香港特別行政區 訴 蔡信能

Read the full judgment text of DCCC 1506/2024 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 13 January 2026.

1. 被告人承認一項「企圖搶劫」罪,違反香港法例第210章《盜竊罪條例》第10條和第200章《刑事罪行條例》第159G及159J條。

Cites 8 cases

Case No.DCCC 1506/2024[2026] HKDC 90
Court
District Court
Date13 Jan 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

DCCC 1506/2024

[2026] HKDC 90

香港特別行政區

區域法院

刑事案件2024年第1506號

---------------------------------

  香港特別行政區  
   
  蔡信能  

---------------------------------

主審法官: 區域法院法官謝沈智慧
日期: 2026年1月13日
出席人士: 謝祿英女士,為外聘大律師,代表香港特別行政區
趙振寰先生,由法律援助署委派的廖陳林律師事務所延聘,代表被告人
控罪: 企圖搶劫罪(Attempted robbery)

--------------------------

判刑理由書

--------------------------

1.被告人承認一項「企圖搶劫」罪,違反香港法例第210章《盜竊罪條例》第10條和第200章《刑事罪行條例》第159G及159J條。

案情撮要

2.被告人承認的案情撮要內容如下:

(1) 2024年5月3日約0200時,曹樂怡女士(控方第一證人)在一間24小時營業的健身中心健身後步行回家。當她途經新界屯門鄉事會路與新和里交界時,發現有人從後行近,對方與她相距約一米。控方第一證人回頭觀望,看見赤裸上身,穿着黑色長褲和戴著深色手套的被告人在她身後步行。

(2) 控方第一證人擔心自身安全,決定行向新和里方向。被告人繼續尾隨控方第一證人,並突然在新和里AD0980號燈柱附近大叫及用一把長15厘米的灰白色𠝹刀指着控方第一證人,說了三次:「拎晒啲錢俾我」。控方第一證人回答說沒有帶銀包。被告人看似放棄打劫控方第一證人。控方第一證人於是逃到附近的7-11便利店向警方報案。

(3) 警方翻看閉路電視片段後,發現被告人在案發後帶着單車於新墟一帶遊蕩。2024年5月6日1607時,被告人在其寓所被捕。警方在該住所檢獲被告人的衣物(包括一件黑色短袖T裇、一條黑色長褲、一對深色手套及一對白色鞋)。此外,警方在被告人住所內檢獲一些物品,當中包括兩把𠝹刀(灰白色及黑色),警方還拍下被告人黑色單車的相片。

(4) 初次警誡下,被告人保持緘默。其後的錄影會面中,被告人於警誡下同意一些事情,當中包括他在2024年5月2日約2230時,身穿黑色T裇離開住所,在其住所檢獲的兩把𠝹刀及單車屬於他本人所有。

(5) 2024年5月7日,控方第一證人出席列隊認人手續,明確地認出被告人是試圖搶劫她的人。同日,控方第一證人認出案中檢獲的灰白色𠝹刀是被告人在案發期間所使用的𠝹刀。

(6) 被告人住所及屯門一帶的閉路電視片段拍攝到以下情況:

(i) 2024年5月2日2230時,被告人帶着單車離開住所;

(ii) 2024年5月3日0134時,一名上身赤裸的男子及一名女子站在新和里;及

(iii) 2024年5月3日0210時至0211時,被告人(上身赤裸)帶着單車離開新和里,其後在新墟一帶徘徊。

量刑原則

3.行劫是極嚴重的控罪,最高刑期為終身監禁;企圖行劫的刑期相同。案發時,被告人手持𠝹刀。辯方大律師承認一般持械行劫的案件中,適當的量刑基準為 5 年監禁。

4.Mo Kwang Sang v R [1981] HKLR 610一案中:

(1) 被告人與另一名男子闖入兩名女子的住所。當時只有一名女子在住所內。被告人和同黨用刀恐嚇住所內的女子,並將她捆綁起來。之後被告人與同黨於住所內搜掠並盜取現金及其他財物。警方於住所內的珠寶箱找到被告人的手指模,因而作出拘捕。案發時被告人22歲,初犯;

(2) 原審法官判處被告人4年6個月監禁。被告人不服判刑,提出上訴許可申請。

(3) 上訴法庭指:

“This is the first of five cases which are listed before us today and tomorrow in which convicted persons have applied for leave to appeal against sentences imposed on them for robbery.

In one of these cases two or more men were armed with knives, with which they threatened their victims before robbing them and, in most cases, tying them up.

Armed robbery of this nature, which must cause terror to the victims as well as a loss of their possessions, has become increasingly common.

We think that it will be of assistance to District Judges if we indicate the level of sentence for armed robbery with which we would not interfere.

By the word "armed" in this judgment, we are referring to knives and other dangerous weapons, but not to firearms for which severer sentences are normally imposed.

As this court has said on a number of other occasions, little account can be given to the previously clear record of anyone who takes part in an "armed robbery".

We suggest that, in future, the appropriate sentence in an ordinary case of armed robbery, where the accused was carrying a knife or other dangerous weapon which he displayed to his victim should normally be five years.

If such a robbery also involves an invasion of private premises (which includes domestic and business premises and the common parts of premises such as lifts and staircases) we suggest that a sentence of six years would be appropriate.

If any physical violence, which includes tying them up, is used on any of the victims, we suggest that a sentence of seven years should be considered.

These suggested sentences should be increased if there are other aggravating factors. Among these, though the list is not exhaustive, are invasion of domestic premises during the night; the presence of more than one person in the group of robbers; threats made to victims; ill-treatment of elderly persons and children; and a multiplicity of offences of a similar kind.

These guidelines are intended to apply to those who are convicted after a trial. Thus the suggested sentences should be reduced by such amount as the court may think appropriate for a plea of guilty.

Nothing which we say, of course, should be construed as inhibiting a court from adjusting these sentences to accord with the record, age or other personal circumstances of the accused or from taking account of the particular facts of the case before it.”

(4) 上訴法院認為該案適當的量刑基準為7至8年監禁,判刑已過輕。因此拒絕批准上訴申請。

5.辯方承認本案涉及持械企圖行劫,適當的量刑基準是5年監禁(即60個月)。

被告人的背景

6.被告人現年52歲,曾接受中三程度教育、未婚。他過往有6個刑事定罪紀錄,涉及7項控罪,其中一項與盜竊有關。

7.於其經歷供詞中,被告人向警方聲稱沒有長期病患。大律師指這說法並不準確。2015年被告人被診斷患有精神病。大律師向法庭提供一份青山醫院精神科駐院醫生(顏醫生)在2025年4月15日的醫療報告。報告指:

“2. Psychiatric history: Mr. Choi was first known to the mental health service upon his first and only psychiatric admission to CPH from 26 October 2015 until 4 February 2016. He presented with at least 4 months history of elated mood associated with grandiosity, overspending with accumulation of debt, increased unrealistic plans, and irritability with an act of kicking his girlfriend’s leg. Then he also reported history of cannabis and amphetamine use since teenage. He was diagnosed with mania with psychotic symptoms. He was discharged with a combination of Epilim chrono 1400 mg nocte (mood stabilizer), olanzapine 25 mg nocte (antipsychotic), aripiprazole 10 mg (antipsychotic), benzhexol 2 mg twice per day (anticholinergic for alleviating side effects), as well as lorazepam 0.5 mg twice per day as needed (benzodiazepine).

3. He continued to be kept on follow up at our unit in the subsequent years with no evidence of reinstatement into substance use. His mood was reported to be stable with regular follow up in TMMHC at four-month intervals and regular blood taking. His Epilim level was in the therapeutic range in May 2018, was slightly decreased in February 2019, but became undetectable by January 2023. However, throughout 2023, he continued to report having stable mood and continued to cope with work as a night shift taxi driver with preserved sleep and appetite.

4. He was seen at our unit on 16 January 2024 before due, he came alone and reported to have increased stress due to leakages at home and unemployment. He reported to have increased spending, buying repair tools and kitchen utensils costing $50,000 in total, and cited increased plans of buying items for resale and going for trips in Taiwan. He also broke up with his girlfriend for 10 years, and had significantly more exercise with loss of weight. He did not report any abnormal perceptions or beliefs. He did not appear overtly elated and his speech was coherent and relevant, though the tempo was slightly faster than usual. He was impressed to be in relapse with hypomanic symptoms. He admitted to having poor drug compliance, and after psychoeducation, he agreed to resume medications on trial of a lower dose of medications as negotiated. He was prescribed with Epilim chrono 800 mg nocte and olanzapine 10 mg nocte. Aripiprazoke was taken off.

5. He was seen three weeks later on 6 February 2024, whereupon he reported to have improved adherence and tolerated the medications well, though his Epilim level on 30 January 2024 was still undetectable. However, he reported to have more stable mood with maintained sleep, with no more mentions of increased spending or plans, and denied other hypomanic or manic symptoms. He was arranged with a follow up appointment in 8 weeks with the same regimen.

6. He subsequently defaulted the scheduled follow up, and he was next seen on 17 May 2024 when he was already under the supervision of Correctional Services Department (CSD). He had good medication adherence under supervision and reported stable mood. In view of him previously tolerating a higher dose and for maintenance and relapse prevention, he agreed for slightly increasing olanzapine back to 15 mg nocte. He was then seen in June, September and December 2024 similarly under CSD supervision and reported stable mental condition.

7. Progress: He was last seen at our unit on 8 April 2025 by the undersigned with CSD staff via telehealth. He similarly reported stable mood, preserved sleep and appetite, with adequate energy in the daytime. He tolerated the medications well. He denied features of hypomanic or manic relapse, and denied any abnormal perceptions or beliefs. He was able to understand his legal proceedings, the difference between pleading guilty and not guilty, and the potential consequences thereof.

8. Summary: Mr Choi was known to MHS upon his first and only psychiatric admission in 2015. He was diagnosed with manic episode with psychotic symptoms. He was kept on following up at our unit but had a relapse in early 2024, likely secondary to poor drug compliance.

9. Recommendations:

(a) Recently upon last seen by the undersigned, he is impressed to be in remission vis-a-vis his mental illness. However, regular and adequate dosage of maintenance medications is required to maintain remission, and hence;

(b) He needs to continue taking his psychiatric medications for the maintenance of his mood condition;

(c) If he does not take the medications provided, there is a high probability that he will suffer from a relapse after a certain period of time especially under stress. The relapse may likely come in the form of a hypomanic or manic episode, which was the case witnessed in early 2024. A mixed or depressive episode is also possible though he has no previous history thereof …”

討論

案發背景

8.大律師指被告人有一名交往十年的女友;兩人並同居至2024年1月。雙方多番爭執至女友遷離,而且關係有起伏。大律師指,2016年2月4日,被告人出院後一直於屯門精神健康中心門診接受定期跟進及治療,情況亦似趨於穩定。2024年1月16日,被告人提前覆診。報告指他因家中漏水、失業、增加花費及與女友分手而精神壓力大增。醫生認為被告人有輕度躁狂症狀復發的跡象;被告人亦承認沒按醫生指示服藥。

9.大律師指被告人自行修理家中的漏水問題才決定暫停的士司機的工作。他花費共約 5 萬元作維修,與女友的關係亦處於低潮,令他感到困擾;他希望暫時停止工作,稍作休息。他從2016年從青山醫院出院,他的積蓄足以支持生活一段時間;被告人的銀行戶口現仍有數萬元結餘。2024年1月,女友與被告人和好,但兩人沒有再一同居住。2024年2月6日被告人的情況有所改善,他又再次停止服藥。

10.大律師指2024年5月2日晚上,被告人與女友相約見面喝酒。被告人踏單車外出與女友會合後喝了約12瓶啤酒。案發當日(2024年5月3日)凌晨約2時,被告人與女友發生爭執。被告人在酒精和爭執的影響下,情緒極度激動,於是推著單車四處走動,意圖平靜心情。後來他看見本案的受害人,開始向受害人說話;受害人沒有理會他,令他怒火加劇,於是尾隨受害人,並在一時判斷失誤下拿出身上的鎅刀指向受害人,大喊要受害人交出所有金錢。當受害人表示沒有帶銀包後,被告人便立刻放棄及離開。

11.大律師向法庭提供受害人的證人供詞,指被告人的說法與受害人供詞第2段脗合:

「3. 於同日凌晨2時左右,當時我行到屯門鄉事會路與新和里交界時,發現我背後有個影子同我好近,約一米內,於是我望向後邊,發現有一名男子(年約30至40歲、約1.8米高、肥材、無著上身衫、大肚腩,著黑色長褲、戴住黑色手套、無紋身,下稱WP)同我好接近,之後WP見到我望住佢,佢就不停同我傾偈,但當時因為我戴住耳機,我聽唔到WP講乜嘢。同時,我因為好驚,於是我就企停喺上址扮打電話,而WP亦企停喺度。當我得知WP跟踪我後,我就選擇行去新和里方向,並行去新和里道路中間,因為嗰度多啲燈光,而WP繼續跟住我。期間,我係新和里近燈柱AD0980時,WP突然係我後面大聲叫,之後我就望後面,我見到WP右手手持住一把灰白色鎅刀(約15cm)指住我。WP就同我講咗3次:「拎晒啲錢俾我」。我就回答WP講:「我無帶銀包。」當WP聽到我回答後,WP疑似放棄搶劫我,我就繼續行去譚美麗芬中學方向。同時我見到有途人經過,我就立即行去途人(資料不詳)求助,要求途人陪我行去屯門井財街青菱徑7-11便利店。途人陪我行去青菱徑途中,我因為好驚無回頭望WP。之後,當我係青菱徑7-11 便利店後,我就立即報警求助。」

12.大律師指被告人承認企圖搶劫受害人。可是,被告人並非因缺乏金錢而犯案;當時被告人煩躁不安,將挫折感發洩在受害人身上;因受害人無視他的說話而感到嬲怒,因此才愚蠢地作出打劫的行為;一旦受害人指沒有帶銀包,被告人便從激動的情緒清醒過來,停止進一步行動。

13.本席不同意大律師的說法。首先,被告人的說法與受害人的供詞並不脗合。被告人明顯是跟蹤受害人一段路後才作出搶劫的行為:

(i) 受害人從沒提及被告人推著單車;

(ii) 受害人指被告人是跟蹤了她一段路,而且十分貼近;

(iii) 受害人轉身望着被告人後,被告人才開始向她說話;

(iv) 受害人因戴著耳機,沒有聽見被告人的說話;

(v) 受害人十分驚慌,停下腳步假裝打電話,被告人亦停下,但被告人並沒亮刀;

(vi) 受害人繼續步向新和里,被告人繼續尾隨一段路程;

(vii) 受害人到達燈柱時被告人才突然亮刀,要求受害人交出所有金錢。

14.大律師指案發時,被告人是因為騎單車才戴上手套。他續解釋被告人所騎的單車是摺疊單車,摺疊時需要用塑料索帶固定摺疊部份,以便將單車推行;每次被告人騎單車外出都會帶備用作企圖行劫的鎅刀,用作切割索帶。案發時,被告人只是一時衝動拿出鎅刀指嚇受害人,犯罪行為並非有預謀。

15.本席亦不接受大律師的說法。首先,涉案的手套並非單單手套,而是勞工手套。從閉路電視截圖可見,被告人外出時已打開單車,單車在他的跨下,但被告人並未佩戴手套(辯方附件一)。同樣地,被告人回家時同樣是沒有佩戴手套(辯方附件二)。大律師指案發前,被告人因情緒問題,推著單車四圍走動,意圖冷靜下來。換言之,當時被告人並非在騎單車,亦沒需要戴上手套。本席亦看不到任何原因需要先摺疊單車才推行。辯方向法庭提供的相片顯示涉案單車設有儲存物件的位置;如被告人每次踏單車時均須使用涉案鎅刀,該鎅刀應放在單車的儲存位置內。沒有爭議的是被告人被捕時,單車上沒有索帶,而涉案鎅刀則在被告人的住所內。另外,涉案的鎅刀是伸縮式的;換言之,案發時被告人不但拿出鎅刀,還將刀片伸出作案。

16.無論如何,Mo Kwong Sang案所述的量刑指引是初步量刑基準;如有加刑因素,法庭可將量刑基準上調。就算被告人並無預謀犯案,這只顯示沒有加刑因素。雖然本席不接受辯方的說法,本席亦不打算將量刑基準上調。雖然被告人有一次盜竊的刑事定罪紀錄,但已是2002年的事,而且被告人並非慣犯,本席不予以考慮。

酒精影響

17.大律師指,本案罪行沒有預謀。被告人是在個人感情問題和酒精影響下作案。眾所周知,在酒精影響下犯案並非減刑因素。Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition指出:

“[30-38] The policy of the law is not to give an accused a sentencing reduction on the basis that he was drunk when he committed the offence: R v Rosenberger ex p Attorney General (1994) 76 Crim R 1. He must instead expect to receive the sentence his offence merits: R v Paton [1982] Crim LR 58. In HKSAR v Chiu Wai-kan Vicken (No. 2) [2011] HKC 519 … Stock VP explained that ‘where an accused has become addicted to alcohol or drugs he must, generally, be treated as carrying responsibility for that state of affairs, especially when he has sought no assistance to take himself out of the cycle.’

[30-39] In R v Liu Ping-kin [1993] 2 HKC 192, 195, Pennington JA said the accused ‘apparently has a problem with alcohol, but we do not consider that as a mitigating factor’. In R v Grossi (2008) 183 A Crim R 15, 32… Redtich JA observed that ‘drug or alcohol induced conditions have not as a general rule required any significant moderation of [these] sentencing considerations’ …

[30-41] When alcohol has contributed to the commission of the offence, an accused cannot expect to turn to his advantage, self-induced intoxication: Attorney General v Lee Kui-man [1997] 1 HKLRD 576, 579… Quite the contrary, as demonstrated in HKSAR v Gambold Chinzorig (HCMA 126/2016, 15 June 2016, unreported), it was said of a pickpocket who had taken drink before committing the offence that he ‘must have known that he put himself in the way of temptation’ and his sentence was enhanced in consequence …’

被告人的精神狀況

18.大律師指法庭可考慮在還押期間透過定期和充足藥物,被告人的精神狀況已有所緩解。雖然醫生報告沒有明確地指出案發時被告人的精神狀況,但報告指被告人於2024年2月後不久便未再服藥,導致罪行發生的怒火爆發與病情復發的情況相符。辯方認為被告人和女友的爭執及酒精的影響很大可能是一併造成本案「悲劇」的主因。

19.Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition指出:

“[30-225] A mental disability, if causative of or materially contributing to the offending, is ‘capable of reducing moral culpability as distinguished from legal responsibility, and thereby affecting the punishment that is just in all circumstances’: Henry v R [2019] NZCA 407, [43]. It may, that is, ‘be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance, relevant to the offender’ (rather than the offending): Shailer v R [2017] 2 NZKR 629 … However, the extent to which a mental disorder affects the accused’s moral culpability ‘depends upon the nature, effect and severity of the condition and its symptoms’: Western Australia v Malone [2015] WASCA 188, [74]. If the mental impairment has contributed to the offending, this may, moreover, ‘affect the significance of general deterrence as a sentencing consideration’: Cluett v R [2019] WASCA 111, [63]. There must, however, be a causal link between his illness and his criminal conduct, and, in HKSAR v Tang Ho-yin [2020] 1 HKC 475 … a rioter, who suffered from Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), was told that his condition could not ‘conceivably amount to a reason, let alone an excuse, for his involvement in such a serious offence. Those who suffer from such conditions must equally be deterred from voluntarily involving themselves in mob violence.’ [35]

[30-226] If an accused suffered from a mental disorder this may be of relevance in two ways. First, it affects the assessment of the extent of the objective criminality, and second, it influences the question of whether the case requires a deterrent sentence: R v George (2004) 149 A Crim R 38, 45 …, HKSAR v Chan Wai-hung [2009] 3 HKLRD 127 … Such a person may lack effective powers of reasoning or control. As Spigelman CJ noted in R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255, to the extent that mental illness explains the offence, an offender’s inability:

… to understand the wrongfulness of his actions, or to make reasonable judgments, or to control his or her faculties and emotions, will impact on the level of culpability of the offender, even where the illness does not amount to an excuse at law.

[30-227] A custodial sentence will weigh more heavily on a mentally ill person: R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398, 400. If, however, the accused has decided to forego treatment for his condition, this may blunt as possible impact as mitigation: HKSAR v Tang Ho-yin

[30-228] In R v Grossi (2008) 183 A Crim R 15, 33 … it was said that the question of whether a particular mental condition should reduce moral culpability or general deterrence and the extent to which it should do so would usually depend upon:

(1) the nature and severity of the symptoms;

(2) Its effect on the mental capacity of the offender at the time of the offence or at the time of sentence. There must be some connection between the condition and the commission of an offence. The nexus may be established by showing that it affected the offender’s ability to exercise an appropriate judgment in one or more of the ways stated in Verdins’ and

(3) the nature and seriousness of the offence.

[30-229] In R v Wright [2001] 3 NZLR 22, 26, the relevance of mental disorder to a sentencing court was described thus:

it is a factor which will inform a just sentence having regard to the character of the disorder and the weight it ought to carry when balancing sentencing objectives. Its character may indicate a lesser degree of moral culpability or a greater subjective impact of penalty. It may suggest a more or a less risk of a repetition of offending, so as to direct particular attention to issues of personal deterrence or public protection. And these considerations must be synthesized with the sentencing elements of the denouncing the fact of violence in our society and acknowledging grievous effects on victims.

[30-230] If the accused suffers from a mental disorder, this may render him an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence: Kennedy v R (2008) 181 A Crim R 185, 197 … The retributive and denunciatory aspect of the sentence that is appropriate for someone of ordinary capacity ‘will often be inappropriate to the situation of a mentally retarded offender and to the needs of the community’: Muldrock v R (2011) 244 CLR 120 … As Wood CJ explained in R v Henry (1999) 106 A Crim R 149, 254 …:

The community will readily understand that the offender who suffers from a mental disorder or abnormality is less in control of his or her cognitive facilities or emotional restraints, and in some instances lacks the ability to make reasoned or ordered judgments. Almost invariably there is a limited appreciation of the wrongfulness of the act, or of its morral culpability, which, although falling short of avoiding criminal responsibility does justify special consideration upon sentencing. Moreover, such a condition is inherent and its presence does not depend upon any element of choice.

[30-231] However, it is not right for a court to disregard general deterrence in sentencing simply because the accused has a personality disorder: Secretary for Justice v Yan Shen [2012] 3 HKC 557, 570 … In HKSAR v Chan Sau-lan, Becky [2018] 2 HKC 548 … the accused had ‘obvious mental problems’ which justified ‘a more individualized sentence falling outside the established guidelines’, but a sentence of five years’ imprisonment (as opposed to eight), was nonetheless still appropriate for a serious robbery offence. In a case of armed robbery, the paramount considerations are condign punishment and deterrence, and notwithstanding an accused’s mental condition ‘we cannot ignore these public policy considerations’: HKSAR v Chan Sau-lan, Becky …

[30-233] Emotional stress may not mitigate extreme conduct in any substantial way: HKSAR v Liu Man-kuen [2000] 4 HKC 197, 403 …. But if the stress is so great that an accused act wholly out of character this may be irrelevant: R v Ng Ka-ling [1988] HKC 310 … Account was taken in R v Huthart [2002] 4 HKC 692, 698, of the ‘deplorable state of physical and mental health’ of the accused when he committed the offence. The severity of the disorder should always be assessed, as this will determine the extent of its relevance to each case. In R v Wiskich (2000) 207 LSJS 431, 457, Martin J said:

A sentencing court must determine the impact of disorder upon both the offender’s thought processes and the capacity of the offender to appreciate the gravity and significance of the criminal conduct … if an offender acts with knowledge of what is being done and with knowledge of the gravity of the criminal conduct, the importance of the element of general deterrence otherwise appropriate in the particular circumstances is not greatly affected. The gravity of the criminal conduct is also an important consideration … In some circumstances, however, the mental disorder may not be serious or causally related to the commission of the crime, and the circumstances of the crime so grave, that very little weight in mitigation can be given to the existence of the mental disorder and full weight must be afforded to the element of general deterrence. In between those extremes, an infinite variety of circumstances will arise in which competing considerations must be balanced.

[30-234] If an accused possesses a below average intelligence, this may affect sentence … Such a person might realize that something is wrong, but not just how wrong it is; just as ‘a child may understand that something is wrong without understanding that it is very wicked’ … Always to be factored into the calculation of sentence is the need to ensure that the public are protected: R v Stabler (1984) 6 Cr App R(S) 129, 131. However, a court should beware of giving undue weight to a psychiatric condition that falls short of permanent affliction: Secretary for Justice v Tang King Wa [2023] 4 HKC 289, 309 …” (my emphasis)

20.於本案中,就算被告人的病情復發,本席也認為並非減刑因素:

(i) 如上文所述,酒精影響並非減刑因素;

(ii) 被告人與女友爭執的感情壓力不足以作為持械行劫的藉口;

(iii) 根據辯方提供的醫療報告,被告人精神狀況最嚴重之時(即2015年10月入住青山精神病院之時),他的症狀包括過度興奮及自大(elated mood associated with grandiosity)、過度使費引致欠債及不實際計劃(over spending with accumulation of debt, increased unrealistic plans)和容易發怒引致腳踢女友(irritability with an act of kicking his girlfriends leg)。報告指2024年1月,被告人並沒不正常的感知(perceptions)或想法(beliefs),說話有條理(coherent, and relevant);被告人亦並沒過度興奮(overly elated),只是語速比正常稍快(tempo was slightly faster than usual)。醫生認為被告人有輕躁狂症復發(in relapse with hypomanic symptoms)。可是被告人的情況明顯不嚴重;這從醫生沒有要求被告人入院可見一斑。2024年2月,雖然被告人似乎仍沒有服藥,但稱上述症狀已消失,情況穩定;醫生亦認為被告人適合繼續以門診治療,顯示情況並不嚴重;醫生從沒指被告人的精神狀況導致犯案行為;他只是指被告人不服藥,引致2024年初病情復發的症狀。況且,被告人的症狀亦與持械行劫全無關係。因此,沒有任何資料顯示被告人犯案與他的精神狀況有任何關係(causal link or contribution);

(iv) 就算被告人病情復發,根據他之前的症狀,最多也只是暴躁(irritable),與持械行劫無關;

(v) 被告人的精神病徵明顯是可治療的,而非永久性(permanent disability )。就算被告人病情復發也是因他自己不服藥;

(vi) 醫生從沒指被告人的精神狀況令被告人無法意識到控罪的嚴重性;及

(vii) 本案涉及「持械行劫」,性質極嚴重;法庭需考慮保護社會大眾的安全及利益。

家人及女友的支持/判刑對家人的影響

21.大律師指被告人的母親和女友均支持被告人。雖然母親居於養老院,但被告人經常照顧母親,希望盡快與母親重聚。眾所周知,這些均非減刑因素:見Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition第 [30-130] 至 [30-142] 段。

認罪折扣

22.被告人適時認罪,可獲三份一的扣減(即由 60 個月監禁減為 40 個月監禁)。於HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam [2016] 5 HKC 231, 上訴法庭已指出,認罪折扣已是減刑的最高分水線(High watermark),涵蓋悔意及其他求情因素;除非有極特殊的求情因素,法庭不應予以額外減刑。本案中,除了適時認罪外,根本沒有其他減刑因素。

23.因此,本席判處被告人40個月監禁。

  ( 謝沈智慧 )
  區域法院法官