Ncm v. Flicbl
Read the full judgment text of HCSD 55/2024 on BabelCite. This HCSD judgment was delivered on 4 June 2025.
1. By an application dated 16 December 2024, the Applicant seeks to set aside the statutory demand dated 3 October 2024 issued by the Respondent.
Cites 5 cases
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HCSD 55/2024 [2025] HKCFI 2476 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE A STATUTORY DEMAND NO. 55 OF 2024 ____________________
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____________________ DECISION ____________________ Introduction 1.By an application dated 16 December 2024, the Applicant seeks to set aside the statutory demand dated 3 October 2024 issued by the Respondent. Material Background 2.The Respondent is an insurance company. 3.The Applicant is an insurance agent. He worked for the Respondent from 2015 to January 2017. 4.On 15 May 2017, the Respondent commenced HCA 1130/2017 against the Applicant in respect of (i) a “clawback” sum of HK$3,701,599; and (ii) a further sum of HK$269,496.67 due by a downline agent in respect of which the Applicant was a guarantor. 5.As the Applicant did not file an acknowledgement of service, on 6 July 2017, the Respondent entered default judgment against the Applicant (the “Default Judgment”). 6.It transpired that in January 2019, the Applicant worked for the Respondent again. 7.It is not in dispute that the Applicant had signed a letter of offer (the “Letter of Offer”) issued by the Respondent on 8 January 2019. 8.For present purposes, the following terms of the Letter of Offer are pertinent:-
9.The Applicant says that:-
10.However, the Respondent contends that the Applicant did not fulfil the Contract-to-date PC Requirement. 11.The Respondent’s case is as follows:-
12.On 8 July 2020, Ms Li wrote to the Respondent indicating that she withdrew her enquiry or complaint on 10 June 2020. 13.Nevertheless, the Respondent took the view that the Disputed Policies were still liable to be rescinded. 14.Accordingly, the Respondent contended that there was no PC (ie production credit) arising from the Disputed Policies. In light of the deduction in respect thereof, the Applicant had not fulfilled the Contract-to-date PC Requirement[1] under the Letter of Offer. Thus, the condition for waiving the Default Judgment under the Letter of Offer was not fulfilled. It follows that the Respondent is still entitled to enforce the Default Judgment against the Applicant. 15.In the premises, based on the indebtedness under the Default Judgment, the Respondent issued the Statutory Demand dated 3 October 2024. 16.The Applicant disputed the Respondent’s suggestion that he had failed to fulfil the Contract-to-date PC Requirement under the Letter of Offer. 17.Whilst the Applicant took issue in respect of the reliability of the alleged investigation carried out by the Respondent, he sought to rely on the email/letter[2] dated 17 September 2020 from Mr Cheung and Ms Li. In this email/letter, Ms Li confirmed that:
18.The Applicant further contended that none of the terms contained in the Letter of Offer and the agency agreements that he signed on 17 January 2019[3] empowered the Respondent to reverse the PC (ie production credit) that had been given to him. Legal Principles on Setting Aside a Statutory Demand 19.The applicant bears the burden of satisfying the court that there is a valid reason that the demand ought to be set aside: DCKD v JPWL [2022] HKCFI 1059 at para 22 (per Linda Chan J). 20.When considering an application to set aside, the Court is only undertaking a limited exercise and will only be concerned with whether the creditor is able to pursue bankruptcy proceedings founded on the statutory demand: see Budge v AF Budge (Contractors) Ltd [1997] BPIR 366, 372A-D, per Peter Gibson LJ). 21.As Kwan J (as she then was) explained in Re Choy Wai Bor (HCB 8565/2001, 28 May 2002) at para 22:
22.In DCKD v JPWL (supra) at para 24, Linda Chan J stated:-
Deliberation 23.Bankruptcy proceedings are not the avenue for resolving genuine factual disputes. This court should not usurp the function of a civil court in resolving disputes that ought to be resolved at trial: see Re Leung Cherng Jiunn [2016] 1 HKLRD 850 at para 20 (per Kwan JA, as she then was). 24.In my view, the Applicant has raised a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds as to (i) whether the Respondent was entitled to revoke and/or cancel the PC (ie production credit) arising from the Disputed Policies; and (ii) whether the Applicant had fulfilled the Contract-to-date PC Requirement of HK$995,339 before the contractual deadline (ie December 2019). 25.In light of the email/letter dated 17 September 2020 from Mr Cheung and Ms Li, there is plainly a genuine factual dispute as to whether Ms Li had authorized Mr Michael Cheung (who is her husband) to handle the Disputed Policies and to sign and/or subscribe the same on her behalf. 26.If the answer to the question lies in the affirmative, it is, to say the least, highly arguable that the Disputed Policies should be treated as valid for present purposes. Thus, the Respondent should not deduct the Applicant’s PC (ie production credit) arising from the Disputed Policies. It follows that the Applicant had fulfilled the conditions (ie the Contract-to-date PC Requirement of HK$995,339) under the Letter of Offer. As such, the Respondent is contractually barred from enforcing the Default Judgment. 27.On the evidence, I am not in a position to reject the assertions contained in the said email/letter dated 17 September 2020 summarily on affidavit. 28.It appears to me that the contents of said email/letter are consistent with Ms Li’s act of withdrawing her complaint or enquiry on 8 July 2020 (which is admitted by the Respondent). 29.Moreover, it does not appear that Ms Li, who signed her name on the said letter, has an interest in the outcome of the dispute between the Applicant and the Respondent. It is uncertain as to why Ms Li would have conjured up some false assertions out of the blue. 30.I am unable to conclude that Ms Li’s assertions are false; nor am I in a position to find that the signature on the letter did not belong to Ms Li. These are matters for trial. 31.I am of the view that the dispute between the parties should be resolved at trial in a civil action. The Respondent should not have sought to invoke bankruptcy proceedings as a means for resolving its dispute with the Applicant. Conclusion and Disposition 32.Accordingly, I allow the Applicant’s application herein and order that the Statutory Demand be set aside. 33.There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. 34.I order the Respondent to pay the Applicant’s costs in this matter forthwith, summarily assessed at HK$130,000. 35.I thank Mr Kin Lau and Mr Stony Chan for their assistance.
Mr Kin Lau, instructed by M/s Simon CW Yung & Co, for the Applicant Mr Stony Chan, instructed by M/s Cheung, Chan & Chung, for the Respondent [1] The Applicant’s PC as of December 2019 (ie the 12 calendar months) was HK$1,027,329.70. The PC arising from the Disputed Policies was HK$64,013.94. The Respondent contends that this should be deducted. Hence, the PC achieved by the Applicant was only HK$963,314.76. This fell below the requisite Contract-to-date Requirement, which was HK$995,339. [2] The email was attached with a typed letter that was signed by both Mr Michael Cheung and Ms Li [3] The Applicant signed an individual agency agreement and an agency management agreement on 17 January 2019. |
Cases cited in this judgment