Nguyen Minh Chien v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 660/2020

[2026] HKCFI 184

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 660 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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DECISION

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1.By a summons issued on 8 October 2025 (“Summons”) supported by an affirmation of the same date (“Affirmation”) the Applicant sought “leave to appeal out of time” my order dated 2 September 2025 (“Order”) wherein I had refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 20 March 2020 (“TCAB Decision”).

2.The relevant considerations in relation to such an application are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346; Nupur Mst [2018] HKCA 524; Nguyen Van Quyen [2025] HKCA 510). The prospect of success is important as the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Tran Van Anh [2025] HKCA 408).

3.The Summons and Affirmation did not explicitly identify any ground of appeal. However:

(1) In the Affirmation the Applicant claimed that he had not received “any letter from the High Court, so [he] did not know that [his] application for Judicial Review had been refused”, and that he only learnt of the refusal when he went to the Immigration Department, upon which he says he “quickly” went to the court to file the application. I take it that such are his attempt to explain for the reasons for his delay. The Applicant also confirmed to me at the hearing that his only ground of appeal was what he had mentioned in the Affirmation; and

(2) At the hearing the Applicant also orally requested me to consider that “should I be returned to Vietnam I will be killed”.

4.As the 14-day period for the Applicant to appeal against the Order expired on 16 September 2025 (RHC O. 53 r. 3(4)), there is a not insubstantial delay of just over three weeks.

5.At the hearing the Applicant claimed that he had only learnt about my Order on 2 October 2025 when he had reported to the Immigration Department. He also said that he had not updated the Immigration Department or the High Court with his more recent address provided in the Affirmation[1], which he said he had moved to around 1 ½ years before the hearing in November 2025, because he had forgotten to do so.

6.There is therefore no good or valid reason for the delay, as the Applicant had failed to update the court and the Immigration Department with his new address in circumstances where it is his duty to give the court, and the Immigration Department, an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner. The consequence of any delay occasioned by the ineffectiveness of such an address falls on his shoulders (Hasmi Rizwan Imran HKCA 439 at §§14-15; Rai Tika Kumari [2025] HKCA 78).

7.Turning to the prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended appeal, I see no basis (in the nature of an error of law, a failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse my decision (Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524):

(1) Given the above, I do not see any merit in any potential ground of appeal which relies on how he had allegedly learnt of the Order late; and

(2) I also do not see how the Applicant’s claim at Paragraph 3(2) above constitutes a, or gives rise to any, viable grounds of appeal that would justify reversing the Order and my decision. This is so given the nature of judicial review proceedings which, as I pointed out in the decision, are not a further avenue of appeal, and when in the decision I had reviewed the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and saw no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate such.

8.Finally, and given the above, an extension of time for the Applicant to advance a hopeless appeal would substantially and needlessly prejudice the respondent.

9.In the circumstances, I refuse the application and dismiss the Summons.

10.The Applicant may make an appointment with my clerk for this decision to be interpreted to him in Chinese, if he wishes.

The applicant appeared in person