Lee Chick Choi v. The Hong Kong Golf Club
Read the full judgment text of DCEO 11/2019 on BabelCite. This DCEO judgment.
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DCEO 11/2019 [2026] HKDC 460 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES ACTION NO 11 OF 2019 ________________________ BETWEEN
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________________________ DECISION ________________________ 1. Introduction 1.1This is my decision on the following summonses issued by the Claimant:
2. The Decision 2.1By the Decision, I dismissed the Claimant’s application for a stay of execution (“Stay Application”) of my judgment handed down on 20 April 2023 (“Judgment”). As noted in the Decision, the Stay Application was effectively an application to suspend the adverse costs order made against the Claimant as a result of the Judgment (“Costs Order Absolute”). The Claimant’s application was pursued on two bases, namely (1) it was taken out in response to the Respondent’s pursuit of taxation of the Costs Order Absolute and (2) his application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the Judgment has merits. 2.2I dismissed the Stay Application on the bases that (1) the Claimant failed to satisfy the merit threshold to engage the court’s discretion to the entertain the Stay Application (Decision §2.5) and (2) in any event, the Claimant failed to demonstrate that absent a stay the appeal would be rendered nugatory. 3. The Applications 3.1The Leave Application is yet another unmeritorious application pursued by the Claimant. I have pursued his written materials, including the Draft Reply Affirmation on a de bene esse basis. 3.2The starting point is that the Claimant has (again) failed to set out concise grounds that are reasonably arguable in a draft notice of appeal. The supporting affirmation dated 2 October 2025 simply asks the court to refer to a number of documents. The Claimant’s written submissions do not improve the position and neither does the Draft Reply Affirmation. This is not the first time that the court has to point out that a leave application made by the Claimant leave application is defective: Lee Chick Choi v The Hong Kong Golf Club [2023] HKDC 1318 §2.2. 3.3Quite apart from the above defect, doing the best I can to decipher the Claimant’s written materials, I am unable to see there is an arguable appeal that I was in error in forming the view that the Claimant has failed to surmount the merit threshold in showing an arguable appeal in CAMP 329/2023. 3.4In any event, where, by the Decision I had dismissed the Stay Application, the proper course is for the Claimant to renew his application to the Court of Appeal and such renewed application to the Court of Appeal is not an appeal: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 Note 59/13/7 and see for example Chau Tat Wing, suing in his own capacity and as the sole executor of the estate of Wong Tim Lun deceased v Wong Kwai Wan & Ors [2026] HKCA 63 §§1 and 11. 3.5Still further, I have found at Decision §2.8 that there was no evidence to show that the Claimant would suffer any serious deleterious effect absent a stay. The Claimant in his supporting affirmation refers to the fact that he receives Social Security Allowance of HK$4,250 each month and has no money to satisfy the potential costs liability of HK$3.2 million. 3.6The Claimant faces a number of difficulties. First, as pointed out by the Respondent, no explanation has been proffered by the Claimant as to why that evidence was not put forward at first instance. Secondly and more importantly, the evidence now put forward falls fall short of what is required, name the obligation is for the Claimant to adduce “good evidence in support” of any serious deleterious effect” Professor Chan Yan Cheong v The Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee [2020] HKCFI 2180 §§10-11. The Claimant has not adduced any bank statements and, as I understand the position, the entitlement to receive Social Security Allowance is not dependent on any means test and does not, on its own, shows that the Claimant lacks financial means. 3.7For the reasons set out above, I dismiss the Leave Application. As pointed out by the Respondent, there is no basis put forward by the Claimant to support the Variation Application and the same stands dismissed. 4. The 12/1/26 Summons 4.1I accept the Respondent’s submissions that the Respondent’s submissions were not, as a matter of fact, lodged out of time. In any event, by the direction made for the paper disposal of the Applications, the Claimant, after filing his submissions (which he did on 30 December 2025) was not entitled to file any further submissions after the Respondent’s submissions without the court’s leave. Therefore, any prejudice to the Claimant, if any was caused, is minimal. I do not find the content of the Draft Reply Affirmation is helpful to the present deliberation. The 12/1/26 Summons is therefore dismissed. 5. Conclusion 5.1I dismiss the Applications and the 12/1/26 Summons. 5.2I further order that the costs of the Applications and the 12/1/26 Summons be paid by the Claimant to the Respondent. The costs of the Application (by reference to the Respondent’s Statement of Costs dated 8 January 2026) are summarily assessed (without a certificate for counsel) on an indemnity basis at HK$45,000 and the costs of the 12/1/26 Summons are assessed (by reference to the costs for a time summons) at HK$700. The foregoing orders and assessment are on a nisi basis.
The Claimant acting in person Mr Martin Kok, instructed by Johnson Stokes & Master, for the Respondent |
Cases cited in this judgment
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