Masanthiah Teerapong v. Director of Immigration
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 742/2025 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 10 June 2025.
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 20 January 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks [1] , which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 178 of 2024 (“the 2 nd previous claim”). This Court struck it out because it duplicated with his earlier application in HCAL 1386 of 2018 (“the 1 st previous claim”), which had been dismissed by this Court by Order dated 31 March 2
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HCAL 742/2025 [2025] HKCFI 1923 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 742 OF 2025 _____________
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_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ THE APPLICATION 1.This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision dated 20 January 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) refusing his claim on the applicable risks[1], which had been determined in his previous application under HCAL 178 of 2024 (“the 2nd previous claim”). This Court struck it out because it duplicated with his earlier application in HCAL 1386 of 2018 (“the 1st previous claim”), which had been dismissed by this Court by Order dated 31 March 2021. 2.The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process. 3.The applicant appeared before the Court on 28 April 2025 and admitted that he had applied for judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision in the previous claim and this is the second application on the same facts and grounds. The procedural history 4.The applicant, aged 47, is a national of Thailand. In his 1st previous action, he claimed that if he is refouled to Thailand, he will be harmed or killed by the senior leader of a political party in Thailand because he had defalcated the party’s money given to him for touting election votes. 5.The Director dismissed his claim for the reason that it was not substantiated. He appealed to Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”). The Board found that his claim was unfounded and dismissed his appeal. 6.His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 31 March 2021. 7.In 2024, he submitted a duplicated application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and his duplicated application was struck out by this Court. 8.By letter received by the Immigration Department on 2 December 2024, the applicant applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. The subsequent claim application 9.Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success. 10.Upon the immigration officer’s advice, he had submitted additional materials in support of his application. He relied on a new ground that he had a dispute with his creditor, whom he did not mention to the immigration officer in his 1st previous claim. He also submitted that he did not want to be separated from his wife, who is having health problems in Hong Kong. 11.The immigration officer considered his evidence and found that the applicant had given no reason why he had not mentioned the creditor in his 1st previous claim. The immigration officer did not accept his evidence on this new issue. That he does not want to be separated from his sick wife is not a valid reason in support of his subsequent claim. Besides, the immigration officer also found that state protection would be available to him and internal relocation is viable if he returns to Thailand. 12.For those reasons, the immigration officer was not satisfied with the applicant’s subsequent claim application satisfied the conditions under section 37ZO of the Ordinance and he refused his application for subsequent claim. Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision 13.The applicant filed Form 86 on 26 March 2025 for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. He attached a statement of grounds to the form. His grounds in support of his application are summarized below.
14.In the affirmation in support of his application, the applicant has not raised any specific reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. Discussion 15.The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact-finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1). 16.The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant admitted that he relied upon the same reasons in his previous claim for this application. He asked this Court to consider that now he has a family in Hong Kong. 17.Those ground under paragraph 13 are bare assertions or his own opinions without any evidence in support. There is no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision. The fact that he has a family in Hong Kong is not valid to challenge the Director’s Decision. 18.The applicant fails to show that he has any realistic chance of success in his intended judicial review of the Director’s Decision. 19.I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. The RPO 20.This is a clear case of abuse of the process of the court as the applicant’s 2nd previous claim was struck out by this Court for abuse. 21.Because of the applicant’s attempt to abuse the process, the Court has to protect its process to be abused again. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 22.RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Direcctor of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25. 23.For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. The RPO was explained to the applicant before the hearing. When asked whether he had anything to say about the proposed RPO, he said he had nothing to say. 24.I am therefore satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
DISPOSITION 25.The applicant’s application is dismissed. 26.RPO in terms of paragraph 24 be made against the applicant.
The applicant appeared in person. [1]. The applicable risks are:
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