions in the first ground of appeal should not be considered in isolation, whilst accepting that there might have been a slip of the tongue on the part of the judge. Mr Lai said that when the summing-up was read as a whole, there was no real danger of the jury being confused or having a misunderstanding on the burden of proof. 30.In respect of the second ground of appeal, Mr Lai referred to the evidence of the applicant in relation to what occurred on the hike and submitted that it did not provide support for the claim that he lost his self-control as it showed that he was able to desist from assaulting Bosco whenever there were lulls in the fighting. There was, accordingly, no evidential basis requiring the judge to give a direction on manslaughter by provocation. F. Discussion F.1 Ground 1 31.In light of the argument on the first ground of appeal, it is necessary to see how the judge directed the jury in respect of the burden of proof. At the beginning of her summing-up, the judge told the jury that:
In a later more detailed direction, the judge said:
32.The judge gave a Liberato direction and also reminded the jury that the burden of proving guilt to the criminal standard remained on the prosecution even if they, the jury, rejected the applicant’s evidence. She said:
33.When directing the jury on the elements of murder, she commenced by saying:
34.She also informed the jury that not every question in their minds might be answered by the evidence and then continued:
35.At the conclusion of her summing-up, the judge again reminded the jury of the burden and standard of proof and the operation of the standard of proof in the drawing of inferences. She said:
36.It is apparent that the judge repeatedly and emphatically directed the jury on the burden and standard of proof. Against this backdrop the complaints of the applicant fall to be considered. 37.As the ground of appeal attacked a comment made by the judge in respect of the WhatsApp messages it is necessary to place them in context and see what else she had to say about them. 38.The judge first informed the jury of the interpretation that the prosecution was placing on the messages, saying:
39.When discussing the defence interpretation of the messages, the judge distinguished those messages relating to Martin from those relating to the applicant. After a lengthy discussion of the submissions of Mr Grounds, counsel for Martin, the judge said:
40.The judge went on to discuss the position of the applicant and reminded the jury that the case for the prosecution was that this was a joint enterprise offence and so what Martin said reflected a common intent. She then turned to what Mr McNamara was urging on behalf of the applicant. She said:
41.This was immediately followed by the following directions to the jury and the italicized words are the comments of the judge of which the applicant complained.
42.When discussing Mr Grounds’ submissions, the judge had told the jury:
43.Placed in the context of the judge’s overall directions on the WhatsApp messages, it is quite apparent that the judge is merely contrasting the different interpretations that the prosecution and the defence are placing on the WhatsApp messages and reminding the jury that they cannot place the prosecution’s interpretation on them unless they are sure that is the interpretation they bear. We do not read this passage, in the way Mr Boyton urges us to do, as reversing the burden of proof. Furthermore, given the very clear, and often repeated, directions on the burden and standard of proof, we have no doubt that the jury would not have been confused by this direction and would have understood it in the way we have set out. 44.Mr Boyton’s complaint about the judge’s references to a conspiracy are all derived from comments made by defence counsel in their closing submissions. These comments queried why all the members of the WhatsApp chat group were not said to be members of the joint enterprise. For example, Mr McNamara said:
The judge was merely referencing those comments which were favourable to the defendants. 45.Nor can it be said that just because the planning for the crime commenced before the dates particularized in the indictment that any offence committed as part of that planning process constitutes an uncharged act. If bank robbers steal a car two days before a robbery in order to use it as their getaway vehicle that theft does not become an uncharged act. An uncharged act is a criminal offence that is quite independent of the offence for which the accused is being tried and which could lure the jury into impermissible propensity reasoning. That is not the position in respect of the events, including the aborted 13 May proposal, which had probative value in proving a joint enterprise crime whose planning preceded its date of execution as particularized in the count. There is nothing in this point. 46.Nor is there anything in the complaint concerning the judge’s observation to the jury, and a non-binding personal observation is all it was, that in assessing the credibility of the applicant’s account of how the fight with Bosco transpired they might like to take into account the fact that the applicant emerged from the fight free of any stab wounds. This was a perfectly legitimate comment for the judge to make based on the evidence. F.2 Ground 2 47.The legal principles relevant to when a trial judge should direct a jury on an alternative verdict not relied on by the defence were discussed by the Court of Final Appeal in HKSAR v Chau Yui Ming[21]. The judgment in that case is the final word on this question and the court’s earlier decision in Ho Hoi Shing v HKSAR[22] should no longer be regarded as representing a complete statement of the law of Hong Kong on this question. Although Chau Yui Ming did not dramatically alter the law as set out in Ho Hoi Shing, the changes it did make were significant and the approach it lay down must now be the approach of trial judges and appellate courts when being called upon to answer the issue we have described at the beginning of this paragraph, and which issue underlies the applicant’s second ground of appeal. 48.In Chau Yui Ming, Ma CJ, in giving a judgment with which the other members of the court agreed, commenced his analysis of the law by reiterating a number of “important connected features of a criminal trial”.[23] One of these was that “the defence must be free to conduct its defence as it sees fit in the way the evidence is treated and the way the defence is presented to the court, provided this is done reasonably and properly.”[24] 49.In respect of the particular issue under consideration, namely the obligation of the judge to present to the jury alternative verdicts for their consideration, Ma CJ noted that this issue was concerned with “that aspect of fairness being the public interest in the fair outcome of a trial.”[25] 50.In the appeal under consideration much reliance was placed on the language employed in Ho Hoi Shing in respect of the low evidential threshold that had to be met in order to give rise to alternative defences. Ma CJ was critical of attempts after conviction to identify possible factual scenarios that could be derived from the evidence but which were contrary or inconsistent with the defence run at trial, and in respect of which no directions had been given by the trial judge. He said:
51.Noting that in the appeal before them there was no alternative defence run by the appellant at trial, Ma CJ characterized what was being run on appeal not as alternative defences but as only mere speculations. 52.In answering the question in what circumstances it would be incumbent on a judge to direct a jury on an alternative verdict Ma CJ said the judge should ask the further question of “whether there is an obvious alternative verdict which is supported by the evidence of that alternative.”[27] In answering this question, the trial judge should have regard to the way the defendant has conducted his defence. Ma CJ said:
53.Ma CJ obtained assistance from the decision of the English Court of Appeal in R v Fairbanks where it was said:
54.In the present case the applicant relied on self-defence as a complete defence to murder and unlawful act manslaughter as a lesser alternative on the basis that the jury may be satisfied that the applicant assaulted the deceased, other than in self-defence, but without any intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. 55.The applicant was represented by an experienced criminal practitioner who concluded, on the basis of his instructions, and after considering all possible defences, that these were the only defences available to the applicant. Implicit in Mr McNamara’s response to Mr Boyton’s enquiry is that he considered, but rejected, provocation as a viable defence. Nothing has been placed before us that would cause us to conclude that this professional judgment of Mr McNamara was not reasonable or proper. 56.However, Mr Boyton contended that Mr McNamara, the prosecutor and the judge all missed the point; the point being that once self-defence failed and once the jury found the mens rea for murder proven, the applicant would be left without any defence. But, unfortunate for the applicant as that may be, that is not the point. The point is that a conscious decision was made not to run provocation at trial and consequently no positive case of the elements of the provocation defence were sought to be elicited from the applicant or the prosecution witnesses in the course of their testimonies. An evidential foundation had not been laid to run provocation at trial. That has placed Mr Boyton in the unenviable position of trying to derive evidential benefit from pieces of evidence which came out in the course of the trial and argue that cumulatively they laid the foundation for a provocation based manslaughter verdict. This is precisely what Ma CJ cautioned against in Chau Yui Ming – namely, the ingenious efforts of appellate counsel “to identify alternative scenarios, particularly after trial, in order to impugn a summing-up, these allegations bearing little or no resemblance to what was the reality at trial.[30] 57.In respect of the applicant, the defence of provocation was simply not an obvious alternative verdict which was supported by the evidence. This ground of appeal fails. G. Disposition 58.For these reasons we refused the application for leave to appeal conviction and dismissed the appeal.
25 November 2020 Mr David Leung SC, DPP and Mr Mark Wei, on fiat of the Department of Justice, for the respondent Mr David Boyton, instructed by Krishnan & Tsang, assigned by DLA, for the applicant 22 January 2021 Mr Derek Lai DDPP (Ag) and Mr Mark Wei, on fiat of the Department of Justice, for the respondent Mr David Boyton, instructed by Krishnan & Tsang, assigned by DLA, for the applicant [1] According to the WhatsApp message sent from Martin, Bosco arrived at 23:06 hours. [2] Appeal Bundle, pages 62B-64H. [3] Appeal Bundle, page 58A-B. [4] Appeal Bundle, page 53H-K. [5] Appeal Bundle, page 56M-N. [6] Appeal Bundle, page 81B-D. [7] [2019] 5 HKLRD 574 [8] [2019] 5 HKLRD 602 [9] Appeal Bundle, page 24F-J. [10] Appeal Bundle, pages 28K-29C. [11] Appeal Bundle, page 32H-K. [12] Appeal Bundle, page 34N. [13] Appeal Bundle, page 37E-F. [14] Appeal Bundle, page 99A-D, I-L. [15] Appeal Bundle, pages 50T-51D. [16] Appeal Bundle, page 53R-U. [17] Appeal Bundle, page 57I-P. [18] Appeal Bundle, pages 57Q-58C. [19] Appeal Bundle, pages 52U-53D. [20] Appeal Bundle, page 327A-C. [21] (2019) 22 HKCFAR 368 [22] (2008) 11 HKCFAR 354 [23] (2019) 22 HKCFAR 368, 384, at [27]. [24] Ibid. [25] Ibid, at [28]. [26] Ibid, 385, at [31]. [27] Ibid, 386, at [32]. [28] Ibid, 387, at [35]. [29] [1986] 1 WLR 1202, 1205G-1206B. [30] See footnote 26. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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