K,LYS v T,CKE

FCMC 10356/2013

[2026] HKFC 126

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 10356 OF 2013

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JUDGMENT
(Restricted Application Order)

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The Application

1.The Court has on its own motion, called upon the 1^st respondent husband (“Husband”) to show cause why a Restricted Application Order (RAO) should not be entered. The record demonstrates a prima facie risk that, absent a RAO, the Husband will persist in filing unmeritorious applications, constituting an abuse of process.

The procedural history

2.The relevant background of this case is set out in HHJ K.K. Pang’s judgments dated 31 August 2018 ([2018] HKFC 148), 29 December 2020 ([2020] HKFC 269) and my decision dated 10 March 2026 ([2026] HKFC 39).

3.By a judgment dated 30 June 2026 ([2026] HKCA 1155), the Court of Appeal dismissed the Husband’s applications for leave to appeal for an urgent stay of his means examination, and leave to appeal against my decision dated 6 January 2026, on the ground that they were totally without merit.

4.In short, following the parties’ divorce on 29 June 2021, the parties engaged in ongoing litigation, with the court granting joint custody of their two children and ordering the Husband to pay monthly maintenance of HK$25,000. Despite court orders, the Husband failed to comply with his payment duties regarding interim maintenance and children maintenance, resulting in substantial arrears.

5.The petitioner wife (“Wife”) has issued six judgment summonses against the Husband. On 29 May 2025, the Husband applied to void the maintenance order made on 29 December 2020 (“Maintenance Order”), an application which I dismissed on 6 January 2026. Since that dismissal, the Husband has filed numerous unmeritorious applications with this Court.

6.The following is a schedule of the applications issued by the Husband subsequent to the dismissal of his application to void the Maintenance Order:

7.It was only after the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment on 30 June 2026 that the Husband finally retained legal representatives and settled his years of outstanding maintenance arrears.

8.As observed by the Court of Appeal at paragraph 88 of its judgment:

We have described in some detail the applications taken out by the respondent in the past six months, which have occupied a considerable amount of judicial time and resources. We note that quite a number of them are repetitious, not to mention the lack of merits. A party does not have unlimited and indiscriminate access to the court at the expense of other litigants. At an appropriate time, the court may exercise its power to issue a restricted application order (“RAO”, to prohibit a litigant from making further applications in existing proceedings without leave of a judge) and/or a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”, to prohibit a litigant from commencing fresh proceedings without leave of a judge) under its inherent jurisdiction to prevent persistent abuse of the process of the court. (emphasizes added)

Discussion

Whether or not a RAO should be granted against the Husband?

9.It is well settled that the Court possesses inherent jurisdiction to make RAOs to restrain a vexatious litigant from abusing the judicial process. This power is properly exercised where a litigant has demonstrated a pattern of abuse and is likely to persist in making unmeritorious applications: see Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Ltd (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

10.The Court of Final Appeal observed that:

48. There are many variants of such abuse and of what motivates it.  It may represent a calculated attempt by a defendant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution.  Or it may be a malicious campaign of harassment directed against a particular adversary. Actions which are unintelligible or wholly frivolous may be commenced by litigants who are unfortunately mentally unbalanced.  Sometimes the vexatious conduct springs from some deeply-felt sense of grievance left unassuaged after unsuccessful litigation.  The vexatious litigant typically acts in person and characteristically refuses to accept the unfavourable result of the litigation, obstinately trying to re-open the matter without any viable legal basis.  Such conduct can become obsessive with the litigant not shrinking from making wild allegations against the court, or against the other side’s legal representatives or targeting well-known public personalities thought to be in some way blameworthy.  Numerous actions may be commenced and numerous applications issued within each action.

11.Practice Direction 11.3 regulates the procedure for making such orders, and the Court has duly complied with its requirements.

12.The Husband submitted that he would not contest the RAO proceedings.

13.Within a span of just six months, the Husband filed fourteen applications, the vast majority of which were dismissed. It was only at the eleventh hour, on the very day of the hearing on 6 July 2026, that he finally withdrew his three summonses filed on 5 June 2026, a summons filed on 22 June 2026, an ex-parte summons filed on 23 June 2026, and three applications for leave to appeal. His persistent filing of meritless and wholly repetitious applications has resulted in a profligate waste of valuable judicial time and resources, which ought to have been dedicated to deserving litigants.

14.The aforementioned judgments clearly evidence the Husband’s pattern of vexatious litigation. By habitually issuing summonses, he has repeatedly brought applications that do nothing more than rehash the same submissions, a course of conduct designed solely to protract the litigation without merit. He habitually appealed against decisions made against him notwithstanding the obvious lack of merits.

15.The Husband paid no heed to prior judicial findings that his actions constituted an abuse of process. In particular, after the court issued its judgment on 10 March 2026 ([2026] HKFC 39), expressly describing his applications as a waste of the court's time and resources, the Husband proceeded to file 13 subsequent applications as set out in paragraph 6 above. This tally includes two applications for the renewal of leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, in addition to the various applications made through correspondence. His litigious conduct has continued unabated.

16.The Husband was well aware of his right to legal representation and consistently maintained that he needed to seek legal advice. Although legally represented when the Maintenance Order was made, he later chose to litigate in person, filing a succession of unmeritorious applications. He only retained legal representatives on 3 July 2026, a mere three days after the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment. In order to prevent this continuous abuse of the court’s process, the imposition of a RAO is necessary, as it remains the sole mechanism capable of ensuring the rational conduct of these proceedings.

17.Although the Husband had fully discharged all outstanding maintenance obligations to the Wife pursuant to a Consent Summons executed on 6 July 2026, yet his obligation to pay maintenance has been afoot since the judgment of HHJ KK Pang delivered on 29 December 2020. The mere fact that the parties have now entered into a Consent Summons regarding the outstanding maintenance does not detract from, the reality that the Husband has consumed a considerable amount of judicial time and resources. It does not, in any manner, detract from or impair this Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent a persistent abuse of its process.

18.Consequently, I am fully satisfied that it is both necessary and appropriate for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction to issue a RAO against the Husband to curtail any further abuse of process.

19.In any event, should the Husband possess any legitimate grounds to initiate or take any step in such proceedings, his recourse is to apply for leave to do so from a designated judge.

Conclusion

20.I shall therefore make the RAO in terms below:

(1)  the Husband is prohibited from making any further application to court in the action herein, whether before or after judgment, without the leave of Deputy District Judge Jacqueline Lee (“designated judge”) being first obtained;

(2)  all applications for leave to issue an application in the action herein must be made in writing to the designated judge (and not to any other judge or a master) without giving notice of the application to the intended respondent;

(3)  in the event that the designated judge is not available to deal with the application for leave under paragraph 2 above, the same should be dealt with by another judge designated by the Acting Principal Family Court Judge as the case may be;

(4)  all applications for leave under paragraph 2 above and all ancillary matters thereto should be dealt with on papers and without any oral hearing unless the designated judge otherwise directs;

(5)  where leave to make the substantive application is granted, service of the order giving leave must accompany service of the substantive application in question, which should be heard by a judge and not a master unless the judge otherwise directs;

(6)  if contrary to this order, the Husband seeks to issue an application in the action herein without prior leave of the court, the purported application should forthwith be referred by the Registry to a master for such application to be dismissed in accordance with this order; and

(7)  if, contrary to this order, the Husband purports to serve on any intended respondent any application in the action herein without at the same time serving on each of the intended respondents a copy of an order giving leave to issue such application, such application should automatically stand dismissed, so that neither the intended respondent nor the court would be required to take any steps in response.

21.There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. I therefore grant a costs order that the Husband do pay costs of this RAO proceedings (including all costs reserved if any) to the Wife on an indemnity basis to be taxed if not agreed. Given that both parties instructed counsel, a certificate for counsel is granted. The Wife’s own costs are to be taxed pursuant to the Legal Aid Regulations.

22.Costs are awarded on an indemnity basis, having regard to the background of the case leading to the present hearing.

Mr. Eric Leung, instructed by Messrs. Alvin Cheng & Rosaline Choy for the Petitioner

Mr. Oscar Tang, instructed by Messrs. Alex To & Co. for the 1^st Respondent