Vo Thi Kim Yen v. Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
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HCAL 1504/2022 [2026] HKCFI 4788 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1504 of 2022 BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3) Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Isaac Chan:
Observations for the Applicant: 1.By a Form 86 filed on 15 December 2022 (“Form 86”), the applicant, a national of Vietnam, applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claim Appeal Board / the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 9 December 2022 (“Board’s Decision”)[1] confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 3 December 2021 and rejecting the applicant’s non‑refoulement claim. 2.In the Form 86, the Board and the Director was both named as the putative respondent. No party was named as the putative interested party. Only the Board should be the putative respondent, and the Director should be the putative interested party instead. The Form 86 shall be amended accordingly on the court’s own motion. 3.I refer to the Board’s Decision for the background of the applicant, the basis of the claim, the evidence and the argument the applicant has relied upon, which will not be repeated herein. 4.The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Given the seriousness of the issue involved in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decisions of the Board. However, the Court will not intervene unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in those decisions: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at paragraph 14. 5.General assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review: see Re Fabio Arlyn Timogan [2020] HKCA 971, at paragraph 23. 6.The present application for leave is meant to be a filtering process, and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at paragraph 23. I will therefore provide brief reasons for my decision as follows. Discussion 7.The applicant has set out the following grounds for the intended application for judicial review:
8.At the hearing on 14 May 2026, the applicant was absent. 9.All intended grounds are general assertions without particulars. Those grounds also suffer more specific problems as follows. 10.Regarding the applicant’s intended challenge against the Director’s decision, such decision has been superseded by the Board’s Decision and therefore it is not susceptible to judicial review: re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549 at §45. The focus of the present application should be the Board’s Decision. 11.As to the intended challenge regarding the use of the COIs by the Board, the applicant has provided no particulars as to any specific problems of the COIs. The applicant also has not provided any particulars as to her alleged personal background and experience that were inconsistent with the COIs, and how they would have significantly impacted upon the Board’s Decision. Notably, the applicant had not reported the assaults by the creditor to the police (see paragraph 12 of the Board’s Decision) and therefore had no specific evidence to demonstrate the lack of state protection for her (see paragraphs 50 to 51). 12.The allegation that there was state acquiescence in her case was unsubstantiated by any particulars or evidence. 13.None of the grounds could demonstrate (i) any procedural unfairness in the appeal before the Board and (ii) how the Board’s Decision was irrational based on the principle set out in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 14.I have also considered the Board’s Decision as a whole by applying the enhanced standard of scrutiny. I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. 15.The Board’s Decision has, with respect, correctly and comprehensively set out the applicable legal principles. I do not see any errors in either the summary or the application of those legal principles. 16.The Board’s Decision has also set out the procedural history of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim, including the details of the hearing before the Board 11 July 2022 (see paragraph 6 of the Board’s Decision). I see no irregularities or unfairness in the entire process. 17.Upon the analysis of the applicant’s evidence given both before and at the hearing, the Board concluded that the applicant was a defaulting debtor and might have been assaulted by some gangsters but found that the creditors did not have any intention to seriously harm or kill her. (see paragraphs 29 to 37 of the Board’s Decision). The Board further concluded that the applicant had failed to establish the proscribed risks. In any event, the Board took the view that state protection would be available and that internal relocation did not need to be considered as the applicant was unable to establish that she faced a proscribed risk in her area of residence (see paragraph 77 and paragraphs 97 to 100 of the Board’s Decision). Based on the available materials, the conclusions of the Board were clearly justifiable. I do not see any basis to suggest that the Board was irrational or Wednesbury unreasonable. 18.I therefore dismiss the application for leave to apply for judicial review under the Form 86. Dated the 24th day of August 2026
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Form CALL-1 |
Cases cited in this judgment