Luck Most Ltd and Others v. Good Movement Ltd
Read the full judgment text of LDCS 11000/2020 on BabelCite. This LDCS judgment was delivered on 24 February 2023.
1. By a Notice of Application filed herein on 29 May 2020, the applicants apply under the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance (“Cap. 545” or “the Ordinance”) for an order for sale of Sub-section 3 of section A of Inland Lot No. 734 (“the First Lot”) (No. 10 Matheson Street, Hong Kong (“the First Building”)) and Sub-section 4 of Section A of Inland Lot No. 734 (“the Second Lot”) (No. 12 Matheson Street, Hong Kong (“the Second Building”)).
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LDCS 11000/2020 [2023] HKLdT 14 IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION LAND COMPULSORY SALE MAIN APPLICATION NO 11000 OF 2020 __________________________
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_________________ DECISION _________________ The Application and Background 1.By a Notice of Application filed herein on 29 May 2020, the applicants apply under the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance (“Cap. 545” or “the Ordinance”) for an order for sale of Sub-section 3 of section A of Inland Lot No. 734 (“the First Lot”) (No. 10 Matheson Street, Hong Kong (“the First Building”)) and Sub-section 4 of Section A of Inland Lot No. 734 (“the Second Lot”) (No. 12 Matheson Street, Hong Kong (“the Second Building”)). 2.The applicants claim to hold the average of over 90% in the First and Second Lots. 3.There is only one respondent, who is the registered owner of 1 equal undivided 6th part or share of and in the Second Lot together with the sole and exclusive right and privilege to hold, use and occupy the 5th Floor of the Second Building. 4.The respondent opposed the application. An Amended Notice of Opposition has been filed on 19 April 2021. According to the Amended Notice of Opposition, the particulars of opposition have been set out in paragraph 1 under section C. 5.By a summons taken out by the applicants on 7 October 2022, the applicant sought to struck out paragraph 1(b), the plan marked A and the Schedule annexed to the Amended Notice of Opposition (collectively referred to hereinafter as “paragraph 1(b)”) under Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of High Court and/or under the inherent jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal on the ground that they disclose no reasonable cause of action or defence, they are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or they may prejudice embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action, and/or they are an abuse of the process of the Tribunal. (The full text of paragraph 1(b) is set out in the Appendix I hereto). Applicants’ case (Part I) 6.As the background, I shall refer to an earlier summons by the applicants to expunge 3 of the expert reports filed by the valuation expert of the respondent and inadmissible for these proceedings. These 3 reports are on the RDV of the subject site developed with some adjacent lots. In the hearing on 29 July 2022, Mr. Chain, counsel for the respondent (in the earlier summons and today) argued that these reports were relevant to the argument of the respondent on the issue of merged site factor and/or special interest factor on the RDV of the First and Second Lots. And paragraph 1(b) set out the particulars to support the merged site factor and/or special interest factor as contended by the respondent. 7.Mr. Mok, counsel for the applicants argued in the earlier summons that the merged site and special interest factor were not basis of valuation permitted by the relevant provision of Cap. 545, in particular paragraph 2 of Schedule 2. Hence he asked for the 3 expert reports be expunged for being irrelevant. Mr. Chain submitted that this would be a pleading point and if the applicants were to take this argument, they should also apply to strike the relevant parts in the Amended Notice of Opposition (including paragraph 1(b)) and which, the respondent would oppose. 8.I accepted the submission of Mr. Chain and Mr. Mok asked to include an oral application to strike out paragraph 1(b), which I was prepared to entertain. And Mr. Chain had no objection but he asked for an adjournment to put in supplemental submission for the new oral application. Mr. Mok agreed to abandon the oral application and would not rely on the argument that the basis of merged site value and special interest value were not arguable at all for the summons to expunge the expert reports. 9.While I have allowed the applicants’ summons to expunge the 3 expert reports for other reasons as set out in my Ruling dated 2 September 2022, Mr. Mok now returns seeking to strike out paragraph 1(b). 10.Mr. Mok analyzed paragraph 1(b) and the argument of the respondent raised. I do not think this is disputed that Inland Lot 734 is sub-divided into sub-lots, making up of Nos. 5, 7, 9, 9A & 9B of Sharp Street East, and Nos. 10, 12,14, 16 & 18 of Matheson Street. And Inland Lot 734 is adjacent to Inland Lot 1451 with Leighton Centre erected thereon. 11.Mr. Mok accepts that Cap 545 proceedings have been commenced for 10-12 Matheson Street (this action), 16 Matheson Street (LDCS 12000/2020), 9A-9B Sharp Street East (LDCS 13000/2020), 5 Sharp Street East (LDCS 10000/2020 with a sale order granted on 10 March 2021). No Cap. 545 application has been taken out for 14 & 18 Matheson Street, 7 & 9 Sharp Street East, and Leighton Centre. 12.With this factual background, Mr. Chain submits that the respondent would argue at the trial that in assessing the reserve price if an order for sale would be granted, the merged site and special interest value should be taken into account. I would adopt the analysis of Mr. Mok on the case as pleaded by the respondent in paragraph 1(b) –
13.It is not disputed that the applicants are related to or companies within the Hysan Group. It is therefore contended by the respondent that the First and Second Lots enjoy a special interest (or Clay Factor) of the potential to form part of a larger merged site redevelopment. And its RDV should be enhanced by a premium brought about by this special interest. And the applicants failed to take these into account when preparing the RDV expert report. And hence the respondent filed the other reports on the issue which I have expunged for other reasons. In any event, the respondent contends that these factors should be taken into account in valuing the redevelopment potential of the Lots and is relevant to the assessment of this Tribunal on the reserve price if an order for sale is granted. 14.Mr. Mok argues that the merged site factor is excluded by Schedule 2 of Cap. 545, in particular paragraph 2, which reads –
15.Mr. Mok submits that by section 5(1) of Cap. 545, in the event of the grant of a sale order, the subject lot(s) “shall be sold by public auction in accordance with the conditions specified in Schedule 2”. The conditions include the “on its own” formula. And the “on its own” formula as now set out in paragraph 2 of the Schedule 2 was not originally included in the draft Bill. It was only added to Schedule 2 during the vetting stage by the Provisional Legislative Council. Mr. Mok refers to Day Bright Development Ltd & Others v Choi Pak Ling & Others [2014] 4 HKC 364, when the records of the Provisional Legislative Council on this matter has been summarized at paragraph 53, which are set out in Appendix II. 16.Mr. Mok further submits that as recorded in the minutes of 28 February 1998 of the Bills Committee, “… members considered this suggestion [namely the suggestion of introducing the ‘on its own’ formula to Schedule 2] fair as it would be difficult to assess the reserve price if other factors such as the potential of adjacent sites acquired by the majority owners were taken into account. Moreover, even if the majority owners owned a number of adjacent lots, they might not be the successful purchaser of the lot at the auction.” 17.In Day Bright’s case, after analyzing the records of the Provisional Legislative Council, another panel of this Tribunal with HH Judge Wong and Member Pang observed at paragraph 54(i) that –
18.Mr. Mok submits that there could be no ambiguity that the proper interpretation of Schedule 2 is (a) to exclude, in the fixing of reserve price, any enhanced redevelopment potential that could be generated by the full ownership of the majority owner of adjacent lots and (b) to allow the auction to take care of whether, and if so, to what extent the difficult-to-assess factors, including inter alia the merged site and special interest factors, would affect the final bid. 19.He also refers to a number of decision of this Tribunal by different panels, which adopt the “on its own” formula, including Day Bright’s case, First Kind Ltd v Yuet Loong investment Co Ltd [2018] 2 HKLRD 83, and other cases listed in paragraphs 12-14 of his written submission which I do not repeat. 20.Mr. Mok also refers to the judgment of Le Pichon JA (as she then was) given in Fully H.K. Investments Limited & Others v Poon Vai Ching & Others, HCMP 591/2007, in particular paragraph 20 –
21.In gist, Mr. Mok submits that I am bound by the decision of Fully’s case, which ruled that merged site or special interest factors are excluded by paragraph 2 of Schedule 2. And there is no unfairness as the issues of any enhanced value would be taken care of by the process of auction. 22.Leaving aside the question of constitutionality which Mr. Chain relies on and which I shall deal with in the later part of this ruling, Mr. Mok submits that there is no reasonable cause of action for the respondent to rely on these matters for valuation and they should be struck out. Legal Principles on Striking out in Lands Tribunal Applications 23.I do not think the legal principle for striking out is in dispute and no submission has been made. I do not go into details. In fact, I have discussed the application of striking out in the Lands Tribunal in my decision dated 2 September 2022 at paragraph 20, which I do not repeat. 24.I remind myself that an order to strike out should only be made in the plain and obvious cases. The Respondent’s case (Part I) 25.Mr. Chain responds to the submission of Mr. Mok, saying: -
26.I take the first responses from Mr. Chain first. On interpretation, Mr. Chain submits that the “on its own formula” does not have the effect as contended by the applicants. I believe he is arguing that the applicants seek to argue that the minority owners are being deprived of their shares or benefit derived from merged site or special interest factors. I do not think that is the position taken by the applicants from the above analysis. 27.While the respondent complains that the reserve price usually results in the sale price, Mr. Chain accepts that the respondent’s complaint is irrelevant on the question of interpretation of paragraph 2 of Schedule 2. 28.Mr. Chain submits that the formula under paragraph 2 only requires the Tribunal when setting a reserve price, which by its very nature is, and is meant to be, a minimum, to “take into account (in Chinese 顧及) the redevelopment potential of the lot but on its own.” The Tribunal must have regard to the redevelopment potential on its own. It does not follow that the Tribunal may not have regard to other factors in fixing the reserve price. He submits that the merge site or special interest factors may be considered and taken into account in setting the reserve price. 29.It is his submission that the merged site factor and special interest factor are intrinsic value of the property of the minority owners and they should not be deprived of. They should be allowed at least to argue the point. It is opened to this Tribunal after hearing all evidence to reject the argument. But it is wrong to deny the respondent the right to argue the point. 30.Mr. Chain complains that in some of the cases cited by Mr. Mok, the Tribunal in setting the reserve price is not concerned with what is the value of the property, and held it would be a matter for the market. He moves on to argue that by so doing, the minority owners would be deprived of a portion of the intrinsic value of their property when the same were to be taken against their will. Discussion and Ruling on Interpretation 31.I believe it is clear that Cap. 545 only requires this Tribunal to set a reserve price for the auction. This Tribunal would not fix the sale price of the lot or lots to be sold, or the compensation of the minority owners. Even at the debate at the Provisional Legislative Council, the concern is on fixing of the reserve price. 32.Mr. Chain submits that Day Bright relies heavily on the minutes of the Bills Committee. And there is no sufficient information on what exactly was the suggestion made by the Law Society and what the debate was about. But I believe what has been included in the judgment is sufficient for the consideration, in particular that paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 is an amendment at the vetting stage and consideration has been placed on the difficulty of setting the reserve price. I would not go as far as Day Bright to suggest that the minority owners were to share only up to the full redevelopment potential of the lot, not the entire site of the redevelopment (paragraph 54 of the judgment). And indeed, Day Bright’s conclusion is that “a consensus had been reached between legislators and the administration to exclude the redevelopment potential arising from the majority’s ownership of adjacent lots from assessing the reserve price.” To that I agree. 33.And as Mr. Chain submits, the reserve price is the minimum and is not meant to be the final sale price. I thought it must follow that the ultimate sale price, as determined by the market, is the fair compensation for the minority owners, and would reflect when appropriate, other factors that the lot or lots would enjoy including merged site or special interest factors. 34.And as Mr. Mok submitted, the enhanced price by merged site factor, or indeed any reason why someone in the market is prepared to put up a higher price would be reflected in the auction proceedings. And that is also the ruling of Court of Appeal in Fully’s case. By employing the auction proceedings, it would reflect the market price, which must include all realizable value of the lot(s), including any merged site or special interest factors. I would refer to a passage in the judgment given by the Court of Appeal in Good Faith Properties Limited & Others v Cibean Development Company Limited, CACV 35/2014 (dated 22 September 2014) :
35.The above judgment is on whether the respondents in a Cap. 545 application should be entitled to costs on compensation approach. But the above passages shed light on the way how Cap. 545 should be interpreted. 36.The Court of Appeal accepts that the minority owners may obtain the benefit of the hope value if this is reflected in the sale price achieved in the auction, and this must include any realizable enhanced value attributable to merged site or special interest factors. The function of the Tribunal is to decide if an order for sale should be granted, and if so, the reserve price. 37.I fail to see why the fixing of a reserve price on the redevelopment value on its own would deprive the minority owner of a share in the merged site or special interest factors. These are hope value, and as considered by the above ruling in the Court of Appeal, they may be reflected in the sale price. 38.Public auction is a known mean to obtain the market value. Clearly, the provision under Cap. 545, in particular section 5(1) has only required the subject lot(s) to be sold by public auction in accordance with the conditions as set out in Schedule 2. And in Schedule 2, paragraph 2 provides that the reserve price shall take into consideration the redevelopment potential of the lots on its own. If I would read in this way, the minority owners are compensated by a market price of the property obtained by auction. The reserve price is fixed by taking into account the redevelopment potential of the lots on its own. In setting this mechanism of fixing the reserve price, it is clear that the legislature intends to protect the “minimum compensation” receivable by the minority owners with a surplus. At the same time, there is a clear guidance that is workable to fix a reserve price for the auction to take place. The maximum return must be determined by the market. 39.A reserve price is a protection. Yet it is part of the scheme for redevelopment under Cap. 545. There could be many potential elements that may increase or decrease the value of the subject lot. If there is no limit to the factors to be taken into account in assessing the reserve price, the auction could not take place and the order of sale would not be effective. That appears from the minutes of debate in the Provisional Legislative Counsel to be the concern of stakeholders, which was adopted by the legislature and hence the additional amendment of the “on its own” formula. 40.Even if the applicant may own adjacent lots, there is no guarantee that he is the successful buyer, and that he must develop the subject lot with his own lot. And looking it this way, if the minority owners who may be so wealthy as able to acquire the subject lot, there is no guarantee that he could acquire the lot of the applicant for a joint development. Hence the possibility of a merged site or special interest is afterall a probability of extended development, or market reality. I agree with Madam Justice Le Pichon that this may, if there is such potential factor to enhance the value of the subject lot, be reflected in the sale price of the subject lot. It is fair to let the market determine the correct final sale price. The intrinsic value of the property of the minority owner, if could be realized in the market would has been taken into account in the final sale. 41.Mr. Chain also raised a point for argument with a hypothetical case. If there are 2 adjacent lots and the applicant is the owner of lot A. the applicant is applying for an order for sale against the minority owners in lot B. And the applicant being a big developer has made known to its shareholders and the public that its plan is to redevelop both sites together, and has indeed been submitting building plans for a joint redevelopment of the 2 lots. The applicant also makes known to its shareholders that it would definitely bid at the auction. On the fact of such an extreme case, Mr. Chain submits that “one is left wondering why: - (a) the legislative should, and if so, why it is constitutional, make provision to deprive the minority owners of their fair share of the auction price, and (b) how [Cap. 545] can have that effect?” 42.At first glance, the argument of Mr. Chain is very attractive. It appears that it is unfair for the applicant/buyer would benefit from the merged site value, while he only pays for the value of the subject lot with a price valued on its own. 43.But if the law does set the reserve price taking into account the merged site factor, one would wonder who would be the interested parties to bid at the auction? In his example, one wonders if the only interested party would be the applicant. An outsider would not bid up to the enhanced value without first obtaining the understanding from the applicant that they may develop together, or the applicant is happy to sell the adjacent lot to him/it. Otherwise, upon buying the subject lot, the new purchaser has no guarantee of receiving the enhanced redevelopment value and could suffer loss by bidding at a higher than market value of the subject lot on its own. 44.Cap. 545 has been discussed at length by the Court of Appeal in Pacific Base Holdings Limited & Others v Lee Hop Biu & Others [2021] HKCA 780. While the issue is on feasibility, the discussion is still useful in our analysis of the consideration of reserve price. 45.The Court of Appeal accepts that the making of a compulsory sale order can interfere with the private ownership of the minority owners. And yet the Court of Appeal found that the scheme under Cap. 545 serves legitimate aims (and which I shall refer to again in the discussion on constitutionality later). 46.I refer to paragraphs 40-42 of the judgment –
47.It is clear that it is a policy decision on how to strike the balance between the interest of majority owners, minority owners and the public interest in urban renewal. And most important, the statutory scheme leaves to the market to decide if redevelopment is feasible, instead of the Tribunal. I see no reason why the same rationale should not apply to fixing of reserve price which leaves the fixing of the final sale price to the market, and there would be a fair scheme to fix the price taking into the interest of the majority owners, the minority owners and the public interest. 48.And for pure interpretation, reserve price is the reserve price. The wordings of paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 give this Tribunal the guideline on how to assess the reserve price. The “on its own” formula is clear to set the reserve price with reference to the redevelopment potential of the subject lot on its own. I can only accept that we may consider any factor as suggested by the experts for valuation as long as this is not in conflict with the clear wordings of Cap. 545. And the provision of “on its own” is so clear that there could be no alternative to fix the reserve price taking into account the redevelopment potential of the subject lot on its own. The Chinese version of Cap. 545 would not assist Mr. Chain but if there is any conflict, having considered all the argument, I would rule under Cap. 1 Rule 10B that the English version best reconciles the texts. Constitutionality (Part II of Parties’ Case) 49.Mr. Chain submits that the reserve price is the minimum sale price. A formula of setting the reserve price to take into account of the redevelopment potential of the lot on its own would be unconstitutional. I shall now move on to his second argument and the response from Mr. Mok. 50.With my analysis above, I do not agree with Mr. Chain that the provision in Cap. 545 deprived the minority owners of any value in the proprietary interest they hold. The scheme of arrangement for a sale by auction is to take into account all possible realizable value of the property and I disagree with Mr. Chain’s submission. 51.And if the “on its own” formula does have an adverse impact on the value of the property, I note the argument of Mr. Chain that any provision to such effect has to comply with the proportionality test laid down by the Court of Final Appeal in Hysan Development Co. Ltd. & Others v Town Planning Board (2016) 19 HKCFAR 372. I do not think Mr. Mok has any disagreement to the principle. And I set out paragraph 52 of the judgment of Court of Final Appeal –
52.The Court of Final Appeal further comes to the ruling that a fourth test should be added. I refer to paragraph 135 of the judgment: -
53.Mr. Chain does not seek to rely on the first 2 steps/tests. He submits that it is not accepted that there is any legitimate aim why on a compulsory sale, which he argues is the same as a compulsory purchase, an owner should not be fully compensated for the full value of his properties. If the “on its own” formula is as contended by the applicant, fall foul of the 3rd and 4th tests. It would not be “no more than is necessary”. It would also not be proportionate. 54.Mr. Mok first refers to the judgment of this Tribunal given in Intelligent House Limited v Chan Tung Shing & Others [2008] 4 HKC 421 which ruled that even if Basic Law Article 105 (“BL105”) did apply, it did not exclude a law permitting and requiring a private individual to sell his property to another private individual in accordance with the law. Cap. 545 does not breach BL 105. I do not think Mr. Chain challenge this ruling. 55.If we take a look at Cap. 545 again, the scheme of redevelopment starts off with the requirement that the applicant has to satisfy this Tribunal that the subject lot shall be redeveloped due to age or state of repair. And when we are so satisfied, then an order for sale shall be granted, the property shall be put on auction. 56.Mr. Mok has no objection to the 4 tests principle as aforesaid set by the Court of Final Appeal. And on tests/steps 3 & 4, he seeks further assistance from a judgment given by the Court of Appeal in Pacific Base Holdings Ltd & Others v Lee Hop Biu & Others [2021] 5 HKC 214, in particular paragraphs 40 and 41 which I have referred to above. He submits that it is constitutional to exclude the Tribunal from considering whether the redevelopment of the subject lot is feasible, and the same would apply to any provision to require the Tribunal to consider the redevelopment value of the subject lot on its own. I agree. 57.Mr. Mok adds that “the ‘on its own” formula of Schedule 2, in excluding the difficult-to-assess factors in the assessment of the reserve price, serves the useful function of providing the Tribunal with a well-defined working formula when fixing the reserve price. That would facilitate the smooth resolution of Cap. 545 proceedings to facilitate urban renewal.” I agree. 58.In summing up, I am confident to say the scheme of Cap. 545 in getting the best price by auction does cover all factors that may affect the price. We have to accept that any factor is just a probability to enhance the value of the subject lot(s). The applicant may not be the successful bidder. He may have an adjacent lot, yet he is not obliged to develop with the subject lot. And in no case the owner of a lot may compel the owner of the adjacent lot to develop their property together. Hence it is a reasonable balance between all interest parties to leave how these probabilities would affect the final sale price to the market, and the realizable value would be reflected from auction result. (And I would repeat the analysis by the Court of Appeal in Pacific Base which I set out in paragraph 42-44 above.) Conclusion and Order 59.And hence I repeat that Cap. 545 provided this Tribunal is to fix the reserve price with regards to the redevelopment potential of the subject lot(s) on its(their) own. This would not deprive the minority owners of an enhanced value. I rule against Mr. Chain and do not find that the “on its own” formula is unconstitutional. 60.It follows that the merged site factor or special interest factor would not be relevant and any reference to evidence thereof shall be irrelevant. The part in the Amended Notice of Opposition suggesting that these would be raised and evidence to be adduced on such factors should be struck out. Having considered all matters raised before me, I found this is a clear case that the issue raised in paragraph 1(b) should be struck out. 61.Mr. Chain also submits that the issue should be determined by way of trial of a preliminary issue instead of striking out. Yet when an issue is clearly unarguable, I fail to see why this Tribunal should not strike out the issue. This is within our jurisdiction, and should be so exercised for case management and for saving of Court’s time and costs. 62.In conclusion, I would allow the application and struck out paragraph 1(b) together with the plan marked A and the Schedule annexed to the Amended Notice of Opposition. 63.As for costs, I believe that this may be one of those situations in a Cap. 545 application when the applicants should be entitled to costs of the summons. So I give an order nisi in favour of the applicants that they should have costs of this summons with certificate for counsel which should become absolute within 14 days unless directed otherwise. 64.I have also reserved the costs of the 3 expert reports mentioned above in the prior application and to be determined after this ruling. I have reserved the costs to be determined after I have decided on this striking out summons. As I rule against the respondent, the reports which are for the merged site and special interest factors would not be relevant at all. I believe the correct order is that the applicants shall have the costs of and occasioned by these reports with certificate for counsel and an order nisi to that effect is granted and shall become absolute within 14 days unless directed otherwise. All the costs are to be taxed at High Court Scale if not agreed. 65.Finally, I thank counsel for their able assistance.
Mr Mok Yeuk Chi, instructed by Mayer Brown, for the 1st to 10th applicants Mr Benjamin Chain, instructed by So, Lung & Associates, for the respondent Appendix I page 1
Appendix I page 2
Appendix I page 3
Appendix II “53. The following can be gleaned from the records of the Provisional Legislative Council placed before the Tribunal:
[1] (2010) 13 HKCFAR 762 at §28. This was a case where a provision making the determination of the Court of First Instance on election petition matters final was challenged as a possible violation of Article 82 of the Basic Law which provides that the power of final adjudication shall be vested in the Court of Final Appeal. [2] Page 8 of the CSA [3] See page 36 of the Official Record of Proceedings on 7 April 1998 [4] See page 37 of the Official Record of Proceedings on 7 April 1998 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under LDCS 11000/2020


