Re Muniyappan Thangam
Read the full judgment text of CAMP 263/2023 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 15 May 2025.
1. This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung dated 10 July 2023 refusing to extend time for the applicant to appeal against the decision of DHCJ To (“the Judge”) dated 5 May 2023 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 21 November 2019 (“the Board’s De
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CAMP 263/2023, [2025] HKCA 415 On an intended appeal from [2023] HKCFI 1201 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 263 OF 2023 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL 368/2020) ____________________
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___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.This is an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of DHCJ KW Lung dated 10 July 2023 refusing to extend time for the applicant to appeal against the decision of DHCJ To (“the Judge”) dated 5 May 2023 refusing to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 21 November 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”) refusing the applicant’s application for late filing of a notice of appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 31 July 2018 (“the Director’s 2nd Decision”) rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim based on the persecution risk[1], the BOR 2 risk[2] and the BOR 3 risk[3]. Background 2.The applicant is a national of India. He entered Hong Kong on 12 February 2009 as a visitor, but he overstayed and was arrested by the police on 28 February 2009. He lodged a torture claim on 2 March 2009, which was rejected by the Director’s Notice of Decision dated 18 January 2013 (“the Director’s 1st Decision”). Thereafter, by way of a written representation dated 12 April 2013, the applicant lodged a non-refoulement claim, which was assessed under the Unified Screening Mechanism on grounds other than the torture risk[4]. 3.The applicant’s claim was based on a fear of being harmed or killed by a high-ranking police officer in his locality due to his suspected involvement in a murder investigation. The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the Judge at [6] to [10] of his decision (“the CALL-1 Form”)[5]. 4.By a Notice of Decision dated 31 July 2018 (i.e. the Director’s 2nd Decision), the Director decided against the applicant’s non-refoulement claim based on all applicable grounds other than torture. 5.The applicant did not appeal against the Director’s 1st Decision to the Board, but sought to appeal against the Director’s 2nd Decision. However, he filed the relevant notice of appeal/petition (“NoA”) late on 17 August 2018 (by one day). The Board, after considering the applicant’s reasons for the delay as well as the merits of the applicant’s claim, dismissed the applicant’s application to file the NoA out of time on 21 November 2019 (i.e. the Board’s Decision). The Judge’s decision 6.The applicant filed a Form 86 (out of time) on 10 March 2020 seeking to judicially review the Board’s Decision, without setting out any grounds of review. In his supporting affirmation, he claimed that he did not wish to return to India because his life would be in danger. 7.After summarising the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the Board’s and the Director’s Decisions, the Judge refused to extend time for the applicant to apply for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision. The Judge gave the following reasons in refusing to grant leave at [18] to [22] of the CALL‑1 Form:
The present application for extension of time to appeal 8.The applicant’s address as stated in the Form 86 was at the Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre. The court was subsequently notified by the Department of Justice that the applicant was transferred to Tai Tam Gap Correctional Institution (“the Institution”). According to the court’s record, a copy of the CALL-1 Form and a sealed copy of the Judge’s order were sent by post to the applicant at the Institution on 5 May 2023. This letter was not returned undelivered. 9.Pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(4), the applicant had 14 days to lodge an appeal. The applicant did not file a Notice of Appeal within 14 days of the Judge’s decision dated 5 May 2023. 10.The applicant took out a summons in the Court of First Instance on 14 June 2023 seeking extension of time to appeal, in which his address was also stated to be the Institution. In the Summons and in his supporting affirmation, he repeated that his life would be in danger should he be refouled, and that the Board’s Decision was “unfair”. 11.The applicant’s application to appeal out of time was dismissed by DHCJ KW Lung on 10 July 2023[6]. 12.By a summons filed on 27 July 2023, the applicant renewed his application for an extension of time to appeal before this court. In the summons and his supporting affirmation, the applicant sought an extension of time to appeal against the decision given by DHCJ KW Lung on 10 July 2023, being the court’s refusal to grant an extension of time for him to appeal against the Judge’s decision dated 5 May 2023. Although in his summons the applicant purported to appeal against the decision of the court dated 10 July 2023, we shall treat it as a renewed application for an extension of time to appeal against the substantive decision of the Judge dated 5 May 2023, by which leave for judicial review was refused. 13.In the Summons and the supporting affirmation, the applicant repeated the dangers he may face should he be refouled, complained that “the point of [his] case was ignored”, and contended that “the Decision were not transparent”. 14.The applicant failed to lodge any written submissions as directed by the Registrar of Civil Appeals. He is therefore deemed to have abandoned his right to rely on the same. 15.Having considered the papers, we are satisfied that this application can properly be dealt with on the papers without the need for an oral hearing. We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed. Discussion 16.As noted above, the Judge’s decision dated 5 May 2023 was sent to the last known address of the applicant (i.e. the Institution) on the same day, and was not returned undelivered. The inference to be drawn is that he has received that letter from the court, and he has had knowledge of the Judge’s decision within the period he was permitted to lodge the intended appeal. 17.The applicant has failed to elaborate on how and when he had become aware of the Judge’s decision. We are accordingly of the view that the applicant has failed to proffer any reasonable explanation or reason for his delay in lodging his intended appeal. 18.We have nonetheless proceeded to consider the merits of the intended appeal. 19.The applicant has not condescended to any particulars, in the Form 86 or otherwise, as to on what basis the Board’s Decision was said to be not in accordance with the law, procedurally unfair or Wednesbury unreasonable. That being the case, the application for leave for judicial review was hopeless and rightly dismissed by the Judge. 20.Section 37ZT(3) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) (“the Ordinance”) provides that the Board may allow the late filing of the NoA if the applicant provided sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy the Board that (i) he had exercised all due diligence to file the NoA within the prescribed time; and (ii) his failure to do so was due to circumstances beyond his control. 21.Regardless of procedural breaches committed by the applicant and the lack of explanation therefor, it is incumbent on the Board, in exercise of its discretion to extend time for appeal, to consider the merits of the applicant’s claim. See Re Khan Kamal Ahmed [2019] HKCA 377 at [20]; Re Qasim Ali [2019] HKCA 430; Re Castillo Raquel Adona & anor [2022] HKCA 1053. 22.We note that the Board has in its decision duly considered in some detail both the applicant’s reasons for the delay in lodging the appeal, and the substantive merits of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim (see [12]-[18] of the Board’s Decision). 23.We reiterate that an appeal (or an intended appeal) against a refusal of leave to apply for judicial review is not the occasion for this court to examine the decision of the Board afresh. This court is only concerned with the decision of the Judge at first instance, and shall interfere with such decision only if the Judge had erred in law, failed to take into account a relevant matter or was otherwise plainly wrong. See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Qasim Ali at [18]. 24.Having subjected the Board’s Decision to anxious scrutiny, we do not see any reason or basis for this court to intervene. The applicant has in any event failed to identify any arguable error of law by the Judge, any relevant matter that he had failed to consider or any other reason why the refusal of leave was wrong. Nor can we discern any such matters. 25.It is well-established that an appeal against a refusal to grant leave for judicial review is not a fresh application for leave, and that an applicant must point to errors on the part of the Judge. This has clearly not been done here. 26.For these reasons, we do not see any prospect of success in the intended appeal. This court will not grant an extension of time for a hopeless appeal. The summons filed on 27 July 2023 is accordingly dismissed.
The applicant acting in person. [1] This refers to a risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which is a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. [2] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383. [3] This refers to a genuine and substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment covered by article 3 of s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance. [4] This is now referred to as a foreseeable and real present risk of torture covered by Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) which is, in brief, defined in s 37U(1) as severe physical or mental pain or suffering inflicted with state consent or acquiescence to obtain information, or as punishment or intimidation or based on discrimination. |
Cases cited in this judgment