香港特別行政區 訴 佘詩韻

DCCC 611/2022

[2023] HKDC 262

香港特別行政區

區域法院

刑事案件2022年第611號

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判刑理由書

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1.被告人承認兩項盜竊罪，違反香港法例第210章《盜竊罪條例》第9條。

案情撮要

2.被告人承認的案情撮要如下：—

(1)  蘇志浩（控方第一證人）是蘇何律師行（律師行）的合夥人。自2012年始，被告人是律師行的會計文員，負責預備支票給控方第一證人簽署，以結清律師行開支。被告人2015年12月請辭，2016年1月29日離職。

(2)  律師行在中國銀行（香港）有限公司（中銀）持有兩個銀行帳戶。約於2016年11月至12月，多張由律師行簽發的支票未能兌現。控方第一證人因而開始留意由被告人預備的支票，發覺被告人經常聲稱打錯受款人姓名或名稱；原有的受款人姓名或名稱劃去後，被告人會要求控方第一證人在支票加簽確認更改。

(3)  2016年1月，被告人離職前不久，曾預備兩張支票給控方第一證人簽署，受款人均為律師行辦事處所在物業的業主，用來繳付租金。一星期後，控方第一證人發現租金仍未繳付，便向中銀查核，發現兩張支票均已成功入帳。

(4)  控方第一證人其後從中銀取得上述兩張支票的副本，發現受款人姓名均改為被告人姓名。至於被告人過往交給控方第一證人簽署的其他支票，控方第一證人再向中銀索取支票副本。該些支票的簽發目的是結清律師行開支。控方第一證人發現，有人以164張支票的形式（受款人均為被告人）從律師行兩個中銀帳戶提取港幣共2,446,906.20元，其中包括上述兩張受款人應付給業主的支票。該164張支票中，154張存入被告人的恒生銀行（恒生）個人銀行帳戶。律師行從未批准支付上述款項給被告人。

(5)  2013年6月18日至2014年7月30日期間，有人以37張支票的形式從律師行的中銀帳戶（號碼0129XXXXXXX537）提取港幣共399,799.50元。該37張支票中，31張其後存入被告人的恒生帳戶（控罪1）。

(6)  2014年4月29日至2016年1月19日期間，有人以127張支票的形式從律師行的中銀帳戶（號碼0129XXXXXXX540）提取港幣共2,065,090.70元。該127張支票中，123張其後存入被告人的恒生帳戶（控罪2）。

(7)  2016年3月8日，控方第一證人向警方報案。2016年4月2日，警方拘捕被告人。被告人在警誡下保持緘默。

(8)  2017年，律師行透過民事法律程序向被告人討回港幣2,446,906.20元。

被告人的背景

3.被告人現年49歲，已婚，與丈夫同住。她沒有刑事定罪紀錄。2003年至2012年間，被告人與丈夫開設時裝生意，感到極大壓力，並患上憂鬱焦慮症，自2006年4月始向蔡定國醫生求診。雖然被告人的抑鬱焦慮症有改善，但現仍需以藥物控制病情 [見辯方文件夾附件1，21-24頁]。

量刑原則

4.沒有爭議的是，本案涉及違反誠信，而上訴法院亦於HKSAR v Cheung Mee-Kiu [2008] 1 HKC 113, [2006] 4 HKLRD 776 就這類案件訂定量刑指引：—

超過1,500萬元 10年或以上監禁

300-1,500萬元 5-9年監禁

100-300萬元 3-4年監禁

25-100萬元 2-3年監禁

少於25萬元 少於2年監禁

5.後來，上訴法庭於HKSAR v Ng Kwok Wing [2008] 4 HKLRD 1017, [2008] HKCU 2056一案內調整Cheung Mee Kiu量刑指引：—

1,500萬元或以上 監禁10年或以上

300-1,500萬元 監禁5-10年

100-300萬元 監禁3-5年

25-10萬元 監禁2-3年

25萬或以下 監禁2年或以下

6.於R v Barrick (1985)  81 Cr App R 78，英國上訴法院指法庭應考慮其他因素包括：—

(1)  被告人的職位；受害人對被告人信賴的程度及性質；

(2)  盜竊時段的長短；

(3)  被告人如何使用盜取物品或金錢；

(4)  竊案對受害人的影響；

(5)  控罪對公眾及其信心的影響；

(6)  控罪對合夥人或其他職員的影響；

(7)  控罪對被告人本身的影響；

(8)  被告人個人的背景；

(9)  所有有關的求情因素，包括病患、過重責任而帶來的壓力、過長的延誤（例如超過兩年）等等。

量刑

7.辯方大律師承認Ng Kwok Wing案的量刑指引適用，量刑基準為3-5年監禁。本案控罪1涉及近40萬；單單考慮金額，適當的量刑基準為2年3個月監禁。控罪2涉及超過200萬；單單考慮金額，適當的量刑基準為4年監禁。整體而言，本案被竊金額近250萬元；如只考慮金額，總刑期的量刑起點是4年6個月（即54個月）監禁。

8.本案中，被告人長期犯案，兩項控罪為時共2年7個月，涉及超過160張支票；控罪涉及兩個銀行戶口。被竊金額被用作瘋狂購物。受害人是一間律師樓。被告人的行為令支票的真正受款人無法獲得付款，有些支票無法兌現，影響律師樓的經濟聲譽。可幸的是，沒有證供顯示被告人的行為令律師樓受到律師公會調查或監管。

9.考慮到上述因素，本席將控罪1及控罪2的量刑基準分別上調3個月及6個月；即控罪1的量刑基準為2年6個月監禁，而控罪2的量刑基準為5年監禁。考慮到整體案情，本席認為適當的總刑期基準為5年監禁。

減刑因素

10.大律師指本案有多項大幅減刑的因素，包括被告人的悔意、被告人現在的身體狀況、被告人犯案時的精神狀態、極不合理的延誤、全數還款及更生等。本席現逐一處理上述因素。

悔意

11.本席同意被告人於本案提訊期間已即時坦白承認兩項控罪，顯現真誠的悔意，亦可獲認罪的三份一折扣。可是於HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam（吳文南）CACC 418/2014一案內，上訴法庭已指明，認罪的折扣已包括悔意，因此悔意並不構成額外的減刑理由。

被告人的身體狀況

12.大律師指被告人七年前患上哮喘病（見辯方文件夾第29頁）；最近更發現患上癌症，需特別照料。

13.首先，大律師要求法庭參考辯方文件夾第25-28及30頁的醫學報告，指被告人患上乳癌。事實上醫學報告的內容剛好相反。醫學報告（第25頁）指：—

“The parenchymal echopattern of breast is normal.

A 0.6cm x 0.4cm x 0.9cm circumscribed hypoechoic lesion at R10H 5 cm from nipple, no suspicious features and probably benign.

No cystic lesion is seen.

No glandular distortion or abnormal shadowing is noted.

The retromammary tissue planes are intact.

No nipple retraction is noted. No enlarged ancillary lymph node is observed.

IMPRESSION

1. No mammographic evidence of malignancy is demonstrated.

2. A 0.6cm x 0.4cm x 0.9cm circumscribed hypoechoic lesion at R10H 5 cm from nipple, no suspicious feature and probably benign. It could be fibroadenoma or fibroadenosis. Interval follows up mammogram and USG for surveillance is recommended. BIRADS 3.

… Category 3 - Probably Benign Finding (likelihood of cancer (>0% but <2%）”

14.而辯方文件夾第26-30頁根本與乳癌完全無關。第26-27頁的醫學轉介信關乎被告人的痔瘡及右耳腫塊；第28至30頁則為耳鼻喉普通科及哮喘科的覆診便條。

15.明顯地，被告人並沒患上乳癌。況且，一名被告人的病患，一般而言並不構成減刑因素。Sentencing in Hong Kong 10^th edition第474-478頁指：—

“[30-174] The ill health of an accused ‘is not a license to commit crime’: Clarkson v R 2007 171 A Crim R 1, 49.

[30-175] In Yip Kai Foon v HKSAR [2000] 1 HKC 335, 339, (2000)  3 HKCFAR 31, 35, Li CJ said: ‘Under the guidelines and principles evolved by the courts, medical grounds will seldom, if ever, be a basis for reducing the sentence for crimes of gravity’…

[30-176] The objective criminality of particular offences will often be such that the sentence of imprisonment which is otherwise appropriate is necessary, irrespective of health factors: HKSAR v Tong Fuk-sing [1999] 3 HKC 332, 336, [1999] 3 HKLRD 710. The Correctional Services Department operates excellent medical facilities: HKSAR v Wong Chi-Choi [2005] HKCU 1443 (HCMA 628/2005, 6 October 2005, unreported)

[30-177] In HKSAR v Tam Yuen-tong [2007] 1 HKLRD 894, 896, [2007] HKCU 165, McMahon J made the point that ‘as a matter of reality most prisoners receive medical attention in prison of an equal or better standard than they would otherwise receive’. In HKSAR v Chan Kau-tai [2008] 3 HKC 78,79, [2008] 4 HKLRD 404, it was noted that the accused who needed a liver transplant was being attended to in the custodial ward at Queen Mary Hospital and was in good hands’. Save in the rarest of cases, a prisoner’s medical condition is not a matter to which the court will have regard for mitigation of a proper sentence’: R v Ho Mei-lin [1996] 4 HKC 491, 493”

被告人的精神狀況

16.Sentencing in Hong Kong 10^th edition, 第486-487頁指出：

“[30-225] A mental disability, if causative of or materially contributing to the offending, is ‘capable of reducing moral culpability as distinguished from legal responsibility, and thereby affecting the punishment that is just in all the circumstances’: Henry v R [2019] NZCA 407, [43]. It may, that is, ‘be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance relevant to the offender’ (rather than the offending): Shailer v R [2017] 2 NZLR 629, [2017] NZCA 38. However, the extent to which a mental disorder affects the accused’s moral culpability ‘depends upon the nature, effect and severity of the condition and its symptoms’: Western Australia v Malone [2015] WASCA 188, [74]. If the mental impairment has contributed to the offending, this may, moreover, ‘affect the significance of general deterrence as a sentencing consideration’: Cluett v R [2019] WASCA 111, [63]. There must, however, be a causal link between his illness and his criminal conduct…

[30-226] if an accused suffers from a mental disorder this may be of relevance in two ways. First, it affects the assessment of the extent of the objective criminality, and, second, it influences the question of whether the case requires a deterrent sentence: R v George (2004)  149 A Crim R 38, 45, [2004] NSWCCS 247; HKSAR v Chan Wai-hung [2009] 3 HKLRD 327, [2009] HKCU 278. Such a person may lack effective powers of reasoning or control. As Spigelman CJ noted in R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255, to the extent that mental illness explains the offence, and offender’s inability:

… to understand the wrongfulness of his actions, or to make reasonable judgement, or to control his or her faculties and emotions, will impact on the level of culpability of the offender, even where the illness does not amount to an excuse at law…

[30-228] In R v Grossi (2008)  183 A Crim R 15, 33, [2008] VSCA 51, it was said that the question of whether a particular mental condition should reduce moral culpability or general deterrence and extent to which it should do so would usually depend upon:

(1)  The nature and severity of the symptoms;

(2)  Its effect on the mental capacity of the offender at the time of the offence or at the time of the sentence. There must be some connection between the condition and the commission of an offence. The nexus may be established by showing that affect the offender’s ability to exercise appropriate judgement in one or more of the ways stated in Verdins (2007)  169 A Crim R 581, [2007] VSCA 102)  and

(3)  The nature and seriousness of the offence…

[30-231] however, it is not right for a court to disregard general deterrence in sentencing simply because the accused has a personality disorder: Secretary for Justice v Yan Shen [2012] 3 HKC 557, 570, [2012] 3 HKLRD 652. …

17.大律師稱被告人犯案的原因是憂鬱焦慮症，有強迫購物症，盜取了金錢用作瘋狂購物，舒緩情緒，並呈上蔡定國醫生的精神科報告（見辯方文件夾第21-23頁）。大律師依賴 HKSAR v Chiu Peng [2002] 1 HKLRD 185指「若犯案是一名被告人是部份受到精神方面的病患之影響所引致，法庭應當在判刑時給予扣減以反映減輕刑事性（Diminished criminality）或構成罪行性（Culpability）。

18.事實上，於Chiu Peng一案內，上述法庭指：—

“16. If an accused is suffering from mental illness which played a part in the commission of the offence, the court may properly allow a discount of sentence… or, as in this case, the accused’s mental illness made him gullible and easily susceptible to persuasion by the perpetrator of the crime, reducing his responsibility for participating…”

19.蔡醫生指2006年4月6日首次會見被告人，診斷被告人患上抑鬱症。得到蔡醫生的診治，被告人的情況已有改善。首先，被告人於2013年中才開始犯案。換句話說，案發時，被告人已接受了超過7年的治療。再者，於Chiu Peng（同上）一案內，有證供顯示被告人犯案時的病徵。於本案中，除了失眠外，醫生對被告人犯案時的精神狀況及病徵隻字不提；不但沒有證供顯示被告人的精神狀況與本案有任何關係，更沒任何證供顯示被告人患上強迫購物症。另外，被告人犯案的手法是指稱寫錯支票受款人名稱，誘使受害人加簽，再更改受款人名字；犯案手法明顯是有計劃，被告人亦頭腦清醒。

20.基於上述因素，本席不認為被告人的精神狀況構成任何減輕罪責的原因。

延誤

21.就法律程序的延誤，Sentencing in Hong Kong 10^th edition 有以下的解釋：—

“[30-83] In Mills v HM Advocate and The Advocate General for Scotland (2002)  SCR 860,877, Lord Hope said that a delay in bringing the accused to justice is widely recognised as a mitigating factor that can be taken into account when he has been sentenced.

[30-84] This usually arises where the prosecution is at fault for the delay: HKSAR v Lau Kin-yu [2003] HKCU 251 (HCMA 391/2002, 13 March 2003, unreported). Such a delay might cause the accused to be ‘under the strain of legal proceedings for a very long time’: Attorney General v Ling Kar-Fai (No 2) [1997] 2 HKC 651, 654…

[30-85] In Secretary for Justice v Schmitt [2008] HKCU 979 (CAAR 12/2006, 17 June 2008, unreported), Stuart-Moore VP noted that there is a delay in every case before trial, and that the ‘real question is whether there has been an unreasonable delay, through no fault of a defendant, which has contributed to his punishment’. The court will also need to be satisfied that the delay has ‘resulted in unfairness to the accused’: R v L (1995)  84 A Crim R 142, 145. If there is a delay resulting from a very extensive (and necessary)  investigation, the accused cannot expect a benefit therefrom: Secretary for Justice v Ip Hon-ming and Anor [2015] 1 HKC 143, 168…

[30-86] In HKSAR v Law King-yip and Ors [2004] HKCU 1391 (CACC 369/2003, 14 October 2004, unreported), (as approved in HKSAR v Cheung Suet-ting [2010] 6 HKC 249, 257), complaint was made, by one of several persons convicted of conspiracy to defraud, about the delay of over 30 months between the dates of arrest and trial. It was further argued that the trial of 108 hearing days had constituted an additional hardship, ‘worse’, so it was said, ‘than prison’. In rejecting these factors as mitigation, the court commented that the delay had to be viewed in the context of the size of the investigation that the police had to conduct. The conspiracy had lasted for more than a year, there were many victims, expert witnesses had to be consulted, and the prosecution was not at fault for the delay. The trial had been listed for 20 days, but overran because the defence vigorously contested the case. In these circumstances, Lunn J said the court was satisfied that ‘neither the delay in the commencement of proceedings nor the length of the trial itself are factors relevant to the sentence imposed’.

[30-87] As to the extent to which a delay might affect sentence, mere length of time between the commission of the offence and the prosecution ‘is a factor of limited weight’: FCG v Western Australia (2008)  183 A Crim R 313, 341, [2008] WASCA 47. In HKSAR v Chiang Lily [2013] 3 HKLRD 18, [2013] HKCU 855, there had been a delay in both the trial and the hearing of the appeal, neither attributable to the accused, who, in consequence, was awarded a sentencing discount of two months. In HKSAR v Ho Hon-chung (Daniel) [2004] HKCU 773 (CACC 350/2002, 29 June 2004, unreported), Woo VP said:

“We should mention that delay as a mitigating factor would necessarily only warrant a relatively short reduction in sentence, for otherwise, it might give rise to a wrong idea that it would be better for a defendant to unjustifiably drag out a case in which he is eventually convicted rather than to plead guilty or to proceed to trial expeditiously”.

[30-88] A long wait for trial can obviously affect an accused: R v William Hung [1994] 1 HKCLR 47, 57, [1994] HKCU 236. If the delay has caused suffering to the accused, a suspended sentence of imprisonment may be appropriate to redress the situation: HKSAR v Chiu Peng, Richard [2002] 1 HKC 401, 411, [2002] 1 HKLRD 185. In Secretary for Justice v Chan Boon-ning [2004] HKCU 307 (CAAR 1/ 2002, 16 March 2004, unreported), the court, having said that a sentence of not less than nine years’ imprisonment was appropriate for a serious case of theft, reduced that by one year because of the unnecessary and unreasonable delay to which the accused had been subjected prior to trial. In R v Blanco (1999)  106 A Crim R 303, 306, Wood CJ explained:

“It is highly desirable that the prosecuting authorities act promptly where they had evidence of serious criminality. If they fail to do so, then they must expect that circumstance to be taken into account on sentencing. It is in the public interest that those who are suspected of serious criminality be brought to justice and be brought to justice quickly, particularly when there is a strong case available against them.”

[30-89] The delay upon which an accused may wish to place reliance includes the period between the start of the investigation and the commencement of the trial: R v Chan Kin-yee [1988] 2 HKLR 183, 186, [1988] HKCU 361…

[30-90] In some circumstances, however, the effects of delay upon an accused can constitute potent mitigation. In HKSAR v Ma Kim-hung [2002] HKCU 573 (CACC 33/2002, 10 May 2002, unreported), there was a delay of over 2½ years between the accused admitting the offences and the date of sentencing, and he was given a discounted sentence as ‘this must have had a debilitating effect’ upon him. In HKSAR v Sham Kwok-kee [2014] HKCU 931 (CACC 142/2013, 11 April 2014, unreported), there was a delay of almost 8 years between the arrest and charging of the accused, and this attracted a sentencing discount because of the ‘prolonged anxiety’ it had caused to the accused. In HKSAR v Cheng Kelly Kit-yin [2014] 4 HKLRD 34, [2014] HKCU 1441, there occurred a ‘period of unjustifiable delay in the prosecution process, which endured to the disadvantage of the appellant’ [17], and this attracted a sentencing discount of four months.

[30-91] Delay may need to be taken into account when rehabilitation is a real prospect, as when the accused has ‘been at large and has ordered his affairs during the period of the delay with a view to re-organising his life’: R v Miceli [1998] 4 VR 588, 590. In Secretary for Justice v Chun Kit-bing [2001] 2 HKC 123, 128, [2001] 1 HKLRD 844, Stuart-Moore VP explained:

Ultimately, the best way of looking at the delay in this case is by appreciating the fact that the respondent was 31 years old at the time of the offence. She is now 38 years old. Leaving aside the part played by the respondent and the subsequent report about her lifestyle, which reveals that she has apparently completely rehabilitated herself, both of which are side issues, the delay was, in our opinion, a most powerful circumstance making the suspension of the sentence an appropriate method of disposal on the special facts of this case…

[30-94] In Secretary for Justice v Hui Siu-man [1999] 2 HKLRD 236, 241, [1999] HKCU 1648, Power VP described the delay in the prosecution of the offence after the accused had acknowledged his guilt as being ‘of crucial importance’. That was because the delay had ‘given him the opportunity to rehabilitate himself by obtaining steady employment and to repay a very large amount of the money which he had to borrow to the restitution’ (cited with approval in HKSAR v Cheung Suet-ting [2010] 6 HKC 249, 257). A suspended sentence of imprisonment was deemed to be proper in Secretary for Justice v Chan Kit-bing [2001] 2 HKC 123, 128, [2001] 1 HKLRD 844, as the accused had been completely rehabilitated during the period of the delay. If, therefore, an accused has made best use of a delay for which he is not responsible, a court is entitled at least to examine how exactly the situation has developed in the meantime.

[30-95] In Scook v R (2008)  185 A Crim R 164, 176, [2008] WASCA 114, Buss JA sought to identify the ‘guiding principles’ in relation to delay, although these were not intended to be ‘exhaustive or inflexible’; these were cited with approval in HKSAR v Chiu Chi-wing [2013] HKCU 2420 (CACC 243/2012, 18 October 2013, unreported). His Honour identified seven matters as being of relevance:

First, delay is not, of itself, mitigating factor.

Secondly, delay will not ordinarily be a mitigating factor if it has been caused by difficulties in detecting, investigating or proving the offences committed by the offender, and the period of the delay is reasonable in the circumstances.

Thirdly, delay will not ordinarily be a mitigating factor if it is caused by the offender’s obstruction or lack of cooperation with the State, prosecuting authorities or investigatory bodies, but the offender’s reliance on his or her legal rights is not obstruction or lack of cooperation for this purpose.

Fourthly, delay will not ordinarily be a mitigating factor if it results from the normal operation of the criminal justice system, including delay as a result of the offender or a co-offender exercising his or her rights; for example, interlocutory appeals and other interlocutory processes.

Fifthly, delay may be conducive to the emergence of mitigating factors: for example, if, during the period of delay, the offender has made progress towards rehabilitation or other circumstances favourable to him or her have emerged.

Sixthly, delay (not being delay of the kind described in the second, third and fourth guiding principles)  will ordinarily be a mitigating factor if:

(a)  the delay had resulted in significant stress for the offender or left him or her, to a significant degree, “in uncertain suspense”; or

(b)  during the period of delay the offender has adopted a reasonable expectation that he or she would not be charged, or a pending prosecution would not proceed, and the offender has ordered his or her affairs on the faith of that expectation.

Seventhly, delay caused by dilatory or neglectful conduct by the State, prosecuting authorities or investigatory bodies may result in a discount of the sentence that would otherwise be imposed on the offender, if the court thinks it an appropriate means of marking its disapproval of the conduct in question.”

22.控辯雙方均向法庭提供本案的 「事件時序列表」。綜合雙方列表的內容，事發時序如下：—

日期	事件
2016年1月尾	律師行東主揭發被告人盜竊