Re Cifi Holdings (Group) Co. Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 2326/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 26 June 2025.
1. By a petition presented on 13 June 2025, CIFI Holdings (Group) Co. Ltd. (“ Company ”) seeks the Court’s sanction under section 673 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) of a scheme of arrangement (“ Scheme ”) between the Company and the Scheme Creditors [1] .
Cited by 4 cases · Cites 17 cases
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HCMP 2326/2024 [2025] HKCFI 3250 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2326 OF 2024 ________________________
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________________________ REASONS FOR DECISION ________________________ Introduction 1.By a petition presented on 13 June 2025, CIFI Holdings (Group) Co. Ltd. (“Company”) seeks the Court’s sanction under section 673 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) of a scheme of arrangement (“Scheme”) between the Company and the Scheme Creditors[1]. 2.The Scheme was approved by an overwhelming majority of the Scheme Creditors present and voting at the Scheme Meeting held on 3 June 2025. Specifically, the Scheme was approved by 98.9% of Scheme Creditors in number, representing 92.66% in value. 3.At the hearing, I sanctioned the Scheme. These are the reasons for my decision. Of particular significance is the question of whether or not the fees and costs of the AHG (defined in [8]) split the class of Scheme Creditors who have met and approved the Scheme or in some other way impact on the Court’s approval of the Scheme. Background 4.The Company was incorporated in the Cayman Islands and registered in Hong Kong as a non-Hong Kong company in 2011. Its shares have been listed on the Main Board of The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (“SEHK”) since November 2012 (Stock Code: 884). 5.The Company is the ultimate holding company of the Group, which is principally engaged in property development, property investment, and the provision of property management services, primarily in first-and second-tier and core cities in the PRC. 6.As at 31 December 2024, the Company (on a standalone basis) had total assets of approximately RMB88.37 billion and total liabilities of approximately RMB59.26 billion. The Group (on a consolidated basis) had total assets of approximately RMB256.17 billion and total liabilities of approximately RMB204.25 billion. 7.Since mid-2021, the Group’s business has been severely impacted by the unprecedented downturn in the PRC real estate sector and COVID-19 pandemic. This has resulted in significant liquidity pressure and an inability to service all offshore debt obligations as they fall due. 8.To address these challenges, the Company engaged financial and legal advisers and has been in extensive negotiations with major offshore creditor groups, including an ad hoc group of holders of the Existing Notes (“AHG”) and a co-ordination committee of lenders (“CoCom”) since November 2022. 9.Following these negotiations, the Company entered into a Restructuring Support Agreement (“RSA”) with the AHG on 27 September 2024, subsequently amended on 22 October 2024 and 11 April 2025. The Scheme Purpose and Scope of the Scheme 10.The Scheme, as part of the wider restructuring, seeks to restructure approximately US$6.8 billion[2] of the Company’s offshore indebtedness (“Existing Debt”) in order to avoid a group-wide liquidation. 11.Based on a liquidation analysis prepared by Kroll (HK) Limited on the Group’s unaudited management accounts as of 30 June 2024[3], the Scheme Creditors’ recovery under the Scheme is estimated to be about 14.6% to 36.6%, whereas in a liquidation the Scheme Creditors’ recovery is estimated to be about 4.1% to 9.9%. 12.The Restructuring takes place via the Scheme and two inter-conditional consent solicitations (“Consent Solicitations”) to amend the governing law of the Existing Convertible Bonds and Existing Perpetual Securities from English law to Hong Kong law prior to the Restructuring Effective Date. The relevant Scheme Creditors have approved the Consent Solicitations and the governing law change will take place one hour before the occurrence of the Restructuring Effective Date. 13.The Existing Debt subject to the Scheme comprises:
14.The Company is the primary obligor (borrower/issuer) of the Existing Debt. Certain Existing Debt benefits from guarantees provided by offshore subsidiaries (“Subsidiary Guarantors”). 15.In respect of the Existing Notes, Existing Convertible Bonds, and Existing Perpetual Securities, the Scheme Creditors will be voting in their capacity as the beneficial owners of the instruments. The beneficial owners of the Existing Notes, Existing Convertible Bonds and Existing Perpetual Securities may vote in their capacity as contingent creditors due to their ability to obtain definitive notes in certain circumstances. The trustee and the common depositary under the Existing Notes, Existing Convertible Bonds and the Existing Perpetual Securities did not vote at the Scheme Meeting. Other Liabilities Falling Outside the Scheme 16.Certain liabilities of the Group totalling approximately US$15.8 billion[4]are excluded from the Scheme. These include primarily:
17.No Scheme Creditor has objected to these exclusions, and none of such other creditors have expressed any opposition to the Restructuring. Scheme Consideration Entitlement 18.The Scheme provides for Scheme Creditors to choose from nine options (“Options”) of Scheme Consideration Entitlements, which cater to different preferences and needs of Scheme Creditors. 19.The Options involve cash and instruments (notes or loans) with varying maturity profiles (2 to 9 years), interest rates (0% to 2.75% base, with potential step-ups/adjustments), PIK/deferral features, and principal haircuts (ranging from 0% to 68%). 20.All the new instruments benefit from the same credit enhancement package, including guarantees, share charges, account charges, and charges over inter-company receivables. In gist, the Options are as follows:
Consent Fees, Work Fees and Other Expenses 21.Scheme Creditors who acceded to the RSA (1) before 27 October 2024 (“Early-Bird RSA Fee Deadline”) are eligible to receive the Early-Bird RSA Fee at 0.15% of their eligible restricted debt; or (2) after the Early-Bird RSA Fee Deadline, but by 27 November 2024 will receive 0.05% of their eligible restricted debt. 22.The AHG will receive the AHG Work Fee to compensate them for work, time, resources in negotiating the Restructuring, and risks associated with trading restrictions due to receiving material non-public information. The AHG Work Fee is payable regardless of whether the Scheme is sanctioned and implemented, with the majority already paid. 23.The AHG Work Fee consists of (1) a fixed portion of US$46 million, and (2) any remaining escrow amount after payment of various costs and expenses. The amount is estimated to be approximately US$62.85 million, which has been and will be paid by instalments. The AHG Work Fee represents approximately 0.92% of the aggregate outstanding principal amount of the Existing Debt and approximately 2.94% of the AHG’s holdings in the principal amount of the Existing Notes. 24.The Company has also agreed to pay the professional fees, costs and expenses of advisers to the AHG, CoCom, and certain bank creditors (“Advisers Fees”), which represent in total 0.26% of the aggregate principal amount outstanding under the Existing Debt. Releases imposed by the Scheme 25.The releases provided for under the Scheme includes:
Restructuring Effective Date and Restructuring Conditions 26.The Scheme becomes binding on the Scheme Effective Date (upon the Scheme sanction order being filed). The compromises under the Scheme take effect on the Restructuring Effective Date, upon satisfaction/waiver of Restructuring Conditions. 27.The current Longstop Date (deadline by which the Restructuring Effective Date must occur) is 31 August 2025, extendable under specific conditions up to 30 December 2025 under Clause 2.2 of the Scheme. Legal Principles 28.In considering whether to sanction a scheme, the Court applies some well-established principles which have recently been restated in my decision in Re Add Hero Holdings Ltd[6] at [58]. The Court will consider, in particular, the following factors:
29.In my view each of the above factors are satisfied in the present case. Permissible Purpose 30.The Scheme represents a legitimate effort at debt restructuring for a distressed company. This is a permissible purpose: Re Hong Kong Petrochemical Company Limited[7] at [14]. 31.The Scheme also provides for certain ancillary discharges of the Restructuring Released Parties under Clause 9 of the Scheme:
32.The discharge of third-party guarantors and principal obligors is uncontroversial and permissible: Re Sunac China Holdings Ltd[8]at [19]; Re Unity Group Holdings International Ltd[9] at [20]. The ancillary discharge in favour of third parties in connection with the Company’s restructuring steps is also permissible: Re Sunac[10] at [19]. Class Composition 33.In considering whether creditors are properly classified, the relevant principles are summarised in Re Sunac[11]:
34.In terms of “rights in”, it is only the rights compromised by the scheme or granted by it that are relevant to the question of class composition. Other rights or interests, such as those acquired in a restructuring of an associated company, will be relevant at the discretionary stage, when the Court considers whether the meeting fairly reflected the views of creditors and whether to discount votes of creditors with a “special interest”: Re Add Hero[14] at [73]. 35.I have already referred to the existence of the AHG, which is a common feature of restructurings such as the present one. It is normal for the AHG to be paid a fee and have its advisers costs reimbursed by the debtor. This invites consideration of whether the AHG acquires additional rights, which take its members outside the general class of unsecured creditors. 36.In the present case, the AHG is made up of two groups of investors, namely 1) institutional investors that are representative of the wider noteholder constituency, and 2) investors that acquired the debt instruments following the Company’s defaults, such as hedge funds and distressed investors. It might be argued that these two groups of investors are not in the same position. In Re Inmarsat Plc[15], Norris J observed that the objectors to the scheme therein, though not speculators, were clearly in the business of exploiting opportunities. They bought shares in the company shortly before Bidco’s bid to takeover the company and sought to delay the sanction of the scheme to elicit an increased offer from Bidco. Norris J did not find this to be a class-fracturing feature and sanctioned the scheme[16], yet he observed that when it comes to costs, justice may require that an established investor or creditor caught up in the cross-fire of a takeover or a restructuring should be treated differently from a speculator or “opportunity investor” who deliberately chooses to put himself in the firing line by acquiring equity in an anticipated or actual bid situation or debt in a company in distress, though the Court must be cautious in drawing such distinctions[17]. The relevance of this distinction is that it is arguably harder to justify a member of the AHG receiving additional payments to compensate it for the work and costs it has incurred in contributing to the development of a restructuring scheme if it acquired debt after the company defaulted and with a view to profiting from an anticipated improvement in the value of the debt as a result of a restructuring. 37.At an intuitive level there is perhaps something immediately troubling about compensating a distressed debt investor for the costs it incurs in conducting what given the nature of its business is an ordinary cost, namely, managing its high risk investment. Paying an existing investor who bought at close to the face value of the debt its costs of trying to assist in achieving a restructuring is intuitively more palatable. However, I accept that distressed debt investors may well contribute by virtue of their expertise to the achievement of a successful restructuring that might otherwise prove illusive. There may be cases in which this is challenged, but I accept that absent challenge the court can properly proceed on the basis that payment of fees to a member of the AHG is permissible and does not split the class even if a member acquired the debt as an investment, i.e, as a distressed debt investor, after the company’s financial difficulties become known and its debt (commonly bonds) dropped significantly in value. However, although the payment of a fee or the reimbursement of professional costs may be justified, some regard must be had to the amount paid and an excessive payment may alter the analysis and the conclusion. AHG Work Fee and Advisers Fees 38.The principles concerning the payment of work fees to members of the AHG and their professional fees may be summarised as follows:
39.The final AHG Work Fee is estimated to be around US$62.85 million, clearly a significant sum. This might have a bearing on the adequacy of the Explanatory Statement in so far as it deals with the justification for the payment of this sum, which I shall explain later, but for the purpose of class composition, I agree with Mr Jat Sew-Tong SC[26], counsel for the AHG, that the AHG Work Fee does not fracture the class:
40.As regards the Advisers Fees, generally such payments also do not fracture the class: Re Nostrum Oil & Gas Plc[29] at [35] (Meade J). However, it should not be taken as a rule or norm that such fees would be unobjectionable regardless of the amount: Re Shimao Group Holdings Ltd[30] at [33] (Linda Chan J). 41.I am of the view that the payment of Advisers Fees would not fracture the class. They are reimbursements for the actual costs incurred by AHG, CoCom and certain bank creditors for engaging their own advisers for the purposes of negotiating the Restructuring and should not be regarded as conferring an additional benefit to them. The Advisers Fees represent 0.26% of the aggregate principal amount outstanding under the Existing Debt and have been fully disclosed in the Explanatory Statement[31]. They are not so material as would fracture the class. 42.Given the strength of the voting support of the Scheme, even if the AHG were to be put in a separate class, the voting outcome would remain the same and, therefore, although a significant consideration in the context of this case it is academic. This was also the case in Re Petrofac[32]. 43.In my view, the Scheme correctly placed the Scheme Creditors in one class. The appropriate comparator is the Company’s liquidation because should the Scheme fail, the Company is likely to go into liquidation: Re CA Cultural Technology Group Limited[33] at [22(1)]. In the event of the Company’s liquidation, the Scheme Creditors would have identical “rights in” because all Scheme Creditors’ claims against the Company are unsecured and would rank pari passu in a liquidation of the Company. The Scheme Creditors also have the identical “rights out” because the Scheme treats them equally. Third-Party Guarantees and Releases 44.As regards third-party guarantees, the fact that some of the Existing Debts benefit from guarantees granted by third parties would not fracture the class. It is well-established that rights of the creditors against third parties (for example against guarantors for the company’s debts) will generally constitute interests as opposed to rights; differences in interests may be relevant to the discretion to sanction the scheme: Re Petrofac Ltd[34]at [131]; Re Unity Group[35]at [20]. 45.The Scheme effects an ancillary discharge in the following manner which is consistent with contemporary scheme practice:
46.I accept that the discharges are justified in the present case. Consent Fees 47.It is well-established that a modest consent fee available to all scheme creditors will not fracture the class composition. In assessing the materiality of the fee, the Court considers the size of the fee as compared to the projected returns under the scheme and in liquidation: Re Sino-Ocean Land (Hong Kong) Limited[41] at [31] (Linda Chan J); Re ColourOz Investment 2 LLC[42] at [102]-[103] (Snowden J). 48.In the present case, the level of consent fees is relatively modest[43] as compared to the estimated returns under the Scheme (14.6% to 36.6%) and the liquidation scenario (4.1% to 9.9%). The consent fees, therefore, do not fracture the class. Compliance with the Convening Order 49.I am satisfied that the Convening Order has been complied with. This appears from the 3rd Affirmation of Zhu Gaoming dated 13 June 2025, confirming the circulation and publication of the Notice of the Scheme Meeting, Explanatory Statement, and Scheme to the Scheme Creditors at least 14 days before the Scheme Meeting. The English and Chinese advertisement of the Notice of the Scheme Meeting was duly placed in The Standard and Sing Tao Daily on 12 May 2025. Statutory Majorities 50.The Scheme was approved by the statutory majorities of Scheme Creditors at the Scheme Meeting: see [2] above. Information provided to Scheme Creditors 51.The principles that govern the sufficiency of explanatory statements are well established:
52.As I have already explained in the present case, the AHG Work Fee is estimated to be US$62.85 million. A work fee of such magnitude might attract objections from creditors who do not stand to receive these additional payments. Mr Jat also referred me to Re Noble Group Ltd & Anor (No.2)[51] in which Snowden J held at [69] that the fact that significant numbers of non-AHG scheme creditors who do not receive the same level of fees as the AHG voted in favour of the scheme shows that these creditors have in effect rendered their own commercial judgment as to what is in their best interests. Mr Jat submits that no creditor has objected or raised any query in relation to the AHG Work Fee. The Scheme was eventually passed by an overwhelming majority, and even amongst the non-AHG Scheme Creditors, 87.86% (by value) approved the Scheme. 53.The Court is normally slow to differ from the majority of creditors’ view as it acts on the basis that businessmen are much better judges of what is in their commercial interest than the Court (Re Add Hero[52] at [85]). However, the extent to which the Court will give deference to the views of the creditors must also depend on the nature of creditors and their ability to understand what is being proposed: Re ALL Scheme Ltd[53] at [102(x)] (Miles J). As I have already explained the AHG consists of sophisticated financial actors, including distressed debt investors. As I said in Re Add Hero[54], creditors possess varying levels of commercial and financial sophistication, and the effort they may expend in understanding the information with which they are presented will differ accordingly. If an explanatory statement is not sufficiently full or accurate, the Court is unlikely to be able to place any reliance on, or give effect to, the affirmative vote at the scheme meeting: Re ALL Scheme[55] at [138]. In the case of a significant work fee such as has been incurred in the present case, the explanatory statement must fairly and adequately explain the justification for the level of fees. 54.In the present case, details of the AHG Work Fee have been disclosed in the Explanatory Statement[56], including particulars of the AHG’s work and the payment schedule. There are comparisons between the AHG Work Fee to the principal amount of the Existing Debt and work fees paid by companies in similar restructuring matters. The Explanatory Statement also explains the Company’s business rationale for the Scheme[57] and makes clear that the Scheme is an alternative to the Company’s liquidation[58]. It provides estimates of the likely returns for Scheme Creditors in a liquidation and under the Scheme[59], as well as the risk factors[60]. I am satisfied that the information provided in the Explanatory Statement is sufficient to enable the more financially sophisticated Scheme Creditors to decide whether or not to vote for the Scheme, but should be comprehensible to less sophisticated Scheme Creditors. Intelligent and Honest Man Test 55.I have recently summarised the established principles in Re Add Hero[61] at [85]-[86]:
56.In my view, the Scheme is one which an intelligent and honest man might approve. The primary objective of the Scheme is that, upon the Scheme becoming effective, the Scheme Claims will be discharged and, in return, then Scheme Creditors will be entitled to the relevant Scheme Consideration Entitlement, which gives the Scheme Creditors a much better return than in an insolvent liquidation of the Company. This is reflected by the fact that an overwhelming majority of the Scheme Creditors, many being sophisticated financial parties, have voted in favour of the Scheme. The level of support obtained provides evidence that a reasonable creditor would have approved the Scheme. International Dimension 57.The Company was incorporated in the Cayman Islands. In transnational restructuring, there are two inter-related considerations. The Court has to consider (1) whether there is sufficient connection between the scheme and Hong Kong for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over a scheme promoted by a foreign company, and (2) whether the scheme is effective in other foreign jurisdictions of practical importance: Re CA Cultural[63] at [30] and [32]. 58.In seeking a sufficient connection, the purpose is to ensure that the Court does not exercise a prima facie exorbitant jurisdiction save where it is appropriate to do so: Re Winsway Enterprises[64] at [26]. 59.It is clear that the Scheme has a sufficient connection with Hong Kong. First, the Company was registered in Hong Kong as a non-Hong Kong company in 2011. Its shares have been listed on the SEHK since November 2012[65]. Second, the fact that a significant portion of the Scheme Claims (namely Scheme Claims under 12 Existing Loan facilities) are governed by Hong Kong law establishes a sufficient connection with Hong Kong: Re Century Sunshine Group Holdings Ltd[66] at [50]. 60.As regards the efficacy of a scheme, the relevant principles are as follows:
61.For Scheme Claims governed by Hong Kong law to be discharged under the Scheme, any dissenting creditors’ opposition should not hamper the effectiveness of the Scheme: Re Sunac[71] at [35]. 62.At present, the Company does not intend to seek recognition of the Scheme under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code due to ahigh level of support shown by Scheme Creditors holding Scheme Claims governed by New York law in the Scheme Meeting. In particular, the voting turnout rate of the Scheme Creditors was 97.51%, out of which 99.13% of the voting Scheme Claims voted for the Scheme. The substantial support underscores the Scheme’s international effectiveness despite the absence of a formal Chapter 15 recognition. Overwhelming creditors’ support of the Scheme can negate the need for formal foreign recognition as the risk of adverse enforcement by a dissenting Scheme Creditor in the United States is remote: Re Zhongliang Holdings Group Company Limited[72] at [39]; Re China Singyes[73] at [18(3)(v)]. No “blot” or Roadblocks 63.As a final cross-check, the Court will also consider whether there is any blot or defect in the scheme which may hinder its operational effectiveness: Re China Bozza Development Holdings Ltd[74]at [29]. 64.It is a recognised practice in complex restructurings that schemes sanctioned by the Court would become effective only after a series of post-sanction steps occur. The Scheme is similar because the Restructuring Effective Date is conditional on a series of post-sanction steps to implement the Scheme, such as steps to issue and list the various debt instruments forming part of the Scheme Consideration. I am satisfied that the Company is likely to be able to satisfy these Restructuring Effective Date conditions. The present case is similar to Re Sunac[75], and the Court would not be acting in vain in sanctioning the Scheme. Conclusion 65.For the above reasons, I sanctioned the Scheme and granted orders in the terms of the draft produced to this Court.
Mr William Wong SC and Mr Look Chan Ho, instructed by Linklaters, for the Company Mr Jat Sew-Tong SC and Ms Jasmine Cheung, instructed by Kirkland & Ellis, for the Ad Hoc Group of Creditors [1] Unless otherwise stated, I shall adopt the abbreviations and terminology employed in the Scheme and the Explanatory Statement despatched to the Scheme Creditors in accordance with my Order on the Originating Summons dated 23 April 2025 (“Convening Order”). [2] Principal as of 31 December 2024. [3] Further to this Court’s comments at the convening hearing, the Company requested its financial adviser to summarise the figures showing the difference in key metrics between the information available to Kroll when preparing the liquidation analysis and the latest audited financial statements for the financial year ended 31 December 2024. The difference supports the Company’s position that the financial position has not improved since the liquidation analysis was conducted. [4] Principal as of 31 December 2024. [5] Deed of Release, Clause 2.5. [6] [2025] HKCFI 310; [2025] 1 HKLRD 870. [7] [2024] HKCFI 2601; [2024] 5 HKLRD 124. [8] [2023] HKCFI 2850; [2023] 5 HKLRD 765. [10] Supra. [11] Supra, at [20]-[22]. [12] [2021] HKCFI 1592; [2021] HKCLC 911 at [15]–[16]. [13] [2023] EWHC 696 (Ch) at [28]–[29] (Leech J). [14] Supra. [15] [2021] 1 BCLC 446. [16] [2019] EWHC 3470 (Ch). [17] Supra, at [24(e)]. [18] Supra, at [20]-[22]. [19] [2018] EWHC 2911 (Ch). [20] [2025] EWHC 859 (Ch). [21] Supra, at [20]-[22]. [22] Supra. [23] Supra. [24] Supra. [25] Supra. [26] With Ms Jasmine Cheung. [27] From the formation of the AHG in November 2022 to the anticipated restructuring effective date in September 2025. [28] [2021] 2 BCLC 396. [29] [2022] EWHC 1646 (Ch). [31] Explanatory Statement at [8.5(k)(vi)]. [32] Supra, at [10]-[11]. [33] [2024] HKCFI 1721; [2024] 3 HKLRD 668. [34] Supra. [35] Supra, at [12]-[17]. [36] [2025] EWHC 1015 (Ch). [37] Supra. [38] With Mr Look Chan Ho. [39] Supra, at [113]. [40] [2025] HKCFI 271 at [16]. [41] [2025] HKCFI 1270; [2025] 2 HKLRD 518. [42] [2020] BCC 926. [43] See [21] above. [44] Supra. [45] [2017] 1 HKLRD 1. [47] Supra. [48] Supra. [49] Supra. [50] Supra. [51] [2019] 2 BCLC 548. [52] Supra. [53] [2021] EWHC 1401 (Ch). [54] Supra, at [83]. [55] Supra. [56] Explanatory Statement at [8.5(k)(ii)-(v)]. [57] Explanatory Statement at [7.1]. [58] Explanatory Statement at [4.67]-[4.68]. [59] Explanatory Statement at [4.69]-[4.71]. [60] Explanatory Statement at [12.1]-[12.6]. [61] Supra. [62] Re Allied Properties (HK) Ltd [2020] HKCA 973; [2020] HKCLC 1549, [37]. [63] Supra. [64] Supra. [65] See [4] above. [67] Supra, at [58]. [69] Supra. [70] Supra. [71] Supra. [73] Supra. [74] [2023] HKCFI 1620; [2023] HKCLC 469. [75] Supra. |
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