Yeung Siu Yung v. Fan Pui Wan, Margaret and Others
Read the full judgment text of HCA 1211/2018 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 27 June 2025.
1. Madam Yeung Siu Yung’s (“P”) was a victim of an elaborated and sustained fraud scheme perpetuated by the defendants (“Ds”).
Cited by 4 cases · Cites 7 cases
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HCA 1211/2018 [2025] HKCFI 2525 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1211 OF 2018 ____________ BETWEEN
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_______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ INTRODUCTION 1.Madam Yeung Siu Yung’s (“P”) was a victim of an elaborated and sustained fraud scheme perpetuated by the defendants (“Ds”). 2.She brought this claim against Ds principally for their conspiracy to defraud and injure her by unlawful means. 3.P was a vulnerable retired divorcee of around 70 years old who, in reliance of fraudulent misrepresentation and/or deceit perpetrated by Ds, made numerous remittances of a total sum of HK$71,867,411.35 to various parties between July 2014 and October 2017 for purported investments and returns which turned out to be bogus. 4.P also claims against the 1st defendant Margaret Fan Pui Wan (范佩韻) (“D1”) for breach of fiduciary duty, and against the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th defendants (“D3”, “D4”, “D5”, “D6” and “D7” respectively) for unjust enrichment. 5.It is clear that D1 was the mastermind behind the whole fraudulent scheme with the assistance from D2 who was her husband; D3 who was her personal assistant; and D8 who was her former lover. D4, D6 and D7 were D1’s corporate vehicles to effect receipt and dissipation of the fraud proceeds. 6.As can be seen from this judgment, what Ds did to P was wicked, despicable and callous. 7.By the time of the trial, only D3 was willing to face the music and appeared at the hearing. D1 who was legally represented until one week before the trial filed a notice to act in person on 5 November 2024. She simply disappeared and never turned up at the trial. D2 and D8 also never appeared and had vanished long time ago. 8.A criminal trial arising out of the same fraudulent scheme perpetuated against P took place in the High Court under HCCC 142/2023 before a judge and jury in February 2025. Both D1 and D3, together with another person, were the defendants in the criminal case. D1 had absconded and did not appear at the criminal trial. The trial judge issued an arrest warrant against her and her bail money was confiscated by the Court. 9.At the end of the criminal trial, D3 was convicted of offences relating to money laundering and was sentenced to 20 months of imprisonment. 10.D3 who was not legally represented in the present proceedings gave evidence. As did P and her daughter Ms Wong Nga Ching Cindy (“Ms Wong”). They were the only witnesses who testified at the trial. 11.P’s case has been very carefully summarized and analyzed by Mr Mike Yeung, P’s counsel in this case, in both P’s opening and closing submissions. Where appropriate, I shall respectfully adopt the contents of those submissions in this judgment. 12.Further, given the fact that the evidence presented by P in this case, including the contents of P and Ms Wong’s witness statements which they have adopted as evidence-in-chief when they gave evidence, are not challenged by D3, I shall accept them as proven in this case. Unless otherwise stated, I would also disregard any documentary evidence, witness statements or written submissions filed or lodged by D1, D2 or D8 prior to the trial in this case as they have not turned up in Court to try to prove their case. BACKGROUND Procedural History 13.P commenced the present proceedings in May 2018 and obtained interlocutory injunction against Ds. P now seeks recovery from Ds, jointly and severally, of a total sum of HK$66,013,631.35[1], having taken into account setoff of a total sum of HK$5,853,780 which P has so far received from D4[2]. 14.P has obtained default judgments against D5, D6, D7 and D8. However, as Mr Yeung has submitted, these could hardly be any recourse or comfort to P because:
15.The trial therefore only concerned D1 to D4. Both the notice of trial and the PTR dated 1 March 2023 had been served on them. 16.D4 was at all material times a Hong Kong company whose sole director and 96% shareholder was D1, but was unrepresented after the following sequence of events:-
17.By the time of the trial, D1, D2 and D3 were all acting in person. However, they had all along been legally represented at different stages of the proceedings:-
18.D2, who participated in the action and had proper notice of the PTR and trial date, was absent at the PTR on 24 July 2024. In his absence, Hon Ng J ordered that the trial do proceed as scheduled (“the PTR Order”). 19.P confirms that the trial bundles have been served on D1 to D4 in accordance with §3 of the PTR Order. P sent her version of the dramatis personae (in both Chinese and English), chronology of events and list of issues to D1, D2, D3 and D4 for agreement but have not heard from any of them. P therefore filed and served her version in accordance with §4 of the PTR Order. Factual Background 20.P was at the material times a lonely and gullible lady of around 70 years old. She was retired and divorced and living alone in Hong Kong. She was born and only educated up to Form 5 in Mainland China. Her English was only up to elementary level and therefore had limited English capability. Neither did she have any knowledge of any investment product in the financial or capital market. P’s limited English capability was in fact corroborated by D2 who had met with P on a couple of occasions. 21.D1 was a lady who appeared to P to be in her thirties or forties at the time when they first met in 2014[3]. It was only discovered by P much later that D1 in fact was a repeated offender of dishonesty-related crimes. She was convicted of “using false instrument” in 2009 and was at the material time in around 2016 subject to another prosecution of “fraud/using copies of false instrument”. 22.According to P, she met D1 when she presented herself as an experienced figure in the financial services industry in May 2014 who offered P assistance in making investments. D1 quickly won over P’s trust to the level of the capacity of a fiduciary, and they soon developed a close relationship to the extent that D1 would call P “godmother” (契媽). To this end, D3 confirmed that he “was aware that [D1] addressed to [P] as “godmother” (契媽)’’. 23.D2 was D1’s husband. According to P, she first met D2 in around late 2016/early 2017, and her understanding from D1 at that meeting was that D2 already knew much about P’s background and the purported investments emerging from D1. In fact, when D2 was arrested by police in around December 2017 for the fraud reported by P, he admitted under caution that he knew D1 had purported dealings with P. 24.D3 was the secretary and/or personal assistant of D1, and was the company secretary of D4 and D7. He was one of the persons arrested by the police in around December 2017 for the fraud reported by P. Under caution, he admitted he knew that D1 introduced investment plans to P and that D1 would use P’s proceeds to pay for D1’s legal fees, personal monthly insurance and repayment to debtors. 25.D4 was at all material times a Hong Kong company controlled and directed by D1. On top of D4, D1 was also the directing mind of D6 and D7. D4, D6 and D7 were recipients of many of the remittances made by P in reliance of the fraudulent misrepresentation and/or deceit. DISCUSSION P’s Case 26.In essence, P’s case is that:
27.Based on the documents produced by P at trial (which was helpfully summarised in table form by Mr Yeung in his opening), it can be seen that P made the following remittances/payments:
28.Mr Yeung has further summarised from the above to show in the table below the remittances/payments made by the recipients/beneficiaries:
29.Given D2’s admission under caution upon arrest that D1 would use P’s proceeds to pay for D1’s legal fees[4] and in view of the fact that D1’s criminal trial of “fraud/using copies of false instrument” was conducted in January to May 2017[5], it is quite clear that the payments/remittances to Messrs ST Cheng represented D1’s legal costs arising from her criminal case. 30.As Mr Yeung has set out in the opening, the payments/remittances were made on the back of the following (mis)representations as pleaded in the statement of claim (“SOC”):
31.P does not dispute that, during the course of the fraud, a total sum of HK$5,853,780 was paid by D4 to her[56]. P accepts that the quantum of her claim shall be deducted by such sum. 32.P in the action therefore primarily claims damages and compensation of HK$66,115,909.35 (being HK$71,969,689.35 – HK$5,853,780)[57] against all Ds for unlawful means conspiracy, and further or in the alternative:
33.In the present proceedings, D1 and D4 are effectively running bare denial defence. All they put forward is that P knew what she was entering into, that there was no misrepresentation, and that P’s loss is simply the result of investment losses[58]. 34.D2’s defence is that he had no knowledge of the dealings between P and D1, as he only met P twice, and that he was not involved in the making of any representations to P[59]. 35.D3 similarly claims that he was not involved in the making of any representations to P in relation to any purported investments[60]. LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES TO BE DECIDED Legal Principles 36.The legal principles on unlawful means conspiracy and fraudulent misrepresentation/tort of deceit are trite and have been helpfully summarized by Mr Yeung and of which I agree and would adopt. They are as follows:
37.Insofar as unjust enrichment is concerned, the legal principles are similarly trite: Shanghai Tongji Science & Technology Industrial Company Limited v Casil Clearing Limited (2004) 7 HKCFAR 79; [2004] HKCFA 21 at §67. Four questions have to be answered:
38.On fiduciary duties, the categories of fiduciary relationship are infinitely varied and the duties of the fiduciary vary with the circumstances which generate the relationship. A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The undertaking can be implied in the circumstances, particularly where someone has taken on a role in which fiduciary duties are appropriate. Fiduciary duties are obligations imposed by law as a reaction to particular circumstances of responsibility assumed by one person in respect of the conduct or affairs of another. The concept encaptures a situation where one person is in a relationship which gives rise to a legitimate expectation, which equity will recognise, that the fiduciary will not utilise his or her position in such a way which is adverse to the interest of the principal. The expectation is assessed objectively, and so it is not necessary for the principal subjectively to harbour the expectation. Nor is it relevant whether the person who is alleged to be a fiduciary subjectively considered himself or herself to be undertaking fiduciary duties: Snell’s Equity 34th edn §7-005. Issues to be Decided 39.In light of the above legal principles, and considering that payments/remittances made by P are well proven, I agree with Mr Yeung that the core issues need to be resolved by the Court in this case boil down to the following:
40.In considering these questions, Mr Yeung invited the Court to place particular emphasis on the documentary evidence[61] and the photos showing meetings between P and D3/D2[62] in this case. I agree with that approach. FINDINGS OF THE COURT Evidence at trial reinforces the respective roles played by Ds 41.As said, P and her daughter Ms Wong gave evidence at trial, whereas D3 gave evidence to support his defence. 42.D3 did not cross-examine P and Ms Wong as he said he had nothing to ask them. Thus, I will treat their evidence as unchallenged and will accept them in full: see Xie Li Xin at §8. 43.I agree with Mr Yeung’s submissions that the evidence transpired at the trial further reinforces the roles of Ds in the scam. 44.The following are some of the matters highlighted by Mr Yeung in his closing submissions in relation to the different roles played by various Ds of which I accept:
45.In his closing submissions, Mr Yeung confirms that P will not pursue the grounds of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment in this case. Therefore, there is no need for this Court to make any findings based on those causes of action. Ds’ fraudulent scheme as supported by the D1’s Letters 46.I accept the following submissions made by Mr Yeung that P’s case is corroborated by the D1 Letters:
47.I find all D1 Letters were written with the sole purpose of deceiving P and gaining her trust so that D1 and her associates, including D2, D3 and D4 could cream as much money out of P as possible. In this regard, I find D1 is a heartless and cold-blooded individual who has no morals at all. D3’s Evidence 48.As said, D3 was the only defendant who appeared at the trial and gave evidence. I find his evidence wholly incredible and I have no hesitation to reject all of them. 49.I agree with Mr Yeung that, in deciding whether to accept a witness’ account, importance should be attached to the inherent likelihood or unlikelihood of an event having happened, or the apparent logic or events. The Court should consider the consistency of the witness evidence with undisputed or indisputable evidence, and the internal consistency of the witness’ own oral testimony and his/her witness statement. In cases of fraud, the Court should always test the veracity of witness’ evidence by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, and pay particular regard to their motives and to the overall probabilities: see Hui Cheung Fai & Another v Daiwa Development Ltd & Others [2014] HKCFI 650 at §§77-80. 50.Factors which may affect the evaluation of a witness’s evidence include evasive and argumentative answers, tangential speeches avoiding the question, blaming legal advisers for pleading, disclosure and evidence shortcomings, self-contradiction, internal inconsistency, shifting case, new evidence, and selective disclosure: see Cheung Hon Kin v Chubb Life Insurance Company Ltd [2024] HKCFI 1313 at §82. D3’s evidence wholly unbelievable and defies logic 51.I find D3 is a shameless liar, who likes D1, has little or no morals at all. He would do anything to assist D1 and other Ds to deceive P. His only motive is to try to assist D1 and others to scam as much money out of P as possible. 52.The following are some of the matters which he was caught out lying as highlighted by Mr Yeung in his closing submissions. 53.D3 confirmed during cross-examination that he provided assistance to D4, D7 and Covermagazine HK Limited (“Covermagazine”) which were all D1’s corporate vehicles, and that the business nature of D4 and Covermagazine was as stated in the relevant bank account opening forms[74]. He also confirmed he was the company secretary of these entities. When he was asked to confirm that these entities did not provide investment and asset management services, he audaciously said D4 had. But when he was intimidated that provision of investment asset management services required SFC licence, D3 said he did not know whether D4 had relevant licence even though (1) he was the company secretary; (2) he never signed any documents relating to SFC licence application; and (3) he never heard from D1 about any SFC licence application. 54.I find D3’s evidence, as summarized by Mr Yeung in his closing submissions below, wholly incredible and not worthy of believing:
55.Given the above, I have no difficulty in finding D3 as an utterly untruthful and dishonest witness. In my judgment, he is at much responsible as D1, D2 and D8 in perpetuating the fraudulent scheme against P. Without his active participation, the fraud would not have succeeded in my view. Core Issues to be Decided 56.As submitted by Mr Yeung in his opening submissions, given that there can be little dispute on the payments/remittances made by P, the core issues to be decided by the Court would include:
The Misrepresentations and Payments 57.I find the following facts as stated in P’s evidence, which were principally contained in her witness statement (“P WS”), as proved as they are not challenged by any of Ds, including D3 who was present at the trial. 58.As Mr Yeung has analysed, the scam began in around May 2014 and ran until October 2017[80], and can be broadly divided into 3 stages, viz (i) the initial stage; (ii) the second stage; and (iii) the final stage. At the initial stage, Ds began with misrepresentations to win over P’s trust, followed by misrepresentations in connection with the existence of a private placement program (“the 1st PPP”)[81]. I accept that these (mis)representations were created as powerful weapons, individual and collective, to lure future payments from P at subsequent stages. Soon after, at the second stage, they started to scam P’s monies through those misrepresentations in connection with the 1st PPP and also other misrepresentations on further investments and 1st PPP-related matters progressively made[82]. Later on, at the final stage, they scammed more monies from P mainly under the pretext of investment returns[83]. (i) The Initial Stage 59.At initial stage up till around end of July 2014, P signed the following documents and made the following payments/remittances –
60.Based on P’s account, I find the following facts happened at the beginning of their relationship. P and D1 met in around mid-May 2014. D1 quickly introduced herself to P as a former HSBC senior official who maintained good connections, influence and network in HSBC (“the D1 Background Representation”). Traces of this HSBC-background representation could be seen in:
61.Unsurprisingly, given P’s background, the D1 Background Representation swiftly developed into a fiduciary relationship whereby P being at the inferior and vulnerable end was heavily dependent on and influenced by D1 (“the Fiduciary Relationship”)[92]. 62.At around the same time, D1 acted quickly to take advantage of P’s rather inferior background and scarce financial knowledge to falsely represent to P on the existence of a time-deposit alike scheme provided by HSBC, ie the 1st PPP (“the 1st PPP Representation”). As submitted by Mr Yeung, the 1st PPP Procedures, which was shown by D1 and D3 to P[93], is the best proof of the 1st PPP Representation having been made. According to paragraphs 1(a), 1(c), 4, 5, and 7 of the 1st PPP Procedures, P would earn interest of 10% per day on the amount of deposit in P’s USD current account in Hang Seng Bank, provided that such amount had a minimum of US$10 million and that she might have to move such amount to a HSBC account. I agree with Mr Yeung that this to the eyes of someone like P must have worked like a time deposit. D3 in his evidence admitted that he had played a part in preparing the know-your-customer form referred to in the 1st PPP Procedures and that he understood the contents therein and handed them for P’s signing. Thus, both D1 and D3 made the 1st PPP Representation to P. Thereafter, taking advantage of P’s limited English capability, a number of documents alleging to relate to participation in the 1st PPP (“the 1st PPP Documents Representation”) were presented by D1 to P for signing (“the 1st PPP Documents”). 63.In the circumstances, I find the 1st PPP Documents and the May 2014 Declaration serve as cogent proof of the 1st PPP Documents Representation having been made. 64.P therefore decided to participate in the 1st PPP, in reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship and/or the 1st PPP Representation. P also acceded to D1’s request to make the May 2014 Declaration. Given her limited English capability, it was clear that P signed the 1st PPP Documents on 16 May 2014 and signed the May 2014 Declaration on 23 May 2014, in reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the 1st PPP Representation and/or the 1st PPP Documents Representation[94]. I so find that was the case. 65.After the fraud was revealed, police advised P that the 1st PPP never existed[95]. The inevitable inference to make is that all the documents purportedly relating to the 1st PPP were false instruments. Thus, I find the 1st PPP Representation and the 1st PPP Documents Representation were false when they were made by D1 and D3, and knowingly so. 66.Further, crime investigation report revealed that D1 was a repeated offender of dishonesty-related crimes. She was convicted of using false instrument in 2009 under ESCC5549/2008, and was convicted of fraud/using copies of false instruments and imprisoned in August 2017 under ESCC2138/2016[96]. This indicated that D1, being a person with serious integrity issue since she was in her thirties[97], could hardly have been a former HSBC senior official. In fact, it was also discovered that D1 had her SFC licence removed from the Register of Licensed Person in 2008, which tallied with D1 being subjected to prosecution on dishonesty-related crime in 2008[98]. In any event, D1 fails to adduce any evidence to show that she was a former HSBC senior official. It is therefore open to the Court to draw adverse inference from D1’s failure to adduce contradictory evidence: see Xie Li Xin at §10. I so draw such inference against her. 67.Based on the above evidence, I make the finding that D1 Background Representation was false when it was made by D1, and knowingly so. 68.Insofar as D3 argues to have been silent when he handed documents containing the 1st PPP Representation to P for signing, P submits that a person who allows a false statement by a third person to the representee to go uncorrected may also make a misrepresentation: see Koo Ming Kown v The Baptist Convention of Hong Kong and others [2024] HKCFI 2869 §117(h). To this end, P submits and I accept that D3 already knew the presence of a fraud against P in May 2014 for the following reasons:
69.Based on the above evidence, I find that D3 had knowingly made the above representation. 70.At this juncture, ie in around May/June 2014, P was only asked to make transfer of her monies to her own bank account, and she did[101]. Mr Yeung submits that this was the first step of a premeditated scheme to induce payments and remittances. And Ds did not wait long before they embarked on causing loss to P to their benefit, which began in around July 2014. I agree with his submissions. 71.Before that, through more frequent meet-ups and chats, P became emotionally attached to D1 and conveyed her background to D1 in more details. Realising P’s crave for daughter’s love and attention and care, D1 was quick to claim that she grew up in a single-parent family without a mother (“the Family Background Representation”), which raised the relationship further to one of 「契媽/契女」 to consolidate P’s trust on and proneness to D1’s assertions[102]. The Family Background Representation was cogently supported by D1’s own statement in the D1 Nov 2017 Letter, where she said at §5 on page 2[103] 「另外，我知道，你同鄭生說要見到我，才有動作，契媽，請你相信我，我是急於病和家人的生意，才會這樣做，飛去英國，我自小媽不在，你是我的母親一樣，怎會不希望你探我病（之前）我以為自己無咁嚴重。」 (P’s emphasis) 72.As I found above, there is no doubt that the D1 Nov 2017 Letter was written by D1. 73.Mr Yeung further submits that the Family Background Representation was false when it was made by D1, and knowingly so. D1’s mother was present and stood as D1’s surety when D1 was brought before the criminal court on 19 May 2018 for mention of the charge of fraud arising from P’s report of the present case to authority[104]. I would draw adverse inference from D1’s failure to adduce any evidence to show that she grew up in a single-parent family without a mother: see Xie Li Xin at §10. It was clearly a lie in order to gain sympathy and trust from P. 74.Next came the signing of the July 2014 Declaration. P was told by D1 in around July 2014 that the 1st PPP she had applied was disapproved by HSBC’s Hong Kong branches and that the whole process had to be processed again with HSBC’s UK branches. D1 represented to P that further documents alleging them to relate to the UK-processed 1st PPP (“the Revised 1st PPP Documents”)[105] would have to be signed (“the Resigning 1st PPP Documents Representation”)[106], and presented these documents to P for signing. P was also asked to make the July 2014 Declaration[107]. Given P’s limited English capability, I find it was clear that she signed the Revised 1st PPP Documents and the July 2014 Declaration on 29 July 2014 in reliance of the Resigning 1st PPP Documents Representation[108]. 75.In my view, the July 2014 Declaration serves as proof of the Resigning 1st PPP Documents Representation. As the 1st PPP never existed[109], the Revised 1st PPP Documents must be false instruments. I therefore find that the Revised 1st PPP Representation and the Resigning 1st PPP Documents Representation were false when they were made by D1 and D3, and knowingly so. 76.I agree with Mr Yeung’s observation that it is important to note that it was D3 who took P to Central and Western District Office of the Home Affairs Department on 29 July 2014 to make the July 2014 Declaration and who declared to have interpreted the contents of the documents attached thereto to P[110]. Therefore, he must have made the Resigning 1st PPP Documents Representation to P. P’s case is that D3 on the same occasion also repeated to P the D1 Background Representation, the Family Background Representation, and the 1st PPP Representation to reassure P and win her trust[111]. As I found earlier, D3’s assertion that he only took P to sign documents as part of his job is utterly inconceivable and should be rejected. I find that D3 already knew a fraud was set up against P, and that he agreed to take part in it. 77.Starting from 30 July 2014, Ds relied on misrepresentations, made and/or to be made, to induce P to make payments and remittances. On 30 July 2014, D1 represented to P that P was invited to participate in the 1st PPP via HSBC UK branches on certain conditions (“the Substituted UK 1st PPP Representation”). The conditions included the need to travel to the UK to sign documents and to meet with third parties, and the need to pay for costs of the UK trip and legal fees. D1 further represented to P that there existed Hong Kong solicitors being D5 and D8 in the matter to protect P’s interest (“the HK Solicitors Representation”). 78.The Substituted UK 1st PPP Representation and the HK Solicitors Representation are supported by the STC Declaration signed by D1[112] and a name card bearing information of D5 and D8[113] which were presented to P on 30 July 2014[114]. Mr Yeung has highlighted the relevant parts of the STC Declaration below to show up the falsity of the document:
79.In reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the 1st PPP Representation, the HK Solicitors Representation and/or the Substituted UK 1st PPP Representation, P made the travel to London and incurred the following costs and payments:
80.In my judgment, it cannot be disputed that one or more of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the 1st PPP Representation, the HK Solicitors Representation and/or the Substituted UK 1st PPP Representation was made to induce P’s payments in the preceding paragraph, which represented the luxury leisure tourism in London of D1 and D8[118]. 81.P submits and I accept that the UK 1st PPP Representation and the HK Solicitors Representation were false when they were made by D1, and knowingly so. First, the 1st PPP never existed[119], so there also never existed any UK-processed 1st PPP. Second, the STC Declaration was a forged document[120]. Third, D5 was never a law firm in Hong Kong and D8 was never a qualified solicitor in Hong Kong[121]. Again, adverse inference from D1’s failure to adduce any evidence to show that the veracity of the STC Declaration, the existence of the 1st PPP via HSBC UK branches or the qualification of D5 and D8 can be made and I so make them against D1, D5 & D8: see Xie Li Xin at §10. 82.Based on the above evidence and analysis, up till around end of July 2014, I find the following misrepresentations were made to P:
83.I also accept the amounts as shown in the following table prepared by Mr Yeung which sets out the payments/remittances/action induced by the relevant misrepresentations up to the end of July 2014:
(ii) The Second Stage 84.Before moving on to the 2nd stage of the fraudulent scheme perpetuated by the various Ds against P, I echo with Mr Yeung’s submissions that “a representation once made is likely to have continuing effect. So if made for the purpose of an intended transaction it will continue until the transaction is completed or abandoned or the representation ceases to be operative on the mind of the representee … Third, if at a time when it is continuing the representor discovers that the representation was false when made or has become false since he should correct it…”: Koo Ming Kown, supra at §117(i). To this end, I accept that all the misrepresentations made at the initial stage, and any misrepresentations made at other stages in connection with the 1st PPP, were intended to have continuing effect. 85.The documentary evidence produced by P shows that, from the end of July 2014 up to around mid-2015, P signed the following documents and made the following payments/remittances:
86.During the stay in London in August 2014, D1 and D8 represented to P (“the European Projects Investments Representation”) that there existed opportunities to make investments in big projects in Europe (“the European Projects”). D1 also represented to P that D4 was a trader in the European Projects (“the D4 Trader Representation”). On this basis, Ds sought P’s payments of US$100,000 to D4 plus purported legal fees of US$27,000[133]. P was also asked to attend meetings with “traders” for the European Projects in London between 12 and 15 September 2014[134]. 87.I find the making of the European Projects Investments Representation was supported by P’s payments of HK$388,000 to D4 on 8 August 2014 (equivalent to US$50,000) on 8 August 2014, US$27,000 to Bliss Group Limited on 9 August 2014 and HK$388,000 (equivalent to US$50,000) to D4 on 1 September 2014, as well as P’s return to stay at London Rosewood Hotel from 12 to 15 September 2014 incurring GBP7,526.50[135]. I further find that there is virtually no justification for receipt by D4 and Bliss Group Limited of these sums, nor is there any for P’s further stay at Rosewood London Hotel. D1’s case appears that she had no knowledge about the European Projects[136]. I agree with Mr Yeung that, in the absence of contradictory evidence, the answer must be, as put forward by P, that the European Projects Investments Representation and/or the D4 Trader Representation, individually or together with the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation and/or the HK Solicitors Representation, were made to induce these 3 payments by P. 88.There is no dispute or it is indisputable that D4 was D1’s corporate vehicles. 89.The documentary evidence also reveals that, after D4’s receipt of the two sums of HK$388,000 each, purportedly for the European Projects, there were progressive dissipation:
90.P submits and I so find that the payment of US$27,000 to Bliss Group Limited must be D1’s personal expenses, as the police revealed in their brief facts in the parallel criminal case that D3 admitted under caution upon arrest that he knew “[D1] would use [P]’s monies to pay for her legal fees, personal monthly insurance and to repay some of her debtors”[143]. 91.In my judgment, there is no justification for these withdrawals, transfers and payments. In light of the obvious dissipation of P’s monies, it is clear that there never existed the European Projects. I find the European Projects Investments Representation and the D4 Trader Representation were false when they were made by D1, and knowingly so. 92.During P’s stay in London in September 2014, D1 represented to P (“the JV Investment Representation”) that there existed another investment (“JV Investment”)[144], and induced P to make payment of US$2 million. D1 passed to P two joint venture investment agreements (“the JVA”)[145]. D1 asked that payment for the JV Investment be made to some foreign traders, and gave P a telegraphic transfer form in which information of D6 as the recipient and the transfer was all pre-filled by D1[146] for P’s signing[147]. 93.I agree that the JVA is solid proof of the JV Investment Representation having been made. 94.D1 also represented to P (“the Hotel Development Investment Representation”) that there existed hotel development investments (“the Hotel Investments”)[148]. P was given a proposal purportedly relating to the Hotel Investments (“the Proposal”) and asked to sign a confidentiality agreement[149]. The Proposal serves as proof of the Hotel Development Investment Representation having been made. 95.In reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the HK Solicitors Representation and/or the JV Investment Representation, P made payment of US$1 million to D6 on 15 September 2014[150]. I agree with Mr Yeung that there cannot be any question that the JV Investment Representation, individually or together with one or more of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation and/or the HK Solicitors Representation, was made to induce P’s payment to D6 on 15 September 2014. 96.Further, in reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the HK Solicitors Representation and/or the Hotel Development Investment Representation, P signed a confidentiality agreement[151]. I also agree with P’s submissions that there cannot be any question that the Hotel Development Investment Representation, individually or together with one or more of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation and/or the HK Solicitors Representation, was made to induce P’s signing of a confidentiality agreement and to set the scene for making further misrepresentation. 97.P returned to Hong Kong on around 26 or 27 September 2014[152]. On around 27 October 2014, D1 represented to P that:
98.Traces of the Joint Account Representation having been made can be seen from -
99.As Mr Yeung submits, the making of the Deposit and Transfer Representation and the D6 Trader Representation are sufficiently reflected by the Alleged Joint Account TT Form. 100.I find as a fact that it was in reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the HK Solicitors Representation, the JV Investment Representation, the Joint Account Representation, the Deposit and Transfer Representation, and/or the D6 Trader Representation, P made payment of US$1 million to D6 on 27 October 2014[160]. 101.Further, in my judgment, there cannot be any question that the JV Investment Representation, the Joint Account Representation, the Deposit and Transfer Representation, and/or the D6 Trader Representation, individually or collectively or together with one or more of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation and/or the HK Solicitors Representation, were made to induce P’s payment to D6 and P’s signing of the Alleged Joint Account TT Form on 27 October 2014. 102.It can hardly be disputed that D6 was D1’s corporate vehicles. Apart from the fact that D1 was one of the bank signatories of the D6 HSBC Account[161] and the cheques were all co-signed by D1[162], monies paid by P to D6 were transferred to associates and also to D4 for further dissipation, including to D1 and D2:
103.In my view, there is no justification for any of these withdrawals or transfers. The payments to D6 cannot be investment proceeds. D2’s receipt of proceeds from D4 is a clear pointer of D2’s knowledge of and agreement to become part of the scam, as D1’s case is that she and D2 were financially independent[183]. P submits and I accept that, relying on D2’s silence in receiving fraud proceeds with reference to the principles laid down in Koo Ming Kown, supra §117(h) and Peter Geoffrey De Krassel §§55-58, D2 already knew a fraud was set up against P right from the beginning, and in any event by this stage, and that D2 agreed to take part in it. By letting the false statements made to P go uncorrected, D2 also made the misrepresentations too. Again, I would draw adverse inference from the failure of D1 and D2 to adduce contradictory evidence, and to hold that D2 was a co-conspirator and these debits/withdrawals during this period were dissipation of fraud proceeds. 104.In light of the obvious dissipation of P’s monies, I find there never existed the JV Investment or the Hotel Investments. Neither did the Alleged Joint Account ever exist. The JVA, the Proposal and the Alleged Joint Account TT Form were all false instruments. I further find that the JV Investment Representation, the Hotel Development Investment Representation, the Joint Account Representation, the Deposit and Transfer Representation and the D6 Trader Representation were false when they were made by D1, and knowingly so. 105.On or around 26 January 2015, D1 represented to P (“the Further Investment Representation”) that there existed yet further investment in which D4 was a trader that would yield profits of approximately US$300,000 in around 3 months’ time (“the Further Investment”)[184]. 106.The making of the Further Investment Representation is supported by (a) two cheques of HK$6,975,000 each post-dated 8 & 10 April 2015 issued by D4 (signed by D1 on its behalf) to P (“the Two Post-Dated Cheques”)[185]; and (b) the accompanying receipt acknowledgement setting out how the two cheques related to an investment between P and D1[186]. The total sum under the Two Post-Dated Cheque (HK$13,590,000, equivalent to US$1,800,000 taking an exchange rate of around HK$7.55:US$1) represented precisely the purported principal of US$1,500,000 plus profits of approximately US$300,000 under the Further Investment. 107.I find as a fact that it was in reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation and/or the Further Investment Representation, P made payment of US$1.5 million to D4 on 26 January 2015[187]. I further find there cannot be any question that the Further Investment Representation, individually or together with one or more of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship and the Family Background Representation, was made to induce P’s payment to D4 on 26 January 2015. 108.The Two Post-Dated Cheques were never cleared as P was told in around April 2015 that P could only present these cheques for clearance upon D1’s further notice and no such notice had ever been given by D1[188]. 109.I note the fact that it was D3 who had collected the cashier order of US$1.5 million and deposited it into D4 BOC FX Account[189]. Thus, I find D3 certainly was not an innocent employee of D1 who was merely acting on the instruction of his employer, ie D1. I find he was a willing and active participant in the fraud. 110.Based on the documentary evidence discovered by the parties, I further find that during the following few months until April 2015, there were progressive dissipation of P’s monies by Ds:
111.In my judgment, there is no justification for any of these withdrawals or transfers. The payment to D4 on 26 January 2015 cannot be investment proceeds. Again, I am entitled to and would draw adverse inference from D1’s failure to adduce contradictory evidence, and to hold that these debits/withdrawals during this periods were dissipation of fraud proceeds. 112.In light of the obvious dissipation of P’s monies, in my view, there never existed the Further Investment. The Two Post-Dated Cheques could never be cleared, and together with the accompanying acknowledgement were false instruments. The Further Investment Representation was false when it was made by D1, and knowingly so. 113.In around May 2015, D1 represented to P that there was the need to remit US$1.5 million to D4 which was a trader and participant in the 1st PPP for extra returns (“the D4 1st PPP Trader Representation”)[195]. P was therefore asked to pay another sum of US$1.5 million to D4 and to sign a letter, which has been pre-signed by D1, to purportedly give effect to transfer of funds to D4 and acknowledge restriction on movement of funds in P’s account (“the Restriction Letter”)[196]. 114.As Mr Yeung submits, the making of the D4 1st PPP Trader Representation is manifestly reflected by the Restriction Letter, which reads:
115.I find as a fact that, in reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the 1st PPP Representation, and/or the D4 1st PPP Trader Representation, P made payment of US$1.5 million to D4 and signed the Restriction Letter on 6 May 2015[197]. 116.I further find there cannot be any question that the D4 1st PPP Trader Representation, individually or collectively or together with one or more of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation and/or the 1st PPP Representation, were made to induce P’s payment to D4 and P’s signing of the Restriction Letter on 6 May 2015. 117.As is apparent from the above, D4 in truth was D1’s corporate vehicles. D3 again was the one who collected the cashier order of US$1.5 million and deposited it into D4 BOC FX Account[198]. Further, for the next few months until October 2015, there were progressive dissipation of P’s monies:
118.In my view, there is no justification for any of these withdrawals or transfers. The payment to D4 on 6 May 2015 cannot be investment proceeds. Again, I am entitled to and would draw adverse inference from D1’s failure to adduce contradictory evidence, and to hold that these debits/withdrawals during this periods were dissipation of fraud proceeds. 119.As advised by police, the 1st PPP never existed[212]. As a result, there never existed the need for further payment to D4 for extra returns under the 1st PPP. The Restriction Letter was false instrument. This is underpinned by the obvious dissipation of P’s monies. I find D4 1st PPP Trader Representation was false when it was made by D1, and knowingly so. 120.Again, D3 was the one who collected both of the cashier orders, of a total sum of US$3 million (equivalent to over HK$23 million), from P in January and May 2015. 121.Mr Yeung submits that any reasonable and honest person in D3’s shoes would have been at least raised enquiries and that D3’s conduct in happily depositing sums of such magnitude into an account of D1’s corporate vehicles is a clear indicator of his knowledge of the fraud and his agreement to become part of it. 122.I entirely agree with his submissions. 123.In my judgment, D3’s silence and turning a blind eye to what quite obviously was a scam at the very least constituted knowledge and agreement to become part of the representor in those misrepresentations inducing these two payments. In my view, D3 must have known a fraud was perpetrated against P at this point and must have embraced it. I so find it was the case. 124.As summed up by Mr Yeung in P’s Closing Submissions, from around end of July up till around mid-2015, I find the following misrepresentations were made to P:
125.P also produces the following table which sets out the payments/remittances/action induced by the relevant misrepresentations from end of July 2014 up to mid-2015:
(iii) The Final Stage 126.At the final stage, P was mainly induced to make numerous payments and take other actions under the pretext of returns on the 1st PPP. From mid-2015 up to October 2017, P signed the following documents and made the following payments/remittances:
127.On around 7 October 2015, D1 represented to P that collection or receipt of investment returns arising from the 1st PPP would be ready soon (“the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation”). For this purpose, D1 further represented that the balance in the Alleged Joint Account had to be a round-off figure of HK$40,000,000 for easier reporting (“the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation”) and that the Alleged Joint Account had a credit balance of US$129,748,993 (“the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation”). On this basis, P was asked to pay HK$6,580,547 as the cut-off figure in the round-off exercise, and HK$12,779 as a sum to facilitate receipt of return[230]. 128.The making of the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation, and the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation were reflected in a letter purportedly issued by HKMA dated 7 October 2015 and shown to P by D1 (“the 1st Purported HKMA Letter”)[231]. This letter, which was signed by D1, reads:
129.In reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the HK Solicitors Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation, and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation, P made payments of US$840,770.02 (equivalent to around HK$6,580,547 at the then exchange rate) and HK$12,779 to D4, and countersigned on the 1st Purported HKMA Letter, on 7 October 2015[232]. 130.Since D4 was D1’s corporate vehicles and the 1st PPP never really existed, I find there was no justification for D4 to receive these sums. 131.In the circumstances, I find as a fact that there cannot be any question that the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation, and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation, individually or together with one or more of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation and/or the HK Solicitors Representation, was made to induce P’s payments to D4 on 7 October 2015. 132.Again, there were progressive dissipation of P’s US$840,770.02 after the deposit to the D4 BOC FX Account on 7 October 2015:
133.Again, I find that there is no justification for any of these withdrawals or transfers. The payments to D4 on 7 October 2015 were scam. P has invited the Court to draw adverse inference from D1’s failure to adduce contradictory evidence, and to hold that these debits/withdrawals during these periods were dissipation of fraud proceeds. I would be happy to do so as I find there was no other reasons for those withdrawals and transfers. 134.As advised by police, the 1st PPP never existed[237]. The necessary inference to make must be that there never existed any investment return. Nor was there any need for further payment to D4, whether for round-off for investment return or any other purposes. The 1st Purported HKMA Letter was a false instrument. There was also the obvious dissipation of P’s monies. In the circumstances, I find the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation, and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation were false when they were made by D1, and knowingly so. 135.On or around 26 February 2016, D1 represented to P that, for the purpose of investment return on the 1st PPP, there was the need to have a joint account in the name of D7 at BOC with a balance of US$500,000 (“the 1st PPP Investment Return BOC Account Opening Requirement Representation”)[238]. For this reason, P was asked to make a transfer of US$500,000 to the D7 BOC Account. 136.At this point of time, as explained by her in P WS, P began to feel anxious about getting her monies back, but she was asked to be patient by D1. In the meantime, P’s bank account in Mainland China was frozen, which she later found out in about August 2016 was attributable to her procurement of currency exchange to remit around RMB700,000 to her Mainland China account for property purchase[239]. D1 exploited P’s concern to conjure up money laundering issue to make P worry on one hand and gave P much-needed care and comfort on the other. This unfortunately convinced P that D1 continued to be a much-trusted person to be listened to and relied on[240]. 137.In reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return BOC Account Opening Requirement Representation, P made further payment of US$500,000 to D7 on around 28 April 2016[241]. 138.D3 has confirmed that D7 was D1’s corporate vehicles with no business operation[242]. As I have found above, the 1st PPP never existed[243], and that there thus never existed any investment return. In the premises, there could not have been any need for having a joint account with minimum balance as represented by D1. In other words, there is no justification for D7’s receipt of monies from P. I agree with Mr Yeung that the payment to D7 by itself evidences the 1st PPP Investment Return BOC Account Opening Requirement Representation having been made. 139.Further, in the absence of contradictory evidence, the answer must be, as put forward by P, that the 1st PPP Investment Return BOC Account Opening Requirement Representation, individually or together with the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation were made to induce this payment of US$500,000 by P to D7. 140.Extraordinarily, the balance of the D7 BOC Account had only US$8 left in 2018[244]. There is no evidence on whereabouts of the monies, and D1 has not offered anything which could vindicate D7’s receipt. Plainly, as Mr Yeung submits, P’s monies had been dissipated. Again, I have no hesitation to draw adverse inference from D1’s failure to adduce contradictory evidence, and to hold that the disappearance of P’s US$500,000 deposited into the D7 BOC Account were dissipation of fraud proceeds. 141.It is beyond any shadow of doubt and I so find that the 1st PPP Investment Return BOC Account Opening Requirement Representation was false when it was made by D1, and knowingly so. 142.D1’s deceitfulness has no bounds. As pointed out by Mr Yeung, taking advantage of a conjured up money laundering issue upon P’s frozen account in Mainland China, D1 in around April 2016 represented to P that there was the need to make tax payment and money laundering clearance payment in order to facilitate the receipt of investment return on the 1st PPP and that she had already made payment of HK$5 million and HK$1 million (“the 1st PPP Investment Return 1st Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation”)[245]. 143.The D1 Nov 2017 Letter sheds light on D1’s trick to cite money laundering issue to get P into making payments[246], evidencing the making of the 1st PPP Investment Return 1st Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation. 144.In November 2016, D1 represented to P that she was meeting with a HKMA officer and that there was the need to pay US$500,000 for tax arising from investment return on the 1st PPP (“the 1st PPP Investment Return 2nd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation”)[247]. 145.Traces of the making of the 1st PPP Investment Return 1st Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation and the 1st PPP Investment Return 2nd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation can be seen from two documents purportedly issued by HKMA dated 23 November 2016 and shown to P by D1 (“the 2nd Purported HKMA Letter”)[248]. One of these documents was addressed to D1[249] and the other one to P[250]. Both were signed by someone whom D1 alleged to be a HKMA officer. The one addressed to P reads:
146.In reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the HK Solicitors Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return 1st Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return 2nd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation, I find P made payment of US$500,000 to D4 and countersigned on the 2nd Purported HKMA Letter on 23 November 2016[251]. 147.D3 collected the cashier order of US$500,000 and deposited it into the D4 BOC FX Account[252]. Mr Yeung submits that any reasonable and honest person in D3’s shoes would have been at least raised enquiries. He further submits that D3’s silence and turning a blind eye to what quite obviously was a scam at the very least constituted knowledge and agreement to become part of the representor in those misrepresentations inducing this payment. D3 must have known a fraud was perpetrated against P at this point and must have embraced it. I entirely agree with his submissions. 148.Further, D1 later sought further payment from P citing that it was needed for facilitating receipt of investment return on the 1st PPP[253], effectively repeating the representations made so far. 149.I further find as a fact that, in reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the HK Solicitors Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return 1st Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return 2nd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation, P made payments of US$60,000 to D8 and US$340,000 to D4 on 16 December 2016[254]. 150.Again, I find that the 1st PPP never existed and that D4 was D1’s corporate vehicles. The 2nd Purported HKMA Letter was false instrument. There was no justification for D4 to receive the sum. In the circumstances, in my judgment, there cannot be any question that the 1st PPP Investment Return 1st Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return 2nd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation, individually or together with one or more of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the HK Solicitors Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation, and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation, was made to induce P’s payments on 23 November & 16 December 2016. 151.The documentary evidence shows that there were yet again dissipation of P’s monies right after the deposits to the D4 BOC FX Account on 23 November[255] and 16 December 2016[256]:
152.Once again I would draw adverse inference from D1’s failure to adduce contradictory evidence, and to hold that these debits/withdrawals during this periods were dissipation of fraud proceeds. 153.I also find P’s payments on 23 November & 16 December 2016 to D4 and D8 were a scam. 154.Accordingly, the 1st PPP Investment Return 1st Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return 2nd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation were false when they were made by D1, and knowingly so. 155.In around March and April 2017, D1 represented to P that HKMA required further payment of US$300,000 for tax arising from investment return on the 1st PPP and that the Hong Kong Government required payment of HK$1,100,000 for money laundering clearance (“the 1st PPP Investment Return 3rd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation”, together with the 1st PPP Investment Return 1st Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation and the 1st PPP Investment Return 2nd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation, collectively, the “1st PPP Investment Return Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation”)[260]. 156.As Mr Yeung has submitted and I accept that the making of the 1st PPP Investment Return 3rd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation is cogently supported by:
157.I find as a fact that, in reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation, and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation, P took the following actions:
158.As said, the 1st PPP never existed and that D4 was D1’s corporate vehicles. Therefore, I find the 3rd Purported HKMA Letter and the Purported JFIU Letter were false instruments. There was no justification for D4 to receive the sum of US$300,000 from P. Neither was there any justification for payment by P to Hong Kong Government and STC. In truth, as the police revealed[268]:
159.In my view and as submitted by Mr Yeung, it is clear that the 1st PPP Investment Return 3rd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation, individually or together with one or more of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the HK Solicitors Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return 1st Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return 2nd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation, were made to induce P’s payments in March and April 2017. 160.The scam was further corroborated by distinct dissipation of P’s monies:
161.I therefore find that the 1st PPP Investment Return 3rd Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation was false when it was made by D1, and knowingly so. 162.D1 in around June and July 2017 sought further payment from P citing that it was needed for facilitating receipt of investment return on the 1st PPP[271], effectively repeating the representations made so far. 163.In reliance of the D1 Background Representation, the Fiduciary Relationship, the Family Background Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Round Off Balance Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Account Balance Representation, and/or the 1st PPP Investment Return Tax and Other Payment Requirement Representation, P made:
164.As the police revealed[276], the sum of HK$500,000 to STC was D1’s legal costs in her then criminal proceedings. There was no justification for D4 to receive the various sums from P. They were all scams. 165.P submits that all these representations were made to induce P’s payments in June and August 2017, and that all these representations were false when they were made, and knowingly so. I so find they were the case. 166.When D1 was convicted and imprisoned in August 2017 under ESCC 2138/2016 [277] , there was the concerted effort of D1 and D3 to conceal D1’s imprisonment by representing to P in August 2017 that D1 was sick and hospitalised in the UK (“the UK Stay Representation”)[278] with a view to continuing with the scam. This is evidenced by D3’s own admission of making the lie to P[279]. D2, being the husband of D1, must have known that D1 was imprisoned, yet he assisted D3 in the meeting with P on 7 November 2017 to conceal D1’s imprisonment[280], lest is the almost undeniable fact that D2 all along had been recipient of fraud proceeds. I agree with Mr Yeung that, by this stage in around August 2017 at the latest, D2 and D3 must have knowledge of and agreed to become part of the scam. 167.I also find the UK Stay Representation was reinforced by D3’s delivery of the D1 Aug 2017 Letter to P. On the same occasion, to try and win over P’s trust, apart from repeating all the representations that had been made by D1 to P, D3 also represented to P that there was the need for further payment of HK$1,300,000 for money laundering clearance (“the 1st PPP Investment Return Further HKMA Payment Representation”)[281]. 168.In reliance of one or more of the UK Stay Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Further HKMA Payment Representation and/or any other representations previously made to her, P made payment of HK$1,300,000 to D4 on 21 August 2017[282]. Again, the 1st PPP never existed and there was never any investment return. Plainly, Ds had to make these representations to induce P’s payment of HK$1,300,000. D3 collected the cashier order of HK$1,300,000 and deposited it into D4’s account[283], which he admitted to have control of electronic transfer[284]. 169.In around September 2017, D3 represented to P that there existed the need to create a trust holding assets of at least HK$3 million for money laundering clearance (“the “Trust Requirement Representation”)[285]. The making of this representation was supported by the D1 Father Sept 2017 Letter, which D3 admitted to have known the contents and have passed to P[286]. 170.In reliance of one or more of the Trust Requirement Representation, the UK Stay Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Further HKMA Payment Representation and/or any other representations previously made to her, P under D3’s instruction made payment of HK$500,000 to D4 and HK$150,000 to STC on 7 October 2017[287]. D3 collected the cashier orders of these payments and deposited them into D4’s account[288]. Obviously, the said representations were made to induce P’s payments on 7 October 2017. 171.As the police revealed[289], the sum of HK$150,000 to STC was D1’s legal costs in her then criminal proceedings. 172.There can hardly be any dispute that D3 was the person who made the representations to P and sought payment from her from August 2017. It is inherently improbable that someone else sought payment from P and that D3 was merely a person who collected payment without any enquiry in the circumstances, particularly so in view of (1) the admitted lie to conceal D1’s imprisonment which as submitted in paragraph 15(g) hereinabove could not have been a “white lie” as he argued; and (2) D3’s admission of knowing D1’s conviction of dishonesty-related crime and her consequential integrity issue. If there were any truth in such contention, then the Court would have expected D3 to call that someone to give evidence to support his case. 173.What is more striking is that D3 reaped more reward when he became more active in the scam since August 2017:
174.I also find that D3’s explanation on his receipt of HK$200,000 from D4 on 10 October 2017 was a pack of lies. He asserted that the sum was for forwarding to D2 to bring it for D1’s bail application on the day, and when the application failed, the sum was deposited back into D2’s account[303]. The D1’s criminal litigation search report shows that D1 did not have any bail application pending appeal on 10 October 2017. In any event, even if there was any need to give D2 monies from D4, it begs the question of why D3 did not conduct electronic transfer to D2 directly since D3 had power to do it. 175.D3’s explanation on his receipt of other sums from D4 between August and December 2017, as set out in his witness statement §27, is equally meritless. During cross-examination, when it was pointed to D3 that D1’s corporate vehicles could not have had any business operations after D1’s imprisonment in August 2017, D3 claimed that two staff of Covermagazine with salary of around HK$15,000/HK$16,000 each continued to generate income. I find this cannot be true for the following reasons:
176.P submits that all sums received by D3 from D4 represented rewards for his role as a co-conspirator. I agree and so find that was the case. 177.D3 in November 2017 attempted to get P into making further payments of HK$2.5 million as the remaining amount payable under the Trust Requirement Representation (as evidenced by the D1 Nov 2017 Letter §13 on p.3[307] which reads: 「13.我相信，金管會致電你，不可延遲，說應該你只欠250萬港元放回星展做信託。」 But P finally woke up and reported the matter to police[308]. 178.One or more of the UK Stay Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Further HKMA Payment Representation and/or any other representations previously made to P was made to induce P’s payment in August 2017. 179.One or more of the Trust Requirement Representation, the UK Stay Representation, the 1st PPP Investment Return Further HKMA Payment Representation and/or any other representations previously made to P was made to induce P’s payments in October 2017. 180.All these representations were false when they were made by D1 and/or D3, and knowingly so. 181.In summary, in the final stage from around mid-2015 to October 2017, I find the following misrepresentations were made to P –
182.Mr Yeung also produced the following table which sets out the payments/remittances/action induced by the relevant misrepresentations from mid-2015 to October 2017 of which I accept and find as what actually took place during that period:
THE UNLAWFUL MEANS CONSPIRACY CLAIM 183.Mr Yeung submits that, for unlawful means conspiracy, the following matters have to be established (See Xie Li Xin at §191; JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov & Anor (No 14) [2020] AC 727 at §10; She Tsu Yi v Tsui Ki Ting & Others [2007] HKCFI 1130 §154):
184.Likewise, for fraudulent misrepresentation / the tort of deceit, Mr Yeung submits that the following have to be proved according to Xie Li Xin at §§183-185:
185.In addition to the above, Mr Yeung further submits that, insofar as agreement or adherence to the agreement to the conspiracy is concerned, consent can be inferred if it is proved that the conspirator knew what was going on and the intention to participate in the furtherance of the criminal purpose is also established by his failure to stop the unlawful activity: see Pak Win Investment Ltd (In Compulsory Liquidation) v Chung Yuet Sheung, Lorrain & Others [2012] HKCFI 126 §15. 186.Mr Yeung refers me to the 3 tables in §§83, 125, 182 above and submits that P’s case of making payments/remittances/transfers to various parties as well as signing documents in reliance of relevant misrepresentations as indicated in those tables has been cogently made out. 187.I agree with him. 188.I further agree with Mr Yeung that all of the representations were false and made fraudulently:
189.Although D1 did the bulk of the misrepresentations at the early stage, D3, who knew the presence of a fraud against P right from the beginning but chose to remain silent and let the false statement go uncorrected, is deemed to have made the misrepresentations too. In any event, D3 took over D1’s role since D1’s imprisonment in August 2017 and did explicitly make misrepresentations to P to induce further payments/transfers/remittances. D2 similarly knew the fraud against P, at least from the time when he received any fraud proceeds from D1 or D4. He therefore is deemed to have made misrepresentations to P when he remained silent and let the false statement go uncorrected. 190.I further agree with Mr Yeung that the scam in the present case is so obvious that there is virtually no room to argue that the misrepresentations were not intended to induce P to make payments or take other actions to her injury. It is beyond any shadow of doubt that P made payments/transfers/remittances of a total sum of HK$71,867,411.35. I fail to see how there could be argument that such payments transfers/transfers/remittances, of which approximately HK$67.8 million went to D1’s corporate vehicles, were made independent of these misrepresentations. 191.By virtue of their assistance in making (actively or passively) one or more of the misrepresentations and/or their receipt of fraud proceeds, I find D2 and D3 must have agreed to become part of the conspiracy. 192.Insofar as D4 is concerned, a company, being a separate legal person, can conspire with its directors; and the knowledge of the company may be found in a director who has management or control for the transaction or act in question: see Apple Inc & Anor v Proview International Holdings Limited & Others [2011] HKCFI 1375 at §32. As D1 was at material times the directing mind of D4, D1’s action is attributed to D4 such that D4 must have been a part of the conspiracy. Further, D4 was clearly the vehicle to receive and dissipate fraud proceeds, D4 thus must have agreed to be part of the conspiracy. 193.For the foregoing reasons, I find all of the elements of unlawful means conspiracy, with the unlawful means being fraudulent misrepresentations/tort of deceit committed by Ds, have clearly been satisfied. DISPOSITION AND ORDER 194.In the aforestated premises, I find D1 to D4 jointly and severally liable and order them to pay to P a total sum of HK$66,013,631.35 (being HK$71,867,411.35 - HK$5,853,780), together with interest thereon at judgment rate from 24 May 2018 until date of judgment and thereafter at judgment rate. 195.P also seeks an injunction restraining each of D1 to D4 from disposing any of his/her/its assets up to the value of HK$66,013,631.35 until full and final payment of the compensation as per prayer 1(e) of the SOC (effectively continuation of the injunction order made on 23 May 2018 and extended on 1 June 2018, until full and final payment of the compensation). P submits that a Mareva injunction and the usual execution mechanism can work in tandem: China Citic Bank Corporation Limited (Quanzhou Branch) v Li Kwai Chun & Others [2018] HKCFI 1800 §§26-32. Given the extremely low commercial morality on the part of D1 to D4, this is precisely the type of case where a post-judgment injunction is required. 196.On costs, P invites the Court to apply Xie Li Xin at §§217-220 and order indemnity costs in favour of P. I agree that worse than the defendants in Xie Li Xin, D1 to D4 had continued to run wholly incredible defence and, in the case of D1, D2 and D4, failed to attend the trial. None of D1 to D4 complied with the PTR order to complete the pre-trial matters, such as filing of opening submissions. D3’s testimony at trial was appalling and contradictory. It was clear to all of them that they had no defence from the start. They did all that they could to drag on the trial to the extent possible, delaying P’s recovery and instead subjecting P to more injury and suffering to the maximum. In my view, all of them wasted considerable time and costs. 197.I have no hesitation to order costs against D1 to D4 on an indemnity basis, such costs to be taxed if not agreed. 198.Last but not the least, I wish to thank P’s counsel Mr Yeung for his very able assistance in this case, particularly in preparing the very detailed opening and closing submissions which have clearly set out the issues and analysed the evidence in a most logical and meticulous manner. They have hugely assisted the Court in preparing this judgment for which I am very grateful.
Mr Mike Yeung, instructed by Chan Ching Man & Co, for the plaintiff The 3rd defendant appeared in person The 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants was not represented and did not appear [1] (HK$71,867,411.35 – HK$5,853,780 = HK$66,013,631.35) [2] This figure is different from the one set out in SOC §§86, 87, 88, 91, prayer 1(a). The difference of HK$102,278 results from P’s confirmation in the witness box (on Day 1 of trial) that the claim of HK$102,278 at SOC §39.2 is a mistake and has to be deducted from the total claimed amount. [3] In fact D1 was born in 1972, hence she was around 42 in 2014 [4] See police brief facts at [9/120/2057/§§7&8] [5] See crime investigation report [9/118/2032-2035/items 6-18] [6] See SOC §24.3 [1/2/19] [7] See SOC §16 [1/2/16] [8] See SOC §18 [1/2/16-17] [9] See SOC §21 [1/2/18] [10] See SOC §22 [1/2/18] [11] See SOC §22 [1/2/18] [12] See SOC §24.2 [1/2/19] [13] See SOC §24.3 [1/2/19] [14] See SOC §37.1 [1/2/24] [15] See SOC §34.1 [1/2/23] [16] See SOC §34.2 [1/2/24] [17] See SOC §37.2 [1/2/24] [18] See SOC §37.1 [1/2/24] [19] See SOC §46 [1/2/27] [20] See SOC §41.1 [1/2/25] [21] See SOC §42.1 [1/2/26] [22] See SOC §42.2 [1/2/26] [23] See SOC §42.3 [1/2/26] [24] See SOC §46 [1/2/27] [25] See SOC §56 [1/2/30] [26] See SOC §53 [1/2/29] [27] See SOC §28 [1/2/20] [28] See SOC §27 [1/2/20] [29] See SOC §61.1 [1/2/31] [30] See SOC §59.1 [1/2/30] [31] See SOC §59.2 [1/2/30] [32] See SOC §59.3 [1/2/30] [33] See SOC §61.2 [1/2/31] [34] See SOC §61.3 [1/2/31] [35] See SOC §63 [1/2/32] [36] See SOC §62 [1/2/31-32] [37] See SOC §67.1 [1/2/33] [38] See SOC §64 [1/2/32] [39] See SOC §65 [1/2/32] [40] See SOC §67.2 [1/2/33] [41] See SOC §67.3 [1/2/33] [42] See SOC §70.1 [1/2/34] [43] See SOC §68 [1/2/33-34] [44] See SOC §70.2 [1/2/34] [45] See SOC §70.3 [1/2/34-35] [46] See SOC §70.4 [1/2/35] [47] See SOC §70.5 [1/2/35] [48] See SOC §70.6 [1/2/35] [49] See SOC §70.7 [1/2/35] [50] See SOC §75.1 [1/2/37] [51] See SOC §72.23 [1/2/37] [52] See SOC §72 [1/2/35] [53] See SOC §73 [1/2/37] [54] See SOC §75.2 [1/2/37] [55] See SOC §75.3 [1/2/37-38] [56] See SOC §§87-88 [1/2/57-58] [57] which, as mentioned in §13 above, has been reduced to HK$66,013,631.35 [58] See D1/D4 defence §§2, 19 [1/5/98-99, 104] [59] See D2 defence §§8-9, 12 [1/3/70] [60] See D3 defence §§6, 12, 13 [1/4/81, 82, 84] [61] In particular those at [9/130-143], [146/2123-2166], [2173-2177] [62] Which can be found at [9/127/2117-2118] [63] See crime litigation search report [9/118/2032-2035/items 5-19] [64] See police brief facts at [9/120/2058/§11] [65] They include the letter dated Aug 2017 at [9/141/2148], the letter dated Sept 2017 at [9/142/2151]; the letter dated Nov 2017 at [9/143/2156-2158] and the letter dated Feb 2018 at [9/] [66] For D4, D1 was the sole director and sole bank signatory, see corporate records of D4 at [2/18/236, 244, 253, 262]; see also police brief facts at [9/121/2081/§6] and D1’s signing on behalf of D4 in the D4 BOC Account Opening Documents at [8/114/1731-1766]. For D7, D1 was a director, see corporate records of D7 at [2/20/278, 288]. For D6, D1 was a bank account signatory, see police reply at [9/147/2178/§3]; see also D6 cheques issued with D1’s signing at [6/106/1382-1386] [67] See corporate records of D4 and D7 [2/18, 20/261, 277, 287]; see also D3 WS §§2(a), 2(b) [1/16/220] [68] See D3 WS §2(a) [1/6/220] [69] See D5 corporate documents at [2/19/267-274] [70] At [9/141/2148], at the beginning it says 「我起碼8月尾才出院」 [71] See the word “星” in paragraph 4 at [9/143/2157] “星期” in paragraph 8 at [9/143/2158] [72] At [9/143/2156-2158] [73] At [9/143/2156] vs [9/146/2173] [74] At [7113/1690] in the case of Covermagazine (being 圖書館、博物館及文化服務業), and [8/114/1733] in the case of D4 (being 廣告、設計、市場研究、職業介紹其他專業及科技服務) [75] At [2/35/387-393] [76] See D3’s declaration at the bottom of [2/35/387] [77] See the letter at [9/142/2151], §§2-5 [78] See the cashier order and deposit slip at [3/81/583] [79] See the cheque and deposit slips at [3/81/583-585] [80] See P WS §§8-109 [1/14/162-203] [81] See P WS §§8-33 [1/14/162-171] [82] See P WS §§34-65 [1/14/172-182] [83] See P WS §§69-109 [1/14/183-203] [84] See P WS §14 [1/14/164] [85] See P WS §16 [1/14/164]; see also the May 2014 Declaration at [2/34/349-386] [86] See P WS §§21-23 [1/14/166-167]; see also the July 2014 Declaration at [2/35/387-393] [87] See P WS §28(a) [1/14/169]; see also transaction advice at [9/123/2103] [88] See P WS §28(b) [1/16/169]; see also remittance application at [2/42/428] [89] See P WS §33 [1/16/171]; see also Rosewood invoice at [9/126/2108-2116] [90] At [2/33/344] [91] At [9/130/2123] [92] See P WS §9 [1/14/162] [93] See P WS §13 [1/14/163] [94] See P WS §§15, 16 [1/14/164-165] [95] See P WS §117 [1/14/206] [96] See crime litigation search report [9/118/2032-2036/items 5-22] [97] D1 was born in 1972 and was around 36 when she was prosecuted in around 2008, see her HKID at [7/110/1613] [98] See P WS §116 [1/14/205]; see also search result of SFC register of licensed person in 2008 [99] The account opening form at [7/109/1593-1599], and see the information provided by D1 in table ‘Schedule 3’ at [7/109/1595] where she said she was self-employed at Wealth Bloomberg and had been there for 6 years [100] See the information provided by D1 in table ‘Schedule 3’ at [7/109/1595] [101] See P WS §19 [1/14/165]; see also the certificates of balance evidencing the completed move of US$11m from P’s Hang Seng Bank account to P’s HSBC account as at 19 Jun 2014 at [2/40-41/425-427] [102] See P WS §20 [1/14/165-166] [103] At [9/143/2157] [104] See P WS §112 [1/14/203] [105] See P WS §21 [1/14/166] [106] See P WS §21 [1/14/166] [107] See P WS §22 [1/14/166-167] [108] See P WS §23 [1/14/167] [109] See P WS §117 [1/14/206] [110] See P WS §23 [1/14/167]; see also D3’s signing and declaration contained in the July 2014 Declaration at [2/35/387] [111] See P WS §23 [1/4/167] [112] At [9/120/2123] [113] At [9/122/2099-2100] [114] See P WS §§25-27 [1/14/167-168] [115] See P WS §28(a); see also transaction advice at [9/123/2103] [116] See P WS §28(b) [1/16/169]; see also remittance application at [2/42/428] and transaction advice at [9/123/2103] [117] See P WS §33 [1/16/171]; see also Rosewood invoice at [9/126/2108-2116] [118] the cost for room per night at Rosewood London Hotel for D1 was as high as GBP990, see the accommodation charge for room 438 Fan Margaret in the Rosewood London Hotel invoice at [9/126/2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112] [119] See P WS §117 [1/14/206] [120] See P WS §117 [1/14/206] [121] See P WS §117 [1/14/206] [122] See P WS §37(a) [1/14/173]; see also cheque deposit slip [2/43/429-431]; bank statement [8/115/1850]; P has clarified in her testimony (P testimony (eic) on Day 1 am) that, while the sum of HK$388,000 was paid by P’s friend Lam Kwai Ming under P’s procurement, her friend owed P monies exceeding this sum so the HK$388,000 was a set off and was paid by P [123] See P WS §37(b) [1/14/173]; see also handwritten record on transaction advice [9/123/2103] [124] See P WS §37(c) [1/14/173]; see also cheque deposit slip [2/44/432-434] and bank statement [8/115/1851]. P has clarified in her testimony (P testimony (eic) on Day 1 am) that, while the sum of HK$388,000 was paid by P’s friend Lam Kwai Ming under P’s procurement, her friend owed P monies exceeding this sum so the HK$388,000 was a set off and was paid by P [125] See P WS §42 [1/16/174] [126] See P WS §§44, 46 [1/14/175, 176]; see also the agreement at [2/37/407-411] [127] See P WS §46 [1/14/176]; see also TT transfer form [2/47/440] and bank statement [4/88/883] [128] See P WS §§44, 49 [1/14/175, 177]; see also the agreement at [2/37/412-418] [129] See P WS §52 [1/14/178]; see also TT transfer form and withdrawal form [2/45, 49/435, 442] and bank statement [4/88/885] [130] See P WS §51 [1/14/178]; see also the TT transfer form [2/45/435] [131] See P WS §57 [1/14/180]; see also cashier order purchase form [2/50/443]; bank statement [8/115/1930] [132] See P WS §63 [1/14/181-182]; see also cashier order [2/51/444]; bank statement [8/115/1932] [133] See P WS §§34-36 [1/14/172-173] [134] See P WS §39 [1/14/174] [135] See P WS §§40, 42 [1/14/174] [136] See D1/D4 Defence §12 [1/5/102] [137] See bank statement at [8/115/1850] [138] See bank statement at [8/115/1851] [139] See bank statement at [6/106/1361] and transaction advice at [6/106/1392] [140] See bank statement at [8/115/1851-1852] [141] See bank statement at [6/106/1362] and transaction advice at [6/106/1395] [142] See bank statement at [6/106/1363] and transaction advice at [6/106/1396] [143] The brief facts at [9/120/2057/§8 (second bullet point)] [144] See P WS §43 [1/14/175] [145] See P WS §44 [1/14/175]; see the two JVA at [2/37/407-418] [146] The TT form at [2/47/440], the handwriting on this form is the same as those on the D4 BOC corporate internet banking password receipt acknowledgement at [7/114/1752] and the D4 BOC daily accumulated debit limits amendment form at [7/114/1753], which as submitted in paragraph 13(b) hereinabove is D1’s handwriting [147] See P WS §§45-46 [1/14/175-176] [148] See P WS §47 [1/14/176] [149] See P WS §48 [1/14/176-177] [150] See P WS §46 [1/14/176] [151] P does not have a copy so the confidentiality agreement is not in the trial bundle. [152] P testimony (eic) on Day 1 am [153] See P WS §50(a) [1/14/177] [154] See P WS §50(b) [1/14/178] [155] See P WS §50(c) [1/14/178] [156] At [2/36/394] [157] At [2/37/407] and [2/37/412] [158] See P WS §51 [1/14/178]; see the TT form at [2/45/435] [159] the handwriting on this form is the same as those on the D4 BOC corporate internet banking password receipt acknowledgement at [7/114/1752] and the D4 BOC daily accumulated debit limits amendment form at [7/114/1753], which as submitted in paragraph 13(b) hereinabove is D1’s handwriting [160] See P WS§52 [1/14/178] [161] See police reply at [9/147/2178/§3] [162] See cheques at [6/106/1381-1386] [163] See bank statement at [4/88/883] [164] See cheque at [6/106/1382], bank statement showing deposit into D4 account [8/115/1852-1853] [165] See BOC letter confirming account number of D4 [7/108/1591]. For the transfers, see bank statements [8/115/1853] vs [7/111/1621] [166] See bank statements [8/115/1853] vs [7/111/1622] [167] See BOC letter confirming account number of D4 [7/108/1591]. For the transfers, see bank statement at [8/115/1853 vs 1797] [168] See bank statements [8/115/1797] vs [8/117/2023] [169] See cheque at [6/106/1381] [170] See police reply at [9/147/2178/§3] [171] See cheque at [6/106/1383] [172] See police reply at [9/147/2178/§3] [173] See bank statement at [4/88/885] [174] See cheque at [6/106/1385], bank statement showing deposit into D4 account [8/115/1854] [175] See bank statements [8/115/1855] vs [7/111/1623] [176] See bank statements [8/115/1855] vs [7/111/1623] [177] See bank statement at [8/115/1855 vs 1800] [178] See bank statement at [8/115/1800] vs [6/106/1384]; see also the cheque at [/6/106/1398] [179] See bank statement at [8/115/1855 vs 1800] [180] See bank statements [8/115/1800] vs [8/117/2020] [181] See cheque at [6/106/1384] [182] See cheque at [6/106/1381] [183] See D1 WS §4 [1/17/229] [184] P WS §54 [1/14/179] [185] At [2/46/436] [186] At [2/46/437] [187] See P WS §57 [1/14/180] [188] See P WS §§58-59 [1/14/180] [189] See D3 WS §14 [1/16/223]; see also the cashier order [2/50/443] and bank statement [8/115/1930] [190] See bank statement at [8/115/1930] [191] See bank statement at [8/115/1930-1931 vs 1858] [192] See bank statement at [8/115/1931 vs 1859] [193] See bank statement [8/115/1859] vs [8/117/2011] [194] See bank statement [8/115/1859] vs [7/111/1627] [195] See P WS §§60-61 [1/14/180-181] [196] The Restriction Letter at [9/131/2127] [197] See P WS §63 [1/14/182] [198] See D3 WS §15 [1/17/223]; see also the cashier order [2/51/444] and bank statement [8/115/1932] [199] See bank statement at [8/115/1932] [200] See bank statement at [8/115/1932 vs 1862] [201] See bank statement at [8/115/1862 vs 1807] [202] See bank statement [8/115/1807] vs [8/117/2000] [203] See bank statement [8/115/1862] vs [7/111/1633] [204] See bank statement at [8/115/1932 vs 1862] [205] See bank statement [8/115/1862] vs [7/111/1633] [206] See bank statement [8/115/1862] vs [7/111/1633] [207] See bank statement [8/115/1862] vs [8/117/2000] [208] See bank statement [8/115/1863] vs [8/117/2000] [209] See bank statement [8/115/1863] vs [7/111/1634] [210] See bank statement [8/115/1864] vs [7/111/1634] [211] See bank statement [8/115/1864] vs [7/111/1635] [212] See P WS §117 [1/14/206] [213] See P WS §72(a) [1/14/184]; see also cashier order [2/52/445]; purchase slip [6/105/1350] [214] See P WS §72(b) [1/14/184]; see also cashier order [2/53/446]; bank statement [8/115/1933] [215] See P WS §73 [1/14/185]; see also withdrawal form [2/54/447]; bank statement [3/86/683; 6/106/1371]; transfer form [6/106/1414, 1428] [216] See P WS §77 [1/14/186]; see also cashier order and purchase form [2/55, 57/448, 450] [217] See P WS §85(a) [1/14/190]; see also cashier order [2/58/451]; bank statement [8/115/1939] [218] See P WS §85(b) [1/14/190]; see also bank statement [3/86/719] [219] See P WS §85(c) [1/14/190]; see also cashier order [2/59, 60/452, 453]; bank statement [8/115/1942] [220] See P WS §90(a) [1/14/193]; see also bank statement [8/115/1942] [221] See P WS §90(b)(i) [1/14/193]; see also cashier order [2/61/454]. This payment was later cancelled by HKSAR: see SOC §71 [1/2/35] [222] See P WS §90(b)(ii) [1/14/193]; see also cashier order [2/62/455] [223] See P WS §91(a) [1/14/194]; see also cashier order and purchase form [2/63, 64/456, 457], bank statement [8/115/1943] [224] See P WS §91(b) [1/14/194]; see also cashier order and purchase form [2/65/458]; bank statement [8/115/1944] [225] See P WS §92 [1/14/194-195]; see also cashier order and purchase form [2/66/459]; bank statement [8/115/1825] [226] See P WS §92 [1/14/194-195]; see also cashier order [2/67/460] [227] See P WS §97 [1/14/197]; see also cashier order [2/68/461]; bank statement [8/115/1826] [228] See P WS §100(a) [1/14/198]; see also cashier order [2/69/463]; bank statement [8/115/1928] [229] See P WS §100(b) [1/14/198]; see also cashier order [2/70/462] [230] See P WS §§69-71 [1/14/183-184] [231] At [9/132/2131-2132] [232] See P WS §72 [1/14/184] [233] See bank statement at [8/115/1933 vs 1869] [234] See bank statement at [8/115/1933 vs 1869] [235] See bank statement at [8/115/1869] [236] See bank statement at [8/115/1934] [237] See P WS §117 [1/14/206] [238] See P WS §74 [1/14/185] [239] See P WS §80 [1/14/188]; see also the document showing P’s purchase of property in Mainland China at [2/38/419] [240] See P WS §76 [1/14/185-186] [241] See P WS §77 [1/14/186] [242] D3 testimony (xxn) Day 2 am [243] See P WS §117 [1/14/206] [244] See bank statement [3/84/606-608] [245] See P WS §78 [1/14/187] [246] At p.2 of the D1 Nov 2017 Letter [9/143/2157], §2 reads: 「另外，主要其實是幫你清洗之前地下錢舖用的匯款公司，才會這樣，我和家人也沒有怪，大家也堅持，所以請你在現在考驗我和你的信任的時候，不要放棄」 [247] See P WS §82 [1/14/189] [248] At [9/134, 135/2141-2142] [249] At [9/134/2141] [250] At [9/135/2142] [251] See P WS §85(a) [1/14/190] [252] See D3 WS §16 [1/16/223] [253] See P WS §83 [1/14/189] [254] See P WS §§85(b) & (c) [1/14/190] [255] See cashier order [2/58/451] and bank statement [8/115/1939] [256] See cashier order [2/59, 60/452, 453] and bank statement [8/115/1942] [257] See bank statement at [8/115/1939] [258] See bank statement at [8/115/1941 vs 1907] [259] See bank statement at [8/115/ 1907] vs [7/111/1668] [260] See P WS §87 [1/14/191-192] [261] At [9/137/2144] [262] At [9/138/2145] [263] See P WS §90(a) [1/14/193] [264] See the 3rd Purported HKMA Letter [9/137/2144] [265] See the Purported JFIU Letter [9/138/2145] [266] See P WS §90(b)(i) [1/14/193] [267] See P WS §90(b)(ii) [1/14/193] [268] See P WS §114 [1/14/204] ; see also police brief facts at [9/120/2057/§8] [269] See bank statement at [8/115/1942 vs 1914] [270] See bank statement at [8/115/1914] vs [7/111/1673] [271] See P WS §91 [1/14/193] [272] See P WS §91(a) [1/14/194] [273] See P WS §91(b) [1/14/194] [274] See P WS §92 [1/14/194-195] [275] See P WS §92 [1/14/195] [276] See P WS §114 [1/14/204]; see also police brief facts at [9/120/2057/§8] [277] See crime litigation search report [9/118/2032-2035/items 5-19] [278] See P WS §§93, 94, 98 [1/14/195-197] [279] D3 testimony (xxn) on Day 2 pm; P WS §§93, 94 [1/14/195-196] [280] See P WS §§104-108 [1/14/200-203]; Cindy WS §§12-16 [1/15/214-216]; see also the D1 Nov 2017 Letter where §§5 and 6 on p.2 reads: 「5. 另外，我知道，你同鄭生說要見到我，才有動作，契媽，請你相信我，我是急於病和家人的生意，才會這樣做，飛去英國，我自小媽不在，你是我的母親一樣，怎會不希望你探我病（之前）我以為自己無咁嚴重。 6. 我叫我老公見你，是因為他也知道，我在英國，所以他證明到我的病和忙中的事。」 [281] See P WS §95 [1/14/196] [282] See P WS §97 [1/14/197] [283] See D3 WS §23(a) [1/16/224] [284] See D3 WS §2(a) [1/16/220]; D3 testimony (xxn) on Day 2 am [285] See P WS §98 [1/14/197-198] [286] D3 testimony (xxn) on Day 2 pm [287] See P WS §100 [1/14/198] [288] See D3 WS §§23(b) & (c) [1/16/224] [289] See P WS §114 [1/14/204]; see also police brief facts at [9/120/2057/§8] [290] See bank statement [8/115/1926] [291] See bank statement [5/94/1112] [292] See bank statement [5/94/1112] [293] See bank statement [5/94/1113] [294] See bank statement [5/94/1117] [295] See bank statement [5/94/1118] [296] See bank statement [5/94/1121] [297] See bank statement [5/94/1121] [298] See bank statement [5/94/1121] [299] See bank statement [5/94/1121] [300] See bank statement [8/115/1928] [301] See bank statement [8/115/1928 v 1847] [302] See cheques and relevant documents at [3/81/583-585] [303] D3 testimony (xxn) on Day 2 pm [304] D3 testimony (xxn) on Day 2 am [305] D3 testimony (xxn) on Day 2 am [306] See the entries at the relevant period at [8/115/1926-1930, 1843-1848] [307] At [9/143/2158] [308] See P WS §§102-103 [1/14/199-200] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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