Resorts World At Sentosa Pte Ltd v. Yau Kan Kan

HCRE 80/2025

[2026] HKCFI 5286

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT CASE NO 80 OF 2025

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BETWEEN

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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A. Introduction

1.This is the Defendant’s application by summons dated 3 December 2025 (the “Summons”) seeking to set aside the registration of the Singaporean judgment (the “Singaporean Judgment”) under Case No HC/OC 81/2025 (the “Singaporean Proceedings”)

B. Material Background

2.The Plaintiff is a licensed casino operator in Singapore.

3.The Defendant is a patron of the Plaintiff.

4.On 16 August 2024, the Defendant gambled at the Plaintiff’s casino. There, the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into a credit facility agreement (the “Credit Facility Agreement”), whereby the Plaintiff provided the Defendant with gaming credit in the amount of S$1 million.

5.Under the Credit Facility Agreement, the Defendant informed the Plaintiff that his address was “新界錦田吳家村29號” (the “No 29 Property”). Clause (r) of the Credit Facility Agreement effectively provides that any documents (including court documents) that are served by post at the No 29 Property shall be deemed to have been validly sent to and served on the Defendant.

6.Meanwhile, the Defendant had also provided a business card to the Plaintiff. There, it is stated that the Defendant is a director of a private company named “Hong Kong Supercharger Energy Ltd”, whose business address is “1A Ng Ka Tsuen, Kam Tin, Yuen Long, NT” (the “No 1A Property”).

7.It is common ground that the Defendant has failed to repay the indebtedness under the Credit Facility Agreement.

8.Hence, on 4 February 2025, the Plaintiff commenced the Singaporean Proceedings against the Defendant.

9.According to the Plaintiff, it attempted to effect personal service on the Defendant. However, whilst Plaintiff’s the service agent met the Defendant’s mother at No 29 Property, he was unable to meet the Defendant personally.

10.In the circumstances, the Plaintiff obtained leave from the Singaporean court (the “Singaporean Court”) to effect service on the Defendant by post to the No 29 Property and the No 1A Property. This was done on 2 May 2025. It is not in dispute that the mails were never returned undelivered.

11.The Defendant did not acknowledge service and did not appear in the Singaporean Proceedings. Hence, on 26 May 2025, the Singaporean Court entered the Singaporean Judgment against the Defendant. It was a default judgment.

12.On 29 May 2025, the Plaintiff served the Singaporean Judgment on the Defendant by post at the No 29 Property and the No 1A Property.

13.The Defendant admitted that he received the Singaporean Judgment. According to the Defendant, on 25 September 2025, his mother, who resided at the No 29 Property, gave him a letter that is accompanied by the Singaporean Judgment.

14.Meanwhile, the Plaintiff commenced the present proceedings in Hong Kong seeking to register the Singaporean Judgment pursuant to the provisions of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap 319) (the “FJREO”)

15.On 10 October 2025, Master Hui granted an order for registration. Master Hui’s order was sealed and perfected on 17 November 2025.

16.On 20 November 2025, the Plaintiff served (i) a notice of registration and (ii) a sealed copy of Master Hui’s order by post at the No 29 Property and the No 1A Property.

17.It appears that the Defendant had received the said notice of registration and Master Hui’s order.

18.As such, on 3 December 2025, the Defendant took out the aforesaid Summons seeking to set aside the registration of the Singaporean judgment.

19.Meanwhile, the Defendant also applied to the Singaporean Court seeking to set aside the Singaporean Judgment.

20.On 19 January 2026, the Defendant’s application was dismissed by the Singaporean Court on the ground that he had failed to raise a triable issue.

C. Summary of the Defendants’ Contentions

21.The Defendant’s complaints can be summarized as follows: -

(1) First, the Plaintiff asserted that he had never received the court documents relating to the Singaporean Proceedings before the Singaporean Judgment was entered. Instead of living in the No 29 Property and the No 1A Property, he has been living in “Flat A, 20^th Floor, Tower 1, Sky Tower, No 38 Sun Wong Toi Road, Kowloon” (the “Sky Tower Property”). (the “No Notice Ground”)

(2) Second, the Plaintiff contended that the Credit Facility Agreement involved gaming or wagering. As such, the Singaporean Judgment is founded upon a gaming transaction, and the same cannot be enforced in Hong Kong as a matter of public policy. (the “Legality of Gaming Activities Ground”)

(3) Third, the Plaintiff contended that he was intoxicated at the time when he entered the Credit Facility Agreement. As such, he was exploited, and, as a matter of public policy, the Singaporean Judgment is not enforceable. (the “Intoxication Ground”)

22.For the reasons elaborated below, I am of the view that the Defendant’s contentions are unmeritorious, and none of his grounds for setting aside the registration of the Singaporean Judgment is made out.

D. Deliberation

D1. The No Notice Ground

23.Section 6(1)(a)(iii) of the FJREO provides that: -

“On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced, the registration of the judgment— (a)shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied— (iii) that the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the proceedings in the original court, did not (notwithstanding that process may have been duly served on him in accordance with the law of the country of the original court) receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend the proceedings and did not appear” (emphasis added)

24.In Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd & Ors v Cheung King Fung Francis & Anor [2007] 1 HKLRD 462 at paras 32 to 34, Tang JA (as Tang VP then was) stated: -

“32. He referred as to para. 13/9/5 Hong Kong Civil Procedure where this sentence appears:

‘When a defendant deposes that he has not received the writ through the post, the court has little option but to believe this save when there is sufficient material to cast doubt upon the defendant’s credibility to enable the court to disbelieve him.’

33. We do not read this as suggesting that the court must accept a defendant’s assertion no matter how improbable.

34. It is quite clear from Forward v West Sussex County Council, cited above, that a defendant is required to provide “convincing evidence”: at 1473G. The Master of the Rolls went on to say of the judge that “He was in our view quite right to be sceptical of the contention that the 4^th defendant had not received the writ in the absence of compelling evidence to show that it had not been forwarded on to him, as would in the ordinary course be accepted”: at 1474H. Of course, how much evidence is required must depend on the circumstances of the particular case.”

(emphasis added)

25.I am not of the view that the evidence available to the court shows that the Defendant had not received the court documents in the Singaporean Proceedings that were served at the No 29 Property and the No 1A Property.

26.At the outset, it should be pointed out that: -

(1) The No 29 Property was the address that the Defendant voluntarily provided to the Plaintiff under the Credit Facilities Agreement.

(2) According to the public records of five private companies[1], the No 1A Property was the Defendant’s address at the material times. In his affirmation in reply[2], the Defendant did not assert that he had no access to the No 1A Property.

(3) The mails containing court documents that were served on the Defendant at the No 29 Property and the No 1A Property had never been returned undelivered.

27.On the Defendant’s admission, he was notified of the Singaporean Judgment, which was served on him at No 29 Property and the No 1A Property on 29 May 2025. Likewise, it appears that the Defendant was also aware of the notice of registration and Master Hui’s order, which were served on him at No 29 Property and the No 1A Property on 20 November 2025. Otherwise, he would not have responded promptly by taking out the Summons herein on 3 December 2025.

28.In the circumstances, it is clear that documents that were served at the No 29 Property and the No 1A Property would be drawn to the Defendant’s attention.

29.However, according to the Defendant, before the Singaporean Judgment was entered, the court documents relating to the Singaporean Proceedings had somehow escaped his attention. In this connection, the Defendant’s explanations were as follows: -

(1) He has been living in the Sky Tower Property since early 2025.

(2) He became aware of the Singaporean Judgment only because his mother (who lived in the No 29 Property) informed him in respect thereof.

30.For the following reasons, I do not believe the Defendant’s explanations: -

(1) For reasons best known to himself, the Defendant has failed to adduce a shred of contemporaneous documents (such as electricity bills, water bills, bank statements, credit card statements, and/or other address proof) to show that he has been living in the Sky Tower Property. Had the Defendant been living in the Sky Tower Property, he could have adduced these contemporaneous documents without the slightest difficulty. In my view, the truth is that the Defendant did not live in the Sky Tower Property at all.

(2) In any event, even if the Defendant lived in the Sky Tower Property as alleged, there was nothing preventing him from receiving notice in respect of the Singaporean Proceedings. It is entirely puzzling as to why whilst the Defendant’s mother would inform the Defendant about the correspondence relating to the Singaporean Judgment, she somehow did not bother to inform the Defendant about the correspondence relating to the Singaporean Proceedings. This was too much a sheer co-incidence. In my view, the Defendant’s assertions do not make sense and are inherently incredible.

(3) For reasons best known to himself, the Defendant has not adduced any evidence from his mother. According to the Defendant’s case, his mother is a crucial witness. However, there is no evidence from the Defendant’s mother that (i) she had not received the correspondence relating to the Singaporean Proceedings before the Singaporean Judgment was entered or (ii) she had forgotten to provide the correspondence relating to the Singaporean Proceedings to the Defendant. The Defendant has failed to provide any explanation as to why he does not adduce evidence from his mother. In my view, the reason was that had the Defendant’s mother made an affirmation, she would have given evidence that contradicts the Defendant’s case: see South China Securities Ltd v Lam Kwen Yuen [2012] 5 HKLRD 524 at para 7 (per DHCJ Lisa Wong SC, as Lisa Wong J then was); and Tullet & Tokyo International Securities Ltd v APC Securities Co Ltd [2001] 2 HKLRD 356, at 365B-J (per Le Pichon JA).

(4) Mr Owen Kun (for the Defendant), doing the best he could, submitted that the Defendant is not the kind of person who would ignore legal proceedings. I disagree. On the Defendant’s case, he became aware of the Singaporean Judgment against him as early as 26 May 2025. However, he did not take steps seeking to set aside the Singaporean Judgment in the Singaporean Proceedings and to set aside the registration of the Singaporean Judgment under the proceedings herein until December 2025. There was a time gap exceeding 3 months. In my view, the Defendant only became serious after he was aware of Master Hui’s registration order and the notice of registration, which were served at No 29 Property and the No 1A Property on 20 November 2025. By this time, the Defendant must have appreciated that the Singaporean Judgment was capable of being enforced in Hong Kong, and this was why he promptly took actions. Based on the objective circumstances known to this court, it does not appear that the Defendant was serious about the legal proceedings prior to late November 2025.

31.For all the above reasons, I am not persuaded that the Defendant had no notice of the Singaporean Proceedings before the Singaporean Court entered the Singaporean Judgment.

32.I accordingly reject the No Notice Ground.

D2. The Legality of Gambling Activities Ground

33.Section 6(1)(a)(v) of the FJREO provides that: -

“On an application in that behalf duly made by any party against whom a registered judgment may be enforced the registration of the judgment- (a) shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied … (v) that the enforcement of the judgment shall be contrary to public policy in the country of the registering court”

34.The question before the court is whether it would be contrary to public policy to enforce a foreign judgment that is premised on a loan advanced to a borrower for the purpose of gambling in a foreign country.

35.In a recent decision, ie Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Tsang Yuek Kwan [2026] HKCFI 4928, I decided the same issue.

36.Having examined Las Vegas Hilton Corporation v Lo Yuk Leung (HCA 8739/1997, 19 January 1998) and Saxby v Fulton [1909] 2 KB 208, in Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Tsang Yuek Kwan (supra) at paras 26 to 34, I stated: -

“26. In Las Vegas Hilton Corporation, the plaintiff, which operated a casino in Nevada, sought to enter summary judgment against the defendant in regard to a gambling debt. One of the defences raised by the defendant was that it was contrary to public policy to allow the plaintiff to recover the indebtedness.

27. On page 11 of the judgment, Findlay J dealt with the question of whether it was “offensive to the public policy or morality of Hong Kong to allow the recovery of this debt in the circumstances in this case”. Findlay J answered the question in the negative…

28. … Las Vegas Hilton Corporation clearly supports the proposition that money lent in a foreign country for the purpose of being used by the borrower for gaming lawfully in the foreign country is recoverable, and enforcing such a lending transaction would not be contrary to any public policy in Hong Kong.

29. In the present case, it is common ground that under Singaporean law, it was lawful for the Defendant to gamble at the casino operated by the Plaintiff. As such, there was no reason why the Plaintiff might not enter into the Credit Agreement with the Defendant. There was nothing repugnant or outrageous in respect thereof.

…

32….As Findlay J pointed out, our law and morality do not regard gambling as “immoral, sinful, improper, or worthy of public condemnation” per se. Instead, “[t]he public policy is that gambling should be controlled and directed”.

33. In the present case, there is no dispute that the Plaintiff was a licensed operator that was authorized by Singaporean authorities to operate a casino. There is plainly no room for the Defendant to suggest that he was encouraged to engage in gambling activities with operators that were unlicensed or unregulated. This was not the case.

34. For all the above reasons, the Legality of Gaming Activities Ground fails.”

(emphasis added)

37.The scenario in the present case is indistinguishable from Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd v Tsang Yuek Kwan (supra).

38.The Legality of Gaming Activity Ground has no merit. I accordingly reject the same.

D3. The Intoxication Ground

39.In refusing to set aside the Singaporean Judgment, the Singaporean Court rejected the Defendant’s case that he was intoxicated at the time when he signed the Credit Facilities Agreement. The Singaporean Court took the view that the Defendant’s case was (i) merely based on a bare assertion and (ii) contradicted by the Defendant’s own conduct of making a partial repayment of S$160,000.

40.Under the Alleged Intoxication Ground, the Defendant implicitly suggested that the Singaporean Court was wrong in not accepting his defence based on intoxication and refusing to set aside the Singaporean Judgment.

41.In WFM Motors Pty Ltd v Maydwell [1996] 1 HKC 444 at 449C-D, Ching JA (as Ching PJ then was) held in determining whether a foreign judgment should be registered: -

“…the court is not retrying the case. The question is not whether the decision of the foreign court is correct.”

42.In the premises, there is no room for the Defendant to “reopen” questions relating to substantive merits.

43.In any event, I agree with the Singaporean Court that the Defendant’s case is wholly incredible. As an experienced businessman, it was inherently improbable that the Defendant would make a substantial partial repayment to the Plaintiff without raising a protest along the lines of intoxication.

44.In my view, the Defendant’s case based on intoxication is simply an afterthought.

45.For all the above reasons, I reject the Alleged Intoxication Ground.

E. Disposition

46.None of the Defendant’s grounds for setting aside the registration of the Singaporean Judgment is made out.

47.I dismiss the Defendant’s Summons dated 3 December 2025.

48.Costs should follow the event.

49.For the following reasons, I am of the view that the costs to which the Plaintiff is entitled shall be assessed on an indemnity basis. First, clause (h) of the Credit Agreement provides that the Defendant shall indemnify the Plaintiff in regard to all legal costs and disbursement on a full indemnity basis. Second, the Defendant’s contentions are wholly unmeritorious.

50.I order the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff’s costs in respect of his Summons dated 3 December 2025 forthwith, summarily assessed at HK$200,000.

51.I thank Mr Owen Kun and Mr Martin Lau for their helpful assistance.

Mr Martin Lau, instructed by Wilkinson & Grist, for the Plaintiff

Mr Owen Kun, instructed by N K Tsang & Co, for the Defendant