Masih Robin v. Torture Claims Appeal Board
Read the full judgment text of CACV 586/2021 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 14 December 2022.
1. On 22 December 2021, DHCJ Bruno Chan (“ the Judge ”) refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review against the decision made by the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“ the Board ”) dated 11 February 2019. The Board’s decision will be referred to later in this Judgment [10].
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CACV 586/2021 [2022] HKCA 1828 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO 586 OF 2021 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 695 OF 2020) __________________
__________________ Before: Hon Yuen and Au JJA in Court Date of Judgment: 14 December 2022 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Yuen JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): Introduction 1.On 22 December 2021, DHCJ Bruno Chan (“the Judge”) refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review against the decision made by the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 11 February 2019. The Board’s decision will be referred to later in this Judgment [10]. 2.On 24 December 2021, the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court against the Judge’s decision. On the same day, he lodged a letter with the Court indicating his consent to have this appeal disposed of on paper without an oral hearing. 3.Pursuant to the directions of Registrar of Civil Appeals made on 24 December 2021, the applicant should lodge his written submissions on or before 7 January 2022. He failed to do so. The Registrar had directed that in the event the applicant failed to lodge his written submissions by the deadline, he will be deemed to have abandoned his right to rely on written submissions, and the Notice of Appeal will be referred to the Court of Appeal for consideration based on the available documents and materials. 4.As it is appropriate to do so, we proceeded to consider the appeal on paper without an oral hearing. Background 5.The applicant is a national of India. He arrived in Hong Kong on 17 August 2015 as a visitor with permission to remain up to 31 August 2015. He overstayed and then surrendered to the Immigration Department. On 21 January 2016, he raised a non-refoulement claim alleging that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by his paternal uncles over a land dispute. The factual background of this case was succinctly summarized by the Judge in [2] – [4] of the Form CALL-1 ([2021] HKCFI 3828). 6.As mentioned earlier, in a Decision dated 7 November 2018, the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) having assessed the applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds i.e. BOR 2 risk[1], BOR 3 risk[2], torture risk[3] and persecution risk[4], determined it against him. 7.In the circumstances of the present case as shown below [9-10], it is necessary to consider the Director’s findings and decision. In his decision, the Director assessed the level of risk of harm from the applicant’s uncles upon his return to India as low. As explained in [12] and [13] of the Director’s decision, from June 2014 to February 2015, the uncles only caused trouble at the applicant’s land and verbally threatened the applicant in order to coerce him to transfer the land to them. During the incidents of attack in March 2015, despite having the opportunity to cause serious injury to the applicant, they did not do so. In any event, it was a private family and land dispute without any official involvement. Further, state or police protection would be available to the applicant if sought [14] – [16]. The objective country of origin information (“COI”) showed that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in India [17] – [22] and it would not be unduly harsh for the applicant to move to other large cities of India where it would be difficult if not impossible for his uncles to locate him [23] – [29]. 8.On 26 November 2018 the applicant lodged an appeal to the Board against the Director’s decision. 9.On 24 January 2019 however, he wrote to the Board requesting to withdraw his appeal as he wanted to return to his home country because it was safe for him to do so. He further stated that “I understand that by withdrawing my appeal/petition, the decision which I had appealed and petitioned against will remain in force. I understand this is a final disposal of my appeal and petition before [the Board].” 10.In a letter dated 11 February 2019, the Board allowed the applicant’s request to withdraw his appeal after due consideration of all the available information placed before it, and being satisfied that the applicant’s request was freely made, and that he understood the consequences of the withdrawal. The Board was also satisfied that the applicant had good reason to do so as he considered it would be safe for him to return to India. The Board accordingly directed that the applicant’s appeal/petition be withdrawn. Decision of the court below 11.However, more than one year after the applicant’s withdrawal of his appeal/petition to the Board against the Director’s decision, on 20 April 2020, the applicant filed a Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision of 11 February 2019. The application was out of time (O.53, r.4 of Rules of High Court (Cap.4A)). In the applicant’s supporting affirmation, he did not explain the inordinate delay, nor advance any ground for seeking relief. He merely stated that he was not satisfied with the decision, saying he could not go back to his home country as his life would not be safe there, and that he wanted to stay in Hong Kong until his problem is solved. 12.Yet, on 30 November 2021, he filed an affirmation to apply to withdraw his application for leave to apply for judicial review, stating that he wanted to return to India as it would be safe for him to do so. 13.The Judge proceeded to dispose of the applicant’s application on paper. Upon consideration of the Director’s and the Board’s respective decisions, and upon the applicant’s latest confirmation that it would be safe for him to return to his home country, the Judge dismissed the applicant’s application on 22 December 2021 for the reasons set out in [10] – [14] of his decision:
Appeal to this Court 14.On 24 December 2021, the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal in which he set out the following grounds:
Legal principles 15.In assessing the merits of the appeal, we have considered the legal principles set out by this Court in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11]. For the purposes of this appeal, the salient principles are as follows:
Discussion 16.As the applicant had himself stated in his affirmation on 30 November 2021 that he wished to withdraw the leave application for judicial review because it was safe to go back to his home country, the Judge’s dismissal of his application could not possibly constitute an error in law, or procedural unfairness or irrationality. 17.In any event the Judge had duly considered the merit of the applicant’s case by considering first, the Director’s decision in which it was clear that the land dispute was personal and private in nature without any state element, and there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant’s uncles had any real intention to cause any serious harm to him, and therefore the risk of harm upon his return to India was assessed to be low, and secondly, the Board’s decision. In this regard, the Judge had rightly explained that the Board had determined and disposed of the applicant’s appeal upon what appeared to be a proper and valid withdrawal of the appeal by him, thus the appeal was no longer extant, and the Board had become functus officio with no jurisdiction to take any further step on the applicant’s appeal: see Re Das Purnima Rani [2019] HKCA 669. As such and in the absence of any evidence from the applicant that his withdrawal was invalid, or there was any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Board’s decision, there is no basis to challenge the Board’s decision. 18.As for the other grounds, they were not raised before the Judge. It is not the practice for this Court to entertain new grounds not canvassed in the Court below: Orense Marian Masangkay [2022] HKCA 33 at [7]. We see no basis to deal with them. 19.Having considered the materials before us, we are of the view that the Judge’s observations and findings are fully justified. Order 20.For the above reasons, this appeal is dismissed.
The applicant, unrepresented, acting in person [1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right of life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). [3] This refers to risk of torture as defined in Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap.115); the definition being the same as that found in Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. [4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. | |||||||||||||||||
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