Rich Engineering Ltd v. Fire Service Installation Contractors Disciplinary Board
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 803/2024 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 7 January 2026.
1. This is an appeal by Notice of Originating Motion filed on 16 May 2024 by Rich Engineering Limited (“ REL ”), the Appellant, against the Fire Service Installation Contractors Disciplinary Board (“ Board ”), in respect of the sentences made by the Board on 16 April 2024. The appeal is lodged pursuant to Regulation 12 of the Fire Service (Installation Contracts) Regulations (Cap 95A) (“ Regulations ”) and under Order 55 rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A).
Cited by 1 case · Cites 6 cases
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HCMP 803/2024 [2026] HKCFI 35 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLEANOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 803 OF 2024 (on appeal from Fire Service Installation Contractors Disciplinary Board) ________________________
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________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________ I. INTRODUCTION 1.This is an appeal by Notice of Originating Motion filed on 16 May 2024 by Rich Engineering Limited (“REL”), the Appellant, against the Fire Service Installation Contractors Disciplinary Board (“Board”), in respect of the sentences made by the Board on 16 April 2024. The appeal is lodged pursuant to Regulation 12 of the Fire Service (Installation Contracts) Regulations (Cap 95A) (“Regulations”) and under Order 55 rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A). II. BACKGROUND 2.The background of the present appeal can be found in Au-Yeung J’s judgment handed down on 1 March 2024 in HCMP 2378/2020 ([2024] HKCFI 648; [2024] 2 HKLRD 531) (the “HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment”). Suffice for the present purpose to set out the following from that judgment as a matter of background:-
3.The extent of the appeal allowed covered the sentences in FSICDB20-20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, which are the subject matter of the present appeal before me. It is necessary to understand the reason for her Ladyship to allow the appeal in the sentences so as to understand what the allowed appeal covered. At §116 of the HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment, her Ladyship said:-
4.Her Ladyship therefore ordered that these 6 cases be “remitted to the same Board to [1] reconsider the sentence and [2] give reasons for the sentences” (§118). 5.It is not in dispute that the Board was functus and could not impose fresh sentences, and therefore, the 6 cases were remitted for giving reasons and reconsideration because the convictions in some other cases for which concurrent sentences were imposed were set aside in HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment, a matter which the Board would have to bear in mind in giving reasons. Her Ladyship’s Order made on 4 March 2024 (the “4 March Order”) well reflects this. 6.On 16 April 2024, the Board gave written reasons in respect of the sentences in the 6 cases (the “Board’s Reasons”). Given the nature of the complaint now raised by REL in the present appeal (as shall be seen below), it is necessary to set out the Board’s Reasons in full:-
7.In other words, in general, the Board considered the mitigation, REL’s past records of similar disciplinary sanction and the past sanctions imposed in other cases (§§3-4 of the Board’s Reasons). 8.In respect of the removal order, as explained in §5, the Board imposed the removal order for the following reasons:-
9.As regards concurrent and consecutive sentences, at §6, the Board set out the following reasons:-
10.The Board did not stop there. As can be seen at §7, it considered the totality, considering that the total sentence was fair just and proportional to reflect the culpability of REL and to act as deterrence. III. SCOPE OF THE APPEAL 11.As mentioned above, by the HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment, Au-Yeung J remitted the 6 cases only for (1) giving reasons and (2) reconsidering the sentences in the light of the successful appeal against some of the other convictions. Therefore, it is not for REL to have the second bite of the cherry to appeal against the sentences on grounds other than the adequacy of reasons and in relation to the reconsideration of the sentence upon the successful appeal against some of the other convictions. That said, the sentence now is, in my view, “fresh” in the sense that (1) reasons were given; and (2) sentence was given in respect of only those convictions upheld by the HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment, while the sentences for those set-aside convictions must have fallen away. Therefore, I am of the view that I should consider the appeal in respect of the sentences in this light, but would not consider any submissions or grounds which would effectively amount to a second bite of the cherry. 12.What does this mean? To answer this question, it is important to appreciate what were the sentences before the HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment and what were the sentences thereafter. IV. SENTENCES BEFORE AND AFTER HCMP 2378/2020 JUDGMENT 13.In this regard, Ms Clara Wong, counsel for REL, has helpfully prepared a table setting out the convictions (both set-aside convictions and the remaining convictions now in the present appeal) and sentences. I adapt the table as an Annex to this Judgment. That table is in fact similar to the table in §9 of the HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment, but Ms Wong has helpfully shaded the present 6 cases in the table. For those items that are shaded in grey in the Annex are the 6 cases in the present appeal, the only convictions remaining after HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment. For those unshaded items, they are convictions set aside in the HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment. The shading added by Ms Wong makes it easier to understand how the sentences were supposed to run and what effect, if any, the setting-aside of those convictions has had on the sentences. 14.It can be seen from the Annex that originally, for Location 1, there was one more conviction (namely, Case 19) (having been set aside), and the sentence for that conviction was a 4-month removal order to run concurrently with the sentences imposed for Cases 20, 21 and 22 (now before me). As a result of the concurrency, a 4-month removal order was imposed for the convictions in Location 1. 15.For Location 2:-
16.The sentences for the two Locations were to run consecutively, and therefore, the net effect was that REL was removed from the list for 9 months in total. 17.Now, with those convictions set aside, as set out in §4 of the Board’s Reasons, the Board took away the sentences for the set-aside convictions. The Board concluded at §8 of the Board’s Reasons that the removal order would be 6 months and 7 days long. 18.Therefore, while the individual sentences are not subject to appeal, pursuant to HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment and 4 March Order, it would be the totality of the sentence in the light of certain convictions having been set aside that should be reconsidered. The scope of the present appeal should be limited to this (in addition to adequacy of reasons). I shall consider this in dealing with Grounds 1, 4, 6, 7 and 8 as a group below in relation to excessiveness of the sentences. V. LEGAL PRINCIPLES 19.The relevant legal principles in relation to an appeal under Order 55 rule 7 are not in dispute. The following are highlighted. 20.First, Order 55 rule 7(7), pursuant to which the present appeal is lodged, provides as follows:
21.Second, in this regard, Ms Wong fairly refers me to Legend Engineering (Hong Kong) Company Limited v Director of Fire Services [2025] HKCFI 585 at §14 per DHCJ KC Chan, where His Lordship said:-
22.Ms Ebony Ling, counsel for the Board, refers me to the next paragraph of the same case:-
23.Consistently, in the context of disciplinary sanctions, as expounded by Kwan VP (with Chu VP and Au JA) in Wan Pak-Kwong Raymond v The Nursing Council of Hong Kong [2023] HKCA 272 at §§19-21:-
24.I see no material difference in the Board. Although fire service installation contractors are not subject to self-regulatory body such as solicitors to the Law Society, the only difference is that the body regulating fire service installation contractors is a government authority with the relevant expertise in the matter. In my view, this difference, at least in the context of an appeal against conviction and sanction, has no material significance on these legal principles. 25.Third, “[e]ven if there was procedural irregularity in the tribunal below, it does not follow that the Court must remit the case to the tribunal for re-trial. It depends on whether there was substantial miscarriage of justice. It is only if it is plainly and unarguably right notwithstanding the misdirection that the decision could stand. If the conclusion was wrong or might have been wrong, then it is for an appellate tribunal to remit the case to the only tribunal which was charged with making findings of fact”: see §20 of the HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment. 26.Fourth, in relation to adequacy of reasons, it depends on “the context in which the decision maker is operating and the circumstances of the case in question”. The reasons may be brief, and need not address every single point: see §§39-44 of the HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment. It, however, must enable the reader to understand and the aggrieved person to assess prospects of obtaining alternative reliefs or resolutions: see Zhao Hong Cora v Registration of Persons Tribunal [2025] HKCFI 5276. 27.Fifth, while the present case is not on sentencing in criminal cases, I think, consistent with the fourth point above, the comments in Cross & Cheung, Sentencing in Hong Kong (11th edition) §37-23 is relevant: “there is no magic formula as to the contents of reasons for sentence, and it is ‘a question of fact and degree in each matter as to whether the reasons provided are adequate’”. 28.With the above legal principles in mind, I shall deal with the Grounds of Appeal set out in the Notice of Originating Motion. Ms Wong, for REL before me, is not the one settling the Grounds of Appeal. In her Skeleton Submissions, she sensibly groups the various Grounds of Appeals and streamlines the submissions on the grounds as grouped. I shall consider these groups according to the order of Ms Wong’s Skeleton Submissions. VI. GROUNDS 1, 4, 6, 7 AND 8 29.Under Grounds 1, 4, 6, 7 and 8, REL complains that the sentences, viewed individually or as a whole, was manifestly excessive. 30.Ms Wong, in particular, refers to the Board’s evidence filed in the present appeal which stresses that the Board could not impose fresh sentences. In reliance on such evidence, Ms Wong submits that the Board erred in law in considering itself handicapped from reconsidering the total sentence imposed against REL, thinking that HCMP 2378/2020 Judgment only ordered it to give reasons. With respect, I disagree:-
31.In other words, the Board did consider the totality of the sentence bearing in mind that some convictions were set aside and provided reasons for the sentences. The issue thus is whether the totality was manifestly excessive or just, and to determine this issue, one must assess the reasons for the sentences. 32.In this regard, Ms Wong submits that a removal order now imposed on REL is a heavy penalty with significant consequences, and this is particularly so when REL only had one past disciplinary record over 20 years, the 6 convictions in questions are not court convictions, REL pleaded guilty in these 6 cases, the ramification was severe and there was no express finding of dishonesty. 33.As regards any finding of dishonesty, the Board’s Reasons specifically referred to the brief facts on which the charges were brought against REL. From the brief facts of the 6 cases, it is clear that Case 24 was the case where dishonesty was involved. The brief facts for Case 24 stated:-
34.Although the word “dishonesty” was not used, “providing false or misleading information” was used. While Ms Wong is right that “providing false or misleading information” (as opposed to “knowingly” providing such information) itself would not necessarily connote dishonesty, reading the brief facts in context, in particular the long period of such information being provided and REL’s representation that it would submit the plan for Shop C with that for Shop B but eventually no plan for Shop C was provided but only the plan for Shop B was submitted, the reader can reasonably understand that the brief facts and the accusation in Case 24 involved dishonesty. 35.When there was dishonesty involved, despite the other factors highlighted by Ms Wong in her submissions (§32 above), bearing in mind the relevant legal principles set out in Part V above, I am satisfied that the sentence was within the reasonable range, not excessive and just. 36.Therefore, Grounds 1, 4, 6, 7 and 8 fail. VII. GROUNDS 2, 3 AND 8A 37.For Grounds 2, 3 and 8A, first, Ms Wong submits that the Board erroneously considered REL’s past disciplinary conviction in 2012 as a similar conviction and in any event that such consideration was irrelevant. She refers specifically to §3 of the Board’s Reasons “紀律委員會已仔細考慮了註冊承辦商代表的求情及註冊承辦商過往曾有相同紀錄處分的記錄”. Ms Wong submits that the reference to the past record in §3 of the Board’s Reasons was made under the heading “Reason for the Order” (命令理由) in the Board’s Reasons, and thus the past record must be part of the reason. 38.Ms Ling submits that this past record played no role in the sentencing according to the Board’s Reasons. In my view, §3 of the Board’s Reasons simply set out what was submitted before the Board and what the Board considered as background for the reasons to be detailed in the subsequent paragraphs, and in explaining the sentencing in §§5-7, this past record was not mentioned at all. In coming to this view, I must mention that I do not consider the Board’s affirmation deposing that the Board did not consider the past record. Such evidence is, in my view, not appropriate. The Board should have set out all the reasons in the Board’s Reasons, and cannot subsequently supplement the Board’s Reasons by way of affirmation in an appeal hearing. This could cause unfairness to the Applicant. 39.Second, Ms Wong submits that the Board erroneously considered itself handicapped from re-considering the sentences, and thus the Board failed to consider the totality of the sentence. I disagree for the reasons set out in §§30-31 above. 40.Third, Ms Wong submits that the Board failed to explain what past orders imposed against other contractors for similar conduct (mentioned in §5 of the Board’s Reasons). In my view, like the REL’s past record considered by the Board, the Board only considered it but it was not the reason for the sentences. In any event, I do not see the need to explain in detail how the other sentences were made use of because first, those sentences were not tariffs (as explained by the Court of Appeal in Wan Pak-Kwong Raymond v The Nursing Council of Hong Kong, supra, mentioned in §23(1) above); and second, mentioning the Board’s consideration of the past sentences would be adequate reasoning in the context. 41.Therefore, Grounds 2, 3 and 8A fail. VIII. GROUND 6 42.In respect of Ground 6, Ms Wong submits that the Board erred in adopting an inconsistent and unprincipled approach in deciding concurrent and consecutive sentences for the 6 cases. 43.As is set out in §4 of the Board’s Reasons, the sentences were set out with reference to two locations. For Location 1, a concurrent sentence was imposed, while for Location 2, consecutive sentences were imposed. For a better understanding, I point out that Location 1 refers to a building in Wan Chai, while Location 2 refers to a building in Sheung Wan. 44.Ms Wong submits that the nature of the three counts of misconduct committed within Location 2 is similar and the misconduct under these three counts arose from the same event, and therefore, she submits, like Location 1, the sentence for the three counts should be concurrent. 45.With respect, I point out that as a matter of fact:-
46.As pointed out by Ms Ling, as a matter of law, it is a discretion whether to order concurrent or consecutive sentences: see Sentencing in Hong Kong (11th edition) §10-3; a fortiori when the disciplinary body would be in a better position to determine how the professional standards and interests would be served by appropriate sentencing (see §§23-24 above). 47.Having considered the facts specifically pointed out in §45 above and the Board’s Reasons in explaining why a concurrent sentence was imposed for Location 1 and consecutive sentences were imposed for Location 2, I am satisfied that the respective concurrent sentence and consecutive sentences were within the reasonable range, not excessive by any comparison exercise as carried out by Ms Wong, and just. 48.So, Ground 6 fails. IX. OTHER GROUNDS 49.As I mentioned above, Ms Wong, counsel for REL, is not the one who settled the Grounds of Appeal. Ms Wong (rightly in my view) does not make any submissions in respect of part of Ground 3, Ground 5, Grounds 8B and 8C, which have no merits at all. X. CONCLUSION 50.In the circumstances, I dismiss REL’s appeal. I agree with Ms Wong that the Board’s position in respect of the scope of the appeal did not appear as sensibly as in Ms Ling’s Skeleton Submissions but appeared that the Board took the stance that even the totality of the sentences could not be appealed at all. I accept Ms Wong’s submissions that as a result of such stance, REL spent some costs and time on this issue in preparing the affirmation in reply. Adopting a broad brush approach, I order REL to pay 85% of the costs of the appeal to the Board. The total costs is summarily assessed at HK$200,000, thus 90% being HK$170,000. 51.I thank Ms Wong and Ms Ling for their assistance.
Ms Clara Wong, instructed by Patrick Mak & Tse, for the Appellant Ms Ebony Ling, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent Annex
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