Rintan v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2133/2019 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 26 July 2022.
1. The applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision dated 11 August 2017 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board’s Decision”). The applicant put down the date of the Board’s Decision as 4 March 2019. There is no such document on the file. This error will be rectified below. The application by Form 86 filed on 25 July 2019 is late. [1] This issue will also be dealt with below.
Cites 4 cases
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HCAL 2133/2019 [2022] HKCFI 2148 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 2133 of 2019
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
Observations for the Applicant: THE APPLICATION 1.The applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision dated 11 August 2017 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board’s Decision”). The applicant put down the date of the Board’s Decision as 4 March 2019. There is no such document on the file. This error will be rectified below. The application by Form 86 filed on 25 July 2019 is late.[1] This issue will also be dealt with below. 2.The applicant did not request an oral hearing. Pursuant to Order 53, rule 3(3) of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”), the Court will deal with her application on paper. 3.Pursuant to Order 20, rule 8 and Order 53, rule 3(6) of the RHC, Form 86 is amended to the effect that the Board is the proposed respondent, the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) is the interested party and the date of the Board’s Decision is 11 August 2017 instead of 4 March 2019. The Director’s refusal to reopen the applicant’s non-refoulement claim 4.The applicant is a national of Indonesia. She had previously lodged a torture claim which was rejected on 3 June 2013. Her subsequent appeal against the dismissal was also refused by the Board on 27 March 2014. Later, she lodged a non-refoulement claim which was to be assessed on all applicable grounds other than the torture risk[2] under the unified screening mechanism. The relevant events could be chronicled as follows:
5.By way of written representations dated 1 March 2017 and 2 March 2017 respectively, the applicant expressed her intention of reopening her non-refoulement claim [8]. 6.In the applicant’s written representations, she simply stated that she would face risk of harm if refouled. She also mentioned that she had been in custody since 25 February 2017. In her letter received by the Immigration Department on 13 March 2017, she again repeated her claim. In her premature notice of appeal/petition filed to the Board, the applicant stated that the reason of failure to return the SCF was that (i) she was afraid she would be returned to Indonesia; (ii) she lost her cellphone and thus lost the contact with DLS; and (iii) she was afraid that the police would arrest her [10]-[13]. 7.The Director probed into whether there were circumstances beyond the applicant’s control preventing her from returning the completed SCF on time [14]. The Director noted that the applicant did not take the endeavor to approach the Immigration Department. In particular, she failed to attend the Immigration Department on 20 August 2014 despite agreeing to do so in the telephone conversation a day before and she also absconded from reporting for recognizance since 29 August 2014 [16]. As to the applicant’s explanation that she lost her contact with the DLS, the Director found that she must be aware of the DLS’s office as she had been there. If she had the real intention of reaching out, she could have done so without difficulties [17]. 8.As a result, on 17 March 2017, the Director concluded that the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that she failed to return the SCF because of circumstances beyond her control. Therefore, the Director refused her request to reopen her non-refoulement claim. The Board’s Decision 9.The applicant appealed the Director’s refusal to the Board. In her notice of appeal/petition dated 14 March 2017, the applicant repeated her claim and her reasons for not returning the SCF on time [12]. 10.Having considered the procedural history mentioned above, in its decision rendered without an oral hearing, the Board refused to reopen the applicant’s non-refoulement claim. In brevity, the Board found that none of the applicant’s explanations, presented either before the Director or the Board, had amounted to sufficient evidence showing that there were circumstances beyond the applicant’s control. As a result, the Board concluded that the Director was justified to refuse the applicant’s request as the requirement under section 37ZG (3) of the Immigration Ordinance was not met.[3] The applicant’s appeal was there dismissed. Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision 11.The applicant has filed Form 86 dated 25 July 2019 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. 12.In her statement attached to her Form 86, the applicant set out the grounds, which are irrelevant to her case as she has not submitted her supplementary claim form to the Director for consideration. Nevertheless, I shall set out those grounds below.
DISCUSSION 13.As mentioned in paragraph 1, the applicant’s application is late. The Court has to consider the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospect of the intended application and the prejudice to the putative respondent if extension of time is granted. Also, the Court should not grant extension for a hopeless application. See AW v. Director of Immigration and William Lam CACV 63 of 2015, 3 November 2015, §27 and Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702, §19. I shall, therefore first consider the merits of the applicant’s case. 14.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Board complied with the public law requirements in coming to its Decision on the applicant’s appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact finding power vested in the Director and the Board. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1). 15.The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decisions should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. 16.In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
17.The grounds in paragraph 12 above are irrelevant to her case. She has not submitted her supplementary claim form and there was no hearing before the Board. The Board only considered the reasons for the Director refusing to re-open her case. There are no valid grounds to challenge the Board’s Decision. 18.The Court does not find any fault with the Board in reaching the Board’s Decision. 19.The applicant fails to show that she has any realistic prospect of success in her proposed judicial review. CONCLUSION 20.I refuse to extend time for the applicant to apply for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. Accordingly, I dismiss her application. Dated the 26th day of July 2022
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1
[1] Delay in applying for relief (O. 53, r. 4) (1) An application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. (L.N. 356 of 1988) (2) Where the relief sought is an order of certiorari in respect of any judgment, order, conviction or other proceeding, the date when grounds for the application first arose shall be taken to be the date of that judgment, order, conviction or proceeding. [2] risk of torture under Part VII C of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 [3] 37ZG. Deemed withdrawal of torture claim on failure to return completed torture claim form (3) A torture claim treated as withdrawn under subsection (1) may be re-opened if the person who made the claim provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that the person— (Amended 7 of 2021 s. 14) (a) had exercised all due diligence to return a completed torture claim form as required under section 37Y(2); but (b) failed to return a completed form as required under the section because of circumstances beyond the person’s control. (Amended 7 of 2021 s. 14) |
Cases cited in this judgment