Npyj v. Smrc
Read the full judgment text of FCMC 9098/2018 on BabelCite. This Family Court judgment was delivered on 2 September 2021 before Her Honour Judge Grace Chan.
Matrimonial causes – Leave to appeal – Case management – Official Solicitor – Restrictive proceedings order – Force majeure – Procedural fairness – District Court – Leave to appeal refused – Costs awarded – Show cause order made. The husband sought leave to appeal against various orders made in his absence, alleging breach of natural justice due to force majeure. The court found no reasonable prospect of success as the husband chose not to attend and the orders were within the judge's discretion. The court also directed the husband to show cause why a Restrictive Proceedings Order should not be imposed due to voluminous applications.
Legal issues: Leave to appeal against orders made on 9 April 2021 · Leave to appeal against appointment of Official Solicitor · Leave to appeal against extension of time for questionnaire
Outcome: Leave to appeal applications dismissed; Costs awarded to wife; Show cause order for RPO/RAO made; Unless order for affidavit in Treating Psychologist Summons
Cited by 1 case · Cites 10 cases
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FCMC 9098/2018 [2021] HKFC 178 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NUMBER 9098 OF 2018 ----------------------------
---------------------------- Coram : Her Honour Judge Grace Chan in Chambers (paper disposal) Date of Judgment : 2 September 2021 ----------------------- JUDGMENT (Leave to appeal in respect of various orders made in the absence of the respondent) ----------------------- Introduction 1.On 20 May, 2 June and 2 July 2021, the respondent husband filed a total of 4 summonses seeking leave to appeal against various orders and/or a costs decision made by me. 2.The litigation history of this case and the voluminous applications taken out by the husband are already set out in some of the previous judgment/decision handed down by this court as follows:
3.For convenience, I would adopt herein the abbreviations used in the aforesaid Judgment, unless stated the otherwise. 4.In this judgment, I shall deal with 3 of these 4 summonses altogether, because they all concern his intended appeal against various orders made by me on 9 April 2021, 18 May 2021, 21 May 2021 and 21 June 2021 respectively and/or in his absence. He avers at those material times, he had left Hong Kong for the UK for his dying father who sadly passed away after he landed the UK. Since then, he was (and still is) unable to return to Hong Kong due to flight restriction and quarantine requirement. Hence, he says that I erred in law in making the orders in his absence due to force majeure and without granting him a chance to be heard, in breach of rule of law, due process, procedural fairness and nature justice and enshrined in Article 10 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. 5.His leave to appeal application filed on 2 June 2021 against a costs decision handed down by me on 21 May 2021 will be dealt with separately in another decision handed down today. 6.Section 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance provides that leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard. 7.The relevant test of whether an appeal has a reasonable prospect of success is whether the applicant for leave can show that he has an arguable case with reasonable chances of success on appeal. A reasonable prospect of success therefore means an appeal with prospects that are more than “fanciful” but which do not need to be shown to be “probable”: SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125; KNM v HTF, HCMP 288/2011. 8.As this is not the first time that the husband filed an application for leave to appeal against a case management order of the court, he should be very familiar with the trite law that an appellant faces a “very high hurdle” in showing that the first instance judge has gone clearly wrong and made orders which will clearly involve an injustice or inability for the trial court to carry out its task, since in an earlier appeal application filed by him against another case management direction of the Family Court in NPYJ v SMRC, [2020] HKCA 832, Chu JA has propounded the following principles:
9.To appreciate why the court made the relevant orders in his absence, it is necessary to set out the relevant events in the following.
10.As said, I came to seize this case on 29 September 2020 during which I fixed the various children’s summonses of the husband for pre-trial review (PTR) for 4 January 2021 (with 1 hour reserved). I also alerted the parties that I had every intention to fix these children’s summonses for trial in the said PTR. 11.Further, I fixed the first appointment hearing of the ancillary relief matters for the same date of 4 January 2021, and gave time extension for the parties to file and serve their respective updated Form E. On the husband’s own application, such time extension was further extended, but yet he still failed to comply with the further extended time table by the said PTR/first appointment hearing. 12.Even more so, on the last working day immediately before the said PTR/first appointment hearing, he took out the Recusal Summons on 31 December 2020, the return date of which was 19 February 2021. 13.Then in the PTR of 4 January 2021, when the court asked for an explanation for non-compliance with the order of filing his updated Form E, the husband made bold submission that I should not hear or make any directions on this case, no matter whether it was children and ancillary relief matter. Time was thus spent on his oral submission, and the PTR of the children’s summonses as well as the first appointment hearing had to be refixed pending the judgment on the Recusal Summons. I gave directions for paper disposal of the Recusal Summons. 14.Had it not been the fact that time was wasted for the court to deal with the husband’s oral submission, the court would probably have been able to fix or at least pencil-mark the forthcoming trial dates for the children’s summonses. 15.The judgment on the Recusal Summons was handed down by me on 10 March 2021, in which the application was dismissed. Immediately, I restored the first appointment hearing to 9 April 2021 (“9/4/2021 Hearing”), which date was made available only upon cancellation of my own annual leave.[1] After the Recusal Judgment 16.Then, on 26 March 2021, the husband took out 2 additional summonses (See: [19(10) and (11)] below), which on my directions, were fixed to 9 April 2021. 17.On the other hand, the wife filed her affirmation in respect of the garnishee application in February 2021 to enforce the MPS Order made by HHJ Adriana Ching Tse (then Deputy Judge Tse). She also issued a summons pursuant to section 12 of Cap 192 which was returnable before the practice judge on 17 May 2021. 18.It is indisputable that despite the MPS Order, the husband has not paid a single penny to pursuant to the MPS Order. He lodged an application for leave to appeal against the MPS Order which was dismissed by the learnt judge on 13 May 2021. Outstanding matters as at 9 April 2021 19.For easy reference and discussion, I set out below the outstanding summonses (all taken out by the husband) or other outstanding matters as at 9 April 2021, some of which will be fixed for trial, whereas some others will be dealt with as interlocutory matters:
Hearing of 9 April 2021 & his absence 20.The court was supposed to deal with 3 matters in the hearing of 9 April 2021, namely the first appointment, and the 1st and 2nd 26/3/2021 Summonses. 21.However, 2 days before the hearing of 9 April 2021, the husband sent a letter dated 7 April 2021 signed by him (“7/4/2021 Letter”) to the court, enclosing an unsigned summons and unsworn 97th affidavit. In gist, he claimed that he had flown back to England on 4 April 2021 due to his father’s deterioration of health, and that he did not know precisely when he would be able to return to Hong Kong. Hence, he sought in his intended unsigned summons the following:
22.The 7/4/2021 Letter was brought to my attention on 8 April 2021, which was considered by me in the hearing of 9 April 2021. I did not accept that he could not come to the court due to the event as alleged and concluded that he chose not to come to court. I gave the following ex tempore observation/comment in the hearing:
23.Since the court did not accept the husband’s alleged reason(s) for absence and concluded that he chose not to attend the hearing, his complaint of making the relevant orders in his absence and/or not giving him a right to be heard, and thus lack of procedural fairness and natural justice, etc, does not begin to take flight. 24.On the other hand, the court has made 3 separate orders on 9 April 2021 in relation to the matters set out at [20]. The husband, however, has not clearly identified in his leave to appeal summons filed in 20 May 2021 or his draft notice of appeal against which orders of 9 April 2021 he is now appealing. So, I have to take it that he is appealing against all of the 3 orders. It is thus imperative to go into greater details of the 3 orders. The 1st Order made on 9 April 2021 25.The first order concerns the 1st 26/3/2021 Summons, and in gist, the following orders were made:
26.In dismissing the application at the sub-paragraph (3) in the preceding paragraph, I gave the following ex tempore reasoning:
27.Apart from the allegation that I erred in law in making the above orders in his absence (which is already rejected by me at [22] above), the husband has not put forward any other grounds as to why and how the above orders are wrong in law. His intended appeal on this order is totally without any merit. The 2nd order made on 9 April 2021 28.The second order made on 9 April 2021 related to the 2nd 26/3/2021 Summons, which contained 3 major but different applications. 29.At paragraph 1 of the 2nd 26/3/2021 Summons, the husband sought to make an order in terms of the Enforcement Summons and the Access Pending Trial Summons. I made no order as to this paragraph 1, with no order as to costs, for the following reasons given orally in the hearing:
30.Paragraph 2 of the 2nd 26/3/2021 Summons sought to withdraw 3/11/2020 Summons (for the appointment of Dr Kristie Craigen as the single joint expert) and 9/11/2020 Summonses (to “renew” the Expert Summons for the expert report of Dr Jadis Blurton and Dr Kristie Craigen to be adduced). 31.As I explained by way of my oral reasoning in the hearing, I had directed as early as 3 December 2020 by way of my court note that the husband should show cause why these 2 Summonses should not be struck out due to an abuse of process. But I was not able to deal further with these 2 Summonses partly due to his leave to appeal application (on appointment of government clinical psychologist) and Recusal Summons. After the Recusal Judgment was handed down, I then “restored” the handling of these 2 Summonses, namely whether they should be struck out due to an abuse of process. It was under such circumstances that the husband now sought to withdraw these 2 Summonses. 32.Notably, the Court of Appeal has already said in their judgment that these 2 Summonses were an abuse of process. [5] 33.However, as I said in the hearing of 9 April 2021 when the husband was absent, I did not wish to dwell on whether to dismiss these 2 Summonses on the ground of an abuse process or to let him withdraw them, so long as it was now confirmed that he would not pursue them any more. I thus gave leave to him to withdraw these 2 Summonses, but with an order nisi that the costs of these 2 Summonses and paragraph 2 of the 2nd 26/3/2021 Summons be to the wife. 34.In my view, the court should not be criticized for making an order in terms of what the husband himself sought, merely because he was absent in the hearing, lest to mention that the court, as a matter of fact, did not accept his reason for absence. Further, it is abundantly clear that the 3/11/2020 and 9/11/2020 Summonses should not have been taken out at all, [6] such that even if he was given a chance to be heard, the court would not have made a different costs order. Importantly, there was no application for variation of such cost order nisi, and thus it has already been made absolute. 35.Paragraph 3 of the 2nd 26/3/2021 Summons sought to have time extension to comply with my directions made on 10 March 2021 (in relation to preparation for the first appointment hearing) to 7 April 2021. 36.Despite the plain fact that it was his own application for time extension to comply with said court directions by 7 April 2021, he had failed to abide by the deadline suggested by him. Further, the court fould it very strange and unexplainable that while he could prepare and sign the 7/4/2021 Letter, he was unable to comply with the said directions by the deadline suggested by he himself. In any event, it is very obvious that by the time when this application was heard, ie on 9 April 2021, such time line had already expired. 37.In such circumstances, I made no order as to this paragraph, and awarded a cost order nisi in favour of the wife, which was already made absolute since there was no application for varying the same. 38.Upon due consideration, I conclude that there is no reasonable prospect of success in his intended appeal against the 2nd order of 9 April 2021. The 3rd Order made on 9 April 2021 39.By way of background, I have to point out that despite the petition of this case was filed in July 2018,[7] the ancillary relief front of this case has not been moving forward in any meaningful pace at all. Despite that numerous first appointment hearings were heard in the past 3 years, such hearings were mostly, if not all, spent on various summonses, including the Trial and/or Interlocutory Summonses, of the husband. 40.The updated Form E of the wife was filed on 4 November 2020. The husband did not file his until an unless order was imposed by me; he filed his updated Form E on 25 January 2021. 41.As said above, the hearing of 9 April 2021 is also a first appointment hearing, whereby both parties have to comply with PD 15.11 in preparing for the hearing, including preparing their respective draft questionnaire on each other’s Form E. 42.The wife prepared her draft questionnaire, to which I gave leave to her to formally file and serve the same within 7 days, ie by 16 April 2021. I also ordered the husband to file and serve his replies to the wife’s questionnaire within 28 days thereafter, ie by 14 May 2021. 43.I fail to see how I erred in giving this case management direction. I reiterate what I said at [22] above. In any event, I do not accept that it is wrong in law to make such case management order in his absence, given the very slow progress of the ancillary relief matter in this case. Importantly, the husband has not made any payment pursuant to the MPS Order made on 25 June 2019. The children have been financially supported only by the wife. 44.Moreover, it is not his argument that insufficient time was given for him to provide his replies. Yet, he has not yet provided his replies to the wife’s questionnaire up to the date of this decision. Order of 18 May 2021 & hearing of 21 May 2021 45.It is accepted that as at the hearing of 21 May 2021, the husband was in the UK and that the said hearing was conducted in his absence. However, it is erroneous for him to say that I refused to adjourn the hearing of 21 May 2021 by virtue of my order of 18 May 2021. It is necessary to put all relevant hearings/events into proper prospective. 46.On 3 May 2021, the husband became represented by Messrs Payne Clermont Velasco. On the same day, his solicitors wrote to the court to seek an urgent hearing for removal of the children to the UK to be with him and to attend the funeral of his late father which was said to take place on 9 May 2021. I acceded to the request and fixed this summons for the following day of 4 May 2021. 47.The husband continued to be represented by Messrs Payne Clermont Velasco in the hearing of 4 May 2021. Upon hearing submission from both parties, I dismissed his application, with no order as to costs. 48.Further, I took the opportunity to restore the the Trial Summonses to 21 May 2021 (as the last PTR held on 4 January 2021 was unable to go ahead as scheduled due to the oral submission made by the husband as per [13]). I informed both parties that I also intended to consider whether the Official Solicitor should be appointed to represent the children in same hearing of 21 May 2021. 49.However, the husband filed a notice to act in person on 14 May 2021. On the same day, he lodged a letter with the court seeking leave to file his summons (signed and dated 14 May 2021),[8] in which he asked that:
50.By my court note of 18 May 2021, I replied to him like this,
51.It is noted that the husband did not file this summons, whether by himself or by his agent. 52.Apart from the above court note, I have not made any formal order on 18 May 2021 refusing to adjourn the hearing of 21 May 2021. 53.Merely to complete the picture, I would add 2 more observation and/or comment as follows. 54.First, in his urgent summons and supporting affidavit for removal of the children to the UK to attend the funeral of his late father, the husband adamantly said that the children be removed from 4 to 18 May 2021 (both dates inclusive) only, which in turn means that he would return with the children to Hong Kong by 18 May 2021. As such, it is unknown why he could not have returned to Hong Kong to attend the hearings of the family court from 19 May 2021 onwards. 55.Second, there are other very good reasons to proceed with the hearing of 21 May 2021 in the absence of the husband:
56.It is pertinent to note that there is not any leave to appeal application in respect of my order of 21 May 2021 on the Trial Summonses and the Interlocutory Summonses, save and except the order concerning the Official Solicitor. 57.Equally, it is pertinent for me to point out that I have made specific directions in respect of the Treating Psychologist Summons, as it is found that the husband has not filed any supporting affidavit, despite that this summons was filed on 27 October 2020. Yet, he failed to comply with this direction to file and serve his supporting affidavit by 11 June 2021. I express my grave concern that such failure to comply with the directions will, once again, affect the next PTR and the time table for fixing the trial of the Trial Summonses. 58.In such circumstances, I will make an unless order for him to file and serve the said affidavit. Order dated 21 May 2021 relating to Official Solicitor 59.In the hearing of 21 May 2021, I made another order (only the relevant parts will be set out) as follows:
60.By his summons filed on 2 June 2021, the husband applies for the following:
61.His intended grounds of appeal are these:
62.I will say straight away that there is no reasonable prospect of success in any of the above intended grounds of appeal due to the following reasons. 63.First, this application is mis-conceived. I have not yet formally made an order to appoint the Official Solicitor to represent the children of the family; I merely “requested” the Official Solicitor to represent the children. The usual practice and procedure in the family court is to, first of all, invite/request the Official Solicitor to consider if he would represent the child/children of the family. His view would usually be contained in a report lodged solely with the court. 64.Such procedure is implicit in rule 108 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap 179A which provides that:
65.In requesting the Official Solicitor to consider representing the children of this case, I take into account the major allegation/ground of applying for variation of the care and control of the children is that the husband alleges that the wife has administered active and serious parental alienation on the children. 66.I have also considered PDSL6 on Guidance in Separation Representation for Children in Matrimonial and Family Proceedings. Paragraph 11 provides that,
67.Paragraph 15 gives a non-exhaustive list of circumstances where the court could consider making an order for separate legal representation of a child:
68.In my view and as far as I can understand it from the affidavits/affirmations of the parties, at least the factors set out in (i), (iii), (v), (vi), (ix) and (xvii) in the preceding paragraph may be engaged. 69.Pausing here, I would venture to say at this stage that given the overall circumstances and the background of this case, I am prepared to appoint the Official Solicitors to represent the children of this case, if he agrees to do so. 70.Second, it is not correct for the husband to argue that he was not given a chance to be heard. It is plain and obvious that the parties were given at least 2 chances to express their view on this topic. 71.This court first brought up the topic of whether there should be separate representation for the children of this case as early as her court note of 9 December 2020. The court referred the parties to PDSL 6 and invited submission by them on/before 23 December 2020, to which they respectively replied to the court on 22 and 23 December 2020. In gist, the wife took a neutral stance but was worried about the costs consequences of the appointment, whereas the husband asked that be put on hold for 3 to 6 months to try out therapeutic intervention. 72.Then, this matter came to a stagnant, due to the Recusal Summons taken out by the husband. 73.After the Recusal Judgment, the court sent out paper directions giving parties a further chance to make written submission on the topic. It is accepted that the husband sent a letter dated 22 March 2021 to the court, but in it, he merely objected to the said appointment and asked that be put on hold once again. Hence, the court does not regard this as a further or new submission. He was merely repeating his old stance without new reason(s) of objection, As such, I do not see Recital (D) of the order was wrong in substance. 74.However, even if (just assuming) that I was wrong in holding such a view in the preceding paragraph, and that Recital (D) of the said order did wrongly state that he had not lodged any submission, such mistake, if any, would not render the court order void and unlawful. 75.Third, it is erroneous for the husband to argue that the said court order was made only upon hearing from the wife. I reiterate that the topic of separate representation for the children by the Official Solicitor was brought up by this court. I also reiterate that both parties were given 2 chances to make written submission to the court as outlined above. 76.Fourth, I reiterate my observation, comment and/or analysis in relation to the husband’s absence at [53] to [55] above. The Order of 21 June 2021 77.Pursuant to my order of 9 April 2021, the husband should have filed and served his replies to the wife’s questionnaire by 14 May 2021. He failed to do so by the deadline. This triggered the wife to take out her summons on 20 May 2021 that he should do so within 7 days. Her summons was returnable on 21 June 2021. 78.On 11 June 2021, the husband wrote to the court again, seeking leave to issue his summons dated 11 June 2021 and to file his 102nd affidavit. In the summons, there are a total of 21 applications on different topics/areas concerning the children and the ancillary relief, such as ordering the wife to deliver the passports of the children to him for his retention; temporary removal of the children to the UK between 30 June to 15 August 2021; immediate order in terms of the Access Pending Trial Summons; appointment of child psychiatrist, Dr Ronnie Pao, and child psychologist, Ms Katrina Rozga; striking out of the wife’s summons for him to file and serve his replies to her questionnaire. 79.It is suggested in the summons that it is to be fixed for 15 minutes only. 80.It is with regrets that the husband has not paid any or any sufficient attention to my previous court note of 18 May 2021 at [50]. On the other hand, the court has an inherent function and power to control the proceedings before her. It is impossible that the court will be able to handle 21 applications of different nature and areas in a merely 15-minute’s hearing, even if just for giving directions. Thus, I replied to the husband like this on 16 June 2021:
81.The husband did not file any summonses consequent to this court note between the date of the court note and the hearing of 21 June 2021. 82.On return day of 21 June 2021, I made an order in the absence of the husband that time be extended for 28 days (instead of 7 days) for him to file and serve his replies to the wife’s questionnaire, ie by 19 July 2021. By his summons filed on 2 July 2021, he seeks leave to appeal against this order on the following grounds:
83.After due consideration, I do not agree that there is any need to hold an oral hearing of this leave to appeal summons, as the application does not involve complicated law or complex facts. Further, I am not satisfied that there is any reasonable prospect of success in this leave to appeal application. In particular, I would say the following. 84.First, my observation and comment in relation to the husband’s absence at [54] above applies equally to his absence in the hearing of 21 June 2021. 85.Second, the first appointment hearings on ancillary relief matter in the family court have to follow the protocol in PD 15.11. These include, among other things, the preparation for draft questionnaire upon which the court may grant leave to formally file and serve the same, and for the other party to reply. I thus reject the husband’s argument that the wife’s application is an abuse of process, and/or that the lack of a margin note etc would make her application/questionnaire defective per se. 86.Third, I repeat all my observation/comment/concern on the slow progress of the ancillary relief matter set out at [39] to [43] above. 87.Fourth, I do not agree that giving time extension for the husband to comply with a previous order is a draconian order as such; I have not made any unless order yet. 88.Fifth, his 102nd affidavit was not formally filed as at the hearing of 21 June 2021, and thus I was entitled not to consider it. But even if (just assumed) that it was considered, I would not have made a different court order. Conclusion on the leave to appeal 89.Due to the matters aforesaid, I conclude that there is no reasonable prospect of success in any of the grounds of the intended appeals of the husband. He has not proven that there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard. Hence, I refuse to grant leave to appeal in all 3 summonses for leave to appeal. 90.As I see no reason why costs should not follow the event, I will thus make an order that the husband do bear the wife’s costs of and occasioned by this application, to be taxed if not agreed. Stay Application 91.Since his application for leave to appeal is rejected, it follows that the issue of his applications for stay contained in his all of these leave to appeal summonses do not arise, and thus should be dismissed. RPO/RAO? 92.In this case, the husband has so far taken out 48 applications since the Consent Order on custody and access dated 4 July 2019, or 22 summonses since I took up this case on 29 September 2020. He has filed over 100 affidavits in this case within a time span of about 3 years since the petition of this case was filed in July 2018 (excluding those affirmations filed under the old petition under FCMC 6134/2017). 93.Up to the date of this decision but excluding the judgment/decision handed down today, the family court has so far delivered 13 judgment/decisions since mid-2019, all on the husband’s applications, of which 8 of them are leave to appeal applications. Together with the recent 4 summonses on leave to appeal filed on 20 May, 2 June and 2 July 2021 respectively, he has lodged 12 applications for leave to appeal against various case management orders and judgment/decisions of the family court. So far, none of his leave to appeal applications was allowed. 94.It is said that after the family court made some case management directions/orders involving the social investigation officer, government clinical psychologist and/or the Official Solicitors, the husband would on many occasions write numerous letters/emails and/or make telephone calls to the social investigation officer, government clinical psychologist and/or the Official Solicitors telling them not to carry on with their proper investigation as directed by the court, pending his various leave to appeal applications, thereby triggering the social investigation officer, government clinical psychologist and/or the Official Solicitors to write to the court for directions from time to time. This has taken up an enormous amount of court’s time. 95.As a result of the voluminous applications on children’s matters taken out by him, which literally used up most if not all of the time in the first appointment hearings, there has been little progress on the ancillary relief matters, such that this case, though in action for more than 3 years, has just recently reached the stage of first round of questionnaire. 96.He has repeatedly made applications to remove the children out of Hong Kong to the UK, or to seek an immediate order be made in respect of the Access Pending Trial Summons and/or the Enforcement Summons. Yet, he has not focused on the directions of this court for, eg preparing his affidavit in respect of the Treating Psychologist Summons. 97.I am loath to pointing out that but for these repeated and/or unfocused and/or unnecessary applications, this court would probably have been able to fix or pencil-mark the Trial Summonses for trial in the PTR of 4 January 2021. 98.The next PTR of the Trial Summonses will be on 22 October 2021. In the best interest of the children and of the parties, as well as in line with the guiding principles in Order 1A, Rules of the High Court, I conclude that it was high time for the court to pro-actively consider if a restrictive proceedings order (“RPO”) or restrictive application order (“RAO”) should be imposed. 99.Hence, I direct that the husband shall show cause as to why a RPO and/or RAO should not be imposed against him. The following directions are given:
Order 100.For all the matters set out above, I now make the following order in respect of his leave to appeal applications:
101.In addition, the court shall make the following orders in respect of the Treating Psychologist Summons:
The petitioner (wife) present and acting in person The respondent (husband) present and acting in person [1] The first appointment hearing was fixed pursuant to the court note of 10/3/2021. [2] The husband’s sworn 97th affidavit was filed on 31 May 2021. [3] The husband avers that the reference to “psychiatrist” at §57 of the Recusal Judgment should be amended to “psychologist” under the slip rule. [4] There was no application for variation of this costs order nisi, which thus was already made absolute. [5] CAMP 255/2020, [2021] HKCA 183 at §34. [6] See footnote 5. [7] The divorce of the parties actually commenced in May 2017 when the wife filed her petition relying on the behaviour of the husband under FCMC 6134/2017. This would mean that the divorce litigation of the parties have been going on for more than 4 years. [8] The husband wrongly stated in his letter of 14 May 2021 that the intended summons attached to it was dated 7 April 2021. The correct date of the intended summons was 14 May 2021. [9] The husband wrongly states in his notice of appeal that his summons was dated 10 June 2021, when according to the court file, the summons attached to his letter of 11 June 2021 was dated the same date of 11 June 2021. | ||||||||||||||||
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