Indro Widodo v. Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office

HCAL 86/2023

[2026] HKCFI 4660

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 86 of 2023

BETWEEN

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Isaac Chan:

1.  The Form 86 be amended to change the date of the subject decision from 4 January 2023 to 30 November 2023.

2.  The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.By a Form 86 filed on 19 January 2023 (“Form 86”), the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claim Appeal Board / the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) purportedly dated 4 January 2023.

2.In fact, on 4 January 2023, the Board only issued an acknowledgment of receipt of the applicant’s Notice of Appeal / Petition for Non-refoulement Claim against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 22 December 2022.

3.On 30 November 2023, the Board delivered its decision refusing the applicant’s appeal / petition and confirmed the decision of the Director dated 22 December 2022 (“Board’s Decision”) [1].

4.At the hearing of the Form 86 on 13 May 2026, I clarified with the applicant about his intention. The applicant confirmed to the Court that he did intend to apply for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision. He had had the chance to understand the Board’s Decision, and he had nothing to say about the said decision.

5.As such, on the court’s own motion, I order the Form 86 be amended to revise the date of the Board’s Decision from 4 January 2023 (which was the date of the Director’s decision) to 30 November 2023, which was the proper date of the Board’s Decision.

6.I refer to the Board’s Decision for the background of the applicant, the basis of the claim, the evidence and the argument the applicant has relied upon, which will not be repeated herein.

7.The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Given the seriousness of the issue involved in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decisions of the Board. However, the Court will not intervene unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in those decisions: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at paragraph 14.

8.General assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review: see Re Fabio Arlyn Timogan [2020] HKCA 971, at paragraph 23.

9.The present application for leave is meant to be a filtering process, and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at paragraph 23. I will therefore provide brief reasons for my decision as follows.

Discussion

10.In the affirmation in support of the Form 86, the applicant has set out the following complaints:

10.1.  The Director did not consider her claim. The Director had only one job, that was to dismiss his claim.

10.2.  The applicant submitted some documents in his mother language, but the immigration officer did not accept.

10.3.  The applicant requested some time to translate the documents but was not allowed.

11.As stated above, at the hearing on 13 May 2026, the applicant confirmed that he did not have any submissions regarding the Board’s Decision.

12.The first complaint that the Director did not consider the applicant’s claim and was predisposed to dismiss the claim is baseless. The Director’s decision has contained a detailed assessment of the applicant’s claim and evidence. In any event, the Director’s decision has been superseded by the Board’s Decision: Re Moshin Ali [2018] HKCA 549 at §45.

13.Regarding the complaint about the immigration officer’s refusal to accept documents written in the applicant’s mother language and refusal to grant time for translation, no particulars could be provided. In presenting the non-refoulement claim to the Immigration Department, the applicant was assisted by the Duty Lawyer Service. A written submission dated 13 October 2022 and the non-refoulement claim form dated 24 November 2022 as well as certain “additional sheets” were submitted ahead of the interview with the Immigration Department on 9 December 2022 (see paragraph 8 of the Board’s Decision). The applicant apparently had legal assistance and ample opportunities to put in documents in support of this non-refoulement. The applicant also confirmed his evidence in the hearing bundle before the Board without making any request to submit further documents (see paragraph 22 of the Board’s Decision). In the absence of any particulars, the applicant’s complaint against the immigration officer’s refusal to accept documents and to grant time for translation is contradictory to the procedural history as recorded and is therefore baseless.

14.Applying the enhanced standard of scrutiny, I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.

15.The Board’s Decision has, with respect, correctly and comprehensively set out the applicable legal principles. I do not see any errors in either the summary or the application of those legal principles.

16.Apart from the procedural history leading to the Director’s decision as summarised in paragraph 13 above, the Board’s Decision has also set out the details of the hearing before the Board on 9 November 2023, where the applicant was assisted by an interpreter. The applicant has made no complaint about the procedures for the appeal before the Board. I see no procedural unfairness in any event.

17.After a detailed analysis of the applicant’s evidence given both before and at the hearing, the Board was not satisfied that the applicant’s claim that he would be harmed or killed by a loan shark in respect of a loan was truthful given the significant inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence given at different stages (see paragraphs 66 to 94 of the Board’s Decision). The Board did not accept that the loan shark had threatened to kill him if he returned to Indonesia and the applicant was in fear of such risk (see paragraphs 96 to 99). In any event, the Board took the view that, based on the information given by the applicant, the feared harm from the loan sharks was not as imminent and substantial as the applicant asserted (see paragraphs 74 to 76). The Board concluded that the applicant has failed to establish the proscribed risks. Based on the available materials, the conclusions of the Board were clearly justifiable. I do not see any basis to suggest that the Board was irrational based on the principle set out in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.

18.I therefore dismiss the application for leave to apply for judicial review under the Form 86.

Dated the 17^th day of August 2026

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1