Vu Ngoc Dan v. Hong Kong Sar Government
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 2303/2023 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 February 2024.
1. By an ex parte application filed on 20 December 2023, the Applicant applies for a writ of habeas corpus , pursuant to Order 54 rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A). The Applicant thereby seeks release from the custody of the Correctional Services Department.
Cites 4 cases
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HCAL 2303/2023 [2024] HKCFI 466 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2303 OF 2023 ________________________
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ A. Application 1.By an ex parte application filed on 20 December 2023, the Applicant applies for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to Order 54 rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A). The Applicant thereby seeks release from the custody of the Correctional Services Department. B. Background of Applicant 2.The Applicant is a Vietnamese national who entered Hong Kong illegally on 1 November 2015. The Applicant was thereafter released on recognizance on 23 November 2015. 3.On 7 December 2017, a removal order was issued against the Applicant (the “Removal Order”) which remains valid. 4.On 10 January 2024, A Notice of Consideration of Deportation was served on the Applicant. A deportation order was made against the Applicant on 25 January 2024 (the “Deportation Order”). 5.The Applicant claims that he has a wife in Hong Kong who is a non-refoulement claimant. The Applicant has no other local connection in Hong Kong. 6.The Applicant was detained since 19 September 2023, after he was released from prison having served his last prison sentence. At the time of the hearing, the Applicant has been detained for 141 days. C. NRC related proceedings 7.The Applicant first lodged his non-refoulement claim (the “NRC”) on 2 November 2015. The Director of Immigration (the “Director”) rejected the Applicant’s NRC on 25 April 2017 by a notice of decision (the “Director’s Decision”). The Applicant’s application for late filing of the Notice of Appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board against the Director’s Decision was refused on 11 January 2019 (the “TCAB Decision”). 8.The Applicant’s application to the Court of First Instance for leave to apply for judicial review against the TCAB Decision (the “JR Application”) was dismissed by the Form CALL-1 in HCAL 1029/2019 dated 3 August 2022. 9.On 16 April 2023 and 3 October 2023, the Applicant indicated his intention to lodge a NRC. The Director informed the Applicant on 4 May 2023 and 20 October 2023 that as his NRC had been finally determined, no action would be taken. 10.In any event, according to the updated removal policy of the ID since 7 December 2022, once a NRC claimant's subsequent legal proceedings have reached the stage of having been rejected by the Court of First Instance, the existence of further proceedings will not normally be considered by the authority as an impediment to removal. 11.There is thus no legal impediment to the Applicant’s removal due to any outstanding NRC related proceedings. 12.On 27 November 2023, Lee & Associates Law Office (“LLO”) informed the Immigration Department that the Applicant had filed a summons to the Court of Appeal under CAMP 355/2023 and requested the release of the Applicant. On 28 November 2023, the Director replied to LLO that under prevailing policy/arrangement, the removal of unsubstantiated non-refoulement claimants will be proceeded upon the dismissal of his JR Application by the CFI, irrespective of whether the claimant has filed a notice of appeal to the higher courts. D. Criminal Record & Sentencing Record & Record of Abscondence 13.Whilst the Applicant was released on recognizance, the Applicant had repeatedly been arrested and subsequently been convicted of the following criminal offences:
E. Steps towards Removal 14.On 27 September 2023, a few days after the commencement of his detention, the Applicant had indicated his refusal to return to Vietnam. 15.On 25 October 2023, the Applicant was informed of the re-entry seeking arrangement and agreed to attend an interview with the Vietnamese Interview Team (a team of officials from the Vietnamese Government responsible for the verification of an applicant’s identity and the approval of his return to Vietnam) (the “VIT”). The Applicant was interviewed by the VIT for identity verification on 31 October 2023 and approval for his return to Vietnam was granted by the VIT on 3 November 2023. 16.On 17 November 2023, the Applicant indicated once again that he refused to return to Vietnam. 17.On 15 December 2023, a Vietnamese passport with expiry date on 15 December 2024 was issued to the Applicant by the Consulate General of Vietnam in Hong Kong. 18.A repatriation flight has been arranged and scheduled for 8 February 2024. 19.It can thus be seen that the Immigration Department has all along taken a proactive stance in effecting the Applicant’s removal, and the major reason why the Applicant cannot be deported is his refusal to co-operate. F. Applicable Principles 20.In the Court of Appeal’s Reasons for Judgment dated 29 July 2022 in Harjang Singh v Secretary for Security and Another [2022] HKCA 781, the principles to be applied in an application for habeas corpus were set out in summary in §164. 21.In considering the present application, I have adopted the said principles and have borne in mind that (1) the burden is on the Director to justify the continued lawfulness of the detention, and (2) the weight to be given to individual factors in the balancing exercise may, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, vary considerably as the period of detention lengthens. G. The Applicant’s Submissions 22.The Applicant has set out his grounds for application in his affirmation filed on 20 December 2023. In summary, they are as follows:
23.The Applicant has in addition made the following oral submissions at the hearing:
24.I have borne these points in mind as appropriate in my analysis below. H. Lawful Authority for Detention? 25.The Removal Order and the Deportation order remain valid. 26.From 19 September 2023 to 9 January 2024, the Applicant was detained under section 32(3A) of the Ordinance pending removal pursuant to the Removal Order. 27.From 9 January 2024 to 22 January 2024, the Applicant was detained under section 29(1) of the Ordinance pending consideration of whether a deportation order should be made against him. 28.From 23 January 2024 to 25 January 2024, the Applicant was detained under section 29(2) of the Ordinance pending consideration of whether a deportation order should be made against him. 29.From 25 January 2024 to present, the Applicant was detained under section 32(3) pending removal under the Deportation Order. 30.Thus, there was and remains clear prima facie lawful authority for the detention. 31.Therefore, the question arises as to whether the overall circumstances have rendered continued detention unreasonable, and hence unlawful. I. Whether Detention has become unlawful 32.The assessment of whether an originally lawful detention has ceased to be lawful due to its continuation for an unreasonable period will be made in line with the “Hardial Singh principles”:
33.The burden of demonstrating the detention (and the continuation of it) is lawful rests on the respondent to the application for habeas corpus. HS1 34.I am satisfied that the Director has detained the Applicant for the sole purpose of removal or deportation throughout the detention period. HS1 is satisfied. HS2 & HS3 35.The starting point is the length of the detention – about 141 days – against which all the other factors must be weighed and balanced. 36.For the following reasons, I am satisfied that HS2 and HS3 are satisfied:
HS4 37.In view of the steps that had been taken by the Director as set out in paragraphs 15 – 18 above, I am of the view that the Director had diligently pursued the Applicant’s removal and I am satisfied that HS4 is satisfied. 38.Based on the above, I am of the view that the period of detention to date has remained lawful at all times and will remain lawful for the foreseeable future. J. Result 39.For these reasons, I dismiss the Applicant’s application for writ of habeas corpus with no order as to costs.
The applicant, acting in person Ms Wingkie Lam, Government Counsel, of the Department of Justice, for the respondents | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment