Lee Sai Hoi v. Li Sin Man and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1456/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 29 September 2022.
1. By a writ indorsed with statement of claim dated 24 September 2021, the plaintiff (“ Mr Lee ”) commenced the present action against the 1 st and 2 nd defendants, his daughter and son respectively (together, the “ Elder Children ”).
Cited by 1 case · Cites 13 cases
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HCA 1456/2021 [2022] HKCFI 2984 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 1456 OF 2021 ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ DECISION ________________________ I. Introduction and Background 1.By a writ indorsed with statement of claim dated 24 September 2021, the plaintiff (“Mr Lee”) commenced the present action against the 1st and 2nd defendants, his daughter and son respectively (together, the “Elder Children”). 2.On 12 October 2021, Mr Lee issued an injunction application (the “Injunction Summons”), seeking to restrain the Elder Children from inter alia passing certain board resolutions of Kendari Company Ltd (the “Company”), as proposed by them in a notice of board meeting issued on 8 October 2021 (the “Notice of Board Meeting”). The intended board resolutions include, inter alia, (1) approving the alleged transfer of 560,000 shares of the Company (the “Subject Shares”) from Mr Lee to the Elder Children and to change the Company’s register to reflect the same; (2) changing the registered office and correspondence address of the Company; and (3) changing the bank mandate of all existing bank accounts of the Company such that the 1st defendant (the “Daughter”) be the sole authorised signatory. 3.On 12 October 2021, Linda Chan J granted an “interim interim” injunction restraining the passage or approval of resolutions approving the transfer of the Subject Shares to the Elder Children, upon Mr Lee’s undertaking that he will not dispose or exercise any rights in respect of the Subject Shares in the meantime (the “October 12 Order”). 4.Mr Lee seeks the continuation of the October 12 Order. On the other hand, the Elder Children seek to discharge the October 12 Order and dismiss the Injunction Summons on the grounds that, inter alia, there is no serious issue to be tried, damages are an adequate remedy, the balance of convenience weighs against an injunction and that there has been material non-disclosure at the hearing before Linda Chan J. 5.For present purposes, the background leading up to the present action may be summarised briefly as follows:
6.As will become apparent below, the present case is in substance a dispute over family assets. At the beginning of the hearing, I invited the parties and their legal representatives to seek an amicable resolution, if only for an acceptable status quo pending the trial of the action. However, despite repeated attempts and entreaties by the Court, regrettably, the parties were unable to reach any consensus. I then heard the parties on the Injunction Summons and indicated that I would hand down my decision in due course.
7.Given the nature of the dispute, unsurprisingly, the evidence before the Court was larded with allegations against the respective behaviour of Mr Lee, the Elder Children, Madam Yu, Madam Cheuk and the Younger Son, much of which is disputed. I do not intend to set them out in this Decision save where the context requires below. 8.Mr Lee’s case may be summarised as follows:
9.No defence has yet been filed by the Elder Children. However, their case is set out in the Daughter’s evidence:
10.As to the circumstances of the Alleged Share Transfers:
11.In his affirmation in reply, Mr Lee firmly denied the Elder Children’s case, whether as to the background or the circumstances of the Alleged Share Transfer. It is unnecessary to set it out here in detail, save as to mention that:
12.The principles concerning the granting of interlocutory injunctions are not in serious dispute: it is for the applicant to show that (1) there are serious issues to be tried on the merits of the case; (2) damages would not be adequate remedy; (3) the balance of convenience lies in favour of the grant of an injunction; and (4) it is just and convenient to grant the injunction: See e.g. Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022 §§29/1/8 – 29/1/17. 13.It is well established that the test for showing a serious issue to be tried is not a high hurdle. The prospects of the applicant’s success are to be investigated to a limited extent only - all that is required is that the applicant has prospects of success which, in substance and reality, exist. Odds against success are immaterial at this stage unless they are so strong that he can have no expectation of success. See e.g., Gu Zhuoheng and Anor v Huang Wei Cheng and Ors [2019] HKCFI 381 §65 per Lisa Wong J. 14.On the balance of convenience, as Ma J (as he then was) held in Music Advance Ltd v Incorporated Owners of Argyle Centre [2010] 2 HKLRD 1041 at §12(d), the underlying principle for the grant of an interlocutory injunction is that the Court should “take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out that it is wrong”. 15.Mr Avery Chan, counsel for the Elder Children, conducted a multi-pronged attack on Injunction Summons, namely, that there was no serious issue to be tried, that damages were an adequate remedy and that the balance of convenience was against the continuation of the injunction. He submitted also that the October 12 Order should be discharged for material non-disclosure. I shall address each in turn. Whether Serious Issue to be Tried 16.Despite Mr Chan’s persuasive submissions, I have no doubt that there are serious issues to be tried in respect of the validity of the Alleged Transfer Documents and the Alleged Transfer Documents. 17.Mr Chan began by referring the Court to well established authorities that allegations of forgery or deception are very serious involving fraud and dishonesty, which should not be advanced without cogent evidence: see e.g., Chinachem Charitable Foundation v Chan Wai Tong Christopher and others [2021] HKCFI 1347. Allegations of fraud and dishonesty “must be pleaded distinctly and with utmost particularity”: see e.g., Re Cyberworks Audio Video Technology [2020] HKCFI 398 at §43 per Coleman J. Finally, inferences of fraud or serious misconduct only should be drawn only where such inferences are compelling: see e.g., Lee Yuk Shing v Dianoor International Ltd (In liq) [2016] 4 HKC 535 at §37, per Kwan JA. 18.He submitted that the forgery plea raised by Mr Lee is “fundamentally flawed in terms of both pleadings and evidence” for a number of reasons, including that, (1) there is a lack of particulars as to the circumstances of the forgery; (2) there is no allegation as to whether it was the Elder Children, Mr Hui or an unknown person who had forged his signature; (3) the plea of forgery is inconsistent with his alternative case of non-est factum and therefore one of the alternative cases is liable to be struck out, in reliance on a decision of DHCJ Leung in Chan Sunny v Chen Min Chun and others [2022] HKCFI 1659 at §57. 19.Further, Mr Chan points out that there is no handwriting expert evidence to support that Mr Lee’s signatures on the Alleged Transfer Documents are forged. The allegation of forgery is also contradicted by the affirmation of Mr Hui filed in the HCMP Proceedings, where he corroborated the Daughter’s evidence as to the circumstances in which the Alleged Transfer Documents were signed. Mr Hui was an independent third party, and no grounds have been advanced as to why he would fabricate evidence. 20.Mr Chan is of course correct as to the need for a high degree of particularity and the heavy evidentiary burden to support a plea of fraud or dishonesty. That said, as I explained in Pacific Rainbow International Inc v Shenzhen Wolverine Tech Limited & Ors (unreported) HCA 3023/2016, 2 May 2017 at §74 in the context of whether a good arguable case had been established for serious misconduct:
(cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Heitkamp & Thumann KG v Living Profit Trading Develop Limited [2019] HKCA 119 at §30) 21.The same approach applies, a fortiori, in the context of whether a serious issue to be tried has been established. 22.The essence of Mr Lee’s case is that, as mentioned above, he has no recollection ever consenting to the Alleged Transfer, knowingly signing the Alleged Transfer Documents, or instructing Mr Hui or the Daughter to prepare such documents. He was therefore “shocked” to be told of the Alleged Share Transfers in the letter from ILL on 23 February 2021. 23.Mr Lee says he does not understand how his purported signatures on the Alleged Transfer Documents came into existence, but doing the best he can, posited several possibilities – either the documents were forged, or he was misled into signing on the documents in the belief that the documents were something else. In any event, he never agreed to the Alleged Transfer and would not have knowingly signed on the Alleged Transfer Documents. 24.Whilst the Court generally accords very significant weight to signed documents and the burden is firmly on the apparent signatory to show that the signature is not his own or that he was misled into affixing his signature, one must view the matter the context and surrounding circumstances. The first matter to bear in mind is that even in 2012, Mr Lee was 79 years of age and suffering from various ailments. Mr Lee was diagnosed with cataracts in 2010 and had clouded and blurred vision which caused him to have difficulty reading documents. Further, on the Elder Children’s own case, Mr Lee was diagnosed with dementia in 2016. 25.There is also no serious dispute that prior to 2017, Mr Lee reposed trust and confidence in Mr Hui and the Daughter to assist him concerning the affairs of the Company and that he would sign documents presented to him on various occasions by Mr Hui or the Daughter without being able to read or understand their contents. 26.In such circumstances, at least for present purposes, I do not agree that raising alternative pleas of forgery and non-est factum is wholly without justification such that one of them must be disallowed. Order 18 rule 12A provides:
27.In Pako Enterprises Limited v Tse Yuet Toa [2020] HKCFI 773, which was referred to by DHCJ Leung in Chan Sunny, DHCJ MK Liu explained at §13 that:
28.Mr Lee’s case is that he had no knowledge of the provenance of the Alleged Transfer Documents, which he said he saw for the first time in March 2021, notwithstanding that they were allegedly signed by him nearly 8½ years earlier. Save for the Elder Children’s case that Mr Hui once mentioned the Alleged Transfer in a telephone conversation with Ms Tsang and Mr Lee in August 2018 (which is disputed by Mr Lee), there is no dispute that these documents never surfaced (or resurfaced) until 2021. 29.Having regard to these circumstances, I do not accept that Mr Lee does not have reasonable grounds to plead an alternative case of forgery and non-est factum. 30.As to the sufficiency of evidence supporting the forgery allegation, I see the force of Mr Chan’s submission that there has not been any handwriting expert evidence before the Court to suggest that the signatures on the Alleged Transfer Documents were not those of Mr Lee. However, I do not regard that as being fatal to a serious issue to be tried being shown at this stage. It is also important to note that handwriting evidence is not by itself conclusive. As the Court of Appeal observed in To Pui Kui v Ng Kwok Piu & Ors (unreported) CACV 281/2012 (21 August 2014) at §81:
31.Mr Chan also raised the argument that Mr Lee’s alternative case that he may have been misled by Mr Hui into signing the Alleged Transfer Documents as being wholly unparticularised and that it has not been pleaded that if there had been any misrepresentation by Mr Hui, the representation was made by him as agent of the Elder Children such as to enable the Alleged Share Transfers to be rescinded. 32.As to the particularity of Mr Lee’s case of misrepresentation by Mr Hui, I reiterate the point I have made above that all that Mr Lee is able to recall is that he reposed trust and confidence in Mr Hui and often signed documents presented to him by Mr Hui without reading or understanding them, as he did not understand English. Mr Lee never agreed to the Alleged Share Transfer and had no recollection of signing documents to give effect to such a transaction. He does not know, however, whether he might have signed the Alleged Share Transfer, especially given his poor eyesight and the passage of time, under the guise that it was presented to him as for some other purpose – hence the plea of non-est factum. It would be unrealistic in these circumstances for Mr Lee to be required to plead particulars of when and where or precisely what representation had been made to him by Mr Hui which led to the signing of the documents. I do not regard this as fatal to Mr Lee showing a serious issue to be tried at this stage. It is of course open to the Elder Children to seek further and better particulars on the statement of claim if they think fit. 33.As to the absence of any plea of Mr Hui’s role as agent of the Elder Children, again, the complaint must be viewed in the context of Mr Lee’s case. He is unable to say at this stage that if the Alleged Transfer Documents were in fact signed by him, how and when he came to sign them. He is only able to say that if he did, he must have done so without knowing its contents in circumstances where Mr Hui or the Daughter had presented to him documents to sign. Moreover, on the Elder Children’s own case, Mr Lee signed them in the same room and in the presence of the Elder Children, Mr Hui and Ms Lun. Again, it is open to the Elder Children to seek further and better particulars if they see fit. However, I do not see this to be fatal to there being a serious issue to be tried at this stage. 34.I should also add that in Mr Lee’s reply evidence, he hinted at the suggestion that Mr Hui may have prepared the Alleged Transfer Documents “to take effect only after my passing”. This suggestion is not found in the statement of claim, and it is not entirely clear whether Mr Lee seeks to raise a case that he may have intended to execute certain documents which were only to take effect upon his death. Whilst this does not affect my view as to there being a serious issue to be tried, if Mr Lee intends to raise such a case at trial, it would plainly have to be pleaded. 35.In addition to Mr Lee’s professed lack of knowledge concerning the Alleged Transfer Documents, the provenance and subsequent resurfacing of the Alleged Transfer Documents plainly give rise to serious issues to be tried as to their validity and authenticity. 36.Other than the Alleged Transfer Documents themselves, there is no contemporaneous documentary evidence supporting the transfer at all. For instance, there are no minutes of the Alleged October 2012 Board Meeting, nor has any attendance note from Mr Hui or Ms Lun who attended been produced. Given that the transaction was to be regarded as some form of “compensation” for loans made by the Company to Mr Lee, one would have expected some form of contemporaneous documentation of the Company forgiving the loans made to the Father. There is none. It would make little sense if Mr Lee was still liable to repay those loans to the Company whilst at the same time ceding 50% of his shareholding (at par value) to the Elder Children. 37.The Alleged Share Transfers are also not reflected at all by the annual returns filed by the Company from 2012 onwards, which, incidentally, had all along been signed by the Daughter as director until 2020. Each of the annual returns continued to show the original shareholding of the Company, a matter which should not have escaped the Daughter’s notice from the outset. 38.Mr Lee was not only the patriarch of a traditional Chinese family but also the founding and controlling majority shareholder of the Company, even if his family members had made contributions to the management of the Company. There is no evidence as to any significant financial contribution by Madam Yu or the Elder Children into the Company. In such circumstances, it is at least open to question whether he would have agreed to cede 50% of his shareholding (at par value) and majority shareholder control to the Elder Children merely to “compensate” them for loans which had been made to him by the Company. 39.No explanation or calculations have been advanced by the Elder Children even now as to how the figure of 560,000 shares was arrived at to “compensate” them for the alleged loans. In my view, the commercial sense of the entire transaction is questionable, to say the least. 40.Further, the Daughter’s explanation as to the long hiatus between the signing of the Alleged Transfer Documents again raises questions. If the intention of the transfer was, as contended by the Elder Children, unconditional and immediate, it is not obvious why the documents languished at ACC’s office for years. This is especially so, as ACC would have been aware, when late stamping would attract, as it did, a substantial penalty for late stamping. Further, it is difficult to accept that, given the value of the shareholding, the Elder Children adopted such a laid back or lackadaisical approach as to whether the transfer had been registered, especially after serious disputes with Mr Lee and Madam Cheuk arose from 2017 onwards. 41.As mentioned above, after Madam Yu’s death, on 23 October 2015, the Elder Children and Mr Lee entered into a deed of family arrangement for the distribution of Madam Yu’s 160,000 shares in the Company. Indeed, that was the sole purpose of the deed, and it did not deal with any other assets of Madam Yu. The entering into the deed of family arrangement and subsequent transfer of Madam Yu’s shares to the Elder Children would have been an opportune time to deal also with the Subject Shares. Yet, the Alleged Shares Transfers were rather inexplicably never raised at the time. 42.Given that, on the Elder Children’s case, Mr Lee voluntarily agreed to transfer the Subject Shares to the Elder Children as fair “compensation” for loans he had obtained from the Company in 2012, it is not immediately obvious why the Elder Children were purportedly concerned about not seeming “eager in going after family assets” in giving effect to the Alleged Transfers, nor why it would amount to any disrespect of Mr Lee’s role as the remaining founder and elder of the Company. 43.I am also slightly troubled by the fact that ILL remained silent in the face of CSC’s queries in their letter dated 28 May 2021 on the circumstances in which the Alleged Transfer Documents were signed. If the circumstances were as clear as now suggested by the Daughter, plainly, there would have been no difficulty for ILL in providing an immediate and detailed explanation of the circumstances now advanced by the Daughter in her affirmation and in the HCMP Proceedings, which were issued only some 3 months later in August 2021. 44.I have not omitted to consider the fact that Mr Hui, a professional accountant and an independent witness, has made an affirmation in the HCMP Proceedings corroborating the Daughter’s version of events as to the execution of the Alleged Transfer Documents. His evidence is of course of significant weight. However, it does not come close in my view to obviating a serious issue to be tried. The credibility of his evidence will undoubtedly be a matter for trial. 45.As to Mr Lee’s contention that no consideration had been received for the Subject Shares until some 9 years later, on 25 October 2021, Mr Chan submitted that there was no substance to the defence. He argues that the Elder Children are not seeking specific performance or enforcement of the Alleged Transfer but are simply seeking to record the shareholdings on the Company’s register of members, which does not require any action on the part of Mr Lee or an order of the Court. 46.I am not persuaded, at least for present purposes, that there is no serious issue to be tried in this regard. Assuming that the parties had knowingly entered into an agreement for sale and purchase of the Subject Shares in October 2012, no payment was ever made or proffered. Even if no payment date had been specified for the purchase of the Subject Shares, the law would imply a term that the purchase price was payable within a reasonable time. Plainly, 9 years is far beyond any reasonable period of time. Although Mr Lee had executed the instruments of transfer, the transfer of the legal title is not complete until and unless the Company approves and registers the transfer, which it has not yet done. 47.In the circumstances, it is at least arguable that, by reason of non-payment, the Elder Children were in repudiatory breach of the agreement to acquire the shares, and Mr Lee was entitled to terminate the agreement, which he effectively did by making it clear he was not bound. Upon termination of the sale and purchase, the Elder Children would no longer be entitled to seek the registration of the Alleged Transfer. Whilst Mr Lee may not have pleaded his case on precisely these terms, the relevant facts are not in dispute. 48.As to Mr Chan’s alternative contention that the consideration had already been paid by way of set-off from the loan to Mr Lee from the Company, leaving aside the fact that there is nothing on the Alleged Transfer Documents to support any such set-off or that the sum was to have been deemed received, this is entirely dependent on the Elder Children’s case for the reasons for the transfer, which is hotly disputed. This is plainly a matter for trial. 49.For the reasons above, I am satisfied that Mr Lee has met the threshold that there is a serious issue to be tried. Adequacy of Damages and Balance of Convenience 50.Again, I have no hesitation in finding that damages would not be an adequate remedy and the balance of convenience lies firmly in favour of the continuation of the October 12 Order. 51.As to adequacy of damages, it is clear that damages would be difficult, if not impossible, to quantify in a situation such as the present. There is little doubt in my mind that if the October 12 Order were not continued, and the Elder Children were allowed to take possession of the Subject Shares, as majority shareholders of the Company, they would exert and cement their control of the Company, irrespective of whether Mr Lee remained a director. 52.There is no dispute that the Elder Children, having the majority on the Company’s board, already removed him from the signatory of the Company’s bank account and demand that he deliver-up the company seal. Although the Elder Children have always been directors of the Company, given Mr Lee’s majority shareholding, their continued appointment was subject to Mr Lee’s wishes. This is not a public company, but a private family company founded by Mr Lee, who had since its foundation in 1985 been in control. To be wrongfully deprived of such control (if this turns out to be the case) until the conclusion of the action (which may be many months if not several years from now) is not something that can be readily quantifiable or compensable in monetary damages. 53.As to balance of convenience, as mentioned above, the Court should take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out that it is wrong. It seems to me that such a course must be to preserve the status quo, that is, to maintain the present shareholding without regard to the Alleged Share Transfers. I also take into account the undertakings that Mr Lee had given to Linda Chan J on 12 October 2021, which Mr Jerome Liu[1], counsel for Mr Lee, confirms will be continued. 54.I recognise that even without the ability to exercise the rights to the Subject Shares, Mr Lee will retain majority shareholder control of the Company given that his remaining 35% shareholding would outvote the combined 30% shareholding of the Elder Children. Given the breakdown in trust and confidence between the parties, it is likely that Mr Lee will exercise his shareholder control to alter the composition of the board, so as to assert board control. Be that as it may, Mr Lee’s majority shareholder control (and therefore the power to decide the composition of the board) has been the status quo for the past 35 years, and the safest course would in my view be to maintain that position. Any complaints of prejudice by the Elder Children must also be viewed against the fact that, even on their own case, they decided to remain silent and wait some 8½ years before proceeding with the Alleged Transfer. 55.In support of the Elder Children’s case that the status quo should be changed in their favour, the Daughter has made a litany of complaints in her affirmation alleging wrongdoing and misappropriation of assets of the Company by Mr Lee. She said that, inter alia, he had “misappropriated not less than HK$47,609,485 and US$1,770,238.78 from the Company without authorisation.” The alleged misappropriation spanned a number of years, with the earliest alleged instance dating back to 2001. 56.As accepted by Mr Chan, such complaints do not add anything to their substantive case concerning the Alleged Transfer but are directed at persuading the Court that shareholder control of the Company should be removed from Mr Lee and placed in the hands of the Elder Children. 57.In short, I am not impressed by these arguments:
58.I have in any event considered the complaints and do not find that they are of sufficient weight to displace my view of where the balance of convenience lies, as explained above. Alleged Material Non-Disclosure 59.There is no dispute between the parties on the duty of full and frank disclosure in ex parte applications and the consequences of material non-disclosure (see e.g., Excel Courage Holdings Ltd v Wong Sin Lai [2014] 3 HKLRD 642 at §§56-58). 60.Although the October 12 Order was made pursuant to an inter partes Summons issued 4 days before the hearing and the Daughter was represented by counsel at the hearing, I accept that, having regards to the authorities such as Muginoho Co v Vimiu HK Co Ltd (unreported) HCMP 107/2012, 24 February 2012, the application should be considered ex parte given the short notice. 61.Mr Chan relied on four grounds of material non-disclosure:
62.These points can be disposed of fairly briefly, and I address them in the order above:
63.For the reasons above, I do not believe that there was any material non-disclosure to justify discharging the October 12 Order. IV. Conclusion and Costs 64.For the reasons above, I make an order continuing the October 12 Order until trial or further order, subject to the continuation of the undertakings given by Mr Lee to Linda Chan J and recorded in the October 12 Order. As far as I understand, the other paragraphs of the Injunction Summons have fallen away, given that the October 12 Order did not restrain the actions specified therein. 65.As to costs, Mr Lee has succeeded in continuing the October 12 Order. Mr Liu asks for costs. However, as is typical in injunction applications such as the present, whether the injunction is correctly granted will depend significantly upon the findings and outcome of the trial. In the circumstances, I think the fairest order would be that Mr Lee’s costs be in the cause. I so order on a nisi basis. 66.Last but not least, I thank both teams of counsel for their assistance.
Mr Jerome Liu and Keith Cheung, instructed by Chiu, Szeto & Cheng, solicitors for the plaintiff Mr Avery Chan, instructed by Iu, Lai & Li, solicitors for the 1st and 2nd defendants |
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