Re Nur Inayah

CAMP 177/2023, [2024] HKCA 41

On Appeal From [2023] HKCA 1133

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 177 OF 2023

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 491 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the judgment of the court):

1.On 13 October 2023, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this Court’s judgment of 6 October 2023 (“the Judgment”) ([2023] HKCA 1133).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s reapplication for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge P Li (“the Deputy Judge”) dated 19 April 2021, by which the Deputy Judge refused her application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2021] HKCFI 1019).

2.The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.In her Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“Dear Sir/Madam,

I would like to infomr the Honourable Court that there is some error in law in my decision. Decision maker just relied on COL Information and my previous facts which were in favour while rejecting my claim. Acual life occur different situation then what is mentioned in COL Information. The Officer and cours prefers to ignore the overwhelming of the evidence of this violence towards minorities searching for unrealistic silver lining. The Decision is betrary a bias and formula approach unlikely fairly access the danger of my life and clearly not reasonable.” (sic)

5.Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged her written submissions on 27 October 2023.  In those submissions, she repeated the procedural history of her non-refoulement claim.  She also cited ST v Director of Immigration [2014] 4 HKLRD 277 and Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289 and contended that high standards of fairness were required in the determination of a torture claim.  She submitted that the Board had acted in a procedurally unfair manner without properly assessing his credibility.  She also referred to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 and R v Ministry of Defence ex p Smith [1996] QB 517 for the proposition that a decision of an administrative body was liable to be set aside if it was reached unreasonably.  She further referred to section 37ZT of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, which relates to the late filing of notice of appeal to the Board but failed to point out its relevance to her case.  It is noted that her submissions are all general propositions and the applicant has failed to show specifically how they are relevant to her case.

6.In our view, her intended application is wholly without substance.  The allegations made in her Notice of Motion and written submissions are all bare and vague allegations unsupported by any evidence. She also did not identify any specific error in the Judgment with sufficient particulars.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  Accordingly, the applicant’s intended appeal plainly has no merit.

7.Further, even taking her case at its highest, her allegations are fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.The applicant has therefore failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

9.For these reasons, we dismiss the Notice of Motion.

The applicant acting in person