White Dynasty Global Holdings Ltd v. Neway Enterprises Ltd and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1939/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 21 September 2022.
1. Before me are (1) the Plaintiff’s Summons filed on 26 April 2022 for summary judgment for HK$175,323,331.26 plus interest; and (2) the 1 st and 2 nd Defendants’ Summons filed on 25 May 2022 for an order of a stay of the present action on the ground of forum non conveniens or alternatively a case-management stay of the present action pending the determination of High Court Winding-up Proceedings No 484 of 2021 (“HCCW 484/2021”).
Cited by 1 case · Cites 9 cases
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HCA 1939/2021 [2022] HKCFI 2933 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 1939 OF 2021 _________________________
_________________________ Before : Master Gary C C Lam in Chambers (Open to Public) Dates of Hearing: 21 September 2022 Date of Decision : 21 September 2022 _______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ INTRODUCTION 1.Before me are (1) the Plaintiff’s Summons filed on 26 April 2022 for summary judgment for HK$175,323,331.26 plus interest; and (2) the 1st and 2nd Defendants’ Summons filed on 25 May 2022 for an order of a stay of the present action on the ground of forum non conveniens or alternatively a case-management stay of the present action pending the determination of High Court Winding-up Proceedings No 484 of 2021 (“HCCW 484/2021”). BACKGROUND 2.The Plaintiff is the bondholder of the bond (the “Bond”) issued by Tian Shan Development (Holding) Limited (the “Issuer”) for an aggregate sum of HK$200,000,000 with an interest rate of 13% under a bond certificate dated 29 March 2019 (the “Bond Certificate”) executed among the Issuer and the Defendants. The maturity date of the Bond under the Bond Certificate was 28 March 2021, subsequently extended to 28 September 2021 by a supplemental bond certificate dated 29 March 2019, with an increase interest rate of 15% and default interest rate of 15%. 3.Correspondingly, on 29 March 2019 and 29 March 2021 respectively, the Defendants, in favour of the Plaintiff, executes a guarantee (the “Guarantee”) and a supplemental guarantee. 4.Clause 2.3 of the Bond Certificate provided that:-
5.Clause 2.1 of the Guarantee provided that:-
6.Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee provided that:-
7.Clause 2.3 of the Guarantee provided that:-
8.Clause 2.5 of the Guarantee provided that:-
9.Each of the Bond and the Guarantee contained a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Hong Kong Courts. 10.28 September 2021 has passed. The Issuer has made no repayment. On 5 October 2021, the Plaintiff’s solicitors issued statutory demands to the Issuer and the Defendants. On 28 December 2021, the Plaintiff presented a winding-up petition in HCCW 484/2021 against the Issuer. On 29 December 2021, the Plaintiff commenced the present action. FORUM NON CONVENIENS 11.For an application for a stay on forum non conveniens when there is a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Hong Kong Courts, “strong reasons must be shown” why the jurisdiction clause should be departed from: see Noble Power Investments Ltd v Nissei Stomach Tokyo Co Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 631 at §§35 and 37 per Ma CJHC (as he then was). 12.Further, it is trite that for a defendant to convince the Court to grant a stay on forum non conveniens, the defendant must identify his defence to the plaintiff’s claim first. “Without such information, the court will not be able to know whether there are any real issues to be tried between the parties or to assess the appropriateness of the forum from the point of view of the trial of the action”: see High Hope Zhongding Corp v 廈門墩峰進出口有限公司, HCA 2485/2015, 16 January 2017 at §30 per David Lok J. Failure to identify such a defence is fatal to an application to stay on forum non conveniens: see High Hope Zhongding Corp v 廈門墩峰進出口有限公司, supra at §§31-35. 13.The Defendants have not filed their defence yet. Ms Ivy Ho, counsel for the Defendants, confirms to me that the only defence the Defendants mount is the jurisdictional defence, and there is no substantive defence. 14.Ms Ho has list out various factors of foreign connection, for example, the Issuer is a limited company incorporated in the Cayman Islands, the 1st Defendant is a limited company incorporated in the BVI, the 2nd Defendant is a limited company incorporated in the PRC, and the register of holders of the bond certificates is kept in the Cayman Islands, and so on. However, as there is no substantive defence mounted, I see no reason why these connections would have any impact on the appropriateness, in particular the cost-effectiveness, of the forum and constitute any strong reasons for departing from the jurisdiction clauses. 15.In the circumstances, I see no strong reasons for departing from the parites’ agreement to the jurisdiction clause, and refuse the stay application on forum non conveniens. CASE-MANAGEMENT STAY 16.In an application for a case-management stay, the Court is to consider the balance of convenience and fairness as between the parties, and should exercise its discretion in such a manner as to ensure that its procedures are used in a logical, fair and cost-efficient manner. Whether or not to grant such a stay is a question of case management, but not a question of depriving the right of a litigant to proceed altogether: see Lok Man Sin v Lam Chi Wing [2019] HKCFI 56 at §§18-20 per Recorder Mr Eugene Fung SC. 17.One significant factor to consider is of course the degree of any overlap of issues. Another factor is the identity of parties. As Ma J (as he then was) said in Linfield Ltd v Taoho Design Architects Ltd [2002] 2 HKC 204 at §16:-
18.In HCCW 484/2021, the Issuer’s opposition to the winding-up petition is a pure jurisdictional challenge on the ground that the Issuer is a non-Hong Kong company. There was no substantive defence raised there. So, there is no overlap of issues at all, and in any event, the jurisdictional challenge to the winding-up petition involves consideration of factors not the same as the jurisdictional challenge mounted by the Defendants here. Also, the Defendants are not parties in HCCW 484/2021. Thus, I do not see how a case-management stay would be a “logical, fair and cost-efficient” course to take. 19.The petition was heard before Linda Chan J on 3 May, 8 August and 22 August 2022, and was adjourned to 3 October 2022. Her Ladyship expressly indicated that if the parties are unable to form a concrete settlement agreement by 3 October 2022, the Court would likely make a winding up order against the Issuer. Ms Ho submits that because the parties in HCCW 484/2021 are negotiating for a settlement, a case-management stay would facilitate the settlement, even possibly with the Defendants herein. 20.However, there is no evidence before me to explain how close, if at all, the parties in HCCW 484/2021 and the Defendants are here to reach a settlement. There is no evidence of whether or not the settlement terms (if any) would have any effect on the liability of the Defendants as guarantors, while the liability of the Defendants as guarantors under the Guarantee is primary and independent. Ms Ho on her feet offered an undertaking on behalf of her instructing solicitors that an affirmation would be filed by next Monday to explain the progress of the settlement negotiation. I refused to accede to such an approach. I decide upon the evidence filed before me. I do not know whether the evidence proposed to be filed would be of any assistance at all. If such evidence were relevant, it should have been filed earlier. 21.In the circumstances, the attempt by the parites in HCCW 484/2021 to reach a settlement agreement gives no support to the Defendants’ application for a case-management stay. 22.Ms Ho also seems to suggest that the present action should be stayed because otherwise, any judgment entered against the Defendants here would be inequitable in that the whole debt would be imposed unfairly upon the Defendants, and the Plaintiff would be spared from its obligation to go after the solvent principal first. She refers me to Rowlatt on Principal and Surety (6th ed., 2011) §7-03:-
23.As pointed out by Mr Michael Lok, counsel for the Plaintiff, this “arguable” approach was squarely rejected by Kwan J (as she then was) in Re Yohan Chandra, ex p United Overseas Bank Ltd [2001] 1 HKLRD 860, affirmed by the Court of Appeal in [2002] 1 HKLRD 404. 24.On the contrary, it is well-established that the remedies available to a creditor could be exercised at any time or times simultaneously or contemporaneously or successively or not at all: see China and South Sea Bank v Tan Soon Gin [1990] 1 AC 536 at 545C-D per Lord Templeman. Corollary to that is the proposition that a creditor “has a completely unfettered choice as to how, and against whom, he should proceed to recover the debt or damages to which he is entitled. The creditor may simultaneously bring winding-up proceedings against the principal and sue on the guarantee in separate proceedings”: see Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited v Pak Kwan Ho, HCA 1269/2015, 26 August 2016) at §§13, 17, per DHCJ Wilson Chan (as he then was), cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Re Lau Yu [2019] 2 HKC 18 at §35 per Kwan JA (as she then was). 25.“[A] fortiori where the guarantee provides expressly that the guarantor waived any right he may have to require the creditor to first proceed against the principal borrower. Such a clause is a perfectly normal provision in a guarantee and there is no obligation on the bank to proceed against the principal borrower before proceeding against the guarantors”: see Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited v Pak Kwan Ho, supra at §§14 and 17. 26.In the present case, by Clauses 2.2 and 2.3 of the Guarantee, the Defendants agreed to be primary obligor and to be liable irrespective of whether actions have been taken against the Issuer. I do not see any reason or equity why the Court should not hold the Defendants to their bargain but should re-write the parties’ contractual agreement, a course the Court always loathes. 27.Therefore, I also refuse to grant a case-management stay. ORDER 14 APPLICATION 28.That leaves the Plaintiff’s Order 14 application. The Plaintiff has established a prima facie case for its claim. The burden lies upon the Defendants to raise arguable defence and/or triable issues. 29.Ms Ho confirms to me that the Defendants’ only defence is the jurisdictional defence. It is not a substantive defence to the Plaintiff’s claim at all. In any event, this jurisdictional defence, if it is a defence to the claim at all, has been rejected when I dealt with the stay summons above. 30.Therefore, the Defendants have raised no arguable defence and triable issues. I should grant summary judgment. ORDER 31.In the circumstances, I order that:-
Mr Michael Lok, instructed by Chungs Lawyers, for the Plaintiff Ms Ivy Ho, instructed by Watson Farley & Williams, for the 1st and 2nd Defendants | |||||||||||||||||
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