GURJINGER SINGH v TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

Read the full judgment text of HCAL 1446/2021 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 22 July 2026.

1. By a summons issued on 27 April 2026, the Applicant applies for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 10 April 2026 (“ the Order ”) refusing him leave to apply for judicial review ( “JR” ). His intended JR was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office ( “the Board” ) dated 29 September 2021 on his non-refoulement claim.

Cites 3 cases

Case No.HCAL 1446/2021[2026] HKCFI 4068
Court
High Court CFI
Date22 Jul 2026
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCAL 1446/2021

[2026] HKCFI 4068

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1446 OF 2021

________________________

BETWEEN

  GURJINGER SINGH Applicant
  and
  TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/
NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
Putative Respondent
  and
  DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION Putative Interested Party

________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge (Non-Refoulement Claims) Lewis Law in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 30 June 2026
Date of Decision: 22 July 2026

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________


1.By a summons issued on 27 April 2026, the Applicant applies for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 10 April 2026 (“the Order”) refusing him leave to apply for judicial review (“JR”). His intended JR was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 29 September 2021 on his non-refoulement claim.

2.An applicant does not require leave to appeal against a Court of First Instance (“CFI”) judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review (Order 59, rule 21(1)(g), Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A). However, an applicant who wishes to appeal against such refusal has to observe the time limit under Order 53, rule 3(4), i.e., within 14 days after the refusal. The 14-day period against the Order expired on 13 January 2026. The Applicant was late for over 2 months when the present summons was filed.

3.A CFI judge has the power to extend the said 14-day appeal period under Order 59, rule 2B(6). The application to extend time must be made promptly. It should be supported by an affirmation deposing any facts relied upon by an applicant and giving a full account of, and explanation for, the whole delay since the expiry of time. In considering whether to extend time for the intended appeal, the Court shall have regard to: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reasons for the delay; (iii) the prospect of success in the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if extension of time was granted (Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346).

4.In the Applicant’s affirmation, the explanation for the delay was that he did not receive the Order from the Court before an appeal became out of time. There was no further explanation as to why he did not receive the Order by post and what he had done to ensure that he would have received the Order by post promptly. The Applicant has obviously failed to provide any reasonable explanation. Nevertheless, the delay in this case (3 days) is not very significant, and it does not seem to me that there will be any prejudice if an extension of time is granted. I should instead focus on the prospect of success in the intended appeal.

5.It is well established that the Court does not provide a further avenue of appeal on the merits of the underlying non-refoulement claim. In an appeal against refusal of JR leave in a non-refoulement case, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the CFI judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge, the appeal should be dismissed (Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

6.As mentioned in my Form CALL-1 giving reasons for the Order, I have considered the Board’s Decision vigorously but am unable to detect any reasonable argument that the decision was tainted by public law errors. In my view, the Board has conducted an anxious scrutiny of the facts of the case and assessed intensely its factual issue. The Applicant had in fact failed to put forward any ground of judicial review against the Board’s decision.

7.In the Applicant’s summons and supporting affirmation, the Applicant further failed to put forth any proposed ground(s) of appeal against the Order. In the oral hearing of the summons, the Applicant did not add anything useful and just repeated that he cannot go back to his country because he has no property there. In the absence of any suggested error in my decision to refuse him JR leave, I do not see any prospect of success in his intended appeal at all.

8.Having considered all the relevant factors to which I should have regard, I decide that the interest of justice does not require me to grant an extension of time in the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the application for extension of time to appeal is refused and the Applicant’s summons is dismissed.

  (Lewis Law)
  Deputy High Court Judge
  (Non-Refoulement Claims)

The Applicant appeared in person

Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 1446/2021