Pky v. Chm
Read the full judgment text of FCMC 3927/2015 on BabelCite. This Family Court judgment was delivered on 31 March 2022 before His Honour Judge G. Own.
Matrimonial law – enforcement of lump sum – leave to enforce arrears – Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance s.12 – computation of 12-month period – grace period – special circumstances – costs – Consent Order – 72 instalments – 90-day grace period – delay not excessive – good reasons established – leave granted – costs order. – Whether the 12-month period under Section 12 of the MPPO starts from the payment date or the expiry of the 90-day grace period – Court held it starts from the expiry of the grace period – Whether delay was excessive – Court held delay was not excessive given the history of late payments – Whether special circumstances existed – Court held yes due to the chase-wait-get paid pattern – Leave granted to enforce HK$380,000 arrears – Respondent to pay costs.
Legal issues: Start of 12-month period · Effect of past late payments · Excessive delay · Good reasons or special circumstances
Outcome: Leave granted to enforce payment of arrears totaling HK$380,000
Cites 4 cases
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FCMC 3927/2015 [2022] HKFC 68 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 3927 OF 2015 ----------------------------
---------------------------- Coram: His Honour Judge G. Own in Chambers (Not Open to Public) Date of Hearing: 21 October 2021 Date of Decision: 31 March 2022 ------------------------------------------------------------------- D E C I S I O N (Leave to enforce maintenance due over 12 months) ------------------------------------------------------------------- Introduction 1.This is the application by the Petitioner Wife (“W”) for leave to enforce maintenance due over 12 months pursuant to Section 12 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192 (“MPPO”). 2.On 3/12/2020, W filed an Inter Partes Summons[1] for leave to enforce payments due over 12 months (“Leave Summons”). By that time, with leave of the Court, W had already issued her 1st Judgment Summons[2] (“1st JS”) for the sum of HK$3,880,000 with the returnable date of 8/2/2021. As per directions of Deputy Judge Doris To, the Leave Summons was scheduled to be heard together with the 1st JS on 8/2/2021. 3.On 8/2/2021, both the Leave Summons and the 1st JS were adjourned to 26/4/2021 upon W’s undertaking to issue a second Judgment Summons (“2nd JS”) within 28 days which would also be heard together[3]. Directions were granted for the parties to file and exchange affirmations and the Respondent Husband (“H”) to also file his Financial Statement (Form E) within 42 days. 4.On 17/3/2021, W issued the 2nd JS for recovery of the sum of HK$4,365,000[4]. 5.Further, on 22/4/2021 W issued the 3rd JS for recovery of the sum of HK$1,125,000[5]. This 3rd JS was also scheduled to be heard on 26/4/2021 (that is, 4 days later) together with the Leave Summons, 1st and 2nd JS. 6.On 26/4/2021, the Leave Summons was adjourned for substantive argument before this Court on 21/10/2021 (with 1 day reserved), and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd JS were adjourned sine die with liberty to restore. Background 7.Parties married in October 1987. There are 2 children born out of the marriage who are now respectively at the age of 33 and 27. 8.In April 2015, W filed a Petition for divorce. 9.Decree Nisi was granted in June 2015. 10.Decree Absolute was granted in August 2015. 11.In June 2015, parties through their lawyers entered into a Consent Summons for a full and final global settlement of their ancillary reliefs[6]. The 13-page Consent Summons was a comprehensive one drafted by W’s lawyers with recitals which embraced various undertakings, understanding, acknowledgement, agreement and conditions precedent to the agreed terms on ancillary reliefs. 12.On 12/6/2015, the Court granted an Order in terms of the Consent Summons (“Consent Order”)[7]. Suffice is to say that amongst other terms and conditions, H was pay to W a lump sum of 17 million by 72 instalments (“Lump Sum”) by depositing into W’s bank account at Dah Sing Bank Limited. Each of the 72 instalments was to be paid not earlier than different designated date(s) set out in the Consent Order. The Agreed Terms 13.Insofar as this application is concerned, the terms in issue are mainly Recitals G and H, which are set out below :-
14.For the sake of completeness, Recital M is also set out below :-
Section 12 of the MPPO, Cap.192 15.Section 12 of the MPPO provides :
The Leave Summons 16.As per the Schedule attached to the Leave Summons, where it was said :- SCHEDULE Pursuant to Recital G of the Order, the Respondent agreed to pay a lump sum of HK$17,000,000 to the Petitioner in full and final settlement of the Petitioner’s ancillary relief claim by way of 72 instalments. The present application relates to the 44th and 45th instalments under Recital G of the Order which are outstanding in the manner as follows.
The Evidence 17.W filed her 2nd Affirmation in support[8] of the Leave Summons. H filed his Affirmation in opposition[9]. W then filed her 4th Affirmation in reply[10]. 18.Since there was no dispute over the factual matters set out in the parties’ affirmations, both Counsel for H and W confirmed that the parties would not be testifying at this hearing for cross examination. Apart from the parties’ affirmation evidence, both Counsel relied upon their oral submissions made in addition to their written submissions already filed. The Issues to be decided 19.There is not much dispute between Counsel as to the legal principles involved. It is also common ground on facts that there was delay on the part of W to seek enforcement of the remaining balance of the 44th instalment of $90,000 and the 45th instalment of $290,000. Summarising their respective cases, the issues before this Court are as follows :-
Discussion Issue (a) 20.The Consent Order was granted upon the Consent Summons signed by the parties in its entirety with no amendment or modification. Recital G as drafted contained a very comprehensive table (spread over 3½ pages) setting out details of each and every one of the 72 instalments by dividing into separate columns with description of (i) Instalment number; (ii) Date of payment not earlier than; (iii) Amount (HK$); and (iv) Sub-total (HK$) per annum. 21.On (ii), the specific words “not earlier than” which followed “Date of payment” must mean that the date stated therein should be the first day when that particular instalment should or need to be paid. It could not be any time earlier. This is clear and unambiguous and must be the parties’ common intention at the time of the Consent Summons. 22.Recital H contains a 90-day grace period to start running after the particular date(s) set for each of the 72 instalments. It provides an avenue of time buffer that any particular instalment(s) could still be paid on any date within the period of 90 days (that is, the grace period) if it was not paid on the date set under the column “not earlier than”. This is also clear and unambiguous. 23.Apparently, the grace period was needed in order to put a ‘cap’ to each particular instalment that was not paid on the earliest date that it should or could be paid; for otherwise, that particular instalment would not have a “last day” time limit to pay. Reason is simple. There was only the time set for “not earlier than” but without the corresponding capping time set for “not later than”. 24.Such “notional last day” set by the 90-day grace period in the terms of Recital H could be any date within or at most at the expiry of the 90-day grace period (and this does not require any separate agreement of the parties) and I would call this as “Scenario 1”; or, it could be such other new payment schedule which would be outside (emphasis added) the 90-day grace period provided that there was agreement of the parties made within (emphasis added) the 90-day grace period. I would call this as “Scenario 2”. 25.Recitals G and H are co-related and must be read and considered together for a workable and sensible meaning. Thus it produced the 2 scenarios above mentioned. It could be seen from the table extracted by W’s Counsel in his Written Submissions on H’s past payment(s) for the 17th to 32nd instalments and 35th to 42nd instalments[14] that Scenario 1 had never occurred. H only paid after (emphasis added) the 90-day grace period had expired. This was not disputed by H or his Counsel. It is fair to say that H did not only make use of the 90-day grace period under Recital H, he had actually taken more time to pay, at least for those instalments extracted if not also for the other instalments. 26.Since neither party took issue on those payment(s) made after the 90-day grace period had expired was without the consensus of the parties, I would just leave it there. 27.For the present application, W in her 2nd Affirmation specifically referred to the deadlines for payment of the 44th and 45th instalments that they should be 1/3/2019 and 1/4/2019 respectively. I noticed that H in his Affirmation in opposition made no reply to or any comments upon those deadlines which W said should be the case. It was only when H’s Counsel in his Written Submissions said the 90-day grace period should have no bearing as to when the 44th and 45th instalments become due[15]. By making such submissions, it would tend to show that W had “delayed” for a further period of 90 days to assert her right of enforcement. 28.With respect, I find it peculiar and uncommon for H’s Counsel to be in any position to make submissions on a point that H did not raise as an issue or even bothered to make any response or comments in his affirmation evidence. This was particularly alarming in this case since the parties had affirmatively restricted their stance only upon the affirmation evidence they filed. Had H’s Counsel wanted to bring up as an issue that the due dates for the 44th and 45th instalment should not be 1/3/2019 and 1/4/2019 as W had said, H must have first said so in his Affirmation in opposition before such submissions could be fairly made by his Counsel. Further, parties’ different views on the date(s) is purely a question of fact and, if raised as an issue, need to expressly said so in his/her affirmation evidence in the absence of any oral testimonies, and not through Counsel’s submissions. 29.That said, on the evidence available and my reading of Recitals G and H, I find as a fact that those instalment(s) under the Consent Order, including the 44th and 45th instalments, only start to become due from the day following the last day of the 90-day grace period (emphasis added) for a particular instalment and not start to become due from the date specified under the column “Not earlier than” for that instalment. 30.To exclude the 90-day grace period for working out when a particular instalment started to become due, as H’s Counsel so suggested, creates ambiguity in the meaning of Recitals G and H which must be taken together; and also provides uncertainty in the computation of time, be it for the purpose of Section 12 of the MPPO or otherwise. My finding as to uncertainty in computation of time was well supported when one looks at the “waiver” provisions within Recital H of any interests accrued if payment was made within the 90-day grace period. Such 90-day grace period with no interest payable or accrued and without the need of any separate agreement of the parties, in my views, is to set a time limit for payment. 31.The need to set a time limit for payment was obvious. The lump sum of 17 million was to be paid in the manner as per the schedule which ended up with 72 instalments with different amount per instalment of $80,000, $125,000, $200,000, $250,000, $290,000, $300,000, $330,000 and $375,000 for different period(s) of time spreading over 6 years. It was not by equal monthly (emphasis added) instalments as in most other cases. Interesting though, they are not fixed in any progressive ascending or descending amount at large. With such structured payment schedule and the qualification of payment date of “Not earlier than”, it is difficult if not impossible, to say actually which instalment and for what amount was due if a default of payment occurred. For example, an instalment payment expressed to be paid “not earlier than 1st March 2022” without any limit on time means that it could be paid at any other time afterwards. Even if it was paid a year later on 1st March 2023, that instalment could not be said to be in default ! 32.Time for payment of sums of money is always important. It must either be clear and specific or that it could be readily ascertainable. The day-to-day use of the term “on or before (date)” by lawyers is a classic example. This term pinpointed to the exact date by the use of the single word “on” and any other earlier date(s) by the words “or before”. 33.In concluding this Issue (a), I find that the last day for payment (emphasis added) of the 44th and 45th instalments under Recital G must also take into account of the 90-day grace period provided under Recital H. 34.Hence, I agree with W that they are 1/3/2019 and 1/4/2019 respectively. Issue (b) 35.H’s past payment(s) for the 17th to 32nd and 35th to 42th instalments were all made post (emphasis added) the 90-day grace period. H made no reference to those “late” payment(s) in his Affirmation in opposition or offered any explanation for the lateness whilst, on the other hand, he maintained that W’s delay for enforcing the 44th and 45th instalments should count from 1/12/2018 and 1/1/2019 (excluding the 90-day grace period). 36.This must be wrong. As a matter of logic or principle, benefits and burden comes in pairs and parallel but not singly and one-sided. It is utterly wrong for one party to take all the benefits whereas the other party takes all the burden. Had H been able to take the benefit over and in excess of the 90-day grace period for making payment(s) as and when he so wishes, and also hassle-free of any accrued interest, how could he be able to fall back and insist upon the original scheduled earliest date for payment when it comes to consider how long had W been delayed in enforcement against him for his default in making the payment(s) ? 37.On the undisputed evidence of W, part of the $290,000 for the 44th instalment was paid by H by 4 separate payments of $50,000 each on 10/5/2019, 28/5/2019, 19/6/2019 and 2/7/2019, totalling $200,000, which is again long after the due date of 1/3/2019 so found by this Court[16]. 38.On this Issue (b), I find that H’s past payment(s), in the absence of any explanation for their lateness or evidence of parties’ consensus for the lateness, supported this Court’s finding on Issue (a) on computation of time, if such finding was not being too generous and favourable to H who had had the benefit and only paid the past instalment(s) after the respective 90-day grace period(s) had expired. Issue (c) 39.Given the finding for Issue (a), the first day when the 44th instalment and 45th instalment started to become due would then be 2/3/2019 and 2/4/2019 respectively. 40.W produced a series of transcript of conversation starting from 30/11/2016 and ending on 6/8/2019[17] between her and one Mr. Edgar Chan as her exhibit “PKY-16” to her 2nd Affirmation together with several related screenshots of pay-in slips. H did not dispute the accuracy of the contents. Mr. Edgar Chan was all along the person with whom W contacted and checked upon for H’s instalment payment(s). He was the accounting staff in H’s company. The gist of the conversation was all about W asking for payment of the instalment(s) at different times over the years. As can be seen, the last few pages of the transcript also covered the 4 payment(s) of $50,000 each for the 44th instalment that H had paid[18]. 41.As can be seen, insofar as the 44th instalment was concerned, at the very first line of the transcript of conversation dated 1/3/2019[19] started with W asking : “Edgar, 2月還未入票 ?”. Two days later on 3/4/2019 W asked : “Edgar, 這兩個月款項會幾時入到我戶口 ?”. On 17/4/2019 W asked : “早晨, 知道幾時可入票 ?”. On 2/5/2019 W asked : “明天入到票嗎 ?”. It goes without say that W was chasing up for defaulted payments. 42.All of W’s questions were responded by Mr. Chan, back and forth. The gist of the answers was mostly on payment arrangement issues, logistic/accounting problem in H’s company, requesting extra time to pay and by separate payment(s) so on and so forth. Just to take a few out at random of the numerous answers by Mr. Edgar Chan back in 2016 and 2017 without going into each and every single question and answer, there are the following answers :
43.It is interesting to see that as early as 2016, stretching over to 2017, and also undisputedly from 2018 and then to 2019, H had been paying the instalments haphazardly rather than punctually despite the scheduled pattern of payment under the Consent Order. 44.As for 44th instalment due to be paid on 1/3/2019 (as found by this Court[20]), Mr Edgar Chan said :
45.On the question of delay, it must be considered against the historic background and all the circumstances in context, and not simply by focusing upon any single or isolated event. That said, what had actually happened in the past and after the 44th and 45th instalments had become due was important. Did W take no steps to follow up the arrears of the 44th and 45th instalments and thereby causing them to become “stale” ? Or, did she make any effort to follow up the matter although not by way of enforcement action but rather by a proven efficient and cost-effective method ? 46.H’s Counsel referred me to a few cases in the Family Court where leave was refused. In the first case of 葉 訴 林 [2020] HKFC 175, the delay was about 28 months[21]. In the second case of 張 訴 郭 FCMC 1425/2009, the delay was 3 years[22]. In the third case of 柯 訴 謝 [2019] HKFC 71, the wife in that case filed the summons in November 2017 for leave to recover arrears due from December 2015 to November 2016, that is, the delay was between 12 to 24 months. Leave was, however, refused for the Court not accepting W’s reasons for the inactivity and not on the length of delay being long or excessive[23]. Hence, this case would be of relevance when considering whether W was able to come up with any “good reasons” or “special circumstances” rather than on the period of delay. 47.In the Court of Appeal case of CSL v WWK, CACV No. 278/2003, leave was refused as the petitioner wife was able to manage herself well and had obtained gainful employment during the period when maintenance fell into arrears. She was found to have left the matter too late to claim for arrears in excess of 10 years[24]. 48.In the case of K v K, HCMC No.2/2004 where it was found that mere requests for payment with no action taken for sparing expenses of litigation could not constitute a good reason for failing to assert her rights nor could it give rise to any special circumstances. 49.Both the CSL and K v K cases are binding upon me on the law. However, neither of them provided any guideline or time line of delay which would be taken as long or excessive so that leave should not be granted. Suffice is to say that whether a period of delay is long or excessive is always fact-sensitive and that the Court has a wide and unfettered discretion to make its decision with the aim and objective to achieve justice and fairness in the case. 50.In Rayden and Jackson on Relationship Breakdown, Finances and Children, I find the following passages useful and instructive :
51.Now I will go to consider the period of delay. 52.On 23/1/2020, W filed an ex parte application for leave to issue judgment summons for the balance of the 44th instalment and the 45th instalments. On that day, almost 11 months had passed after the 44th instalment started to become due on 2/3/2019 and almost 10 months had passed after the 45th instalment started to become due on 2/4/2019. 53.On 5/6/2020, which was about 4 odd months later and this was presumably due to the General Adjournment Period (“GAP”) caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, this Court commented that a separate summons should be taken out for leave to enforce arrears due over 12 months. 54.The Leave Summons was then issued on 18/11/2020, which is 5½ months later. It is plain and obvious that the general comments were just based upon the period of arrears stated by W in the absence of any adjudication over the precise period of arrears by the Court. 55.Taking the 44th instalment (balance) first, it started to become due on 2/3/2019. The 12-month period thus expired on 1/3/2020. Checking such expiry date against the Leave Summons date of 18/11/2020, it was around 8½ months late. Accordingly, the lateness for the 45th instalment was about 7½ months late. 56.If taking H’s last payment of $50,000 for the 44th instalment on 2 July 2019, the 12-month period would then be expiring on 1 July 2020. Checking this expiry date against the Leave Summons date of 18/11/2020, it was only 4½ months late. 57.In my decision, the delay for W to assert her right of enforcement for the 44th (balance) and 45 instalments was not long or excessive. Issue (d) 58.It is trite that W, being the payee under the Consent Order, has the persuasive burden to establish “special circumstances” in that leave should be given for her to enforce arrears due over 12 months. In the case of Arif v. Anwar [2014] EWHC 4669, a case which was referred by W’s Counsel where leave was granted, it was said :
59.W in her 2nd Affirmation provided the following 3 reasons under the sub-heading of “Special circumstances”[25]. 60.First, the arrears represented part of the agreed lump sum of 17 million in full and final settlement of her ancillary reliefs. She only agreed it to be paid by instalments was to enable H to be able to retain his business and assets. Secondly, there was no substantial delay for her to seek recovery of the 44th and 45th instalments given the fact that the Court registry had once been closed for the Covid-19 pandemic. Thirdly, she found it hard to believe that separate application had to be made for the arrears which was part of the agreed lump sum of 17 million agreed to be paid by H. 61.Under Recital M(c) of the Consent Order, it was agreed and provided that 5 months of the rent of W’s place of residence at that time which was to be paid by xxxx 運輸有限公司should be offset by the instalments payable under Recital G. Further, under Recitals J and K, W was required to transfer all her interests and shares in xxxx 運輸有限公司and another company xxxx 物流有限公司to H within 30 days of signing the Consent Summons. 62.H, in his Affirmation in opposition, did not dispute W’s reasons for the agreed lump sum of 17 million and why she also agreed it to be paid by instalments; nor had he complained that W did not transfer her shares and interest in the 2 companies. Hence, I accept W’s first reason that the 44th and 45th instalments were part of the agreed lump sum for settlement of her ancillary reliefs. To disallow W to seek recovery is akin to ‘reducing/varying’ the lump sum which, in all practical terms and effect, prejudiced her ancillary reliefs. 63.As said, the period of delay was neither long nor excessive in the present case. I also accept W’s second reason. 64.W’s third reason is purely a question of her understanding of the practice rules and procedure. It could not be any special circumstances against the operation of such rule. Any Good Reasons/Special Circumstances ? 65.H’s past pattern of payment of the other instalments for the lump sum since 2016, as revealed by the transcript of conversation between W and Mr. Edgar Chan, had not been satisfactory. Nonetheless, W would still get paid after chasing, albeit late, if she chose to wait for whatever reason or arrangement that Mr. Edgar Chan told her. She had had such experience of “chase-wait-then get paid” for almost 4 years by now since 2016. I am minded to say that such “chase-wait-then get paid” was a proven way (emphasis added) of following up unpaid arrears. It was undisputed that so far H had already paid 43 instalments. 66.Unfortunately, it happened again with the 44th instalment for $290,000 which became due on 1/3/2019. W chased and then get paid $200,000 (by 4 separate payments in May, June and July 2019) after having waited or condoned H’s usual pattern of delayed payment. 67.Having said, I find the facts of this case in stark difference from those other run-of-the-mill cases where there was no such “chase-wait-then get paid” historic pattern of payment, whether it was for periodical maintenance payment or for lump sum payment by instalments. 68.Given such background, I accepted that there are “good reasons” for W to wait beyond the 12-month period to assert her rights over the 44th (balance) and 45th instalments. She did chase, waited and then get paid the 4 separate payments of $50,000 each[26]. It was just unfortunate that the balance sum of $90,000 for the 44th instalment this time, and also the 45th instalment, did not come through whilst the 12-month period had already passed. It was neither fair to W nor correct for H to be able to take such technical point to avoid part of the lump sum which he had agreed. 69.I am also satisfied that the circumstances that had arisen through H’s past pattern of payment are special in that leave for enforcement for payment(s) due over 12 months should be granted to W. For otherwise, W’s forbearance and tolerance would be unwarrantedly sacrificed to the prejudice and disadvantage of W. This is utterly unfair, unjust and must be wrong from any perspective. Financial needs and means of the parties 70.There are cross allegations between the parties. 71.H claimed that W does not need the $380,000 arrears in question as she had accumulated wealth through sale of different landed properties between 2014 and 2019[27] and also managed well with her wealth. Besides and in addition, W had by now already received from him 7.25 million out of the 17 million lump sum[28]. 72.W claimed that H had the means and ability to pay the $380,000 arrears in question as his transportation business was very successful with net profits of over 30 million per year[29]. Besides, H’s transportation business also owned substantial assets of 120 to 130 medium goods vehicles, heavy goods vehicles and vans worth around 20 million in total[30]. There was also allegation that H siphoned his shares and interests in his business to their child and to Mr. Edgar Chan[31]. 73.Whilst parties’ needs and finances may be a relevant consideration for the exercise of discretion on this kind of application, this Court however could not make any findings of fact upon any of those cross allegations at their face value without the parties’ evidence and credentials being tested through cross examination. 74.With Counsel’s concurrence of not arranging the parties to testify and be cross examined on their affirmation evidence, they are restricting their disputes in the present case over matters of procedural and technicalities rather than over any other factual matter. 75.Hence, I decided not to venture into this area in the exercise of discretion on the granting of leave to W to enforce the 44th (balance) and 45th instalments, totaling $380,000. Decision 76.For all the above reasons, I decided that leave be granted to W to enforce the payment of $380,000 set out under the Schedule of the Leave Summons dated 18/11/2020. Costs 77.On the question of costs, I decided that H should bear W’s costs of this application, including all costs reserved (if any), to be taxed if not agreed. 78.I also grant Certificate for Counsel. Order 79.I now grant the Order as follows :-
80.This is a costs order nisi which would become absolute if no application to vary the same was made within 14 days from the date of this Decision.
Mr. Derek Hu instructed by Messrs. Ho & Wong, Solicitors for the Petitioner Mr. Chan Yip Hei instructed by Messrs. H.L. Wong & Co., Solicitors for the Respondent [1] TB:A/45-48 [2] TB:A/35-42 [3] TB:A/49 as per Order of DDJ Doris To [4] TB:A/52-55 [5] TB:A/56-59 [6] TB:C/113-125 [7] TB:C/128-140 [8] TB:B/75-88 [9] TB:B/104-110 [10] TB:B/89-103 [11] TB:B/80 §10 of W’s 2nd Affirmation [12] TB:B/78 §9 of W’s 2nd Affirmation [13] TB:B/80 at §11 of W’s 2nd Affirmation [14] See page 4 of W’s Counsel Written Submissions [15] See para 18 of H’s Counsel’s [16] See paragraph 31 of this Judgment [17] TB:C/148 - 203 [18] TB:C/199 - 200 [19] TB:C/199 [20] See paragraph 33 of this Judgment [21] See §59 of the Judgment [22] See §108 of the Judgment [23] See §14 of the Judgment [24] See §33 of the Judgment [25] TB:B:84 §§32 to 36 of W’s 2nd Affirmation [26] See paragraph 44 of this Decision [27] TB:B/106 to 107 §18(a) to (d) of H’s Aff [28] TB:B/107 §19 of H’s Aff [29] TB:B/81 §18 of W’s 2nd Aff [30] TB:B/82 §21 of W’s 2nd Aff [31] TB:B/82 §§24 to 28 of W’s 2nd Aff | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under FCMC 3927/2015