Barbara Pui Yung Lynn, The Administratrix of the Estate of Late Mr. Jack Lynn, Deceased v. Yeung Keung Chi and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 177/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 22 December 2023.
1. Mr Jack Lynn was and is the sole registered and beneficial owner of the subject property. He died on 24 December 2001 without engaging anyone to manage or dispose of the Property. Since mid-2020, a series of transactions were purportedly entered into by a purported Mr Jack Lynn (“ the Imposter”) who forged Mr Jack Lynn’s signature on various documents. It culminated in D5 purportedly purchasing the Property from D4, the mortgagee vendor. D5 paid the purchase price, which were applied to d
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HCA 177/2021 [2023] HKCFI 3351 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO 177 OF 2021 ________________________ BETWEEN
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_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ A. INTRODUCTION 1.Mr Jack Lynn was and is the sole registered and beneficial owner of the subject property. He died on 24 December 2001 without engaging anyone to manage or dispose of the Property. Since mid-2020, a series of transactions were purportedly entered into by a purported Mr Jack Lynn (“the Imposter”) who forged Mr Jack Lynn’s signature on various documents. It culminated in D5 purportedly purchasing the Property from D4, the mortgagee vendor. D5 paid the purchase price, which were applied to discharge the prior incumbrances in favour of D2- D4. 2.In the Main Action of the present case, the Plaintiff’s estate obtained judgment against all the Defendants and recovered vacant possession of the Property. 3.D5 has issued third party proceedings against D2-D4 for contribution and indemnity (“CIP”), based on unjust enrichment. This is the hearing of D5’s Summons dated 6 February 2023 against D2-D4, pursuant to Order 14, in the CIP. 4.D2’s counsel informed the Court that his solicitors had filed a summons to cease to act and hence D2 did not advance any submission. 5.D3 and D4 say that they were not aware of the death of Mr Jack Lynn at the time the transactions were entered into. D3 claims that any enrichment was not at the expense of D5 as the source of the money was D5’s parents. D4 had not received part of the alleged sum from D5. D3 and D4 each claims to be a bona fide mortgagee without notice of third party interests and has changed its position. B. UNDISPUTED BACKGROUND 6.Mr. Jack Lynn passed away on 24 December 2001 in Taiwan. At all the material times, he was the sole registered and beneficial owner of the subject property situated at Flat B, 19th Floor, Park View Mansion, No.3 Lau Sin Street, Hong Kong (“the Property”). The Plaintiff,Ms Barbara Lynn,is the administratrix of his estate (“Estate”). 7.In the second half of 2020, the Imposter had taken out a series of loans from the following parties:
8.By a Deed of Confirmation and Rectification dated 27 October 2020 (“D4’s Deed of Confirmation”), bearing the forged signature of Mr Jack Lynn, the Imposter confirmed that D4’s 2nd Legal Charge should be on “all monies” basis. 9.All of the documents referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 above had been registered in the Land Registry until the orders for vacating their registration set out below. 10.As the repayment under D4’s 2nd Legal Charge was allegedly in default, D4 exercised its “right/power of sale as mortgagee vendor”. 11.On 10 December 2020, an Agreement for Sale and Purchase was entered intobetween D4 (as mortgagee vendor) and D5 (as purchaser) for the sale of the Property at a consideration of HK$9 million (“D5 Agreement”). 12.The purchase money of the Property was paid directly from the joint bank account of D5’s parents by 2 cheques: one for the deposit of HK$900,000 paid to Li & Associates (conveyancing solicitors for D4); and another for HK$8,100,000 for the balance paid into the client’s account of D5’s conveyancing solicitors, Tang, Wong & Cheung. 13.The receipt of the deposit is disputed by D4. 14.By a receipt dated 8/1/2021, Tang, Wong & Cheung stated that the sum of HK$8,100,000 was“RECEIVED FROM: Chick Mei Ki”. 15.On 11 January 2021 (ie. the completion date), pursuant to D4’s written instructions stated in the letter from Li & Associates dated 11 January 2021, Tang, Wong & Cheung issued on D5’s behalf the following split cheques to D2, D3 and D4 respectively for a total sum of HK$8,100,000.00:
16.Upon completion, an Assignment was executed by D4 in favour of D5 (“D5 Assignment”). It was registered in the Land Registry. D5 took possession of the Property until a court order set out below. 17.On 25 January 2021, D5 received the pre-action letter from the Plaintiff’s solicitors and learnt of Mr Jack Lynn’s death in 2001. C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE MAIN ACTION 18.On 1 February 2021, the Plaintiff commenced the present action (the “Main Action”) against D1 to D5 to declare the various documents in paragraphs 7 and 8 above void ab initio, to recover vacant possession and to seek damages. 19.On 9 August 2021 D5 issued the CIP against D2-D4 on the basis of unjust enrichment. She seeks restitution of money paid to them, damages, and contribution and indemnity in respect of the Plaintiff’s claim. 20.In the Main Action, the Plaintiff sought summary judgments against D1-D5 pursuant to Order 14 of the Rules of the High Court. The results are as follows:
21.On 9 August 2021, D5 commenced the CIP by issuing a Third Party Notice against D2 to D4, seeking declarations that each of D2- D4 were holding the sums paid to each of them on completion on trust for her, restitution of those sums and/or damages and/or equitable compensation of HK$9,000,000, being the total amount which D5 had mistakenly transferred to D2 to D4, on the ground of unjust enrichment. 22.D3 has separately taken out 2 sets of Third Party Proceedings against lawyers, which are irrelevant for present purposes. D. DEFENCES TO THE CIP 23.D2-4 all claim to be unaware of the death of Mr Jack Lynn as no death certificate or grant of letters of administration were registered at the time the subject transactions were entered into. 24.D2’s defence as pleaded effectively puts D5 to strict proof. 25.D3’s defence is that the Imposter was referred to D3 by D2 for the purpose of obtaining a loan from D3 with the Property as security. D3 proceeded with the mortgage application according to its usual practice with the engagement of solicitors. D3 was in fact a victim to the fraud of the Imposter and money received was for the discharge of the debt owed to D3. 26.Doing my best, I summarize the defences advanced in the written submission of D3’s counsel, Mr Ngai and Ms Mandy Chan:
27.Mr Ngai also submits that given the factual matrix, the wide range of reliefs sought by D5, the number of parties involved and the query as to whether D5 turned a blind eye to the true state of affairs and took risk to benefit from a questionable transaction (§§18(15) & (16) of D3’s Defence), there are some other reasons for a trial. 28.D4’s defence is that the Imposter was referred to D4 by its intermediary agent for the purpose of seeking a mortgage loan. The intermediary agent suggested that the Imposter was willing to sell the Property in the event that he could not repay the mortgage loan, and was willing to sign a Deed of Surrender to give effect to his intention to sell. 29.D4 eventually granted a loan of only HK$500,000 to the Imposter. On 16 October 2020, the Imposter signed the mortgage loan with D4 at D4’s office, and subsequently executed the 2nd Legal Charge and the Deed of Surrender at Li & Associates’ office. At the request of the Imposter, HK$253,510 out of the loan amount was paid by D4 to the government for property tax and rates in arrears. The balance of HK$246,490 was paid to the Imposter in cash. 30.The Imposter defaulted in repayment. Acting on Li & Associates’ advice, D4 exercised its right under the Deed of Surrender and entrusted Li & Associates to conduct the sale of the Property. The Property was eventually sold to D5 on 11 January 2021. Li & Associates also arranged for the discharge of prior encumbrances charged with the Property. 31.On 11 January 2021, D4 received a cheque in the sum of HK$515,166.60 from D5, being redemption money. It was the only payment that D4 has ever received from D5. 32.The issues raised by D4 are:
33.I shall analyze each Defendant’s defence separately. For present purposes, I accept that D2-D5 did not have notice of the death of Mr Jack Lynn until either the pre-action letter from the Plaintiff’s solicitors dated 25 January 2021 or the commencement of the Main Action. E. Legal principles on summary judgment 34.The principles applicable to summary judgment application are well established. The burden in the defendant to show a triable issue. The Court must not embark upon a mini trial on affidavits. Unless it is obvious that the defence put forward by the defendant is ‘frivolous and practically moonshine’, Order 14 ought not to be applied. Order 14 is for clear cases; that is, cases in which there is no serious material factual dispute and, if a legal issue, then no more than a crisp legal question. The procedure is entirely inappropriate where the plaintiff’s entitlement to recover any sum is the subject of any serious dispute, whether of law or fact”. See Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023 at 14/4/9. 35.The burden remains on the defendants to show triable issues, thus it is for the defendant to show by credible evidence and plausible argument that it has a triable defence. Further, the defendant should condescend to particulars in his defense. See: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023, §§14/4/1 -14/4/4, 14/4/9. If, thereafter, a defendant can show a triable issue that should, then and there, be an end to the application”: Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Co Ltd v. Harmutty Ltd. [2009] 3 HKLRD 94 at §4. 36.Additionally, a defendant may be granted leave to defend if he satisfies the Court that “there ought for some other reason to be a trial”: O.14 r.3(1) of RHC. The circumstances said to require investigation at a trial must be relevant to the issue in dispute: Nice Plan Development Ltd v Ke Jun Xiang (unreported, 25 June 2015, CACV 259/2014) at §19, Chu JA (as she then was). Those reasons usually include the need for the defendant reasonably and properly requires to interrogate or cross-examine the plaintiff. Wherever there are circumstances which require close investigation, there ought to be a trial and judgment should not be given under Order 14: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023Volume 1 at §14/4/10. F. UNJUST ENRICHMENT F1. Legal principles on unjust enrichment 37.There is no dispute that 4 questions should be answered in a claim for unjust enrichment: (1) Was the defendant enriched? (2) Was the enrichment at the plaintiff ’s expense? (3) Was the enrichment unjust? (4) Are any of the defenses applicable? See Shanghai Tongji Science & Technology Industrial Co Ltd v Casil Clearing Ltd (2004) 7 HKCFAR 79. (Each of these will be referred to by the Question number.) 38.The burden is on the plaintiff to establish affirmative answers to the first 3 Questions. Once it is so established, the defendants are not entitled to retain the money, subject to any defense that they can establish. See Pacific Rainbow International Inc v Shenzhen Wolverine Tech Ltd [2023] HKCFI 1292, §§30-33; see also RPB SA v XinWangyi Trade Limited & Ors. [2022] HKCFI 2541, §§21-23, per DHCJ Jonathan Chang SC; 巨 展皮具香港有限公司 v. 上海兄弟海運有限公司 & Anor. [2018] HKCFI 53 §§15-16. 39.I will deal with the first 3 Questions in this Section. F2. Unjust enrichment of D2 at the expense of D5 40.D2 accepts that it has received HK$11,329.40 from D5 and was hence enriched. 41.In the light of the Orders made by DHCJ Stock SC and Au-Yeung J declaring various deeds and agreements void ab initio, D2’s pleaded case that D2’s Loan Agreement was made and executed legally must fail. There was no consideration flowing from D2. The loan was not taken out with D5’s authority. D2 simply has no right to use D5’s money to discharge a debt owed by the Imposter to D2 or to retain the money received from D5. The enrichment was thus unjust. 42.D5 operated under a mistake of fact as to validity of the D2 Loan Agreement. D5 would not have paid D2 but for the fraud of the Imposter. It was thus plain that D2’s enrichment was at the expense of D5. 43.D5 has answered the first 3 questions in the affirmative and D2 has raised no triable issue thereon. F3. Unjust enrichment of D3 at the expense of D5 44.Unjust Enrichment is established because D3 does not dispute the receipt of HK$7,573,504. Paragraphs 41 and 42 above apply equally to D3 except as to the amount paid by D5 to D3 and that the relevant document was D3’s Mortgage. 45.However, D3 disputes that the enrichment was “at the expense of D5”. This is because the HK$9,000,000 purchase money went straight from the joint account of D5’s parents to various Defendants. The money was not traceable to D5 at all and she could not have suffered any economic loss. 46.I am unable to agree. It is unnecessary for there to be a direct payment from the claimant (in an unjust enrichment claim) to the defendant. Where there is a sufficient causal connection, in the sense of a sufficient nexus or link, between the loss to the claimant and the benefit received by the defendant, the requirement of enrichment at the claimant’s expense would be satisfied. See Lee Yuk Shing v Dianoor International Ltd [2016] 4 HKC 535, §§110, CA. 47.Having a “family pot” as in Lee Yuk Shing is not a necessary criterion. Here, the money from the parents was on account of D5 in respect of the Property. It is not uncommon in Hong Kong for parents to provide to a child the purchase price for a property in whole or in part. At least D5’s mother had joined in the bargaining of the price and she would have known that the money was for D5’s purchase. The matter of accounting between the parents and D5 was of no concern to D3. The enrichment was plainly at the expense of D5. 48.It is ludicrous for D3 to say that D5 has not identified any causal relationship between the alleged mistake of fact in paying D3 and the payment D5 now seeks to recovery. D5 purportedly paid D3 only because she mistakenly thought that D3’s Mortgage was then valid and binding on Mr Jack Lynn. The causal link between the payment and the mistake of fact was plain for all to see. Paragraph 42 above equally apply to D3’s evidence. 49.D3 has not raised any triable issue on the first 3 Questions. F4. Unjust enrichment of D4 at the expenses of D5 50.D4 denies receiving HK$900,000. As for D5’s payment of HK$515,166.60 to D4, D4 submits that it was not enriched under the principle of netting off of gains and losses. 51.With regard to the HK$900,000, D4’s own solicitor, Li & Associates, had applied a receipt chop on a copy of the parents’ cheque. In the D5 Agreement, D4 acknowledged receipt of this sum. As a mortgagee vendor, wouldn’t D4 be interested in knowing where the sale proceeds had gone? No receipt for the deposit, no documents in respect of disposal of the HK$900,000 or completion statement for the Property were ever produced despite the order of Master Phoebe Man dated 29 April 2022. D4 claimed that all that it cared about was to take back the HK$500,000 it lent. D4 asserts that the solicitors’ clerk did not contact D4 to report on the transaction. That was unbelievable because D4’s solicitors, Tam Pun Yip (“TPY”) had filed a summons on 27 April 2022 applying to cease to act. The supporting affidavit of Chan Kwok Keung said that the reason for ceasing to act was that TPY did not receive further instructions from D4, contrary to D4’s assertion. TPY did cease acting. D4’s bare assertion that it did not receive the HK$900,000 was totally incredible. 52.In respect of the HK$515,166.60, Mr Ngai relies on Goff & Jones, The Law of Unjust Enrichment 10th ed, §§4-59 – 4-66:
53.Mr Fergus Chan, counsel for D4 submits that this principle of “netting off” is still a developing legal principle. Its precise application and its effect on D5’s unjust enrichment claim is yet to be determined: 54.The “netting off” principle would theoretically eliminate D5’s claim for unjust enrichment and provide D4 with an arguable defence that it was not enriched as “its legal right was lost” as a result of its enrichment. D4 should not be denied his day in Court. 55.I am unable to agree. About half of the HK$500,000 lent were used for rates and government rent before D5 became the purported owner. However, that payment was for the benefit of the Estate and not D5. The rest was for the benefit of the Imposter and not D5. Once again, due to the void D3’s Mortgage, D3 simply had provided no consideration to net off D5’s money. 56.D4 was plainly enriched as alleged by D5 under Question 1. D4 has not purported to answer Questions 2 and 3. I find there to be no triable issues raised as to first 3 Questions of Shanghai Tongji. G. D2’s DEFENCE UNDER QUESTION 4 57.The purported defence put forth by D2 in its Defence are bare denials. No submission was advanced by D2 and no triable issues are raised. H. D3’s DEFENCE UNDER QUESTION 4 H1. Bona fide mortgagee for value without notice 58.In a recent and direct authority of AXHT Company Limited v Freeway Finance Company Limited [2020] 4 HKLRD 133, §§57-64, DHCJ Eva Sit SC (as the learned Recorder then was) faced a similar defence of bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Both P and D were moneylenders and victims of fraud. It was held that P (a subsequent lender) paid D (a prior lender) only on the basis of a mistake of fact that the registered owner of the property was a party to D’s loan agreement and D’s charge and was indebted to D. 59.It was further held that the fact that D’s loan agreement had not been declared null and void was irrelevant. If on proper analysis, D’s loan agreement was void (as against the registered owner), which the court found it to be, the fact that it has not been declared to be so by the parties was irrelevant. There was no consensus ad idem with respect to D’s loan agreement and the same was void. Since D’s Loan Agreement was void, D would not be regarded as having given valuable consideration when advancing Ds’ Loan, and would have no legal right to receive the sum from P. This also disposes of D’s good consideration defence. The Court found that P had established the unjust factor. 60.Applying AXHT case, this case is even stronger. DHCJ Stock and Au-Yeung J have declared various deeds and agreements void ab initio. D3’s defence of bona fide mortgagee for value without notice must fail because the defence necessarily has to on the void Mortgage. D3 could not be regarded as having given valuable consideration when advancing the loan to the Imposter. D3 simply had no legal right to receive money from D5. 61.Mr Ngai relies on the principles set out in YukioTakahashi v Cheng Zhen Shu & Ors [2008] 5 HKLRD 292, Fung J, at §§56, 60 and 61:
62.Applying those principles, Mr Ngai submits that D5 intended that D3 shall have the money. D5’s money paid to D3 was for good consideration to discharge the debt owed to D3 by Mr Jack Lynn. D3’s position has changed in good faith. D5 has not identified any causal relationship and there was simply none between the alleged mistake of fact in paying D3 and the payment that D5 now seeks to recover from D3. D5 took the risk that she might be wrong. It was a state of doubt as opposed to a mistake as put forth by D5. 63.With respect to Mr Ngai, the first instance judgment was overturned on appeal by the Court of Appeal and the appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed ( (2011) 14 HKCFAR 558, FACV 2/2010 §§37-40 (per Ribeiro PJ). 64.The CFA confirmed the principle that where A, with B’s authorization or consent, pays C money which discharges a debt owed by B to C, C has given good consideration for that payment, precluding any claim by A to recover the money from C on the basis of mistake or total failure of consideration (§38 of the CFA judgment). 65.In that case, P sought restitution on the basis of total failure of consideration. The payee (D3) was enriched but CFA held that it was not at the expense of P. P was in fact discharging its obligation under a joint venture when it handed the subject cashier orders to D1 and D2. Likewise when each defendant handed the cashier orders to D3, they were discharging their respective obligations. Each downstream party in the series of back to back contracts were content to accept the subject cashier orders in discharge of the payment obligations owed to them. D3 gave consideration for the money received from P which was to discharge an obligation of D4. The facts in Yukio Takahashi were thus wholly distinguishable from the present case where there was an indisputable fraud such that the forged documents were held to be void ab initio. D3 in the present case cannot be said to have provided consideration on the authority of AXHT case. 66.In any case, Mr Ngai cannot demonstrate on the facts how the words underlined in §56(2) of Fung J’s judgment applied to D5. It is simply unarguable that D5 intended D3 to have the money regardless of whether D3’s Mortgage and the series of loan documents were “true or false”: cf AXHT, §52. What caused her to pay was her mistake (not doubt) as to validity of the void documents. The causal link between her payment to D3 and the restitution sought was plain as daylight. 67.The defence of bona fide mortgagee for value without notice is not triable. H2. Change of position in good faith 68.This is an available defence to an action for restitution on the principle that the recipient’s position may have been so changed that it would be inequitable in all the circumstances to require him to make restitution. This signals “a broad approach based on practical justice”:張 侃 v 尚品滙(香港)國際貿易有限公司[2023] HKCA 996, at §36 (per G Lam JA) . 69.To establish the change of position defence, the defendant must establish a causative link between the receipt of the benefit and his change of position: Credit One Finance Limited v Yeung Kwok Chi [2021] 1 HKC 598, §§66, Mr Recorder Eugene Fung SC. 70.As set out in paragraph 62 above, D3 queries the causal link between D5’s payment and the restitution sought. If so, how could D3 establish the causative link as required by Credit One? 71.Anyhow, the causal link was in fact clear. The change of position was necessarily premised on a void Mortgage. When D3 had not provided consideration, it is not inequitable to require D3 to repay D5 what is rightfully hers. H3. D5 was not herself a bona fide purchaser for value without notice 72.D3 points out that D5 has taken the risk that the title might be defective when she purchased the Property. On her own case, she had never met the registered owner of the Property, knowing that the title deeds were lost by the very person whom D5 knew was back in Hong Kong to deal with the replacement of title deeds. She proceeded with the transaction without a statutory declaration and paid the purchase price in full with cash. She expressly agreed to purchase the Property subject to any defective title, waived and relinquished all her rights to raise any requisition and objections to title, and agreed to D4 not giving any warranty to good title (clauses 7(b)(i) and 12 of D5’s Agreement; clause 1(a) to Part VIII). D5 understood the market price of the Property was about HK$11,000,000 but she purchased it at HK$9,000,000. Her mother even argued for a further reduction after confirming the purchase. The Property was sold by D4 as mortgagee vendor without any auction or any court order for sale, and was done within about 40 days from D4’s 2nd Legal Charge to the first payment on behalf of D5. There is query as to whether D5 turned a blind eye to the true state of affairs and took risk to benefit from a questionable transaction. 73.Having consented to the Plaintiff’s case and submitting to judgment, D5 now shifts the blame to D3 on the basis of her own will and decision. The question of justice would appear to deserve a trial. 74.D5 made no attempt to clarify or affirm to the allegations of D3. For present purposes, I take the facts advanced by D3 in paragraph 72 at their highest. 75.Even so, in my view, taking a risk that the title to the Property might be defective is very different from a risk that there is no title at all. On a fair interpretation of the clauses relied on by D3, in particular, clause 1(a) to Part VIII of the D5 Agreement, D5 “expressly agrees to purchase the Property subject to any defect in title to the Property”. D4 could deliver and D5 was willing to accept a defective title (say with one missing title deed), but D5 could legitimately reject the Property without title at all due to fraud and she was not shown to be a party to the fraud. 76.Anyway, that risk has caused D5 to lose the Property to the Plaintiff. However, taking that risk would not entitle D3 to receive the money D5 mistakenly paid to D3 to discharge a void loan that she had never sought or authorized. H4. Other reasons for trial 77.D3 relies on the number of parties involved, the factual matrix and the multitude of reliefs to submit that there are other reasons for trial. I am unable to agree. The factual matrix was not complex. D2-D5 acted on the documents registered in the Land Registry as many people would have done in a conveyancing transaction. The reliefs all centre around a cluster of documents created over a period of about 8 months, and the purported purchase monies in relation to one Property. These do not in themselves justify a trial when there are no triable issues: Nice Plan Development Ltd v Ke Jun Xiang. 78.I find no triable issues under Question 4 or other reasons for trial. I. D4’s DEFENCE UNDER QUESTION 4 79.D4 similarly runs the defences of bona fide mortgagee for value without notice and change of position. For the same reasons given in respect of D3’s defence, D4’s defences must fail. I find no triable issues under Question 4 or other reasons for trial. J. CONCLUSION 80.In sum, D5 has discharged her burden of establishing an affirmative answer to the first three Questions in Shanghai Tongji, whereas all the defenses raised by D2 to D4 to Question 4 are non-triable. 81.D5 has been held liable to the Plaintiff in the Main Action. That liability arose out of the fraud of the Imposter and the void documents that D2-D4 entered into with him/her. D5 is entitled to an indemnity from D2-D4. D5 accepts that D2-D4 are each liable for the amount they received from D5. 82.I therefore give summary judgment to D5 in terms of paragraphs 1-6 of the Summons, being declarations that D2 to D4 are each holding the sum it received from D5 respectively on trust for D5 and orders to refund the same to D5. 83.I also give judgment to D5 for a contribution by D2-D4 to the full extent including the whole of the Plaintiff’s claim against D5 in the Main Action, in terms of paragraph 9 of the Summons. K. COSTS 84.I make an order nisi that costs should follow the event such that D2 to D4 do pay to D5 costs of and occasioned by D5 in defending the Main action and costs of the CIP (including the costs of this Order 14 application) in terms of paragraph 11 of the Summons. Such costs are to be taxed if not agreed. 85.I thank counsel for their assistance.
Mr. Leon Tang, instructed by Jal. N. Karbhari & Co., for 2nd Defendant Mr. Matthew Ngai and Ms. Mandy Chan, instructed by KCL & Partners, for 3rd Defendant Mr. Fegus Chan instructed by, H. Y. Leung & Co. LLP, for 4th Defendant Mr. Adrian Leung instructed by, V. Hau & Chow, for 5th Defendant |
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