Priyati and Others v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

Read the full judgment text of CACV 615/2020 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 4 November 2021.

1. On 10 November 2020, Deputy High Court Judge P Li refused to grant leave to the applicants to seek judicial review against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) concerning their non‑refoulement protection claims [1] . The applicants lodged a Notice of Appeal against the judge’s decision on 23 November 2020 [2] .

Cited by 2 cases · Cites 5 cases

Case No.CACV 615/2020[2021] HKCA 1612
Court
Court of Appeal
Date04 Nov 2021
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

CACV 615 /2020

[2021] HKCA 1612

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 615 OF 2020

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2902 OF 2018)

________________________

BETWEEN    
  Priyati 1st Applicant
  Akhtar Farah Hawra 2nd Applicant
  Akhtar Ihtesham Rana 3rd Applicant
  and
  Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑Refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative Respondent
  and
  Director of Immigration Putative Interested Party

________________________

Before: Hon Kwan VP, Barma JA and Au JA in Court
Date of Judgment: 4 November 2021

____________________

J U D G M E N T

____________________

Hon Kwan VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.On 10 November 2020, Deputy High Court Judge P Li refused to grant leave to the applicants to seek judicial review against the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) concerning their non‑refoulement protection claims[1]. The applicants lodged a Notice of Appeal against the judge’s decision on 23 November 2020[2].

2.The 1st applicant consented to the disposal of this appeal on paper by the Court of Appeal.  As the Notice of Appeal was filed before the commencement date of section 34B(4B) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4), this appeal is dealt with by three justices of appeal.

3.The 1st applicant is a national of Indonesia.  She is 40 years old.  She came to Hong Kong to work as a foreign domestic helper in August 2004.  She got married in Hong Kong in April 2011 and gave birth to her daughter, the 2nd applicant herein, on 9 August 2011.

4.The 2nd applicant was permitted to remain in Hong Kong as a visitor until 30 August 2011.  She did not depart and overstayed.  The 1st applicant departed from Hong Kong on 28 August 2011.  Her last application for employment to work was refused on 20 October 2011.  She came to Hong Kong again from Macau on 14 January 2012 as a visitor and subsequently overstayed.  The 1st and 2nd applicants surrendered to the Immigration Department on 25 May 2012.  They raised their torture claims on 15 June 2012.  The 1st applicant was arrested by the police in Hong Kong on 28 November 2012.  She was convicted of the offence of common assault and criminal intimidation on 10 January 2013 and was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment suspended for two years.  Their torture claims were rejected by the Director on 26 March 2013.  Their appeal against the Director’s decision was dismissed by the Board on 13 May 2013.  They then raised their non-refoulement claims on 23 October 2013.

5.The 1st applicant gave birth to her son, the 3rd applicant herein, in Hong Kong on 10 October 2014.  She raised a non-refoulement claim on behalf of the 3rd applicant on 29 December 2014. 

6.The applicants’ claims were made on the basis that they will be harmed or killed by the 1st applicant’s brother if they return to Indonesia because the 1st applicant married her Pakistani husband and had children with him without her family’s consent. 

The decision of the Director

7.By a Notice of Decision dated 26 June 2017, the Director rejected the 1st and 2nd applicants’ non-refoulement claims on all applicable grounds except torture risk[3].  The 3rd applicant’s claim was rejected on all applicable grounds including torture risk, BOR 2 risk[4], BOR 3 risk[5] and persecution risk[6].

8.The Director assessed that the level of risk of harm from the 1st applicant’s brother is low as the 1st applicant has never been hurt by her brother but only received verbal threats.  There is no evidence to show that the 1st applicant’s brother or her parents have actual intention to harm the applicants.  The Director further found no indication of state involvement.  The Director also held that the availability of state protection and internal relocation alternatives further lowers or negates the perceived risk.  In addition, the Director decided that the applicants cannot rely on the grounds of the right to respect for private and family life and rights of children as they, being persons not having the right to enter and remain in Hong Kong, are precluded from relying on such grounds to resist removal and the right to respect for private and family life is not considered to be non-derogable and absolute under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights.

The decision of the Board

9.The applicants appealed against the Director’s decision to the Board. They were absent from the hearing before the Board on 11 June 2018.  Taking into account the fact that the alleged verbal threat was made back in January 2012, that the 1st applicant has not been in touch with her family since then, and that there has been no actual incidence of violence or assault on the applicants and no evidence of any involvement of government authorities, the Board considered that the 1st applicant failed to establish the case on behalf of herself and her children.  The Board further found it is possible for the applicants to relocate to another city in Indonesia and there is state protection as well as other available assistance in Indonesia.  The Board also held that the reliance on the right to respect for private and family life and the rights of the children must fail as persons not having the right to enter and remain in Hong Kong are precluded from relying on these grounds to resist removal pursuant to section 11 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.  Thus, the Board rejected the appeal on 26 October 2018.

The intended judicial review

10.The applicants filed a Form 86 and an affirmation on 18 December 2018 to seek leave to apply for judicial review against the Director’s decision. They did not put forward any specific grounds for their intended challenge.

The judge’s decision

11.DHCJ P Li considered the leave application on paper and treated the application as against the decisions of both the Director and the Board.  The judge considered that the decisions are reasonable and there is no error of law or procedure.  The judge concluded that there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review and dismissed the leave application on 10 November 2020.

Grounds of appeal

12.The applicants only stated that the Board disregarded their dangerous situation without giving any specific grounds of appeal in the Notice of Appeal filed on 23 November 2020. 

Legal Principles

13.The general principles regarding an appeal in a non‑refoulement case have been set out comprehensively by the Court of Appeal in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14.

14.The role of the court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal.  The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases the court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of issue at hand, the court should not usurp the role of the Board.  Assessment of evidence and Country of Origin Information materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director).  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.

15.In an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicants.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge, the appeal should be dismissed.  It is not the role of this court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if it is a fresh application for judicial review.

Analysis and disposition

16.The 1st applicant has not put forward any viable ground to show that the judge had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong.  She has also failed to adduce any evidence to refute the findings of the Director and the Board.  Thus, her appeal is devoid of merit and should be dismissed.

17.It is necessary for this court to consider the positions of the 2nd and 3rd applicants separately, as they are minors and have not been legally represented in these proceedings as required under Order 80, rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A). See Fabio Arlyn Timogan v Evan Ruth Esq, Adjudicator of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office [2020] HKCA 971.

18.Despite the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 19 February 2021, no steps have been taken by the 1st applicant to comply with Order 80 rule 2 for the appointment of next friend or to apply for legal aid for and on behalf of the 2nd and 3rd applicants.  Notwithstanding this, the appeals of the 2nd and 3rd applicants may be allowed to stand if the court is satisfied that their non‑refoulement claims had been properly assessed by the Director and the Board as the court has a discretion under Order 2 rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court to treat such non‑compliance as a mere irregularity without rendering the proceedings a nullity: Re Jassal Tajinder Kumar [2021] HKCA 124 §27.

19.The proper approach to deal with children’s non-refoulement claims has been considered by the Court of Appeal in Fabio Arlyn Timogan and Re Jasvir Singh [2021] HKCA 53 which established that:

(a)     Non-refoulement claims by children, even if based on the same set of primary facts, are separate from the claims advanced by their parents and need to be considered as such having regard to the personal circumstances of the children;

(b)     Even if the claims were based on the same set of primary facts, it would be an error of law if the decision-maker simply decided all the claims as if they were one composite claim without giving separate consideration to the personal circumstances of each claimant separately.  It does not necessarily follow from the dismissal of the claim by a parent that the children’s claims could be dismissed without further consideration of their personal situations;

(c)      Ill-treatment which does not reach a level constituting persecution in the case of an adult may do so in the case of a child.

20.As mentioned above, the 2nd and the 3rd applicants’ claim was premised fundamentally on the 1st applicant’s claim that they would be harmed or killed by the 1st applicant’s brother as the 1st applicant got married and gave birth to them without the family’s consent.  The 2nd and 3rd applicants were born in Hong Kong and have never been to Indonesia.  It is clear from the analysis set out in the decisions of the Director and the Board that they had sufficiently and specifically considered the 2nd and 3rd applicants’ claims[7].  In particular, the Director and the Board had specifically considered the alleged difficulties and discrimination the 2nd and 3rd applicants may face as their father does not live with them in Indonesia. 

21.There is no evidence to refute the Board’s findings that the 1st applicant does not need to bring her children to her home village as internal relocation is possible and that reasonable state protection is available to children[8].

22.Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the merits of the 2nd and 3rd applicants’ claims or any underlying matter that may support minor-specific non-refoulement grounds had not been adequately explored before the Board and the judge due to the lack of legal representation.

23.Giving the matter close and anxious scrutiny, we are not satisfied there is reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review of the 2nd and 3rd applicants.  We therefore treat the non‑compliance with Order 80, rule 2 as a mere irregularity and dismiss the appeal of the 2nd and 3rd applicants notwithstanding that they have not been legally represented.

(Susan Kwan)
Vice President
(Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal
(Thomas Au)
Justice of Appeal

The 1st Applicant (1st Appellant), acting in person

The 2nd Applicant (2nd Appellant), acting in person

The 3rd Applicant (3rd Appellant), acting in person


[1] [2020] HKCFI 2837

[2] Folio 1

[3] As defined in Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), which definition is the same as that found in Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

[4] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383).

[5] This refers to risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383).

[6] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

[7] See paragraphs 37, 53(d), 53(e)(xv)-(xvi), 63, 70-73 of the Director’s decision and paragraphs 22-24, 26, 28, 37,  39(d)-(e), 42, 46-51,61 of the Board’s decision.

[8] §§39 & 56 of the Board’s decision