Attaurehman v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 2481/2020

[2026] HKCFI 3730

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2481 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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The application

1.By my decision dated 20 February 2026, I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) dated 16 July 2020 which refused the Applicant’s application to re-open his non-refoulement claim.

2.By a summons issued on 9 March 2026, the Applicant seeks an extension of time to appeal against my decision. As the 14-day appeal period under O.53, r.3(4) of the Rules of High Court expired on 6 March 2026, the Applicant is out of time in his intended appeal by 3 days (which is 1 working day).

3.The applicable principles are trite: the court shall have regard to (a) the length of the delay; (ii) the reasons for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if extension of time were granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226 and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346).

4.The delay in the present case was not lengthy and it was asserted at the hearing that it was caused by health reasons. If the intended appeal is reasonably arguable, I would be prepared to allow an extension of time.

5.But there is nothing in either the summons or the supporting affirmation to attempt to raise any proposed grounds of appeal or to identify any error in the decision he seeks to appeal against. The Applicant simply stated that he wishes to appeal against my decision.

6.I have asked the Applicant to identify his proposed grounds of appeal at the hearing on 31 March 2026. His answer was that he forgot to submit a medical certificate to show that he was unwell at the time of the TCAB hearing, he therefore did not attend the hearing and yet the TCAB proceeded in his absence. He claimed that it was procedurally unfair for the TCAB to do so.

7.I fail to see any prospect of success in the intended appeal. First, this was not a ground the Applicant raised as a challenge against the TCAB decision at the substantive hearing before me. I do not see why I should entertain a new point in an application for leave to appeal. Second, it is well established that there is no absolute right to an oral hearing so long as the TCAB considers that there is no prejudice to the Applicant (a common reason being that there is no real controversy on the underlying facts and there are no matters that the TCAB would require clarification from the Applicant). Here, the sole issue was whether the Applicant had produced sufficient material for the DOI (and the TCAB) to exercise a discretion under s.37ZG(3) of the Immigration Ordinance to allow the Applicant’s claim to be re-opened. It is a question that is eminently proper to be decided without an oral hearing. Third and in any case, I explained in my decision at [12] that it is not for the Court in a judicial review to substitute its own opinion as to whether the claim should be allowed to be re-opened, and I am unable to see how it may be said that I erred in not interfering with the TCAB’s decision.

8.In the premises, it would be pointless to extend time for the Applicant’s intended appeal. I therefore dismiss the application.

The applicant was unrepresented and appeared in person.