Re Md Mahabour Alias Mahabub
Read the full judgment text of CACV 509/2021 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 23 March 2023.
1. On 22 April 2022, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion out of time to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this Court’s (Au JA and L Wong J) judgment of 28 February 2022 (“the Judgment”) ( [2022] HKCA 331 ). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung dated 5 November 2021, refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review ( [2021] HKCFI 3276 ).
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CACV 509/2021 [2023] HKCA 406 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 509 OF 2021 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 2846 OF 2018) ________________________
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.On 22 April 2022, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion out of time to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this Court’s (Au JA and L Wong J) judgment of 28 February 2022 (“the Judgment”) ([2022] HKCA 331). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung dated 5 November 2021, refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2021] HKCFI 3276). 2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this Court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment. We will not repeat them here. After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1. 3.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this Court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. 4.Further, pursuant to section 24(2) of the HKCFAO, the application should be made within 28 days from the date of the judgment to be appealed from. Thus, the deadline for the applicant to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Judgment fell on 28 March 2022. Due to the closure of the High Court Registry during the General Adjournment Period (arising from the COVID-19 Pandemic) from 7 March 2022 up to 11 April 2022, the period was automatically extended to 12 April 2022. Accordingly, the applicant was late for 10 days in taking out his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. 5.Although the applicant did not apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal within time, the Court has a discretion to extend time under section 24(5) of the HKCFAO if good and sufficient grounds are shown by the applicant: see Re Imran Muhammad [2021] HKCA 482 at [9] and the authorities cited therein. In deciding whether there are such good grounds, the Court is entitled to take into account (a) the length of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the chances of the appeal succeeding if an extension of time is granted; and (d) the degree of prejudice to the respondent if the application is granted: Begum Jahanara v Ian Candy, Esq & Another [2021] HKCA 83 at [4] and the authorities cited therein. 6.In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:
7.In his supporting affirmation filed on 22 April 2022, the applicant stated:
8.Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged his written submissions on 6 May 2022. In those submissions, he cited ST v Director of Immigration [2014] 4 HKLRD 277 and Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 and contended that high standards of fairness were required in the determination of a torture claim. He submitted that the Board acted in a procedurally unfair manner without properly assessing his credibility. He referred to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 and R v Ministry of Defence ex p Smith [1996] QB 517 for the proposition that a decision of an administrative body was liable to be set aside if it was reached unreasonably. He also referred to section 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, which relates to the late filing of notice of appeal to the Board but failed to point out its relevance to his case. It is noted that his submissions were all general propositions and the applicant failed to show specifically how they were relevant to his case. 9.Although the applicant’s delay of 10 days is not insubstantial, for present purpose, we will focus on the merit of his intended application for leave to the Court of Final Appeal. 10.In our view, his intended application is wholly without substance. The allegations made in his Notice of Motion and written submissions are all bare and vague allegations unsupported by any evidence. He did not identify any specific error in the Judgment with sufficient particulars. General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. Accordingly, the applicant’s intended appeal plainly has no merit. 11.Further, even taking his case at its highest, his allegations are fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance. 12.The applicant has therefore failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO. We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO. 13.For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit and it will be futile to grant him extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal. Accordingly, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.
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