Lee Chick Choi v. The Hong Kong Golf Club

Read the full judgment text of DCEO 11/2019 on BabelCite. This DCEO judgment was delivered on 30 September 2025.

Cited by 6 cases · Cites 2 cases

Case No.DCEO 11/2019[2025] HKDC 1653
Court
DCEO
Date30 Sep 2025
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

DCEO 11/2019

[2025] HKDC 1653

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES ACTION NO 11 OF 2019

--------------------------

BETWEEN

  LEE CHICK CHOI Claimant
  and  
  THE HONG KONG GOLF CLUB Respondent

-------------------------


Before: His Honour Judge Jonathan Wong (Paper Disposal)
Dates of Claimant’s written submissions: 16 & 30 June 2025
Date of Respondent’s written submissions: 23 June 2025
Date of Decision: 30 September 2025

--------------------------

DECISION

--------------------------

1.Introduction

1.1This is my decision on a rather unusual application made by the Claimant by his summons dated 17 April 2025 (“Summons”) for a stay of execution of my judgment handed down more than 2 years earlier on 20 April 2023 (“Judgment”)[1]. By the Judgment, I dismissed the Claimant’s claim made under the Disability Discrimination Ordinance Cap 487 and made a costs order nisi that that he should pay to the Respondent the costs of the action on an indemnity basis. By my decision dated 11 October 2023 (“Decision”)[2], I inter alia dismissed the Claimant’s application for leave to appeal against the Judgment and varied the costs order nisi to the effect that the Respondent was entitled to enhanced interest on the basis that he was unable to beat the sanctioned payment made by the Respondent on 11 May 2020 (“Costs Order Absolute”). The Claimant has since renewed his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal (CAMP 329/2023).

1.2As there was no counterclaim by the Respondent, practically speaking, the only order arising from the Judgment capable of being stayed is the Costs Order Absolute.

1.3As I understand the position, the Summons was issued by the Claimant apparently for 2 reasons. First, it is said that the Summons was necessitated by the Respondent’s Notices of Commencement of Taxation dated 3 April 2025 (“First Reason”). Secondly, it is said that the Claimant was provided with fresh materials from a third party (Messrs Deacons) and applications have been made to the Court of Appeal for leave to adduce fresh evidence and to amend his grounds of appeal respectively on 16 and 19 May 2025. The Claimant submits as follows (“Second Reasons“):

“…if I will be successful in CAMP 329/2023 and my intended appeal after leave to be granted, the [Costs Order Abolsute] may be the other way around. Therefore, I humbly plead HH Judge Wong would grant me leave to stay execution of his Judgment delivered on 20 April 2023.”

2.Analysis

2.1In my view, the Summons is entirely without merit.

2.2The First Reason is plainly not a legitimate reason. The Respondent is entitled to commence the taxation process and it cannot be sensibly suggested that that the Respondent should voluntarily deprive itself the fruit of the judgment, failing which a reason of stay is then provided.

2.3As regards the Second Reason, there is no application to me to consider any proposed grounds made to the Court of Appeal (including any further amendments) which were not made at the time when I dismissed the leave application in the Decision. On the Claimant’s own case, the applications for leave to amend the appeal grounds and to adduce new evidence have been made to the Court of Appeal. As far as I am concerned, I had by the Decision dismissed the application for leave to appeal, on the bases that the proposed appeal grounds before me did not enjoy a reasonable prospect of success and it was not suggested by the Claimant that there was some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

2.4If it is suggested by the Claimant that, in the context of the Summons, there are appeal grounds which have been proposed to the Court of Appeal (whether in its original form or by amendment) which he says should materially alter my assessment of the merits of the intended appeal, one would have expected him to identify such grounds, bearing in mind that the burden is on him to demonstrate good reasons for seeking a stay. No real attempt has been made by the Claimant to do so and from my perusal of the materials, I agree with the Respondent that the grounds proposed to the Court of Appeal are regurgitations of the complaints made before me.

2.5Where I had by the Decision decided against the leave application before me, it seems to me that it can only follow that the Claimant had failed to meet the minimum requirement to demonstrate that there is an arguable appeal. As such, the discretion to entertain the Summons is not engaged.

2.6For completeness, I agree with the Respondent that the new evidence obtained from Messrs Deacons relating to Ms Cynthia Chung’s “broadcast” of the Judgment is self-evidently irrelevant.

2.7Even were I incorrect on the foregoing, in that there are grounds which have been proposed to the Court of Appeal which were not considered in the Decision, there is no suggestion by the Claimant that such “additional” grounds are of such cogency to warrant to stay on merits alone.

2.8That brings in another insurmountable obstacle in respect of the Summons. The only suggestion is that the Costs Order Absolute should be stayed pending the resolution of CAMP 329/2023 and the appeal proper were leave granted. There is no evidence to suggest that absent a stay the appeal would be rendered nugatory. The costs sought to be taxed by the Respondent are slightly over HK$ 3.2 million. In my view, it cannot be sensibly suggested that the Respondent would not be able to repay any sums paid after taxation even were the Claimant to succeed on appeal. Neither is there any suggestion or evidence that the Claimant would suffer any serious deleterious effect absent a stay. Whilst I accept that the costs claimed by the Respondent is not insignificant to an individual, there is no suggestion by the Claimant himself or evidence adduced to show that he has any difficulty in meeting that obligation.

3.Conclusion

3.1For the above reasons, the Summons is dismissed.

3.2I also make an order that the Claimant is to pay to the Respondent the costs of the Summons to be taxed on an indemnity basis with a certificate for counsel summarily assessed at HK$73,802. The Summons is a continuation of unmeritorious applications pursued by the Claimant, in which indemnity costs have been awarded by me on almost every occasion[3] since (and including) the Judgment.

3.3The above costs order and summary assessment are on a nisi basis.

  ( Jonathan Wong )
District Judge

The Claimant acting in person

Mr Martin Kok, instructed by Johnson Stokes & Master, for the Respondent



[1]  [2023] 2 HKLRD 1117

[2]  [2023] HKDC 1318

[3]  Except in respect of the application to vary the costs order nisi: Decision §5.4.