Day Bright Development Ltd and Others v. Choi Pak Ling and Others
Read the full judgment text of LDCS 13000/2012 on BabelCite. This LDCS judgment.
1. This is an application for compulsory sale of all the undivided shares in Section D of Inland Lot No. 3536 and the Remaining Portion of Inland Lot No. 5099 (collectively “the Lot”), with a building erected thereon known as Nos. 209 & 211 Tsat Tsz Mui Road (“No. 209” & “No. 211”) and Nos. 8 & 10 Nation Street (“No. 8” & “No. 10”), North Point, Hong Kong (“the Building”), for the purposes of redevelopment pursuant to Section 3(1) of the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance, Cap. 5
Cited by 4 cases · Cites 4 cases
IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION LAND COMPULSORY SALE APPLICATION NO. 13000 OF 2012 BETWEEN ________________________
________________________ Coram: His Honour Judge KW WONG, Presiding Officer and Mr Lawrence PANG, Member, of the Lands Tribunal
________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ Background 1.This is an application for compulsory sale of all the undivided shares in Section D of Inland Lot No. 3536 and the Remaining Portion of Inland Lot No. 5099 (collectively “the Lot”), with a building erected thereon known as Nos. 209 & 211 Tsat Tsz Mui Road (“No. 209” & “No. 211”) and Nos. 8 & 10 Nation Street (“No. 8” & “No. 10”), North Point, Hong Kong (“the Building”), for the purposes of redevelopment pursuant to Section 3(1) of the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance, Cap. 545 (“the Ordinance”). 2.The Building is a block of 9-storey commercial/residential building served by 2 common staircases. The front elevation of the Building is facing Tsat Tsz Mui Road and the rear facing Nation Street, a private lane. The Building comprises 9 levels, with 4 shops on the ground floor for commercial use and 4 residential units on each of the first to the eighth floor. Each of the shops and residential units is assigned 1/36th undivided share of the Lot. 3.The Building is in fact part of a larger building complex known collectively as Kut Cheong Mansion comprising a pair of free-standing unconnected parallel rows of buildings with Nation Street separating them. Externally, each row appears to be one single composite structure consisting of 7 similar and contiguous tenement buildings. One row of the Mansion is facing King’s Road and the other Tsat Tsz Mui Road, and the Building belongs to the latter. The rear portions of the two rows of buildings fronting private lane Nation Street open at Healthy Street East on the west and a scavenging lane on the east. This Nation Street is created by all owners of Kut Cheong Mansion granting a mutual right of way to each other. The Building is therefore only one of these tenement buildings of Kut Cheong Mansion. Each of these tenement buildings stands on certain lots of lands sub-divided into a number of undivided shares and governed by its own deed of covenants. In response to a question put to him at trial, Mr So Kin Shing (“Mr So”), the structural engineer instructed by the applicants, was of the view that given modern technology, the Building can be free-standing with or without supports, depending on the outcome of a structural survey, even though the adjourning buildings are pulled down. However, he confirms he has not carried out any such survey to the Building as he has not been instructed to do so. 4.The constituent tenement buildings of Kut Cheong Mansion stand on a rectangular-shaped site basically arranged in two rows of seven. There are 4 units on each level of the tenement building arranged in an array of 2 x 2. Each unit is assigned a street number. The 4 units of the Building in question are assigned Nos. 209 and 211 Tsat Tsz Mui Road and Nos.8 and 10 Nation Street, depending on the street/road a unit is facing. The occupation permit covering the Building was issued on 8 September 1960, i.e. more than 50 years before the date of application on 1 February 2012 (“the Application”). 5.The Lot is not intended to be redeveloped on its own. The entire Kut Cheong Mansion will be pulled down and redeveloped as a merged site. Companies controlled by the same developer have started acquisition of units of the Kut Cheong Mansion for such purpose for some time. They are able to acquire 100% ownership of units in some of the tenement buildings. So far, only six applications under the Ordinance in respect of seven tenement buildings of Kut Cheong Mansion require the determination of the Tribunal. Two applications (LDCS15000/2012 and LDCS16000/2012) have already been concluded by this Tribunal (differently constituted). Two separate compulsory sale orders in respect of two sets of lots have been made. The lots which are subject matters of the applications have already been sold by way of public auction. 6.This is one of the four outstanding applications relating to Kut Cheong Mansion in which the applicants are not 100% owners of the lots. When this Judgment is handed down, one application has been heard by the same panel of the Tribunal, and the other by Member Pang sitting alone, with decisions pending. The Recent Decisions of Supergoal[1] and Many Gain[2] 7.On 26and 29November 2013, a differently constituted panel of this Tribunal handed down two decisions in respectively Supergoal and Many Gain which decided, inter alia, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) decision in Bond Star [3] on the interpretation of Section 3(2) of the Ordinance, which has consistently been applied by this Tribunal, is not to be followed; and the Tribunal came to a construction of the said provision different from the CA. Further, Many Gain requires the applicants to bring before the Tribunal all lots intended to be redeveloped together so as to enable the Tribunal to give directions for them to be sold in one auction, and to set a reserve price reflecting the full redevelopment potential[4] of all the lots of the joint development. 8.The aforesaid decisions obviously have serious impact on the present case and the other outstanding applications relating to Kut Cheong Mansion. Bond Star 9.The question of whether the Ordinance is applicable to land of which an applicant is already 100% owner has once been a hotly disputed issue in compulsory sale applications. On application under the Ordinance, the Tribunal has to determine whether the statutory conditions for a compulsory redevelopment order are met. Once it is satisfied that such order should be made, unless the parties all agree to some other method of sale with approval of the Tribunal, the lot(s) must be sold by auction subject to a reserve price which is fixed by reference to its/their redevelopment potential. This is one of the legislative safeguards for protection of the minority owners whose properties are to be sold compulsorily, perhaps in the extreme case against his/her view, for redevelopment purpose. 10.Obviously, the higher the reserve price, the more compensation a minority owner may obtain in the compulsory redevelopment when the lot(s) are sold. Such reserve price can also form an objective yardstick for assessing whether the applicant has taken reasonable steps to acquire the undivided shares of the minority owners as required by section 4(2) of the Ordinance. 11.Schedule 2, §2 of the Ordinance sets out the statutory formula of the reserve price, as follows:
12.It is not uncommon, like the present case, that a developer may wish to acquire the adjacent lots and develop them as a joint site. Normally and in most cases, the redevelopment potential of a lot, and thus its redevelopment value, will be greatly enhanced if assessed on a composite site basis than on a single lot basis. Accordingly, the more lots of the redevelopment to be included in the application, a higher redevelopment value can normally be achieved according to this statutory “on its/their own” formula. 13.In Bond Star, the applicant put together 5 lots comprising 6 pieces of adjacent lots the subject matter of its application to the Lands Tribunal. In fact in respect of 4 of them the applicant had already acquired 100% ownership. For reasons unique to it, the respondent in Bond Star saw fit to contend that the subject matter of the application should be restricted to the lot which the applicant had not 100% owned. At the first instance trial, the Tribunal ruled that the language of Section 3(2)(a) of the Ordinance did not preclude the applicant from combining lots of which it had owned 100%. An order for sale was made in respect of all the lots the subject of the application. 14.The matter went on appeal on a number of grounds. The Court of Appeal (“CA”), applying a purposive construction to the Ordinance, considered that the Ordinance did not permit an applicant to join in lots where the owner had already 100% owned. It held no order was required for lot the applicant had already wholly owned. In §§14 and 16, Roger V-P has this to say:
15.Roger V-P developed further his reasoning by reference to the definition of “minority owner”. The learned V-P’s conclusion was reached without reference to Hansard. However, in §18 of Bond Star he said he took some comfort from some speeches made by legislative members on 7 April 1998 at the second reading of the Bill of the Ordinance regarding the undesirable “pencil” effect caused by the Bill applicable only to single lots, and that the Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands (“SPEL”) did not say anything to disagree with members in this respect. 16.The CA therefore varied the Tribunal’s decision to confine the sale to the lot which the applicant did not wholly own. 17.The CA decision in Bond Star was appealed against to the Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”) as Capital Well [5]. The main judgment in the CFA was delivered by Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ. Capital Well 18.The issues taken on appeal were unrelated to the construction of Section 3(2)(a) of the Ordinance. However, Ribeiro PJ considered it necessary to comment on the CA’s construction of the Ordinance in this respect. From §§39 to 42, he stated:
19.It is against the aforesaid backdrop that the Tribunal in Supergoal and Many Gain considered it necessary to re-visit the construction of the Ordinance made by the CA in Bond Star. Supergoal & Many Gain 20.In Supergoal, the applicant made application under the Ordinance in respect of a site comprising 8 lots of lands on which 2 groups of buildings forming one composite development were built. The two groups were unconnected in the sense that, save and except that they shared a common entrance at the basement, they did not share any common staircase. Each group was served by two common staircases and a lift. At the commencement of the application the applicant was 100% owner of 3 lots in one group. At the time of trial, it had further acquired 100% ownership in 2 more lots in another group, thus owning 100% in 5 out of 8 lots the subject of the application. At any material time, the applicant owned an average of more than 80% in each lot, whether on entire site or group basis. The applicant originally applied to have all the 8 lots sold for the purpose of redevelopment. 21.Before trial commenced, the applicant through counsel invited the Tribunal to treat the application as two, one in respect of each group, but have the two consolidated and heard together. The applicant relied on the decision of the Tribunal (differently constituted) in Fairtex Development Ltd v Tso Pee Hong & Others [6] which had similar facts with Supergoal. The Tribunal in Supergoal posed for consideration of the applicant’s counsel two questions[7], which in our view boils down to one, and is this: given the CFA’s comment as aforesaid, whether the construction of section 3(2) of the Ordinance by the CA in Bond Star was still binding on the Tribunal. The Tribunal was apparently guided by the principles applied by the Court of First Instance in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Indosuez WI Carr Securities Ltd [8]. 22.The differently constituted Tribunal in Supergoal came to the conclusion that Bond Star, though not expressly over-ruled by the CFA in Capital Well, was undermined. It applied the principles[9] in Indosuez, and decided that it was not bound to follow the said CA decision[10]. 23.The said constituted Tribunal further considered though it was not obliged to follow the CA’s decision, it was also not bound to dissent from it unless it was appropriate to do so[11]. It then attempted to answer the following question posed by the CFA as follows:
24.After another round of analysis taking into consideration of, inter alia, the underlying objectives of the Ordinance, the speeches and changes made to the Bill during the legislative process, the Tribunal came to a view that the CA’s understanding of the provision in question only applicable to single lots might not be correct[13]. It then decided to depart from the CA decision in Bond Star[14]. The construction of section 3 of the Ordinance by the Tribunal in Supergoal is different from that by the CA in Bond Star, and can be understood in following paragraph:
25.It is also stated in §65 of Supergoal the following:
26.Since the said constituted Tribunal came to a view that section 3(2) of the Ordinance did not forbid applicant to include lot(s) of which the applicant is 100% owner, it made no order for consolidation but “bore in mind” that it was dealing with two applications, one for each group[16]. Many Gain 27.Many Gain concerns a section 3(2) (b) application in which there were 2 buildings in Ka Shin Street sitting on 2 lots but were connected by a common staircase. Like Kut Cheong Mansion in the present case, there were adjoining lots which the developer intended to consolidate to form a larger merged site for redevelopment but it did not include all of them in one single application. Instead, a total of 6 similar applications have been made to the Tribunal. Four have been discontinued after the applicants have become 100% owners of the lot in question. Apart from Many Gain the other one has been tried by a differently constituted Tribunal and judgment was pending when the decision in Many Gain was handed down. 28.Although Many Gain concerns some different issues, from §§42 to 47, the Tribunal re-affirmed its views in Supergoal. It was further of the view that by virtue of section 4(6)(a)(i) of the Ordinance, the Tribunal has power to give directions whether a lot can be sold together with other adjourning lots owned by the same applicant in the same auction. It goes without saying that if such direction is made, the subject matter of the auction will be enlarged to include lots not being the subject of the application. The Tribunal considered that such practice would promote the “two-fold objectives of the Ordinance”[17], namely,
29.When consolidating the sale of adjoining lots in a batch to be sold in a single auction, Many Gain considered that the reserve price would accordingly be transformed to reflect the redevelopment potential of the merged lot, presumably by operation of the formula in Schedule 2 §2 – the “on their own” instead of the “on its own” formula will be engaged. In §48, the Tribunal in Many Gain had this to say”
This Panel’s View 30.The decision of a differently constituted Tribunal is only persuasive and not binding on another panel of the Tribunal, though it would be desirable for decisions of the same Tribunal on similar factual situation to be consistent in order to achieve certainty. However, unless and until Bond Star has been impliedly over-ruled by the principles enunciated in Indosuez, by the doctrine of precedent, Bond Star, being a CA authority, should be binding on this Tribunal. In our judgment, the decisions in Supergoal and Many Gain raise at least the following issues, namely,
Indosuez 31.It is necessary to see what the Indosuez’s principles are and whether they are applicable such that this Tribunal being a lower court can depart from the CA’s decision in Bond Star. 32.Indosuez is an appeal from the Board of Review decision on tax.The Court of First Instance was called upon to determine, inter alia, whether the taxing authority was permitted to apportion profits derived from different sources. It was because the taxing authority was then confronted with two decisions, namely, a local CA decision which determined that such apportionment was impossible on ground there being no such statutory provision, and a subsequent Privy Council decision which said, though obiter, that the absence of a specific provision in our statutes for apportionment did not obviate the necessity to apportion between the two sources. 33.Deputy Judge Longley adopted the principles more thoroughly explained by the learned authors of Cross and Harris in Precedent in English Law (4th ed), Chap IV in the following paragraph which is also referred to in Supergoal:
34.The Deputy Judge considered in the circumstances of the tax case before him, it was open to the taxing authority to apportion the profits, i.e. to depart from the Court of Appeal decision. The Deputy Judge further considered this so-called “implied overruling” or “undermining” extended to misinterpretation of law or any reasoning leading to the ratio decidendi of a case decided by a lower court if the superior court has decided that reasoning faulty[18]. 35.In Indosuez, the CA’s reasoning in one decision was obviously found faulty by the Privy Council in another decision. The basis for no apportionment said by the CA was queried and directly quashed by the Privy Council’s comment, though it was an obiter. This Tribunal has no quarrel with this principle. In our judgment, in order for this exception to Stare Decisis to be applicable, it must be the reasoning of the decision or the process by which the ratio is arrived at that is impugned. Any comment by a higher court falling short of the required standard may not be sufficient. 36.In our view, what the CFA in Capital Well has said is that ifthe power to order sale is so confined to land which the applicant is not already the 100% owner, the policy objectives of the Ordnance may be undermined (emphasis added). As put by Mr Mok of counsel for the applicants, and we think correctly, it is only the undesirable practical result flowing from the CA’s construction of section 3(2)(a) of the Ordinance that the CFA has raised concern. Nothing said in §§39 to 42 of the CFA decision in Capital Well has the effect of “undermining” or “implied over-ruling” the reasoning or the process by which the CA arrived at its conclusion in Bond Star. Though doubts over the outcome and undesirable effects of the construction were raised, the reasoning or the interpretation process of the CA in Bond Star was untouched. 37.On the other hand, the CFA had this to say[19]in Capital Well, namely,
38.This expression appears to support the CA’s conclusion in Bond Star that the lot or lots must not be 100% owned by the applicant otherwise there will not be any minority owner. At least it is not inconsistent with the CA’s construction. In our view the observation of the CFA tallies with the legislative intent as revealed from the records when the Bill went through the legislative process[20]. In any event Capital Well expressly said it wished to reserve the question for future consideration when it had the benefit of full argument before them. If the CFA considered it necessary to particularly flag this issue to be re-visited later, in our view it preferred to leave the interpretation as it is now for the time being. Further it is apparent, given the limited assistance then, the CFA could not rule out the CA’s construction of the Ordinance otherwise it would not have said that if such “restrictive construction is required”[21] the court could make directions similar to those given by the CA in Golden Bay Investment Ltd [22]or along analogous lines. At the very least the CFA considered the issues raise difficult questions and suggested the best course may be for them to be addressed by the legislature. Whether to Follow Supergoal & Many Gain 39.We totally appreciate that the construction of section 3(2)(a) of the Ordinance in Supergoal may have the effect of enabling sale of all the lots intended to be redeveloped in one batch, thus avoiding some lots being held in random by some bidders in the auction. No matter it is the original developer or any third party who proves successful in the auction, the land can be redeveloped as an entire site without impediment in line with the objectives of the Ordinance. In addition, such construction also benefits minority owners as they can have a larger share of the redevelopment profit. However, no matter how sound and attractive the construction of section 3(2)(a) arrived at by the said Tribunal in Supergoal may appear, it is to be remembered that the Tribunal is bound by any decision of the CA, unless the exception is applicable. By reasons of what have been discussed above, with the greatest respect to the differently constituted Tribunal in Supergoal and Many Gain, this panel of the Tribunal is of the view that the threshold for applying Indosuez has not been reached. The CFA’s comments in Capital Well, though posing serious questions touching upon the policy objectives of the Ordinance, are insufficient to render Bond Star not binding on the Tribunal. By the doctrine of precedent, we consider we are still bound by the CA’s construction of the Ordinance in Bond Star. Power to Compel Inclusion of lot(s) which the applicant co-owns with others or is 100% Owner 40.In view of our conclusion aforesaid, the question of compelling an applicant to join in adjoining lots which they are already 100% owners and intended for a merged site development as suggested in Supergoal and Many Gain does not arise. 41.The next question is whether section 3(2) of the Ordinance or other provisions of the Ordinance empowers the Tribunal to compel inclusion of lots not already subject matters of the application in the application or to be sold together. 42.In our judgment, §41 of Capital Well sheds light on this issue. When framing a question for its future consideration, the CFA said:
43.The first part of the paragraph supports the proposition that there is no power to compel joining or adding a 100% owned lot to the application. The choice of word “wishes” in the second part when the CFA framed the issue suggests that it recognizes a right to choose (and necessarily a right not to so choose) on the part of the applicant. 44.From a survey of the provisions of the Ordinance, it does not appear to this Tribunal that the court is empowered by the Ordinance to compel combination of lots which the majority owner owns (no matter 100% or not). There is no provision stipulating that in the event a majority owner owns two or more lots which can fit in either section 3(1) or 3(2) he should go about it under 3(2) or have the lots auctioned in one batch. The non-mandatory word “may” is deployed in these provisions. 45.It was suggested in Many Gain that by virtue of the Tribunal’s power to make directions “relating to” the sale and purchase of the lot the subject of the order under section 4(6)(a)(i), the Tribunal may include adjacent lots as the subject of the auction. It follows that even if the applicant fails or refuses to include adjacent lots intended for a merged site development when it makes its application under section 3, so far as such information is available, the Tribunal can direct those lots to be auctioned, and thus setting a reserve price based on the enlarged site. 46.Compulsory acquisition of land for redevelopment purpose is entirely a creature of statue. Any substantive rights of a party and power given to the court should, in our view, be created expressly by the Ordinance. The preamble of the Ordinance states, inter alia, the Ordinance is “to enable persons who own a specified majority of the undivided shares in a lot to make application for an order for sale of all the undivided shares in the lot for purpose of redevelopment of the lot … and for matters incidental thereto or connected therewith” (emphasis added). In our judgment, therefore, the subject of the order for sale must logically refer to the lot which the applicant places before the court in his application unless there is express power in the Ordinance to compel joining of other lots. It appears to this Tribunal that very substantive power would have been created by section 4(6)(a)(i) if it were to enable the Tribunal to joining in applicant’s other lots which are otherwise not before it. Further, if section 4(6)(a)(i) were to give power to include in the auction the applicant’s other lots not subject of the application, thus varying the reserve price (in most cases, upward) by triggering a spill-over effect on the “on its/their own” formula, very substantive powers and rights would had been created and given to respectively the court and the minority owners. We believe if that were the legislative intention more express provisions would have been employed. In our view, section 4(6)(a)(i) is not even engaged before any order for sale is made. 47.Further, section 4(6)(a)(i) cannot be read in isolation. After the Tribunal has gone through the statutory exercise prescribed under section 4(1)(a) and is satisfied all conditions are satisfied, it may make an order under section 4(1)(b)(i), which states:
48.The other sub-sections of section 4 go on to deal with various situations likely to be encountered in the compulsory sale, such as rights of tenants. Section 4(6)(a)(i) stipulates:
49.In our judgment, “the subject of the order” mentioned in section 4(6)(a)(i) refers to an order already made by the Tribunal under section 4(1)(b)(i). Necessarily it means the lot the subject of the application. So the powers created by section 4(6)(a)(i) are restricted to directions incidental to the sale of the lot the subject of the application unless the court has already seized of other lots by other empowering provisions. 50.By reasons of the above and coupled with what this panel’s views on the legislative intent of the reserve price and section 3 after reviewing the Hansard[23], with the greatest respect to the differently constituted Tribunal in Many Gain, we do not consider section 4(6)(a)(i) empowers the tribunal to compel combination of lots not already before the Tribunal to form the subject matter of the application. 51.Having said that we agree that if separate applications have already been made to the Tribunal in respect of individual lots of a merged site, upon application and in appropriate cases the Tribunal do have power under section 4(6)(a)(i) to make directions for them to be sold to, say, one single purchaser in one auction as if the lots constitute a single lot along the line in Golden Bay Investment Limited as mentioned by the CFA in Capital Well. That is, however, subject to the pre-condition that the Tribunal has already seized of all the lots by other empowering provisions. Further, by reasons of our view on the reserve price reached below[24], we consider that in the circumstances the reserve price for each lot/lots should be confined to the original lot or lots the subject of the application. The over-all market prices for the respective lots to be sold in the said manner will then be determined by market force. The Reserve Price & Legislative Process in the Provisional Legislature 52.As seen from above, the CA in Bond Star had referred to certain speeches made by legislators when the Bill was read in the Legislative Council. The differently constituted Tribunal in Supergoal had gone through some of the speeches and amendments when the Bill was passed and came to conclude that the CA’s understanding might not be correct[25]. However, Mr Mok of counsel for the applicants submitted that the Supergoal’s comments were misconceived. Mr Mok places before this Tribunal a bundle of what he considers to be a more complete record of the Provisional Legislature to make good his submission. 53.The following can be gleaned from the records of the Provisional Legislative Council placed before the Tribunal:
54.From the above, this Tribunal observes:
55.The “pencil” development concern was raised on 7April 1998 by some of the legislators during the second reading debate. The speech of the SPEL referred to in Supergoal appeared to deal with such concern. However, from the information set out in the preceding paragraphs, it is noted all speeches were in fact made on 7April 1988 in the same afternoon. The proposed amendments to the Bill (including the amendment to section 3(2) and Schedule 2 §2) were all agreed before the said Council meeting (at least as early as 28March 1998) and remained agreed throughout. It therefore cannot be said that after some legislators had raised the pencil development concern the SPEL then introduced section 3(2) to address those concerns. 56.One may argue that section 3(2)(a), though added to the Bill with the primary objective of avoiding the oppressive “bundling” effect, may help address the “pencil buildings” problem brought by the original Bill. We are of the view that in looking for the legislative intent of whether the Ordinance permits the joining of lots the applicant is 100% owners and/or empowers the court to compel joining in adjoining lots, the Hansard is not helpful, if not against such argument. Further, since the CA in Bond Star has come to a construction which the CFA has not over-ruled, the said questions remained to be answered in the negative. On the other hand, the Hansard is indicative of the legislative intent of restricting the reserve price to the redevelopment potential of the lot(s) the subject matter of the application on its/their own. 57.By reasons of the aforesaid, we do not consider it necessary to consolidate all the outstanding applications of Kut Cheung Mansion in one proceeding nor do we consider this Tribunal can compel the applicants to include all lots of Kut Cheung Mansion in one application as suggested in Supergoal and Many Gain. The reserve price will be fixed according to the “on its/their own” formula by reference to the subject lots of the application. 58.With the aforesaid principles in mind, this Tribunal proceeds to examine the present application. The Present Application 59.When the 1st applicant, the 2nd applicant, the 3rd applicant and the 4th applicant (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the applicants”) commenced the present proceedings, the corresponding ownerships of the respective units of the Building are shown in the table below:
60.They were unable to acquire 3 out of the 36 units of the Building. Thus as at the date of the Application, the applicants together owned 91.6667% equal undivided shares in the Lot. By the time of the filing of the witness statement of Mr Hui Lok Shan (“Hui’s Statement”), the representative of the applicants, dated 12 November 2013, the applicants had further purchased the interest owned by the 2nd respondent, thus increasing the undivided shares owned by them to 94.4444% that of the Lot. As the applicants owned more than 90% of the Lot, they contend that they are entitled to make the Application by virtue of Section 3(2)(b) of the Ordinance. 61.At the time of the filing of Hui’s Statement, 2 undivided shares allotted to 2 units remain outstanding, particulars of which are as follows:
62.None of the respondents has filed any evidence or any expert evidence. 63.In view of the above, Mr Mok, counsel for the applicants, simply called the witnesses to prove the applicants’ case. The applicants contend that all the requirements of the Ordinance have been satisfied and ask for an order for sale in terms of the draft order submitted. Section 3 of the Ordinance – The 80% Threshold 64.Section 3(1) of the Ordinance requires the applicants to have not less than 90% of the undivided shares in a lot before it can make an application. 65.Section 3(5) of the Ordinance provides that the Chief Executive in Council may, by notice in the Gazette, specify a percentage lower than the percentage mentioned in subsection (1) in respect of a lot belonging to a class of lots specified in the notice. 66.Pursuant to Section 3(5) of the Ordinance, a Notice was gazetted on 22 January 2010 and tabled at the Legislative Council meeting on 27 January 2010. It came into operation on 1 April 2010. Section 3 of the Notice lowered the threshold for compulsory sale, insofar as it is applicable, from 90% to 80%. Section 4(1)(b) of the Notice specified one of the classes for the purposes of Section 3 as “a lot with each of the building erected on the lot issued with an occupation permit at least 50 years before the relevant date (which is the date of the application)”. The occupation permit[30] in respect of the Building was issued more than 50 years as at the date of application. The Building is therefore covered by the Notice and the applicable threshold percentage is 80%. Determination of the Existing Use Values (“EUV”) of all units in the Building 67.Pursuant to section 3 of the Ordinance, the Application was accompanied by a valuation report (“Application Report”) prepared by Mr Charles Chan of Savills Valuation and Professional Services Limited (“Mr C Chan”), the applicants’ valuation expert witness, containing the assessments of the values of all units (which are conveniently termed as the existing use values, the “EUV” of all units) in the Building as at 28 November 2011. 68.Schedule 1, Part 1 of the Ordinance requires the aforesaid report to be prepared no more than 3 months before the application. As the Application herein was made on 28November 2011, the Application Report satisfies the 3-month requirement. 69.Under section 4(1)(a)(i), if there is a dispute between the parties on the EUV of the units in the Building on the Lot, the Tribunal has to determine the values. Section 4(1)(a)(ii) further provides that, in the case of any minority owner of the Lot who cannot be found, the majority owner of the Lot is required to satisfy the Tribunal that the value of the minority owner’s property is (i) not less than fair and reasonable; and (ii) not less than fair and reasonable when compared with the value of the majority owner’s property as assessed in the application. 70.In the Application Report of 28 November 2011, Mr C Chan explained his method of valuation and the process of his assessment to arrive at the EUV of each unit of the Building. 71.In his valuation of the EUV of the domestic units of the Building, Mr C Chan adopted the following methodology :
Section 4(2) of the Ordinance - Justification and Reasonable Steps 72.The second matter falls to be decided is whether an order of sale of the Lot should be made under section 4(1)(b) of the Ordinance. According to section 4(2)(a), there are two conditions which must be satisfied before the Tribunal can make a compulsory order:-
73.Accordingly, failing any of the above the Tribunal shall not make an order for compulsory sale of the Lot. 74.For the requirement under paragraph 72(i) above, we have taken into consideration the expert evidence of Mr Benson Wong (“Mr Wong”), the building surveyor and Mr So, the structural engineer adduced by the applicants. 75.Mr So had conducted a structural assessment of the Building and prepared a report dated 8 November 2013. He found the following defects in the Building:
76.Based on the above findings, Mr So concluded that the structural frames of the Building are in need of repair. The Building, completed more than 53 years ago, has exhibited signs that the structural frames have deteriorated to the final stages of its design working life. The deterioration will continue steadily due to extensive carbonation of the concrete. It is inevitable that new defects will occur and previous defects, though repaired, will recur readily, requiring substantial repairs or even partial demolition and re-construction of some defective structural members in the future. Repair works need be carried out regularly in future and such repairs will be more and more extensive. He is of the view that although the repair costs may be relatively modest, they will escalate in future as the extent and seriousness of the deterioration of the structural members increases with age. He recommends that hammer tapping works be carried out to all structural members of the Building with a view to finding out the full extent of defects to be repaired as a matter of urgency. 77.It is reported by Mr Wong in his Condition Survey Report dated 8 November 2013 that:
78.Mr Wong assessed the total cost of repair works at $10,751,265 which amounts to 47% of the construction cost of a new similar superstructure[31]. He was of the view the substantial costs of repair indicated that the superstructure of the Building has deteriorated to a state which is beyond reasonable economic repair. As more rapid deterioration will occur in the future, the necessary maintenance and repairs will inevitably be more frequent and extensive, making the continued occupation of the Building not economical and even unsafe to both occupants and third party. Not only does the repair and maintenance cause disturbance to the enjoyment by owners of the Building, the reality is that even after the repair, the Building remains an old building with outdated and below-market-expectations design. He recommended the owners to redevelop rather than repair given the Building does not possess any historical value or architectural merit. 79.The applicants also rely upon two economic tests, i.e. the age test and the repair test, conducted by Mr C Chan in his Supplemental Report to justify the redevelopment of the Building. 80.In respect of the repair test, Mr C Chan adopted the findings by Mr Wong that the total estimated cost to restore the Building to tenantable standard is $10,751,265. If the identified unauthorized building works and reinstatement works[32] are excluded, the net repair cost for the remedial works is about $9,410,310[33]. He is of the view that there will be about 3% enhancement to the value of the domestic portion of the Building. As shop units are less sensitive to building condition comparing with residential units, he considers there will only be nominal enhancement to the value of that portion. The enhancement by the proposed repair works is only $2,789,400[34]. Mr C Chan considers it not economically justified to carry out the proposed repair works. 81.As regards the age test, Mr C Chan has this to say. The total existing use value (“EUV”) of the Building as at the date of his Supplemental Report[35] is $152,090,000[36]. After the repair there will be a 3% increase on the value of the residential units[37]. The enhanced EUV will be $154,879,400[38] after a net repair cost of $9,410,310 has been spent. His assessment of the redevelopment value (“RDV”) of the Lot on its own also as at the date of the supplemental report is $160,000,000[39]. Given the RDV is higher than the enhanced EUV[40]even after the repair, Mr C Chan opined that the redevelopment of the Lot is warranted. 82.The above expert evidence is unchallenged. We accept it in its entirety. In particular, we are satisfied that based on the evidence of Mr So and Mr Wong, redevelopment of the Lot is justified due to the age and the state of repair of the Building :
Reasonable Steps to Acquire All the Undivided Shares in the Lot 83.The applicants are under an obligation to negotiate terms that are fair and reasonable to acquire the undivided shares of the minority owners when their whereabouts are known. 84.The applicants submitted that they have taken reasonable steps, including making four offers to purchase the R1’s Unit since the action started on 1 February 2012 each enclosing an advice letter of Mr C Chan. The latest 4th offer in the sum of $4,020,000 was made in light of the decisions in Supergoal and Many Gain. The applicants submit that this offer was formulated at a level higher than the formula stipulated in paragraph 141 of Supergoal even if it were rightly decided. In any event, the 1st respondent entered into provisional agreements on 14 January 2014 with the 2nd applicant for the sale of his interest in the R1’s Unit and completion was to take place on 17 February 2014. 85.As for the R3’s Unit, the applicants submit that Szto of the 3rd respondent entered into the Provisional Agreement for Sale and Purchase with the 3rd applicant on 29 November 2011 for the sale of his interest in R3’s Unit at HK$2,371,000 when he should obtain the grant of the Letters of Administration to administer the estate of the deceased registered owner. Had Szto obtained the grant in good time before trial, the sale and purchase of the R3’s Unit would have been completed and the unit would have become the 3rd applicant’s. 86.The applicants submit that reasonable steps have also been taken to acquire the R3’s Unit. Alternatively, when the registered owner died without anyone being granted probate or letters of administration, it is legally not possible to purchase that unit and accordingly there is no legal obligation on the applicants’ part to take steps to acquire the deceased’s unit as if it is owned by a missing owner. 87.By reasons of our views on the reserve price above, and the actual reserve price for the auction of the Lot below[41], we are satisfied that in the circumstances, the applicants have taken reasonable steps to acquire all the undivided shares in the Lot including both the R1’s Unit and the R3’s Unit[42]. In any event R1 and R3 have accepted the offer of the applicants. As regards R4, it is not necessary for the applicants, in order to satisfy section 4(2)(b) to make offer at or above the pro-rated RDV of the relevant unit finally determined by the Tribunal. It will be too onerous a burden on any applicant. According to the CFA decision of Capital Well, the Tribunal is only required to satisfy that the offers fall within the range of what may broadly be regarded as fair and reasonable compensation for the outstanding units in question. We consider section 4(2)(b) has been satisfied. 88.We consider all the conditions set out in section 4(2) of the Ordinance are met. We hereby make an order under section 4(1)(b)(i) of the Ordinance for sale of all the undivided shares in the Lot by way of auction for the purposes of redevelopment of the Lot. Reserve Price for the Auction 89.The applicants submit that the reserve price for the auction of the Lot should be fixed at HK$157,000,000, based on the assessment by Mr C Chan of the RDV of the Lot as at 10December 2013 in his further valuation report of 31 December 2013. The said RDV is assessed using the “on its/their own” formula without reference to the redevelopment potential of the adjoining lots on which Kut Cheong Mansion stands. 90.By reasons of our decisions on the construction of section 3(2) of the Ordinance and the reserve price above, it is not necessary for us to consider the merged site valuations, which are also set out in the said report of Mr C Chan. 91.We have considered Mr C Chan’s valuation of the RDV of the Lot on the on its own basis. We note Mr C Chan had considered two land sale transactions in the past years, i.e. the sale of a site at North Point Estate Lane and Shu Kuk Street in North Point in March 2013 and another at 5-9 Hing Wan Street, Wan Chai in April 2012. We agree with him that they are not suitable for direct comparison purpose because of, as he stated in his report “the substantial disparity in development potential due to different attributes on location, development scale and development restrictions[43]” between the Lot and the two comparables. 92.We agree with Mr C Chan that the residual valuation method has to be employed as the method of assessing the RDV of the Lot as a last resort. This is done by deducting development costs (including construction costs, professional fees, finance costs etc) and developer’s profitfrom the estimated gross development value (potential sales revenue) of the completed development. 93.Mr C Chan formed the view that the optimum development on the Lot comprised a block of 26-storey hotel with entrance lobby and retail shops on G/F, back of house on 1/F and hotel guest rooms on upper floors with details of the hypothetical development and residual valuation set out in Appendix 1.4 (Bundle B2/49-51), and details of the comparables with adjustments in Appendix 1.6 (for shops at Bundle B2/60) and Appendix 1.7 (for hotels at Bundle B2/62). Mr C Chan also adopted the Development Cost Pro-forma recently promulgated by the Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors to facilitate consideration of construction costs in land value assessments in Appendix 1.5 (Bundle B2/53-54). We have gone through his valuation. We accept his valuation and are satisfied with the valuation assumptions, the values and the costs parameters used in his valuation. 94.Based on Mr C Chan’s valuation, we agree that the reserve price for the auction of the Lot should be HK$157,000,000. That is arrived at by the “on its/their own” formula without reference to other adjourning lots which we consider to be the correct approach. Trustees 95.The applicants proposed to appoint Mr Ma Ho Fai (馬豪輝) and Ms Tsang May Ping (曾美萍) who are respectively senior partner and partner of Messrs Woo Kwan Lee & Lo, Solicitors, Notaries, Agents for Trademarks & Patents, as the sale trustees. Based on the information on their background and experience as set out in the letter dated 8 January 2014 from their firm, we are satisfied that they are proper persons to be appointed. Their remuneration at the rate of $5,500 per hour(exclusive of disbursements) as mentioned in the letter dated 8 January 2014 is considered reasonable and acceptable. Particulars and conditions of sale of the Lot 96.On behalf of the applicants Mr Mok has submitted a set of draft particulars and conditions of sale (Document Bundle A6/144/1101-1127) by public auction for our consideration. We understand these are the usual terms used for compulsory sale, and we approve the said draft accordingly. Conclusion and Orders 97.By the forgoing discussion, we are satisfied that the redevelopment of the Lot is justified due to the age and state of repair of the Building; and the applicants have taken reasonable steps to acquire the undivided shares in the Lot. This Tribunal is also satisfied that the values of the minority owners’ units as assessed in the Application are not less than fair and reasonable, and not less than fair and reasonable when compared with the value of the applicants’ property as assessed in the Application. This Tribunal makes the following orders:
Costs 98.Since both the applicants, the 3rd and 4th respondents do not ask for costs, we make a costs order nisi that there be no order as to costs between the parties, such order be made absolute after 14 days if no application is made to vary the said costs order. 99.We would like to express our gratitude to Mr Y.C. Mok, counsel for the applicants for his thorough legal submissions and able assistance rendered throughout the trial.
Mr Y C Mok, instructed by Mayer Brown JSM, for the applicants Attendance of Lui & Law, for the 1st respondent, was excused Mr Tsui Wai-hay of K B Chau, for the 3rd respondent Attendance of Lee & Chow, for the 4th respondent, was excused [1] Supergoal Investment Ltd v Five F Ming House Ltd & others (unreported) LDCS46000/2011 (26/11/2013) [2] Many Gain Investment Ltd v Chan Fai Ho & others (unreported) LDCS28000/2012 (29/11/2013) [3] Bond Star Development Ltd v Capital Well Ltd [2004] 2 HKLRD 855 [4] See §48 of Many Gain [5] Capital Well Ltd v Bond Star Development Ltd (2005) 8 HKCFAR 578 [6] (unreported) LDCS20000/2011 12/9/2012 [7] See §25 of Supergoal [8] [2002] 1 HKLRD 308 [9] See discussion below from §§31 to 38 [10]See §41 of Supergoal [11] See§39 & 43 of Supergoal [12] See §43 of Many Gain which repeated §41 of Capital Well [13] See §57 of Supergoal [14] See §63 of Supergoal [15] See §71 of Supergoal [16] See §§71 - 73 of Supergoal [17] See §47 of Many Gain, which first appears in §62 of Supergoal [18] See §74 of Indosuez [19] §41 of Capital Well [20] See §§ 52 to 57 below [21] See §42 of Capital Well [22] Golden Bay Investment Ltd v Chou Hung [1994] 2 HKC 197@ 200-202 [23] See §§52 to 57 below [24] See §§ 53 to 57 below [25] §57 of Supergoal [26] Page 8 of the CSA [27] See page 36 of the Official Record of Proceedings on 7April 1998 [28] See page 37 of the Official Record of Proceedings on 7April 1998 [29] See §53(ii) above [30] See §4 above [31] See §6.2.1 of Mr. Wong’s report dated 8November 2013 [32] Presumably, this sum of HK$1,340,955, will be shouldered by the identified owners, see page 16 of Mr. C Chan’s Supplemental Report dated 7th November 2013 [33] HK$10,751,265 – HK$1,340,955 = HK$9,410,310 [34] Existing Use Value of domestic units of HK$92,980,000 x 3% = HK$2,789,400 [35] 7th November 2013 [36] See page 6 of Mr. C Chan’s Supplemental Report dated 7th November 2013 [37] HK$2,789,400, see footnote 32 [38] $152,090,000 + $2,789,400 =$154,879,400 [39] See page 16 of Mr. C Chan’s Supplemental Report dated 7th November 2013 [40] HK$160,00,000 - HK$154,879,400 = HK$5,120,600 [41] See §89 below [42] The RDV of a unit is calculated using the formula: EUV of the unit /EUV of the Building x RDV of the Building. Accordingly RDV for the R1’s Unit is $2,703,707 (1.9m/110.33m x 157 m), and RDV for the R3’s Unit is $2,518,717 (1.77m/110.33m x 157m) [43] Paragraph B7.1 on page 11 of Mr. C Chan’s report dated 31December 2013 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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